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Abstract
The chief aim of the thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of the factors 
which affect a state leadership's tendencies to behave in particular ways towards other 
states. It seeks to compare and contrast the effect of different security policy choices 
upon the Swedish and Norwegian leaders' attitudes, approach and diplomatic style 
towards the Soviet Union. The aim is to observe important differences and similarities 
in the responses to largely equivalent stimuli across a cross-section of issue areas most 
relevant for the Scandinavians' respective bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union. 
More precisely, what difference does Sweden's choice to pursue neutrality and 
Norway's decision to become a member of NATO make in their respective relations to 
a superpower?
Based upon the secondary literature on alliances and neutrality, several working 
hypotheses which are proposed to affect Sweden's and Norway's relationship with the 
Soviet Union were generated: most important to a neutral power is that it be seen to 
pursue a credible policy of indifference in relation to the East-West Cold War; actions 
which may be interpreted as being partial to either side of East-West conflict will be 
avoided; as a neutral Sweden must defend its territorial integrity. Finally, Sweden's 
neutrality can also be promoted through playing the role of impartial mediator in 
conflict situations, advocating disarmament in international fora, and resorting to 
international norms and organisations in its relationship with the Soviet Union.
NATO member Norway must make sure that it pursues policies which are partial 
to its alliance members. Much of what Norway does with respect to the Soviet Union 
is motivated by a desire to demonstrate NATO's credibility as a cohesive, credible 
deterrent force to the Soviet threat. Here, demonstrations of loyalty to alliance ideals 
and solidarity with alliance partners are key to understanding why Norway acts as it 
does in relation to the Soviet Union. Policy co-ordination and consultation between 
NATO members are important parts of maintaining a cohesive viable deterrent against 
the Soviet Union. Finally, Norway has shunned arrangements which could result in 
isolation from fellow NATO members in order to further insure NATO credibility and 
its position within the NATO organisation.
The body of the thesis examines crucial bilateral issues in two time periods: 1947- 
1949 and 1987-1991. In 1947-1949 the Swedish and Norwegian decisions to participate 
in the Marshall Plan and general trade questions are discussed. Also examined in this 
period are both leaderships' reactions to the Communist coups in Eastern Europe, and 
Norwegian and Swedish interpretations of Finland's destiny. In the period 1987-1991 
the Norwegian and Swedish leaderships are contrasted over their handling of the 
Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Proposal, border security issues, legal-maritime 
disputes, the Baltic recognition question, trade, environmental and economic 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. Finally, Swedish and Norwegian interpretations 
of the changing Soviet military threat are also compared and contrasted.
The thesis concludes that although commitments to neutrality and alignment 
provide powerful explanations for why Swedish and Norwegian leaders behave in 
observed ways, they can only provide one such explanation. The hypotheses provided 
at the outset are, in the main confirmed, and help to illuminate the junctures where 
neutrality and alignment actually do play important roles in determining Swedish and 
Norwegian attitudes, diplomatic style and approach toward the Soviet Union.
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When I began work on this thesis in the Fall of 1988,1, like many specialists in the 
field of Soviet affairs, could not have imagined that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
would come as quickly as it did. Indeed, Soviet experts and International Relations 
specialists were caught dangerously off-guard by the scope and speed of events which 
first led to the end of Soviet dominion over East Europe, then to the loosening of the 
Soviet Union symbolized by the independence movement of the Baltic countries and 
culminating in the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union in December, 1991.
These whirlwind events took away the breaths of world audiences and left 
international politics transformed. The East-West conflict affected conflicts in every 
comer of the globe. The East-West orientation which dominated International Relations 
scholarship in the post-War period was a result of these trends. Now, International 
Relations scholars which had once concentrated their energies on this stage must focus 
on less military-oriented aspects of the former Soviet Union or totally re-orient 
themselves into other areas.
I feel particularly honoured to have not only lived in, but have also been faced with 
the task of documenting and analyzing a period of history which may not have a 
counterpart as far back as the French Revolution. Neither have many researchers of 
International Relations had the dubious distinction of having the object of their thesis 
disappear before their eyes. Although my angle on this transformation has been 
limited by a narrow conceptual framework which only included Sweden and Norway, 
I hope that this study will serve as a small, yet meaningful contribution to the 
understanding of the period.
This study analyzes the effect of neutrality and alignment on the attitudes, approach 
and diplomatic style of national leaders. I have chosen Sweden and Norway as 
convenient points-of-entry for the examination of this question. I have also chosen to 
study Norwegian and Swedish behaviour towards the Soviet Union through looking 
in detail at the most pressing issues in their respective bilateral relationships, in two 
of the most tumultuous time periods in modem history. While drawing upon the 
formative post-War period 1947-1949, this thesis focuses upon the final four years of 
the Soviet Union, up until the end of the Norwegian and Swedish Parliamentary terms 
in the Summer of 1991. This thesis stops short of covering the final period leading to 
the Soviet Union's dissolution in December of 1991. However, the seeds of the 
U.S.S.R.'s demise were firmly implanted during the period of this thesis.
As is traditional with Ph.D. theses, a great many thanks are due to a large amount 
of people in a variety of places. However, due to the nature and extent of the research 
involved, I have depended to an untraditionally large degree upon outside help. The 
best assistance has been provided intemally by my chief supervisors, Mr. Ron Barston 
of the LSE's Intemational Relations Department and Mr. John Madeley of LSE's 
Government Department, who have been unwilling to stop short of crossing all "t's" 
and dotting all "i's" and who have served as tremendous sources of encouragement and 
guidance through several long years. Dr Christopher Hill of the Intemational Relations 
Department also deserves a special thanks for ushering in the first several phases of the 
thesis.
Other academics and practitioners of diplomacy, in the Nordic countries, the UK, 
and in the U.S. have read selected parts of the thesis and have graciously provided 
their comments and criticisms. Here I would like to particularly thank Dr Clive Archer 
of the University of Aberdeen, Drs Christer Jonsson and Kristian Gemer of the
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University of Lund, Dr Ingemar Lindahl and former Ambassador Lennart Myrsten of 
the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Dr Anders Aslund of the Stockholm School of 
Economics, Mrs Tiina Nordlof(now deceased) of Goteborg University, Mr Rune 
Castberg of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute and Dr Finn Sollie of the Northern 
Perspectives Group, Oslo. The greatest debt of gratitude here nevertheless should go 
to all of those individuals, which at the end of the thesis numbered close to 400, who 
contributed either by interview, written critique or other correspondence to the shaping 
of the thesis' approach or to the thesis' body. The earlier phase of this thesis included 
many interviews in Denmark and Finland; I would like to thank all of those who took 
the time to participate in this phase of the thesis, and whose assistance affected the 
final thesis product in an indirect way. None of the above can be held responsible for 
any mistakes, whether grammatical, substantial or judgemental, contained within the 
thesis, as the fault lies with the author alone.
I extend my hearty thanks to the Norwegian Marshall Fund, the Letterstedtska 
Foreningen, the University of London's Central Research Fund and the Overseas 
Research Student fund scheme administered by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principles of the Universities of the United Kingdom for all financial assistance 
rendered during my years at the LSE. In that vein I must also thank my uncles Julien, 
Berry and René, my aunts Antoinette and Odile for believing in me and supporting my 
efforts to the greatest possible extent. Also, I thank my family-in-law, the Svensons, 
for although it was at times difficult for them to understand why I spent all of those 
hours closed off from them, they nevertheless prodded me forward in positive 
directions.
I am very grateful to particular institutions which have provided me with space in 
which to collect my thoughts and transform them into something readable. First and 
foremost I must thank my former employer, the Chamber of Commerce of Southern 
Sweden's East European Trade Office—and especially its chief, Reiner Folster, for 
unflagging moral support, office space and a flexible approach to my work schedule 
such that the dissertation had some chance of being completed. Also important were 
NUPI, the Norwegian Institute of Intemational Affairs and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute 
of Polhogda, Norway for granting me office space during my various stays in Norway. 
Finally I would like to extend a very special thank you to the whole staff of the City 
Library of Karlskrona, Sweden. The staff did everything within their means, not the 
least of which was filling orders of close to 500 inter-library book loans, to help me 
bridge the geographical gap between where I was actually living/working and where 
the materials necessary for the thesis were located.
1 would like to make a four-partite dedication of this thesis. The most important 
and most patient individual has been my wife, Anna, who has never for a moment 
questioned my long hours in front of the computer terminal or any other of my efforts 
at completing "my life's work." Without her love and dedication the thesis would not 
have been realised. Also, I wish to say thank you to our nine-month-old son, 
Alexander, whose smiles and laughs have propelled me more effectively than anything 
else could. Finally, I dedicate this thesis to my father and mother. Had they lived, I 
wonder if they could have imagined the path in life which I actually chose.
Trevor Gunn 
Washington, D C in April, 1992
Introduction: Sweden, Norway and the Soviet Union 
The Task
The chief aim of this thesis is to develop a clearer understanding of the 
factors which affect a state leadership's tendencies to behave in particular ways 
towards other states. It seeks to compare and contrast the effect of different 
security policy choices upon the Swedish and Norwegian leaders' attitudes, 
approach and diplomatic style towards the Soviet Union. The aim is to observe 
important differences and similarities in the responses to largely equivalent 
stimuli(Frey, 1970:243) across a cross-section of issue areas most relevant for the 
Scandinavians' respective bilateral relationships with the Soviet Union. More 
precisely, what difference does Sweden's choice to pursue neutrality and 
Norway's decision to become a member of NATO make in their respective 
relations to a superpower?
Focus on Diplomatic Style, Approach and Attitudes of Neutral and Aligned Leaders
One is best able to gain access to the diplomatic style and approach by 
focusing upon the formal policies and particular policy decisions which 
Swedish and Norwegian leaders have pursued towards the Soviet Union. It is 
proposed that neutrality and alignment affect leaders resort to particular 
solutions, to handle questions in particular ways.
Also an interesting focus are the countries' leaders' attitudes, or its leaders' 
interpretations and reactions to both Soviet proposals and policies of varying 
character and magnitude. Here we assume that leaders attitudes have an 
important connection with policy,' without necessarily specifying the nature of 
this link. One must recognize that leaders, whose decisions affect the destiny 
of nations, do not respond solely to the "objective" facts of the situation, but
' There is an extensive literature which establishes this connection: see 
Burgess (1967); Greenstein(l967,1969); Hermann, R.(1986) Hermann, M.G.(1974, 
1976); McClosky(1967); Shapiro and Bonham (1973); Walker(1977). We therefore 
find it unnecessary to re-establish what is a well-researched fact.
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rather to the "image" of the situation(Boulding, 1969). Attitudes m ay have 
multiple origins: the leaders' personality(e.g. Alker, 1972, Hermann, 1976), from 
his position in the bureaucracy(e.g. Iversen, 1971) to take two examples. Most 
interesting for this thesis however, is the fact that operating in different security 
policy environments which entail particular foreign policy commitments, as is 
the case w ith Sweden and Norway, also leaves its m ark on the w ay leaders 
react to and interpret the behaviour of other nations.
Argument
To date, there exists no comprehensive study which attempts to compare and 
contrast neutral and aligned countries' behaviour towards other nations or 
towards one particular nation. Existing studies, which we will discuss later, 
generally confine themselves to comparing neutral countries or comparing 
aligned countries—while perhaps not stopping to analyze the inherent 
similarities between them. One is always able to see the characteristics of a 
particular object more clearly when it is compared with other objects. If 
neutrality and alignment are compared and contrasted w ith each other, we 
propose, the strength of the comparative enterprise is evident. A comparison 
is able to "tease out," if one so wishes, some hidden and some evident aspects 
of neutrality and alignment. In fact, Swedish neutrality and Norwegian NATO 
membership are security commitments theoretically juxtaposed to each other, 
but which nevertheless possess one key link—neutrality is partly and alignment 
is defined entirely in terms of Soviet threat.
This study can also be seen as an attempt to broaden the existing literature 
about the Scandinavian foreign policies. In the past, A m undsen(l989) 
concentrated on Soviet strategic interests in the North, while Archer(1988) 
adopted a multi-issue framework for analyzing the economic and strategic 
aspects of Northern waters. Ausland(1986), Jensen(1984), Johansen(1986) have 
made attempts at treating the relationship of the Nordic area-as-a-whole with 
the Soviet Union. However, these studies have limited value in understanding 
the period of immense Soviet change, and do not sufficiently examine specific 
issue areas. Jervas(1973) and Sundelius(1983) provide us w ith practically the
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only worthwhile attempts at analyzing the full spectrum of the Nordic foreign 
policies. However, even these are of too general of a nature to understand the 
foreign policies towards the Soviet Union. The fact stands that no large study 
has grappled with Scandinavian foreign policy towards the Soviet Union in a 
comprehensive manner. This study aims to fill this void.
This study can also be seen as a contribution to contemporary history. This 
thesis attempts to take account of the tremendous change which has led to the 
Soviet Union's demise. One might say that herein is contained the last picture 
of the Soviet Union as a state. It also takes a fresh look at 1947-1949, the 
formative period of the Nordic foreign policies. Although many studies have 
treated the period, a new treatment based upon some previously un-used 
sources, which establishes a focus on the Soviet factor in these developments, 
should be welcome.
Controlled, paired comparison
This thesis attempts to bring forth the differences and similarities between 
Swedish and Norwegian behaviour by using paired, controlled comparison. 
The comparative method's greatest yield can be found when a choice of cases 
is made where a great number of components can be held constant while 
varying others in order to see the subsequent resu lt/ In common-sense terms 
a comparison between relatively similar countries sets out to neutralize certain 
differences in order to permit a better analysis of others(Dogan and Pelassy, 
1984:118), the heart of the comparative method.
One can start by focusing on countries of similar cultural traits, historical 
experience or geographical position^. One can extend the list further into the 
nations' social, political and economic characteristics. Thus the num ber of 
experimental variables, although admittedly still unknow n and still large, is
 ^Lijphart (1970:687). Przeworksi and Teune (1970:32) call it "the most similar 
systems design"; Holt and Turner term it "specification"(l970:11); Eckstein 
(1975:113-123) calls it the "crucial cases study."
 ^Sewell (1967:208-218) or Quandt (1970:181)
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minimized (Przeworksi and Teune, 1970:32). Thus, one is more able to bring 
forth the differences which can be accounted for by, say security policy 
orientation. It is both important to remember cis well as reassuring to be 
reminded that 'm ost similar' cases are not the same as 'identical' cases.
The proper selection of case studies, in our case countries, is an essential 
element of a comparative study. Gunnar Heckscher writes that 'area studies are 
at the veiy essence of comparative govemm ent..the large num ber of variables, 
while frequently still very large, is at least reduced in the case of a happy choice 
of area.'(Hecksher, 1957:88) The nations which make up the Scandinavian area 
are often seen by outside observers as being cut out of highly similar cultural, 
geographical, linguistic, political moulds. Elder, Thomas and Arter(1983:2) point 
out that
...historical interrelationships, cultural similarities and cultural 
diffusion have between (the Scandinavian countries) produced 
a strong regional consciousness..."
However, the Scandinavian states have recognized that these ties, which 
eventually have led to close economic, cultural and political cooperation, do not 
extend into the realm of formal security and defence policy.^ Thus, for the sake 
of this thesis, we can effectively hold many economic, political, cultural, 
geographical, historical variables constant, while examining one of the most 
important differences between them: their differing security policy choices.
It is strange, against this background, that the number of comparative studies 
of the foreign policies of the Nordic countries is extremely small(Faurby, 
1976:154). Clearly, writes Faurby, "here is untried potential for testing the value 
of the most similar systems design..." Przeworkski and Teune(1970:32) point to 
the Scandinavian countries as good examples for this sort of comparative 
exercise since they share many economic, social, cultural and political 
characteristics. Lipset(l963:515-531) sees the Scandinavian area as one of the
 ^The concept of "Nordic Balance," where the Nordic nations look to each 
other for cues of how to best promote their mutual regional security, suggests 
informal cooperation and coordination of their respective foreign policy stances.
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few areas where one could establish the crucial controls needed for the 
comparative method which has not been exploited.
Sweden is an excellent example of a neutral country because of its long 
historical tradition of neutrality. Also, as contrasted with Finland^ Sweden's 
decision to pursue neutrality was a choice fully attributable to the leadership's 
choice. Norway is a prime choice for a NATO state, having a long historical 
past of Soviet relations—related to its role as a front line state within NATO. 
Whereas Norway has undergone minor crises relating to its position within 
NATO, it clearly is a better example of a staunch ally than Denmark, which has 
become known within the Alliance for its footnote (or 'conditional') Alliance 
policy.
The literature on alliances and neutrality
Although we are aware that there are multiple alternative explanations as to 
why Norway and Sweden approached their Soviet relationships in a particular 
way, this thesis attempts to test how far Sweden's neutrality and Norway's 
NATO membership can go in explaining why the leaderships acted as they did 
in particular circumstances towards the Soviet Union. As was pointed out 
earlier, the literature is remarkably weak in making the linkage between the 
theory and the reality of foreign policy behaviour. The literature instead 
concentrates on such questions as: why do alliances form? how are alliances 
sustained? what characteristics bring alliance partners together? In the case of 
neutrality, much of the literature is dedicated to clarifying the concept of 
neutrality and the legal standing of neutral states.
Thus the literature does not present readily-available hypotheses which may 
be tested. However, there are certain traits of neutral and aligned states which 
do stand out from the literature. We propose that these are the pillars of 
neutrality and alignment, and thus will appear and affect, albeit in varying 
forms and degrees, Sweden's and Norway's diplomatic style, approach and
 ^Vital(l971:111) contrasts Finnish neutrality saying that Finnish neutrality 
is unmistakably neutrality against the enemies of the Soviet Union
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attitudes towards the Soviet Union. It could be argued that in a majority of 
Norway's political, economic and military questions with the Soviet Union, its 
status as NATO member affects its behaviour. In Sweden's case, neutrality 
plays a similar role, whereby all foreign policy decisions are taken on basis on 
security considerations(Miljan, 1977:231).
Neutral states
Some confusion has arisen as to the actual meaning of the term neutrality. 
Sweden's policy, officially stated as "non-alignment in peace with a view to 
neutrality in war," implies that a policy of neutrality only applies during 
wartime. A source of further confusion is that "neutrality" is chiefly a term with 
legal content—spelling out the neutral state's obligations in relation to the 
belligerents when armed conflict comes. Terms such as "neutralism"(Wells, 
1982:22) basically denoting a neutral state's refusal to be involved in the East- 
West controversy, or the former Cold War, further clouded the field. 
Neutralism itself does not entail any concrete obligations in time of w ar and is 
not bound by rules of international law, because it solely has political 
content(Wells, ibid). Surely, the Swedish brand of "neutrality" is a mixture of 
the above formulations.
However, rather than resort to a war of words over the question of 
definition, we have chosen to follow Hakovirta's(1983) lead in this area:
"the term 'neutrality' is not used here in the conventional 
manner, but as a general label covering many related terms 
such as "neutralization," "neutralist^ trends and tendencies,"
"neutral options," and so forth.
A state's decision to pursue neutrality has wide-ranging ramifications for its 
conduct of its foreign relations. In fact, in the Swedish case, there is no area of 
foreign policy which is exempt from leaders' scrutiny, establishing the
 ^Lyon (1963:20) differentiates "neutrality," which is non involvement in war, 
from "neutralism" which is non-involvement in THE Cold War. We clearly are 
more interested in neutralism, for it applies well to the security policies of the 
Scandinavian countries.
15
compatibility or incompatibility with Swedish neutrality. In such a way, 
Sweden's trade relations, political relations, and military relations w ith foreign 
nations should serve to promote Sweden's definition of neutrality abroad. The 
chief consideration for Swedish post-War neutrality is to establish balance 
between its relations with West and East and express an indifference in the 
outcome of the political, economic and military battle that ensued between 
them.
Some working hypotheses about the behaviour of neutral Sweden
A crucial concern of neutral state leaders in the post-War period is that they 
be seen by actors in the intemational system as pursuing a credible policy of 
indifference in  relation to the East-West Cold War. Although the Cold W ar 
was not a physical war per se, the nature of the conflict bore traits very similar 
to World War Two: the armament spiral, a clear definition of enemies, to name 
only two. Impartiality however, does not imply ideological thought control or 
commitments to so-called 'moral neutrality' on the part of its leaders(Frei, 
1968:207-214). Indeed intemational law does not prohibit neutral state leaders 
from displaying verbal sympathy or condemnation.^ But the m oment these 
displays move from the verbal to the practical sphere, the spirit of neutrality has 
been violated (Karsh, 1988:24)
The question of neutrality's credibility is paramount in this connection. As 
Frei* states the issue: the credibility of neutrality concerns how far a neutral 
state can make it credible that it is indifferent regarding the outcome of a 
conflict between other powers. The neutral country m ust additionally resist 
diverse demands which are seen to be incom patible w ith neutrality(Ogley, 
1970:16). The perception of a neutral state's policy as credible can only be 
strengthened by consistent, tangible steps of the neutral state's 
leadership(Miljan,1977:233). In this context, Sweden's willingness to uphold and
 ^ Boczek (1989:10) writes that "the permanently neutral countries are 
ideologically Westem democracies..."
* Frei(1969) as quoted in Amstrup (1976:167-8)
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defend the principle of territorial integrity plays a key role. Active neutrality 
obliges the neutral to prevent rival parties, by use of force if need be, from 
exploiting its territory—land, sea or air—for military purposes(Karsh, 1988:24) 
If the neutral state does not respond the state is guilty of a violation of 
neutrality as set forth in legal practice Johansson and Norman, 1989:33). 
Another way to bolster neutrality's credibility, and directly linked to the defence 
of territorial integrity as just outlined, is the maintenance of a strong, deterrent 
defence force. Pravda wrote in 1940 "unarmed neutrality is no 
neutrality"(Thunborg, 1986:70) Swedish ambassador to Washington, Thunborg 
wrote:
"a belligerent state will care little for neutrality, if the 
advantages of an attack are considered to outweigh the 
disadvantages resulting from violating the rights and interests 
of a neutral state" (Thunborg, 1986:70)
Another way to enhance the credibility of neutrality is an active policy 
pursuing, within fora which have no specific attachment to either Cold War 
bloc, goals which are not associated w ith any aspect of the East-West conflict 
Sweden's role as 'mediatori(Holsti, 1970) or fair brokeri’ in a host of issue 
areas serves to strengthen the perception held by the rival states, that the 
neutral state favours neither side. Sweden's attempts to promote 
disarmament(Brodin, Goldmann and Lange, 1972:38-9; Sjostedt, 1983), to 
promote legal treaties^®, and its resort to supranational” , in tem ational 
organisations, and norm s”  can be seen as efforts to weaken the Great
 ^See Hakovirta(l982:95) or Birnbaum(l976:148-9)
”  Thunborg (1986:69) writes that for the neutral "the principles of law are 
both sacred and indivisible."
” "The United Nations has fully legitimized neutrality's existence as a 
security-political guarantee, standing alongside the alliances," write Johansson 
and Norman (1986:37)
”  Barston (1971:46) speaking of small states wrote: "a small state can use 
intemational organisation to mobilize support for their policies by widening the
(continued...)
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Powers(Liska, 1962:37-9), while fostering stability and calm in its own 
neighbourhood.
Some working hypotheses about NATO member Norway
Alliance membership is diametrically opposed to neutrality. Whereas a
neutral state aims to pursue a credible policy of impartiality in the East-West
conflict, a NATO member desires and is expected to be partial to its alliance
members. Osgood(1969:19) writes:
An alliance reflects a "latent war community, based on general 
cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the 
signatories m ust continually cultivate in order to preserve 
mutual confidence in each others fidelity to specified 
obligations.
Here, as in neutrality, a key consideration is the alliance's viability (Walt, 
1987:3,40) in the eyes of the outside world. The very essence of alliances is that 
members should be loyal to alliance ideals, goals and should demonstrate 
solidarity with each other(0'Neill, 1988:12). It is necessary that there be 
cohesion between the members in respect of these objectives(Holsti, Hoppmann 
and Sullivan, 1962:94).
Norway has pursued a policy towards the Soviet Union that simultaneously 
promotes alliance solidarity and strength—stressing the importance of common 
deterrence towards the Soviet Union—while also having adopted a set of self- 
imposed restraints-nam ely a peacetime ban on foreign troops and nuclear 
weapons on Norwegian territory—as a precautionary, confidence-building policy 
towards the Soviet Union.
The strength (and hence credibility or viability) of an alliance, such as NATO 
is partly results from fear of sanctions from its other members if the one state 
should step out of line. For example, allied governments render themselves 
liable to US displeasure if they take initiatives which have wider implications
^^(...continued)
arena of debate and criticism," something which certainly holds true for 
Sweden.
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for American security interests.(O'Neill, 1988:12) A bloc member in good 
standing thus adheres to certain predictable patterns of behaviour with other 
members of the alliance, the leading nations in the bloc, nations within the 
opposing alliance and nonaligned states (Holsti, Hoppm ann and Sullivan, 
1973:176)
Alliances exist chiefly to provide institutions w ithin which nations may 
combine their capabilities in defence against a common external enemy (Holsti, 
1973:88) Cohesion within an alliance, one could say, could be directly affected 
by the perceived threat emanating from this enemy (Ward, 1982:32) Policy 
coordination and consultation between members(Rothstein, 1968:49), in relation 
to the threatening state, the Soviet Union, was one of the main pillars of NATO 
membership. Policy coordination and consultation allows fellow NATO 
members to share and benefit from other members' past experiences w ith the 
Soviet Union. Policy consultation and coordination thus provides a united front 
within NATO by which Norway may resist external pressure from the Soviet 
Union.
Aligned Norway, both for fear of sanctions from its fellow members and 
because of its realisation of its unilateral weakness vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, 
avoids arrangem ents which may result in  isolation from its allies. Norway has 
realized, that as a small state, the solution to its security dilemma must, as 
Liska(1962:24-5) maintains, come from the outside—an external source.
Whereas from one perspective, an alliance constitutes a serious derogation 
of independence and loss of prestige and status(Rothstein, 1968:259), 
membership does provide the ultim ate guarantee of Norwegian sovereignty. 
Knowing that Norway has an alliance backing allows it to place Soviet 
démarches into perspective, knowing well that, if it maintains the alliance line, 
it has a security guarantee. As Defence Minister Holst put it, deterrence within 
NATO, involved making credible the proposition that an attack on Norway 
would not be confined to a fight with Norway(Holst, 1986:79)
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The possible validity of alternative explanations
In attempting to explain w hy the Swedish and Norwegian style, attitudes or 
approaches towards Soviet foreign policy differed one should be mindful that 
official security policy does not provide an all-purpose explanation for the 
similarities or differences which are revealed by the case studies. In fact, 
national security policy can only furnish ONE credible explanation or PART of 
an explanation as to why Swedish and Norwegian leaders acted, or reacted in 
the ways we observe. Neutrality and alignment can provide adequate 
explanations for behaviour in certain circumstances and at specific junctures. 
An attempt to illuminate those intersections is one of the goals of this thesis.
There is no lack of alternative explanations for why national leaderships act 
as they do. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin (1969:203) conveniently divide factors 
which can affect a state's leadership into internal and external. Especially 
relevant for this thesis, with its plethora of different actors and interests is that 
behaviour can be partially attributable to a bureaucratic 'give and take' between 
the relevant actors in a particular question(e.g. Allison, 1969:690). Such factors 
could provide a partial explanation of the outcome of the Swedish-Soviet Baltic 
Sea delimitation treaty. Particular Norwegian or Swedish personalities' 
influence^^ cannot either be discounted as having affected either nation's 
behaviour towards the Soviet Union. Norwegian Ambassador Evensen's 
personal démarche in favour of the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, 
effectively demonstrates how much one official may affect the destiny of the 
nation. The pressure of public opinion on decision-making élites (e.g. Almond, 
1973) could reasonably provide one explanation for the quick steps both 
Norway and Sweden took towards recognizing Baltic independence. K.J. 
H olsti's(1970:237) proposition that nations' national role conceptions are 
powerful in explaining their conduct in international affairs could explain the 
period of transition from Norway's bridge-building role to NATO membership 
from 1947 to 1949. Domestic political variables such as political culture(Verba,
The effect of personality on behaviour is elegantly argued in a num ber of 
studies: Greenstein(l967), Hermann, H.(1976), Burgess(1967), Hermann, R.(1967), 
Spiegel(1985), Rosati(1984).
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1965) or national historic tradition could help to explain w hy Sweden chose to 
continue its policy of neutrality after World War Two.
External factors and conditions, Snyder, Bruck and Sapinpbid) propose, have 
their origin beyond the territorial boundaries of the state, especially the actions 
and reactions of other states. The aim of this thesis is not to assess the effect 
that environmental factors(Sprout and Sprout, 1957:309) have upon Swedish and 
Norwegian decision-makers. Even these factors could be seen as supplementary 
or complementary explanations to the ones proposed in the thesis.
One such factor is the influence of Soviet foreign policy outputs upon 
Norwegian and Swedish behaviour. While they have an undeniable impact, the 
points of influence are not easily specified. In this context it could be suggested 
that a more or less unified Soviet NORDIC strategy in certain questions,'^ 
could explain why Swedes and Norwegians have reacted similarly over select 
issue areas—such as the strategic buildup or environmental cooperation. But 
there are also times when Soviet policies towards Sweden and Norway have 
differed. At such junctures one must take the fact that the Soviet leadership's 
approach may play a key role in accounting for variance in Swedish and 
Norwegian perceptions. For example, the Swedes and the Norwegians differed 
over the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal partially because the 
Norwegians attributed more sinister Soviet motives than did Sweden.
The influence of geopolitics (Mackinder, 1904) could be posited as an 
explanation of the different responses to all specifically security-related issue 
areas under consideration in this thesis. Morgenthau's writing(1948) regarding 
realpolitik could appear to play some role in explaining w hy the Swedes and 
Norwegians have reacted in certain ways regarding border violations or the 
Soviet military buildup. The effect of international systemic variables(e.g. 
Singer, 1969) could also be posited as partial explanations for Norwegian and 
Swedish behaviour in particular circumstances.
See Jensen (1987) or Berner (1986:2).
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The Choice of Time Periods
Two blocks of time are analyzed in particular depth in the present thesis: 
1947-9 and 1987-91. It is proper to look peripherally at 1946, for many of the 
issues which were then under discussion were carried over into 1947-9. It is 
also fitting to tangentially examine 1985-1986 as a prelude to Soviet Union's 
final four years. However it was only in 1987-1988 when W estem leaders first 
realized that Gorbachev's initiatives and the ostensible changes in Soviet foreign 
policy were more than cosmetic.
The chief consideration which motivated these choices was that both periods 
were largely comparable, both being distinguished from the years 1950-1985 as 
times of comprehensive change and transformation. In both periods, the 
Swedish and Norwegian leaderships struggled with the desirability, the viability 
and the meaning of neutrality and alignment. Also, in both cases, how  the 
Soviet Union behaved towards other nations, and towards them in particular, 
was a central consideration in the debate surrounding neutrality and alignment 
This choice is interesting from a historian's point of view. Soviet foreign 
policy towards Europe entered a new phase directly following the w ar—wartime 
cooperation with the West rapidly gave way to competition. 1987-1991, in a 
sense, signalled the end of this segment of history. Thus, 1947-9 may be seen 
as the left-handed parentheses while the latter period could be called the end 
parentheses of a period which left distinguishable marks upon Europe.
The Scandinavian area found itself at a security-policy crossroads 
immediately following World War Two. The period 1947-9 was a time of 
maximum intemational volatility—a critical juncture where Norwegian and 
Swedish leaders were confronted with an array of security policy choices. The 
choices taken in this period, either to pursue neutrality or alignment were to 
form the basis for the entire post-War North European security pattem . The 
essential elements of this model would remain unchcinged until the late 1980's.
W ith the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev, the European security environment 
would be thrown so far off that in December of 1991 the RSFSR would publicly 
express a wish to join NATO. It was a time when the established policies set 
forth following the War were challenged, re-interpreted, polished and
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transformed. It is above all important to have an understanding of the Swedish 
and Norwegian diplomatic style, approach and attitudes towards the Soviet 
Union in order to make sense of change and stability in these aspects of their 
behaviour forty years later.
The choice of issue-areas
A judicious choice of issues, areas of Soviet foreign policy which posed 
somewhat similar questions for both the Swedish and Norwegian leaderships, 
lies at the core of this comparative task  Although absolute comparability 
between the issue areas is un-attainable the case studies do make possible a 
dynamic, paired comparison and contrast study. It may be argued that greatly 
analogous Soviet foreign policy outputs towards both Sweden and Norway 
make a dyadic comparison approach valid.
Norwegian and Swedish interpretations of Soviet foreign policy in Eastern 
Europe and Soviet behaviour towards Finland stood at the very core of 
Norwegian and Swedish security policy deliberations. However, given the tense 
climate of the period, a span of time when the post-War East-West political 
cleavage would be defined, even economic policy came to be seen through the 
lens of security policy. Swedish and Norwegian discussion concerning the 
compatibility of their participation in the Marshall Plan with previous foreign 
policy commitments was a crucial issue for debate. Mainly for the Swedes, but 
also to a lesser extent for the Norwegians, the question of how to adapt trade 
with the Soviet Union to their overarching foreign policy goals, was also an 
important subject.
To complement 1947-1949, a m odem  period of time was chosen in which to 
examine again selected aspects of Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet 
relations. By selecting a broad, cross-section of foreign policy issue areas 
relevant to both Sweden's and Norway's relations w ith the Soviet Union, one 
should be able to more clearly discern the areas, the junctions where neutrality 
and alignment can help explain differences in their behaviour towards the 
Soviet Union. Likewise, it should clarify the parts of Norwegian and Swedish
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Soviet relations in which security policy considerations play less of a role in the 
leaderships' behaviour.
Clearly, the issues of greatest import in Scandinavian-Soviet relations are of 
a m ilitaiy character. In one case, the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, we 
have been forced to go even further back in time to the issue's birth in the late 
1950's. The Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Proposal of 1957 is the most 
prominent, single, recurring theme in Norwegian-Soviet or Swedish Soviet 
relations since World War Two. How did these leaders, w ith a view to their 
security present security commitments, interpret, approach and act upon the 
proposal? Another serious question which is considered is how Sweden's 
neutrality and N orw ay 's NATO membership have affected leaders' handling 
of security-related boundary questions? Yet another question under scrutiny is 
how Norwegian and Swedish leaders have interpreted the process of Soviet-U.S. 
and disarmament in its neighbourhood. Has one or the other state favoured 
specific solutions to the problem? Has one state seen the events in a more 
positive light? Neutrality and alignment have surely played a role in the way 
leaders' have interpreted these, at times, galloping developments.
Also worth discussion are the bilateral issues in the political realm. 
Although indirectly related to military-security policy, it will be interesting to 
see if, and if so where, military-security policy interests affected the diplomatic 
style, attitudes and approach of Sweden and Norway in their relations with the 
Soviet Union on the political plane. In this case, the most important bilateral 
issues were chiefly of a legal nature.
When Gorbachev assumed the CPSU leadership in 1985, the Soviet Union 
stood at odds with both Sweden and Norway over sea delimitations in the 
Baltic and the Barents Sea. How did Sweden's neutrality and Norway's NATO 
membership affect the leadership's attitudes and approach to these problem 
areas? Another political issue, namely that of Norwegian and Swedish policies 
towards the Baltic independence issue, came to a head in the late 1980's. This 
inquiry will attempt to analyze the role of neutrality and alignment along the 
road to Norway's and Sweden's recognition of the Baltic states' independence 
in 1991.
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One of the chief signs of change in Soviet thinking towards the Nordic area 
was Gorbachev's Murmansk speech of October, 1987. The speech, the chief 
elements of which were environmental-scientific cooperation, security policy 
and common resource utilization, seemed to be a re-evaluation of several 
questions which had been taboo in the past—such as environmental cooperation, 
as well as a regurgitation of some old security policy themes such as the Nordic 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. In the past, significant Scandinavian cooperation 
in environmental questions was governed by a restrictive Soviet security 
interpretation of such cooperation. The question w orth considering is the role 
of Swedish and Norwegian security considerations played in leaders' responses 
to the proposals forwarded in Murmansk.
Finally, the thesis will turn to a discussion of Soviet-Norwegian and Soviet- 
Swedish trade relations in the late years of Gorbachev's tenure. Again, the chief 
question concerns the effect which Swedish security commitments, as opposed 
to Norwegian alliance membership had upon the conduct of trade relations.
M ethodology
Selection of Actors
It is critical to understand who is doing the acting—for this will help to 
establish a clearer focus upon the proper level analysis(Singer, 1969) for the 
questions posed. The decisions to pursue neutrality or alignment, as well as the 
responsibility to maintain and defend these decisions, lies effectively w ith the 
élites of Sweden and Norway. Norway's decision to seek NATO membership, 
and Sweden's decision to follow neutrality were political decision of the highest 
rank. In subsequent years there has been consensus that these decisions should 
be maintained, greatly independent of change of government and political and 
economic vacillations, and that élites within the economic, political and military 
realms should bear the chief responsibility for seeing that the chosen security 
paths are followed.
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The group most interesting in the context of this study were those élites 
which most influenced the direction of Sweden's and Norway's economic, 
political and security policy towards the Soviet Union. Three separate 
approaches in political science have evolved in the search for those individuals 
which are most influential in decision-making processes. Robert Dahl and 
Nelson Polsby have become closely identified w ith the Pluralist approach, 
which maintains that power may be tied to the study of particular issue 
areas (Polsby, 1980b:115). Polsby urges the consideration of situations where 
power is exercised (Polsby,!980a:476), asking: 'how  can one tell, after all, 
whether or not an actor is powerful unless some sequence of event, competently 
observed, attests to his power(Polsby, 1980b:60) The institutional view of 
power, represented by C. W right Mills holds that one should first locate the 
institutions of power in society (Mills, 1956:11), followed by an intimate look at 
those individuals of power within them. Floyd Hunter, the leading proponent 
of the so-called 'reputational theory of democracy,' felt one could best find 
individuals in prominent positions in a few groups that are assumed to have 
power connections. He writes: 'from the recognised, or nominal, leaders of the 
groups mentioned, lists of persons presumed to have power in the community 
were obtained (operational location of his elites)(Hunter, 1953:11). 'Through 
a process of selection, utilizing a cross-section of 'judges' in determining 
leadership rank and finally by a further process of self-selection, a rather long 
list of possible power leadership candidates was cut down to manageable size 
for the specific use of this study,' he continues.
However, the selection of the élites combines these three methods, adhering 
to the suggestion of Putnam (l973:8-12), that deciding a cut off point between 
elites and the rest is, in the end, a matter of ad-hoc judgement. The 
reputational, decisional and institutional schools, Putnam contends, all have 
difficulty in reaching consensus, demonstrating the actual interdependence of 
theory and method.
An essential part of the thesis' initial phase was subsumed by preliminary 
interviews w ith journalists, decision-makers and academics with logical 
connections to the group most influential in forming Swedish and Norwegian
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Soviet policies. The core question in each of these interviews was who the 
interviewee felt, in general, were the most influential in forming their country^s 
Soviet policies. A follow-up question inquired as to the most influential élites 
in particular decision-making instances. Finally, bureaucratic charts were 
analyzed with a view to finding those positions within certain key organizations 
which logically handled Soviet questions. These three m ethods were combined 
in arriving at a list of élites who had both visible and concealed power in 
influencing the direction of Swedish and Norwegian foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union.
Selection of Sources
Several sources have been drawn upon in order to bring forth evidence of 
the diplomatic style, approach and attitudes of these élite groupings. In the 
period from 1947-9 several excellent studies have been written, and we have 
taken the liberty to draw upon those. Furthermore, Riksdag and Storting records 
have been utilized for the same period. A third source, original Foreign 
Ministry records from the British embassies in Oslo and Stockholm, and original 
Swedish and Norwegian Foreign Ministry reports have also been utilized to 
provide a further check on the evidence gathered. Additionally, a small group 
of decision-makers who were active during the 1947-9 period were interviewed 
with a hope to gaining a final, living, check on the evidence gathered from other 
sources.
In the period from 1987-1991, primary weight has been placed on open- 
ended, 'qualitative' interviews with approximately 60 élites per country and 
parliamentary records mainly from 1986 through to the Summer of 1991. In 
terms of the interviews, there were general élites—or those generally influential 
in a num ber of foreign policy questions towards the Soviet Union. Then, there 
were those élites which were specifically connected to certain questions. There 
was a set of general questions which were posed to all interviewees, which was 
complemented by specialized questions depending upon the particular élite's 
involvement in a particular question. A third check was provided by articles 
draw n from the Norwegian dailies Arbeiderbladet and A ftenposten and the
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Swedish dailies Svenska Dagbladet and Dagens Nyheter. Finally, second-hand 
accounts and the existing literature were utilized to the extent they were 
relevant to the questions under consideration.
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Chapter Two
Neutrality and Alignment under development; Swedish and Norwegian Élite 
Perceptions of Soviet Foreign Policy
1947-1949^: A  Brief Historical Introduction
On 5 March, 1946, Winston Churchill had made his famous Iron Curtain 
speech in Fulton, Missouri—the Cold War had begun. The "Truman Doctrine" 
made clear that Greece's and Turkey's governments should be supported 
against the threat of Communist-backed insurgency or economic collapse in
1947. The battle lines for the Cold War were drawn. It was in relation to this 
division of Europe that NATO and neutrality were framed. These events would 
feed into the landmark decisions to pursue neutrality or alignment, which 
would influence Norwegian and Swedish leaders' perceptions of and behaviour 
towards the Soviet Union in the post-War years.
Several issues which did not have any direct bearing upon Swedish and 
Norwegian decision-makers also influenced Swedish and Norwegian leaders' 
thinking regarding the practicability of certain security solutions. In the period 
1945-1947, local Communists under Soviet supervision took power in Poland, 
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia (1948). The 
Red Army thus backed up the regimes in these countries, while single-list 
elections of Communist candidates were held. Swedish and Norwegian élites, 
excepting the Communist parties of the two countries, were uniformly critical 
of these trends. These events became decisive for Norway's decision to pursue 
NATO membership. On the economic front, the "Marshall Plan" posed difficult
' Some of the existing works on the period are w orth mention. In the case 
of Norway, see Skodvin (1971), Eriksen (1972). One can go as far as to say as 
that there is no standard work which discusses the period in the Swedish case. 
From the Nordic angle, Wahlback (1973) published a "standard" work. Among 
those who have concentrated on the Scandinavian angle may be counted 
Hirschfeldt (1949), Haskel (1976) on the Scandinavian defence talks and 
Lundestad (1980).
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problems for both the Norwegian and Swedish leaderships. The most 
im portant dilemma was whether participation in the Plan could be interpreted 
as being compatible with Norwegian and Swedish unwillingness to contribute 
to 'bloc-building' in Europe.
In the end, and irrespective of the different security solutions chosen, 
Norway and Sweden made positive decisions over the question. Also in the 
economic realm, Sweden pursued a policy aimed at significantly enhancing its 
trade volume with the Soviet Union—perhaps in an effort to boost credibility of 
its neutral line. The vision which this policy contained was never realized, as 
trade remained at levels as low as Norway, which made no such political push.
The later War years and the early post-War years witnessed a serious 
deterioration in the outlook for Soviet-Finnish relations. The Finns, which had 
chosen to fight the Soviet Union on the side of the Germans, were most likely 
to become the next target for absorption into the Soviet East European sphere 
of influence. A treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was 
signed in 1948, formalizing the future state of Soviet-Finnish security policy 
intercourse. Swedish and Norwegian leaders took into consideration their 
possibilities of affecting the Finnish destiny in their discussions of which 
security policy to adopt. Thus, neutrality and alignment were used as tools of 
influence to affect a neighbouring country—and the security policy future of 
Northern Europe.
This division was crucial to the Nordic region for the respective countries 
had historically seen themselves as teetering between East and West. Sweden 
and Norway had been neutral prior to the war. The Swedish and Norwegian 
vision of maintaining this position in world affairs was pursued until the time 
w hen their preferred (again with the exception of Finland) alternative, the 
Scandinavian Defence Union, became untenable and negotiations broke down. 
Norway, with her declared will to 'b)uild bridges" prior to the war, was forced
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to break with the past; the Norwegian will to never again experience a "9 
April''^ coupled with a feeling that a Scandinavian solution would simply not 
provide sufficient security guarantees saw Norway turn to NATO to satisfy her 
needs. Sweden simply resumed its historically-based policy of neutrality—only 









17 March 48 
End March 48
End April 48 
24 Sept. 48
Sweden recognizes incorporation of Baltic 
nations into Soviet Union
The "Baltic deportation"
"Billion-Credit" granted to S.U.
Bevin proposes defense cooperation between 
Western European states; Scandinavia not 
mentioned.
Rumours that various Scandinavian 
countries "next on the list" spread.
H. Lange asks for U.K. and U.S. military 
guarantees.
Brussels Pact founded.
U.S., Canada and Britain start talks 
about Atlantic Security.
Sweden proposes SDU talks.
U.S. informs DK and N that they will be 
approached sometime soon re: Atlantic Pact
 ^ A common expression in both Norway and Denmark, symbolizing the 
German invasion of both countries.
 ^Partly extracted from Petersen (1979:208).
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15 Oct. 48 Scandinavian Defence Committee established.
10-24 Dec. 48 AP negotiations resume.
3 Jan. 49 Denmark and Norway invited to join AP 
negotiations.
15 Jan. 49 Report of Scandinavian Defence Committee pub.
22-24 Jan 49 Scandinavian defence conference in Copenhagen; 
defence talks are deadlocked.
29-30 Jan 49 Scandinavian Defence Union falls.
7-11 Feb 49 Lange visits U.S. primarily to discuss AP
19 Feb 49 DNA votes for AP membership.
4 Apr 49 AP signature.
Nov. 1949 COCOM is formed
Spring 1950 Norway joins COCOM
Historical Background: Norway
Norwegian pre-War and Wartime experience with the Soviet Union differed 
from its bilateral relationship in the time leading to the Norwegian NATO 
decision. When important strata of Norwegian opinion, especially inside in Den 
Norske Arbeiderparti (DNA), turned against the Soviet Union from 1948 until 
1949,^ this constituted a break in its historical tradition both with respect to its 
pre-W ar perception of the Soviet Union and regarding its own role, the
* According to N50, TUC Chairman Konrad Nordahl "really knew the 
Communists and was willing to fight." Another example was Tranmael, editor 
of the influential labour daily, Arbeiderbladet, who "moved from being 
extremely suspicious of talk of Scandinavian 'balkanisation' in 1942 to being a 
supporter of NATO in 1948."(Udgaard, 1973:29)
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transformation of its "role" perception from neutralist to "bridge-builder."^ The 
DNA did not encounter sizable opposition from the bourgeois parties in this 
reorientation/ a fact which lightened the task in Norway's search for a new 
security path.
The Norwegians, under Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie's ’bridge-building" 
policies, strove for harmonious relations between the developing superpower 
blocs, through unqualified support of the United Nations (Udgaard,1973:228). 
The same Norwegian Labour Party which took the decision to enter into NATO 
had up until 1921 been a member of the Moscow-led Third International.^ The 
Finnish-Russian War of 1939-40 and domestic events in the Soviet Union in the 
1930's lay the groundwork for the Labour Party's alienation from both local 
communists* and the Soviet Union's Communist Party. The Soviet withdrawals 
from Denmark’ and Norway had undeniable impact on élites perceptions, 
demonstrating a Soviet tendency to retreat from what might have been wartime 
territorial gains. The Soviet drawback from Northern Norway left a special
® I support Haskel's(l976:57) conclusion, that ’bridge-building" seemed close 
to Norway's prewar role of neutral mediator and conciliator.
*N53
 ^N50 said: "we in the DNA knew them (the Soviets)...we had met Bukharin, 
Karl Radek and others in the 1920's and had fought with them, therefore there 
was no real fear of them...they were human beings too."
* The Scandinavian communist parties registered steadily lower statistics 
immediately following the War. The NKP had 12.5% in 1945, 6% in 1949 and 
5% in 1953 (Gilberg, 1975:22), while the Swedish VPK had 10.3% in the 1944 
parliamentary elections, 11.2% in 1946's local elections, it also made a serious 
decent, to 6.3% in 1948's parliamentary elections.(AUmanna Valen, 1970,:10)
’ The Soviet Union still had a presence on the strategically important Danish 
island of Bornholm and Iran in 1946. D au(1970:79) states: "the withdrawal from 
Denmark and Norway may be viewed as a Soviet pattern with respect to 
Scandinavia, as opposed to that of the Balkans, with which the Soviet Union 
dealt with in a far more decisive manner in 1945-1946."
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m ark on the population there. Even today, the citizens of Finnmark and other 
parts of Northern Norway have a markedly more w arm  regard for Soviet 
cooperation of varied sorts.
The Norwegian government, which had its seat in London during World 
W ar Two, had a clearly Westem-Atlantic orientation once the w ar was 
concluded. The Soviet-Norwegian dispute over sovereignty of the islands of Jan 
Mayen and Svalbard, two issues which would come to have lasting importance 
for Soviet-Norwegian relations (1944 and 1947), would inject an early element 
of "realism" into the relationship. However, it was not until the beginning of 
1948 that negative perceptions of these events combined with Soviet 
misbehaviour in Eastern Europe and Finland to translate into a concrete 
Norwegian defence policy.
The psychological aspects of Norway's reorientation are important—not least 
because Soviet foreign policy did play its part in this evolution. Norway's faith 
in neutrality (and its attendant principles) was extremely strong in the pre-War 
period. Norway gradually lost faith in being able to uphold and carry through 
this line, especially against the background of "April 9." Although the 
Norwegian leadership from the outset clearly preferred a Western-oriented 
solution to its security situation, the leadership first wanted to exhaust any hope 
for an all-Nordic alternative arrangement. The early Norwegian abandonment 
of this alternative in favour of a Western alliance guarantee caused great worry 
in Moscow. In order to prevent unnecessarily alerting the Soviets about their 
motivation underlying this re-orientation, the Norwegians conceived of a string 
of confidence-building measures, of which the policy of non-basing of foreign 
troops and the prohibition of nuclear arms on Norwegian soil are the most 
prominent.
Historical Background: Sweden
Sweden had a longer historical experience with neutrality than Norway. In 
theory, it has succeeded in remaining neutral in all wars since 1814. Sweden
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had varying degrees of success in defining its neutrality in terms of the 
belligerents at hand.^° The Swedish-Soviet relationship has a lengthy historical 
dimension—a past filled with wars, trade, and political dealings."
Compared to Norway, Sweden held out its hope for a Scandinavian solution 
until the last possible moment. The Social Democratic leadership was, even in 
Sweden, the motor which propelled Sweden's decision to remain neutral in  the 
face of an ominous split between East and West. It was only w hen the Nordic 
alternative finally became untenable, that Denmark and Sweden initiated 
bilateral defence discussions. These discussions did not result in a Swedish- 
Danish neutral alliance. Sweden seemed to have little doubt that given the 
now-visible East/W est split, and in absence of other realistic alternatives, it was 
best to tread its traditional path of neutrality. A clear Governmental 
assumption was that remaining on an even footing between the Soviet Union 
and the Western Alliance would provide the best security guarantee for 
Sweden.
Swedish and Norwegian Perceptions of Finland's Looming Destiny
The 'Finnish Argument' in Swedish Foreign Policy
The Swedes, unlike the Finns in the East, had several foreign policy 
alternatives open to them in the post-War period. It seemed clear, from the 
outset, that the Finns would have some form of close understanding with the 
Soviet Union—what was not clear is which exact form and which degree this 
would take. The Swedes saw one of their roles as assisting the Finns in 
developing a stable, working relationship with the Soviets, not only for the
There is some evidence that Sweden nonetheless collaborated w ith the 
Germans during World War Two.
"  For details see Homborg(1942).
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Finns' and Soviets' own good, but specifically for the peace and stability of the 
Nordic region. A moderate Finnish post-War foreign policy would also 
contribute to the efforts of those Swedes who desired a continuation of 
Sweden's pre-War neutrality policy; the cause of an independent Finland 
became a prerequisite for Swedish neutrality.
There was general agreement amongst the Swedish leadership, a consensus 
which transcended traditional ideological and political lines, that the Finnish 
fate was in great part Sweden's.'^ That the Swedes and the Norwegians had 
three different security alternatives: a Scandinavian Defence Union, neutrality 
or NATO membership, rendered them able to influence the direction of Soviet 
foreign policy towards the Nordic region in general and Finland in particular 
and unique ways. The Swedes and the Norwegians, at important junctures, 
threatened to punish the Soviet Union by "going West" if it did not demonstrate 
a moderate line towards its Western neighbour. What lay at the core of this 
effort was the Swedish perception and assumption that Soviet decision-makers 
were influenced by Swedish thinking of and potential behaviour towards them. 
In turn Swedish leaders observed Soviet foreign policy behaviour and made 
judgements whether a continuation of neutrality was practicable. Sweden's 
active posture towards Finland was permissable given the neutral framework 
since such a cause was not explicitly anti-Soviet.
There are several basic reasons for the Swedish engagement. Many 
Swedes have traditionally seen the Finns as their "little brothers," bearing in 
mind a several hundred year Swedish rule over Finland. Demographically parts 
of the Finnish population are related to the Swedish. Partially for these reasons, 
many Swedes voluntarily took part in both the war for Finland's independence 
and the two wars against the Soviet Union in World War Two.
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The Finnish FCMA^^
In the view of Swedish Foreign Minister Osten Undén, a Finnish pact with 
the Soviets was to some degree inevitable. He expressed that "while a military 
alliance between Finland and the Soviet Union would be disagreeable for 
Sweden, I regard Finland, in any case, as within the Russian orbit."^^ While 
the FCMA was unpalatable, it would have to be accepted as a 'necessary 
evil.'^^ After signature, Undén was to conclude that "the mere existence of 
such a pact emphasized that a powerful protector had come into the picture."^^ 
Talk of the Finnish FCMA triggered rumours in other Nordic capitals of the 
possibility of similar offers. Rumours circulated in following weeks that 
Sweden, Denmark and Norway also had received similar pact proposals.^^ The 
British Ambassador in Moscow in fact passed on the rum our to Sweden's 
Moscow Ambassador Rolf Sohlman that "Sweden was the next on the pact 
list."^* Sweden, like Denmark, never received a pact proposal. Norway, 
however, did receive a note from the Soviet Union asking for a non-aggression 
pact on 5 February, 1949, once the Soviets had begun to seriously anticipate 
Norway's drift Westwards. As a result of rumours. Western and Soviet 
diplomats investigated the respective Scandinavian positions to see which 
position the governments would take if the such a pact were proposed. It soon
"The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between 
the Republic of Finland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," of May,
1948.
Undén, FO 371.71723.N2369/637/63, 8 March, 1948.
FO 371.71451.N3336, 19 March, 1948.
About what he meant, Undén elaborates: "...and all that could be said was 
that a protector was a protector." (FO 371.71724.N4884, 22 April, 1948).
For example see report from Washington embassy, 16 March, 1948 (UDS 
HP 1 ER, 49:B/103).
Sohlman from Moscow, UDS HP 1 ER, 31 March, 1948, D:31:8/1967.
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became clear that if a Soviet proposal were received in any of the Scandinavian 
countries, the response would be uniformly negative.^’
Concrete Efforts to affect Finland's destiny
Significant consensus pervaded the Swedish foreign policy establishment 
over the pursuance of "the Finnish argument." Erlander spoke to the British 
ambassador saying that "I am glad to repeat the statement that the Swedish 
attitude towards Finland remains unaltered and consideration for Finland still 
influences our policy thought and actions."^ Rolf Sohlman fought for this 
cause in Moscow in direct conversations^^ with Soviet officials, attempting to 
engage Vice Prime Minister Zorin^ and Madame Kollontay^ to his favour. 
Sohlman seems to have been the only member of the Moscow diplomatic 
community who tried to influence events to the Finnish advantage.^
For an example of the Swedish "contingencies" on this point see Undén's 
statement to British Foreign Office (FO 371.71724.N3244/g, 18 March, 1948: "In 
the case Sweden was approached by a pact suggestion it would refuse without 
hesitation." Similar statements are reported by the Foreign Office by Danish 
Foreign Minister Rasmussen (FO 371.71383.N3377, 17 March, 1948) and the 
Norwegian Foreign Minister Lange (FO 371.71504.N3040, 13 March, 1948).
20 FO 371.77710.N3504, 11 April, 1949.
After speaking to Zorin, Sohlman reported on 26 February, 1948 (UDS HP 
1 ER) that "my personal viewpoint was that the Swedish government's 
possibilities to realize its 'no-bloc' policy de facto could be influenced by 
developments in Finland." On 18 March, 1948, Sohlman stated in Zorin's 
company that "a happy conclusion to the Finnish (FCMA) negotiations would 
contribute to calming opinion in Sweden." (UDS 1 ER, 31:D/58).
^  Vice Foreign Minister who, beginning in January, 1948 (UDS HP 1 ER, 20 
January, 1948, Sohlman) "was responsible for treatment of Nordic-related 
questions." (HP 1 ER, D 31/592, 20 December, 1948).
^  One of Stalin's closest advisors in foreign policy matters and former Soviet 
ambassador to Stockholm, several years earlier.
^  Sohlman (UDS HP 1 ER, 22 March, 1948, D :24/3-l948:81) remarks, "I have 
seemingly been the only one in this city to make efforts to influence the
(continued...)
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Ambassador Giinnar Hàgglôf, in the company of Undén, said that Finland 
"definitely has a need to clarify its relationship to Moscow, since there were 
people in the politburo, like Zhdanov, who were clearly hostile to Finland." 
(Hagglof, 1973:83) Leading figures, present in and around the Swedish Foreign 
Ministry at the time, admitted the consideration Sweden gave the question—one 
saying that it 'moderated us.'^
The Swedish decision to influence the Soviet position also appeared in other 
forms. One former politician, mentioned that during the SDU negotiations, one 
of the reasons for not opting for "option number 1" (the popularly known 
W estern option) and, instead, choosing "number 2" was because "we wanted to 
help out Finland in all imaginable ways."^ In any case support for Finland 
fulfilled Swedish idealistic goals—not least the hope of upholding neutrality.
Opposition to the effort
Was the argument ever challenged? This is an important question because 
one sees on one hand those who presented Swedish neutrality as being 
contingent upon Soviet good behaviour towards Finland and those who 
favoured neutrality under all circumstances—independent of external factors. 
Swedish Commander-in-Chief, Helge Jung, who seemed a maverick in contrast 
with other important Swedish officials, a man not particularly known for a 
"friendly" view of Soviet intentions,^ attempted to deflate the argum ent.^
^(...continued)
Russians to Finland's advantage-a, in the present context, tragic position...not 
even the Finnish ambassador (Sundstrom) has brought up the question with 
them."
^  S51, S55, S54
“ S54
His speech on 25 November, 1949 could be seen as a sizeable break in the 
credibility of Sweden's neutrality. He spoke in terms such as: "behind the iron 
curtain we can see a depressing picture of ruthless dictatorship, of police and
(continued...)
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Even Undén, on one occasion, was quoted as saying that even if there were a 
Communist coup in Finland, it would have no effect on Swedish neutrality.^ 
Ernst Wigforss, Swedish Finance Minister,^ in a speech given 4 April, 1948, in 
a peripheral reference to Soviet policy towards Finland, said he felt that 'teh in d  
the shifting reactions to foreign policy lay the reflection of difference in the 
different parties' views of the Soviet Union."^^
The Americans, if they saw logic in an d /o r sympathized w ith Sweden's 
neutrality argument at all, were much less convinced of talk of '^buffer states," 
and "bridges" than they were of the viability of the Finnish argum ent The 
Americans felt that the Swedish position could play a role in which policy the 
Soviet Union adopted.^^ The Soviet Union, however, did not appreciate what
^^(...continued)
terror control, of contempt of life of the individual and denial of his right to 
personal freedom..." (FO 371.77710.N l0358, 1 December, 1949). The Soviet 
reaction is exemplified in a discussion between Sohlman and Soviet MFA 
representative: "Jung's speech must be seen as serious in these quarters, due to 
the speaker's official position and his urging of w ar against the Soviet Union." 
(UDS HP 1 ER, D 35:B/136, 8 December, 1949).
^  To British Defence Minister by the Swedish Military Attaché in London 
(FO 371.77400.N 1041, 31 January, 1949): "in the military services, neutrality was 
unable to be supported; the services' considered appreciation that the argument 
that Swedish neutrality safeguarded Finland from Russian occupation was 
fallacious and the Russians would occupy Finland when and if it suited it."
M olin(l988:1). The quote seems to contradict the Swedish Government's 
line ("Finnish argument").
^  Finance Minister Wigforss was one of most influential in shaping Social 
Democratic Soviet policy. Wigforss' neutralist thinking that superpowers 
possessed the same motives and thus the Soviet Union should be judged no 
more harshly than the United States pervaded key Social Democratic circles. 
(Berge (1989: 334f,439), citing Wigforss' memoirs, 1954)
Moller(1986:309-11) writes "perhaps Wigforss had in mind the experiences 
of World W ar Two, when the Western powers, under the cry of "assistance to 
Finland", tried to pull Sweden into the war.
Molin(1988:9) finds in FRUS document (18.2.1948 758 00/2 1848 NARS) 
that the "Americans preferred to rely upon the Finnish argument, that is to say, 
that a Swedish move West would increase Soviet pressure on Finland."
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the "Finnish argument" assumed about Soviet behaviour. Soviet ambassador in 
Stockholm, Tchemychev, said to Undén: "When Finland pursued an anti- 
Russian policy during the war, Swedish opinion felt calm, but w hen Finland 
wished a good relationship with the Soviet Union, Swedish opinion was 
uneasy."^^
Norwegian Consideration of Finland
While the Norwegians were, like the Swedes, concerned about the ways in 
which their final security policy choice would affect Finland's destiny, the 
Norwegian consideration played a more subdued role in Norwegian officials' 
minds than in the Swedish.^ One Norwegian even hinted that there was less 
objective truth in the Swedish "Finnish argument" than was propagated. Indeed, 
this argument might have been used in an attempt to prevent the Norwegians 
from going West.^ While the Norwegians had no illusions that the Norwegian 
advocacy of the Western line would receive any more than a chilly reception in 
Moscow,^ Norway nevertheless felt particularly exposed to Soviet capabilities 
and intentions and thus, perceived a need for a comprehensive security 
guarantee which could be utilized if threat perception became reality.
P.M. written by Undén, on the occasion of Ambassador Tchemychev's 
visit to him. (UDS HP 1 ER, 8 April, 1948).
^  Reports from the Norwegian embassy in Helsinki spoke of nervousness 
in Finnish political circles over the possibility of Norway's membership in the 
Atlantic Pact. (UDN 38.3/319 January, 1949,14 February, 1949; file 25.2/63, Jnr. 
15221).
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^  Minister of Justice, O.C. Gundersen, said "The Soviet Union takes it for 
granted that the Western powers are aggressive, and if we go in for a Western 
alliance, we will be considered to be members of an aggressive alliance." 
(Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 March, 1949).
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Norway, Finland and 'Bad' Soviet timing.
Seen from the Norwegian viewpoint, the timing of Soviet foreign policy 
démarches towards Finland could not have been worse. W hat is more, the 
timing of the Czech coup coincided with the Soviet pact proposal to Finland to 
create a nearly explosive climate of élite opinion in Norway. The uproar 
surrounding, in particular these two events, provided the final impetus for a 
Norwegian NATO membership application.
Soviet proposals for a formal security arrangement were not new to the 
Norwegian élites. As far back as the 31st of May, 1928, the Soviet Union had 
presented a draft of the German-Soviet friendship and neutrality treaty of 24 
April, 1926—stating this could serve as a model for a corresponding Norwegian- 
Soviet agreement.^^ The Soviets had made the same invitation to the Finns, 
but as far as one can see, some time later. Trygve Lie had, four years earlier, 
received a request from Molotov that Norway and Soviet adopt a joint-defence 
arrangement on Svalbard in 1944,^ a question raised again by Molotov in 
1946^’, a thought which was in the front of Norwegian minds when the Soviets 
made their move in Finland. The Soviet historical strategy of attempting to 
secure similar treaties on Soviet border states created, in the minds of 
Norwegian decision-makers, an expectation that this would become a recurring 
trend in Soviet foreign policy. The Norwegians were interested in establishing 
a pattern of the Soviet pact proposals.
Stalin's note to Finnish President Paasikivi on 23 February, 1948 re-awoke 
fears that Norway might receive a similar offer. According to Skodvin, all 
messages received from the Helsinki embassy presumed that a pact proposal to 
Norway was "in the making." (Skodvin, 1971:94) Now, through Stalin's letter
UDN 25.2/72i, Notât, 3 August, 1948.
^  Lange, in speech to Storting 8 April, 1948 (UDN 25.2/63, Jnr. 012748).
The negative response was much stronger this time, since both the 
Government and the Storting supported this line.
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to Paasikivi, "the Soviet Union has shown renewed interest in the question of 
its security on the Northern flank."^ Whereas the Norwegians were seemingly 
as worried as the Finns with respect to Soviet intransigence which might, in 
time, lead to a unilateral Soviet imposition of Rumanian or Hungarian-type pact 
terms(Hetland, 1984:8), the Finnish Pact was seen as distancing itself from the 
"standard agreements" the other East European states had previously 
concluded/^ The Norwegians nevertheless detected some consistency between 
the Finnish-Soviet FCMA and the "East European models."^
Rumours of a Soviet pact offer
Directly following the "Czech coup" and while one knew that Soviet-Finnish 
FCMA negotiations were already in motion^, many messages arrived at the 
MFA in Oslo to the effect that Norway would be the next to be offered a 
pact.^ The messages arrived from Norway's delegations in East Europe and 
the U.S.^, but strangely, not from Norway's Moscow embassy.^ Eriksen
40 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 8 April, 1948.
Ambassador Berg writes (UDN 25.2/65, 11 April, 1948 Jnr. 0132219): 
"already in the pre-amble there is talk of Finland's wish to remain outside of the 
Great Powers' conflicts of interest." Another essential difference, according to 
"SV" is that the Pact "does not contain any rules which require periodical 
consultations about important foreign policy questions."
^  A similar clause was "Article 1 which discussed the military obligations 
in the case of attack from Germany or any other state allied with Germany." 
(ibid) A second similarity was that "Finnish troops may not be used outside of 
Finland's borders" (UDN 25.2.65, 16 April, 1948) Thus, Finnish military 
obligations were limited, similar to Rumania and Hungary.
43 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 8 April, 1948.
^  For example see cable from Warsaw UDN: 25.2/63 Jnr. 008917 UD 1948, 
7 March, 1948.
^  UDN 25.2/63, Washington, 17 March 1948, Jnr. 009417: (Admiral) Vinson 
raised the point that he was worried about "Soviet pressure on Norway, 
specifically with respect to the rumours circulating in Washington."
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daim s that the rumours regarding a potential pact proposal received at the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry were explained in two ways.(Eriksen, 1972:72-73) 
First, the rumours were an attempt to prevent a Norwegian move W estward 
and second, to investigate how Norway would react to an eventual pact 
invitation.
Norwegian Ambassador Berg reported from Moscow that other rumours 
were drculating indicating that the Soviet Union, through a military agreement, 
would gain access to air force bases in Northern F i n l a n d I f  there was any 
truth to the rumours at all, they surely did not concretize at the antidpated 
point in time^ and in the antidpated form—in retrospect they appear to 
support the theory that they were mere 'ta it"  by which the Soviets intended to 
"sound out" the possibilities in such a démarche without any concrete 
commitment. According to one individual, perhaps one of the reasons why a 
Pact invitation never was extended was because the Soviets knew very well that 
such an offer would be declined.^’
The psychological repercussions of the rumours were nevertheless significant. 
Ambassador Berg writes from Moscow^ that since "Norway has become the 
only country with a border with the Soviet Union that had not received an 
invitation regarding the conclusion of a pact or an agreement in another form, 
it was only natural that I would try to make use of my Russian contacts, to seek
^N 52.
UDN 25.2/65, Jnr. 007292, 23 February, 1948.
^  Confirmed by UDN document entitled "Ryktene om sojvetnote til Norge" 
on 23 March, 1948 (further documentation illegible).
N52. He added that the Soviet intelligence m ust have been adequate 
enough to reach that conclusion.
“  UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 008991, 17 March, 1948.
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to orient myself to what extent these plans might affect us."^  ^ Even though the 
reports of a possible Russian request for a pact with Norway might be regarded 
as a w ar of nerves, the Government thought it possible that it would be exposed 
to some Soviet pressure.^ Attempts at ascertaining the tru th  in the messages 
nevertheless proved fruitless. One concrete result of the rum ours was an 
immediate and extraordinarily large increase in the Norwegian defence budget 
to 100 million kronor for defence needs, approved on 16 March, 1948 by the 
Stortinge^^,
Press Offensives as tool of Soviet Influence
Pressure on the Norwegians mainly took the form of Soviet press coverage, 
in fact mild and almost complementary by comparison to Soviet attacks on 
Denmark and Sweden.^ In Sweden, General Jung and Colonel Hjelm had 
both been "strongly criticized" and periodical accounts attacked "American 
influence on the Swedish business c o m m u n i t y . T h e  Norwegians had in
It was added that "no positive information was received...but then, when 
I heard during one conversation that previously there had been discussion of 
a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, I thought I would point this out to the 
Foreign ^ n is try ."  (same communiqué)
“  Lange quoted in FO 371.71485.N3816, 19 April, 1948.
It is noteworthy that approval was received w ithout going through 
committee. (Brundtland, 1964:185).
^  Berg reports that "It has been striking to what extent that the Norwegian 
relationship has been handled in the Soviet press, especially the w ay it has tried 
to solve a great deal of concrete issues, in accordance witii our wishes." Berg 
continues "Norway almost got a rose, especially for its dismissal of American 
attempts to 'sail towards us old and worn out ships.' (UDN 25.2/63,17 March, 
1948, Jnr. 008991.) This positive treatment did not agree with Swedish accounts 
(Swedish Ambassador Sohlman writes that in the Soviet press in January, 1949 
there were "sharp attacks against Martin Tranmael and his clique, which 
included Bratteli, Lange and Hauge, as working for the creation of U.S. bases 
in Norway." (UDS HP 1 ER, date illegible, January, 1949, D:30/28).
UDS HP 1 ER, date illegible, January, 1949, D:30/28.
45
essence escaped this Soviet polemical offensive, conceivably because it 
prioritized the effort to keep Norway out of NATO.
Pushing it over the edge: Swedish and Norwegian Reactions to East European 
Violence and Turbulence
Swedish Élite Perceptions of the Soviet East European Policy
Although Swedish officials never saw a communist coup in Sweden as a 
realistic possibility, the Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe soiled the name 
of the Soviet Union and the Swedish Communist Party. In 1945 there was a 
"steel workers strike," an event seen as crippling to one of Sweden's most 
crucial industries, but more importantly as being instrumented by the Swedish 
Communist Party. This event has significance from two points of view. First, 
it came to symbolize one of the darker sides of the competition between the 
governing Social Democrats and the Communist Party. Also, the event was one 
of the main determinants of the poor showing the Communist party made in 
the 1948 election. Events in Eastern Europe only acted to further speed the 
decline of the Swedish Communist Party.
The Prague coup had such importance for Swedish neutrality since any 
invasion of a state's sovereignty and borders—for whatever reason—runs sharply 
against the spirit of neutrality. For neutral states, borderlines are sacrosanct. 
To an extent this same principle affected Norway's reaction to the Prague coup, 
especially since its bridge-building tradition had not yet been fully abandoned.
The Prague Coup: The Political Debate
Previous to the Prague coup, the difference of opinion between the Swedish 
political parties ran between the Social Democrats and the Bourgeois parties on 
the one hand and the Communist party on the other. Following the coup, the 
political spectrum became more clearly divided between Bourgeois, Social 
Democratic and Communist camps. A whole debate was dedicated to the issue
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of the Prague Coup and related matters in the Swedish Riksdag. Osten Undén, 
in connection w ith this debate, painted the background for East and West 
Europe's division darkly.^ J.Â.T. Wiberg, a Conservative M.P., remarked that, 
over time, "we have seen how a whole set of previously free and independent 
states have either been swept away as independent states or have assumed such 
a position of dependence on a foreign power, that they have become mere 
vassals."^ The Social Democratic M.P., H.M. Hallén, found that the Soviet 
Union was in a state of "un-matched aggressive imperialism."^ A source close 
to Social Democracy at the time summed up Social Democratic thinking thus: 
"at the end of the w ar there were great hopes that the Soviet Union, especially 
w ith consideration to the Soviet Union's position during the War, would strive 
for good neighbourly relations and democracy." He continued that "after 
Prague there was a feeling of insecurity" which put these goals into question.®^ 
Many, such as Centre MP Carl Andersson, took a strongly negative view of the
“  Undén in Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948: "the manifesto of 
Cominform tells that two camps have been formed...the imperialistic and the 
anti-democratic camp, which harbours the intention of establishing world 
hegemony for American imperialism and to crush democracy..." Undén states 
that "it is clear to me the this sort of tendency for bloc-building bodes an 
important deterioration of the political atmosphere in the world..."
Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948. 
“  Riksdagsprotokoll, February 4, 1948. 
S53
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Communists^ But the Communists hardly sat by the sidelines, responding to 
the charges in kind.^*
Reactions within Swedish officialdom
It could hardly be said that their reactions were 'im partial' towards these 
events. Although MFA Political Director, Grafstrom, reports that "after a talk 
w ith (Prime Minister Tage) Erlander, his views are in full agreement with 
Russian propaganda over what has happened in Hungary,"(Grafstrom, 1989) he 
reports that Erlander, in reaction to Czechoslovakia, saw that "with one blow 
the political situation has changed...the Russians' new advances in 
Czechoslovakia and Finland have awakened sentiment in our country. 
Grafstrom himself immediately reached the conclusion that "events in 
Czechoslovakia, more than anything else demonstrated that a good will policy 
towards the Soviet Union is not worth the effort."^ Undén, who was, prior to
^  14 February, 1948, Riksdagsprotokoll: Andersson hints that there even 
ought to be Swedish legislation which allotted resources to prevent a 
Czechoslovak-type Communist coup in Sweden, adding "that which has 
happened in Czechoslovakia has, more than anything else, opened our eyes to 
w hat sort of intentions Communists in every country, even here in Sweden, 
harbour."
Karl Hagberg, Swedish Communist Party (Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 April, 
1948) responded: "Even if it is repeated a thousand times that it was a coup 
d 'état which occurred in Czechoslovakia, in accordance with the Hitlerian 
precept that if a lie is repeated enough times it will be believed— one cannot 
escape certain elementaiy facts. Who took the initiative to pu t asunder the 
Czechoslovak government? The Communists? Nyet, it wasn't; they were 
representatives for precisely the same parties who were appointed by the 
previous Government..."
E rlander(l973:364,371). Erlander speaks as follows: "The Soviet Union 
built up its security system by annexing the Baltic states and through 
constructing a system of buffer states."
63 Grafstrom(1989) entry for 16 March, 1948.
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Czechoslovakia,^ seen to hold a relatively "naïve" perception of Soviet 
motives,^ was seen by Grafstrom as "coming around to greater clarity"^ as 
a result of Soviet behaviour towards Finlemd and Czechoslovakia. Undén 
himself viewed the clash, symbolized by the division of Europe to be chiefly of 
an ideological character. Undén characterized the takeovers such:
"A new strata of Socialists, with values different than our own, 
has taken power in many countries, which, through revolution, 
trampled institutions ruthlessly underfoot in their rise to 
power.
Sweden's neutral status did not hinder Undén from speaking out. 
Neutrality, according to Undén, was a concept-in-practice of International Law, 
which made no specific connections with 'ideological neutrality.'^ "We have 
made it clear that "ideologically we are members of the West...which we have 
not tried to hide," wrote Undén.^’ The military staff at the Moscow embassy 
argued^® that the Soviet authorities ought to be convinced that, especially after 
the "Prague Coup," Sweden's sympathies lay with the West. Comments such
^  Moller(1986) contends that Undén was characterized by demeaning words 
such as: "America-fright," "submissive towards the Soviet Union," "Russia- 
friendly."
^  Grafstrom writes (quoting "Quensel") on 9 July, 1947 that one explanation 
for Undén's attitude towards the Russians was that he had assured Wigforss 
that he would follow a "Russian-friendly" policy.
^  Grafstrom (1989), 16 March, 1948. As a result, said Grafstrom, Undén 
held a speech wherein he went significantly further than he had in the past 
relevant to cooperation within the Marshall Plan.
FO 371.71452.N5678, 13 May, 1948.
^  Moller(1986:314-5) quoting Undén.
Moller(1986:301-2)'s quote of Undén's 16 March, 1948 diary entry.
UDS HP 1 ER, 22 March, 1948.
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as these had great import in clarifying the bounds of post-War Swedish 
neutrality at a formative stage in the policy's development.
There seemed to be a difference of opinion between civil servants and the 
military. It could be said the Swedish military had traditionally made the most 
sinister attributions of Soviet motivation amongst the various professional 
foreign policy élites— a trend consistent with the post-War period. The military, 
at times, was uninhibited in their judgement of Soviet motivation in Eastern 
Europe. For example, in a report by the Swedish military attaché in Moscow, 
Major General C.H. Juhlin-Dannfelt^^ the conclusion is draw n that, seen from 
the Soviet viewpoint, the East European states functioned as a "safety girdle." 
The report goes on to analyze and account for the methods which both the Red 
Army and Cominform used to "politically and militarily strengthen and utilize 
the weapons in the people's democracies for its own purposes."
This tone of expression ran contrary to what high-ranking Swedish officials
were saying about neutrality. It seemed as though Social Democratic M F s were
more critical than were officials who, by virtue of being civil servants, had to
defend the viability of maintaining neutrality. One such example was Moscow
Ambassador Rolf Sohlman, arguably the chief source of Soviet information for
the Swedish Government and the Foreign Ministry.^ Sohlman mentions very
little of East European events directly from his reporting post. One exceptional
opportunity is one report to Undén, where he writes:
"After the upheaval in Czechoslovakia, Moscow seems to find 
itself close to completion of a chapter in its European post-War 
policy: a military and political cordon sanitaire had, bit by bit, 
been soldered together from the Arctic to the 
Mediterranean...many people wonder what the next chapter 
will be."^
UDS 17 December, 1949, HP 1 ER D 223/3960.
^  Sohlman was an important character since, according to Ingemar Hagglof, 
a civil servant in the MF A, "Undén's, Wigforss' and (Gunnar) M yrdal's advisor 
was Sohlman."(Hagglof, 1984:282)
^  UDS 5 July, 1948, HP l E R D  31/342.
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Finance Minister Wigforss seemed irked by the debate surrounding the Soviet 
Union's "aggressive policy, most ;recently witnessed in the Czechoslovak
case."^ ^
Taking Prague Personally: Nonvegiam Élite Perceptions
Norway had made a tremendous^personal investment in fraternal relations 
w ith Czechoslovakian It is unlikelyjthat any other Western country took the 
Prague coup as personally as did k ^  sectors of the Norwegian foreign policy 
establishment. The deep personal relationships which both Trygve Lie (Foreign 
Minister until 1946) and his succesâbr, Halvard Lange (Foreign Minister 1946- 
1965) had with the Czechoslovak" le^ ersh ip  were arguably without parallel in 
the West. Lie himself had built up a  strong personal tie w ith one m an—Czech 
Foreign Minister Jan M asaryk 'Lange had been with Masaryk during the war, 
in fact inheriting the. {Personal relationship from Lie.^ As late as Mid-Summer 
1947, Masaryk had: been in Norwyiy in order to sign a cultural agreement 
between Norway and Czechoslovakia.^^
Masaryk's death/rmore than any other single event, explains w hy Norway 
changed its neutralist/bridge-buildmg-orientation to a security policy strongly 
embedded in the West. The effect of Masaryk's death on Lange cannot be 
overrated. W rapped in Lange'slrreactions were feelings of the loss of a 
personal, close friend, coupled with the feeling of sorrow for a "crushed"
According to Bertil Ohlin, Liberal Party M.P. and highly influential in 
parliamentary foreign policy m ^ e rs , judgement, "according to the hard 
criticism which both tiie conservative and liberal papers are levelling, Wigforss 
reacted by hinting that both partie&perhaps were prepared to drift away from 
Sweden's neutralitycpolicy."(Ohlin^il975:164)
75 N50
At the same time, said N5Q they had an opportunity to talk over Bevin's 
initiative, (towards the establishment of the Economic Commission for Europe). 
Also, Masaryk wasi-"ih heaven because Molotov had accepted the invitation to 
Paris."
51
democracy. "I always date Lange's conversion to my line of thinking to this 
event," said one of his fellow party members, who was, previous to this event, 
supportive of Norway's Western-oriented line.^ Lange's personal "conversion" 
played an arguably greater role than any other event in Norway's path towards 
NATO membership. Lange soon became known as the person who carried the 
DNA and Norway into NATO. In front of an assembled Storting, Lange 
clarified his ideas on the meaning of Czechoslovakia:^*
"The meaning of the events in Czechoslovakia is found on both 
the political and psychological planes. It demonstrates that the 
Czechoslovak communists, in connection with their declaration 
at the founding meeting of Cominform have left the thought of 
'bridge-building' between East and West—between communism 
and democracy...the death of Jan Masaryk made it clear that the 
policy of cooperation, to which he had dedicated his life, no 
longer had any possibilities in the new Czechoslovakia."
For DNA-at-large, "it is totally clear that these events were the basis for the 
shift in Norwegian foreign policy."(Skodvin, 1971:90) To one key DNA member, 
events were especially painful for the DNA leadership because one, 
Czechoslovakia had attempted to conduct the same policy as Norway, with 
respect to the Soviet Union, but also because Czechoslovakia was a 
democracy.^’
Jens Christian Hauge, the Minister of Defence and the so-called "architect of 
Norwegian NATO membership," took a staunch Western line from the outset. 
His thinking on defence matters was based on the idea that "Norwegian security 
was tied to the West."*® According to one former official, up until
^N50




Czechoslovakia, Hauge felt it his responsibility to "drag Lange along,"*' 
towards a Western initiative. However, there is evidence that Hauge saw Soviet 
military policy in a more positive light than his staunch advocacy of alliance 
would lead us to conclude.*^
Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen's views of Soviet foreign policy had been 
public since 1947. One of the most important indicators of Soviet behaviour for 
Gerhardsen was the Czechoslovaks being "forced by Stalin to say no to the 
Marshall Plan."(Solumsmoen and Larsen, 1967:60) The Prime Minister, as did 
other Labour leaders of the time, saw the issue in partially domestic political 
terms, as a fight against domestic communist party  influence.** 
Czechoslovakia was not like the other states who had been "conquered by the 
Soviet Union—Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Albania and Yugoslavia— 
Czechoslovakia had a unique position as a modem . West European 
democracy."*^ Gerhardsen saw in Soviet policy that although the "methods 
were new, the realities were the same."** Gerhardsen saw the Norwegian 
Communists as "Comintem-Cominform-Commumsts, who, like their brothers-in-
81 N50
** Hauge quoted in Skodvin(p.ll6): "There are grounds to point out that the 
Soviet Union has not set in motion direct military operations against any 
country in the Post-War period, and that it has concentrated, to a great degree, 
on security concerns which have been previously defined and clarified."
This standpoint contrasted with a statement approximately a year later (19 
February, 1949): "We must have the courage to admit and give expression to the 
fact that we fear the Soviet Union's expansive foreign policy—for whatever 
motives underlie it...this fear is the chief motive for our foreign policy..."(Amlid, 
1966:48)
** Gerhardsen(l971:197): "We couldn't have any confidence for the 
communists, because they defended what had happened in Czechoslovakia."
*^ Gerhardsen quoted in Solumsmoen and Larsen(l967:72).
** Gerhardsen quoted in Solumsmoen and Larsen(1967:72).
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arms in other countries...are, in their hearts, supporters of terror and 
dictatorship/'^
The Norwegian parties' reactions to Eastern Europe followed a pattern 
similar to Sweden. A significant difference of opinion ran between the 
Norwegian Communist Party and the remaining parties. While the far Left did 
not approve of the methods Stalin utilized, the essential reasons for his actions 
were "understandable," said one former official.*^ The NKP members saw that 
the Soviets had defensive motivations in mind in Czechoslovakia, as one 
individual pointed out: "clearly the Soviet Union's motivation was defensive in 
Czechoslovakia, although I was not in sympathy with either the coup or the bad 
way the Russians handled the situation there."** "The Russians were afraid of 
German policies...the Soviet Union was anxious...therefore, it w asn't all that 
curious that Stalin acted in the way he did," he said, singling out Haakon Lie 
as "very aggressive" and Lange as a man who "nearly wanted a preventative
war."*^
Sweden and Norway Weigh the Defence Alternatives
Sweden: Caught between the Scandinavian Defence Union,
Neutrality and the Western Option
One of the more important outcomes of Soviet behaviour in East Europe was 
that it prompted the Swedish government to take the initiative towards the 
formation of a Scandinavian Defence Union.’® For Undén’  ^ there existed a




^  Defence Minister Vougt, as reported in FO 371.77710.N6485,12 July, 1949.
54
clear connection between events in Czechoslovakia and the SDU initiative. 
Sweden pursued the SDU pathway for several reasons. First, Sweden did not 
w ant to see either Norway or Denmark follow a North Atlantic option. Instead, 
Swedish policy should do all it could to, together w ith Scandinavia, build the 
SDU—a solution which would likely guarantee the Swedish desire to remain 
neutral.’  ^ Yet another reason for attempting a collective solution was the 
realization that an effective unilateral Swedish defence against Soviet attack 
would be impossible.’^
At the same time, Ernest Bevin's speech on 22 January, 1948, advocating a 
Western alliance, ignited a debate in Scandinavia about the possibilities for a 
second alternative: the Atlantic Pact. But the SDU's potential aggressor was no 
different than the Atlantic Pact's: the Soviet Union.’  ^ The negotiations failed.
’\...continued)
Letter cited in Moller(1986:323), dated 11 October, 1954. Undén wrote: "It 
was the great unease in Norway based on the Czechoslovak coup and the 
attendant tendency for Norway to commit herself to the West, which triggered 
the initiative for a Scandinavian Defence Union."
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Social Democratic M.P. T. Nerman, (Riksdagsprotokoll,
9 February, 1949): "Everyone, including the military and civilians, is in 
agreement that an isolated Sweden could not defend itself against Russia for 
more than a short time, in a so-called "delayed defence." From a militaiy 
standpoint, "obviously a coup-like attack has great chances of success in present 
circumstances, for there is practically no military strength in Norway-Denmark 
and a low level of readiness in Sweden." (UDS HP 1 ER, 22 March, 1948).
^  The Scandinavian Defence Committee's final report, released as late as 
1988, made it clear who the "eventual aggressor" actually was: the Soviet Union. 
Social Democratic MP T. Nerman (Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 February, 1949) points 
out that, in the SDU's "Defence Inquiry" "no one in the democratic parties, no 
one in the government or Riksdag, no military person, or anyone in the SDU's 
'Defence Inquiry' has for a second considered that Norden would be attacked 
by any other power than Russia." (ibid).
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most probably because they were "doomed to fail."^ There had been earlier 
attempts at uniting parts of Norden before^ but the prerequisite conditions had 
been absent
The Importance of the Soviet View of Swedish Neutrality
At the essence of neutrality policy is credibility. A neutral state must be seen 
by the potential belligerents as following their chosen path without detour. 
Thus, the Soviet view of Swedish neutrality was crucial to Swedish élites.
The Soviet Union looked upon the talk of and cooperation in the 
Scandinavian Defence Union, NATO or the Marshall Plan as, in varying degree, 
collusion with the West—particularly with the Anglo-Saxon countries. Soviet 
Vice Foreign Minister Zorin stated the Soviet view succinctly, saying: 
"Scandinavian plans for enhanced military cooperation cannot be seen in 
isolation from the ongoing trend of front-building (versus the U.S.S.R.)."^ 
Soviet apprehensions about Swedish neutrality were only kindled when the 
Scandinavian Defence Union's "defence inquiry" continued its work, even when 
it became clear to the Soviet Union that Norway was no longer neutral.’*
The Swedes "held no illusions of the Russian attitude to Sweden joining the 
Atlantic Pact or the formation of a Scandinavian bloc."”  Here the issue of 
bases was crucial. Undén's thinking was crystal clear on this point: "any form
”  Wahlback's conclusion that "the Norwegian and Swedish viewpoints were 
incompatible" is in concord w ith this author. (1973:89)
^  There were Finnish-Swedish negotiations 1937-1939, which occurred as a 
"part of a more vague discussion regarding cooperation amongst the four 
Nordic countries." Wahlback continues: 'b u t these four countries did not fear 
the same enemies, and did not put faith in similar methods to meet the threat..." 
(summarized from Wahlback, 1973:92).
”  Zorin, in conversation with Sohlman, UDS, HP 1 ER, D 31:B/168, on 27 
December, 1948.
’* Sohlman, UDS 5 January, 1949, HP 1 ER, 33:D/2.
”  British Ambassador Farquhar in FO 371.77400.N893/g, 20 January, 1949.
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of military understanding with the Western powers or offers from the U.S. will 
evoke in the Soviets the impression that the United States has received a 
promise for bases on our territory...nothing could possibly be more harmful to 
our peacetime relationship with the Soviets."^ ®® Defence Minister Vougt saw 
the issue in a broader, Scandinavian context, saying it was "essential that no 
foreign bases be established during peacetime in Norway and Denmark.'®^ 
The Bourgeois opposition did attach the same importance to the Soviet 
viewpoint—Sweden should tread its own path.^°^ Perhaps if the Soviet Union 
had known that their initially staunch opposition to the SDU's formation in 
effect catalysed the splitting of Norden into separate security commitments (and 
that two would be NATO), it would have favoured the SDU alternative.'®^ 
According to Sweden's Ambassador to London, Boheman, "if the Russians 
were satisfied that the Western powers could not use Scandinavian territory as 
a base it would be in their interest to leave Scandinavia alone."'®^ From the 
Soviet perspective, unilateral Swedish neutrality was clearly preferred over the 
Scandinavian alternative, however the Soviet press offensive paints a somewhat 
different picture.'®^ Undén felt sure that the Soviet authorities, "with their
'®® Moller(1986:326) citing Undén's diary, 3 May, 1948. 
'®' Vougt in FO 371.77710.N6485, 12 July, 1949.
'®^ Liberal M.P. Ohlin states in Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 June, 1948: "if Moscow 
continues to oppose any form of Scandinavian (military cooperative) 
cooperation, this should, as a matter of course, not effect Sweden's position."
'®^ Undén, quoted by an old Danish politician (Hermod Lanung) as telling 
him "I would have definitely preferred the Danish-Swedish alternative, but I 
couldn't get the military people over to my side."
'®^ British Ambassador Farquhar in FO 371.77400.N893/g, 20 January, 1949.
'®^ Ohlin concludes: "If one listens to the (Soviet) criticism of every form of 
Scandinavian cooperation on Soviet radio and in the press, one could nearly 
draw the conclusion that the Soviet Union would prove equally antagonistic 
towards a Scandinavian Defence Alliance as it would towards Scandinavian 
participation in the Atlantic Pact or the like." (9 February, 1949, 
Riksdagsprotokoll ).
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suspicious minds, would conclude from the Swedish press reactions that 
Swedish efforts to normalize relations were not sincere.^®  ^ Swedish military 
faux pas by no means aided the credibility of Swedish neutrality.^®^ Soviet 
suspicion of Sweden could be awakened by seemingly minute events.^ ®® The 
conclusion one m ust draw  is that the Soviets valued the Swedish decision for 
neutrality, but, especially in the beginning, felt it could have been "cleaned up" 
in certain ways, so as to remove its inconsistencies (criticism of the Soviet 
Union, must importantly).
Perception of Soviet Threat
The Swedish perception of the Soviet threat is interesting because it gives an 
idea of whether leaders felt that a neutral policy was sufficient, faced w ith a 
threat from the East. Undén noted particularly Soviet policy towards Bornholm, 
Finnmark, Spitzbergen as points of potential conflict.^®’ In Undén's mind 
there was every possibility that Sweden could be "dragged into a conflict if the 
Soviet Union were to m ount an attack on Nordic territory and try to place some 
bases there...and if it resulted in Norway adopting defensive measures against 
Russia."” ® He further felt that the Soviet Union m ust see Norden as a 
deployment area if the Scandinavians put Scandinavian territory at the
FO 371.71724.N3244/g, 16 March, 1948.
Case-in-point Commander-in-Chief Helge Jung's speech, UDS HP 1 ER, 
D 35:B/136, 8 December, 1949.
For example, Undén was confronted by the Soviet Ambassador over a 
planned "Estonian Song Festival," 26-27 June, 1948. Undén said he "tried to 
explain that this festival, seen from the Swedish viewpoint, was a natural 
attem pt to hold together people from the same country." (UDS HP 1 ER, 
P.M.,1746, Undén, 30 June, 1948).
UN (Utrikesnamndens Memorialprotokoll), 11 December, 1948: Defence 
Chief Swedlund was cautious in his advocacy of alliance with the West: "It can 
be dangerous to become involved Westwards when we don't as yet know 
anything about American help."
no UN, 17 January, 1949.
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disposition of the W est” ' Ernst Wigforss thought that it was clearly more 
understandable that the Western powers would seek "attack bases" on Swedish 
territory than that the East would pursue the line of attack through 
Scandinavia.” ^
The SDU's Potential Western Connection
There was no doubt that the Americans and the British were attempting to 
secure the participation of the Swedes in the coming Atlantic Alliance.”  ^ It 
is now clear that certain parts of the Swedish leadership also tried to solicit 
assistance from the West. One of the important questions with respect to a 
policy of "armed neutrality" was whence the w ar materiel would come.”  ^ To 
one participant the issue was quite clear: the SDU would receive w ar materiel 
on "advantageous financial terms," but with no "political obligations."” ® The 
Opposition parties continued to hope that the connection with the West would 
become more solid. Wigforss found it "difficult to cooperate with members of 
another defence alliance...therefore (such cooperation) is not of current
1” "Protokoll frân Nordiska samarbetskommitén, 7-8 February, 1948, quoted 
in Môller(1986:323).
” 2 Wigforss' speech, 4 April, 1948, quoted in M oller(l986:309). Again, 
Wigforss saw the possibilities of Sweden abandoning its neutrality by being 
"dragged into war" on the pretense of some event or cause.
UN, 27 October, 1948: Undén admits "the official position of the English 
or the Americans is that they are dissatisfied with our (neutrality) ...but the 
occurrence of such cannot be understood as constituting 'pressure.'" This 
conflicts with Grafstrom's quote of Undén (diary, 18 November, 1947): "Undén 
said, that the Americans have now declared an open diplomatic w ar against the 
U.S.S.R., carrying on propaganda in order to scare and collect supporters."
Rickard Sandler, Social Democratic M.P. and Foreign Minister (1932-39) 
felt that the connection between neutrality and w ar materiel was a secondary 
question, when "the most un-neutral which has been discussed so far is (our) 
thinking." (UN, 20 January, 1949).
”® S5
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interest/'"^ Per Ed vin Skold, the Minister of Finance 1949-1955, saw "Sweden 
being dragged into a Western Pact." Under those conditions, "Skold no longer 
wanted to (be a part of the Government)."” ^
Post-SDU
The NATO option was never seriously debated within the Swedish 
Government, and appeared to be last on the Swedish list of security policy 
alternatives. Besides, from the Swedish perspective, Sweden would get many 
of the benefits of the Atlantic Treaty Organisation without having to pay for it 
by becoming members.” ® Once it became clear that the conditions were not 
ripe for a close intra-Scandinavian defence effort, the Swedes talked for some 
time about joining in a bilateral effort with the Danes(Petersen, 1979:196), who 
allotted highest priority to a neutral SDU. Norway had prioritized a West- 
oriented SDU. Danish Premier Hedtoft asked Erlander to research the 
possibilities for a closer joint Swedish-Danish effort.” ’ However, seen from 
Erlander's perspective, this too would be seen by the Soviets as a "masked 
Swedish Western alliance."^^ Even this effort eventually led to failure.
116 UN 11 December, 1948.
Undén's diary, 5 July, 1948. (the "Skold Crisis."—See Moller(l986:311-2); 
Jonasson(1976).
” ® Norwegian Commander-in-Chief Berg, in conversation with Swedish 
General Swedlund, (FO 371.77713.N3850, 26 April, 1949), seemed angry at 
Swedlund's boasting that Sweden got most of the advantages of NATO without 
having to sign the Atlantic Pact.
” ’ Erlander's first response came on 23 February, 1949. Erlander responded 
that he did not think the conditions were ripe. Dansk Sikkerhedspolitik 1948- 
1966, Fremstillning,p.33.
Erlander paraphrased by Moller(1986:351).
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Norway and the SDU
Evidence exists that, as early as the 22nd February, 1948 the Norwegians 
attempted to seek a Scandinavian solution for their defence woes. In a 
conversation with the Norwegian Moscow military attaché, Danish Commander 
Madsen reported that the Scandinavians were already under attack by the 
Soviet press on the grounds that they had concluded a secret military pact with 
Great Britain and the United States.'^^ But even if these statements were 
untrue, the Soviet Union was still seen as being extremely wary of the West 
utilizing Scandinavian territory in an eventual conflict between East and 
West.'^
One of the major divisions of opinion between Norwegian officials, on the 
one hand and Danish and Swedish on the other was the Norwegian wish that 
any eventual Scandinavian Defence Union should be guaranteed by the 
West.^^ Hauge was perhaps the most interested in eliciting guarantees from 
the British.^^ Two incompatible Norwegian wishes manifested themselves: 
the Scandinavian option of common neutrality, and support and guarantees 
from the West. Sweden objected to the second. Therefore, on this point alone, 
it seems as though the fate of the SDU was already sealed. One could not "have 
the cake and eat it too."
Lange's argument was built on two im portant points, crucial to 
understanding the essential Western role in any future Norwegian defence 
solution. (Brundtland, 1964:179) First, Norway alone was not large enough to
UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 007922, 1 March, 1948.
UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 007922, 1 March, 1948.
Skodvin(1971:97-8) reports on Lange's inquiries for British and American 
support in early 1948.
FO 371.71445.N4194, 7 April, 1948, Hauge to Foreign Office: "the Soviet 
Union knows that it cannot attack the Scandinavian peninsula without w ar with 
the Western democracies."
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deter a superpower. Also, the construction of a Norwegian defence required 
outside assistance, the so-called "supply problem."
The Norwegian assessment of the Soviet threat was not much different than 
the Swedish or the Danish, although it perhaps was phrased in different terms 
and over different issues, which would make the search for a common solution 
difficult.^^ W hat distinguished the Norwegians from the Swedes or Danes 
was their determination of the solution which was most practicable under the 
given domestic and international circumstances. In fact, according to the final 
report of the Scandinavian Defence Commission, there was no doubt who the 
enemy was.^^
'The Russian Note' and Norway's Atlantic Choice
Once it was clear in Soviet minds that Norway had abandoned the 
Scandinavian option and had formally begun a search for a Atlantic solution, 
the Soviet embassy in Oslo delivered a note asking for a clarification of 
Norway's position in the matter.^^^ The note requested to know the 
Norwegian Government's position with respect to the NATO question, in light 
of Norwegian press reports of Norwegian intentions to join the Atlantic Pact.
Lange in secret speech to Stortinget said: "the three Nordic countries are 
not faced by identical security problems, which creates difficulties in trying to 
reach a common line." (UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 012748, 8 April, 1948). Lange 
elaborated saying "there are different interpretations as to the CHARACTER of 
the union wWch is possible to bring about." He attributes this to the different 
approaches to "our geographical situation...our historical experiences," which led 
to the countries to "different judgements about central foreign policy and 
security policy questions." (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 27 January, 1949, )
The Final Report of the Scandinavian Defence Commission (UDN 38.3/3, 
15 January, 1949), each of the Scandinavian countries is presents in turn  a clear 
scenario for Soviet attack.
UDN note received at MF A, 15.00 on 29 January, 1949, no document 
number).
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Furthermore the note inquired whether Norway's planned to host foreign air 
and sea bases on Norwegian territory/^
The Norwegians responded to the note on 1 March, stating that both the 
Government and the Storting had agreed to initiate preparatory discussions 
leading to the specific formation of an Atlantic Pact. The response contained 
the words: "the Government wants to make clear in the most categorical terms 
that it will neither work for a policy that has aggressive objectives or to open 
up Norwegian territory to foreign powers' air force or navy bases, so long as 
Norway is not attacked or exposed to the threat of attack."^^ While the 
Soviets were clearly not pleased, reaction in Moscow was tempered by w hat 
was seen as a "wise and deft formulation in the response" (Hetland, 1984:20-1).
The Norwegian basing policy was thus established prior to Norwegian 
NATO entry. The first consideration of the basing policy was to calm Soviet 
speculations about Norway's intentions vis-à-vis the AP. Another consideration 
in the Norwegian formulation of the basing policy was an internal one, that a 
foreign troop presence in the country could lead to internal friction.'^
The Consideration of a Soviet Attack on Norway
Top Norwegian decision-makers such as Hauge^^^ Lange'^^ and Lie'^
Ibid Note 127. A key Soviet query concerned whether Atlantic Pact 
membership would mean foreign bases on Norwegian territory. The 
Norwegian Government "keyed into" this phrase in its response.
UDN 1 March, 25.2/72 i.
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UDN, March 19,1949,25.2/72: Hauge forwarded the argument that "one 
of the minor imaginable consequences of Norway's membership to the Atlantic 
Pact would be that the Soviet military made a military assault on Norway."
Lange(l966:44) states that it was precisely because of "'sensitivity' to 
Finland that Norway made a last attempt to reach a Scandinavian solution in 
February, 1949."
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of extending a substantial credit to the Soviet U nion/^ This discussion ended 
in an extension of said credit on the 13th of November, 1946.
Behind the Agreement lay a mixture of explicit commercial, political and 
altruistic motivations. One motive which was not stated was that this credit 
extension could indirectly enhance the view of Sweden in the Soviet Union as 
being balanced in its economic relations. First, there was a widely-shared hope 
that the Soviet Union would break out of its isolation and undergo a 
transformation to democracy—a strong political motive(Âberg, 1978:541). The 
financial motive was that there existed unexplored and unexploited markets 
which could profit Sweden's export and import activities.^^ Third, there was 
a strong feeling of empathy for the Soviet Union, which had lost 20 million 
men, having suffered more than any other of the War's v ic to rs .E c o n o m ic  
reconstruction of the Soviet Union as a goal in-and-of-itself was considered 
desirable from the standpoint of Baltic an d /o r Nordic stability. Finally, there 
were domestic Swedish economic goals, such as that the Agreement's possible 
utility as indirect insurance against a coming depression(Hàgglôf,1984:207).
The Content
The Agreement laid down in very precise terms the responsibilities of the 
signatories—a trait of fixed trade agreements which would not disappear until 
the late 1980's. The Agreement called for SEK 300 million in exports to the
These discussions were said to have occurred between Madame Kollontay 
and Ernst Wigforss (S56)
S56; Hagglof(l984:187) writes: the idea was to "create a larger trading 
situation with the Soviets and to establish a more secure footing in the Soviet 
m arket-an  old wish and cherished hope within Swedish industry."
See Hâgglôf(l984:282); Undén thought that Sweden should demonstrate 
"good will" on two grounds: because of the Soviet fight against Nazism and the 
Soviet loss of 20 m. lives. See Moller(1986:268). Erlander aligned himself with 
this view (Erlander, 1973:273).
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Soviet U nion/^  and the Soviet Union bound itself to ordering equipment and 
supplies from Swedish industry with the intention of reconstructing the Soviet 
economy. Deliveries would be spread over a period of five years, at the value 
of SEK 200 million per year (Hagglof, 1984:185). Re-payment would occur 
w ithin a period of fifteen years, at an interest rate in any case not exceeding 
2%.(Hagglof, ibid) (which finally ended up being 2 3/8%, w ith the first three 
years being "interest free.'Y^^
Divisions of Opinion
The "battle lines" in relation to the Agreement were draw n much according 
to the political blocs, with the Bourgeois party establishment in opposition and 
the Social Democratic Government, with the support of certain hopeful business 
circles, in favour. The chief point of Bourgeois opposition was that after the 
war Sweden had to "deal with its own problems."^^
Those individuals who became known as the "founders" of the Agreement, 
Gunnar Myrdal and Ernst Wigforss, in fact inherited the Wartime promises of 
Wartime Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson to the Soviets.^^’ These inheritors 
hardly saw it reasonable that they should turn on their vow. Their chief 
function was to catalyse support for the Agreement, clarify its goals and 
parameters, execute and to some extent defend the ideas embodied in it.
The Agreement was a product of a Swedish vision and a Swedish 
commitment, not a result of a careful examination of the potential costs, benefits
Hagglof(l984:186), involved in the negotiations, writes "for this time 
period, these were wildly large amounts..at the time the Swedish totals were in 
the tens of thousands of Kronor."




and risks that the Agreement would run.'“  No one knew, to be sure, how the 
Agreement would function in practice. Gunnar Myrdal, Minister of Trade 1945- 
1947, started in May 1946 drumming up support for such a plan. Myrdal 
foresaw "a significant increase in our trade Eastwards(Hâgglôf, 1984:208),” 
avoiding however to mention the Agreement by name. By November, the 
Agreement had been passed by the Swedish Parliament.
Criticism Begins
Only a short time had passed before criticism of the Agreement began. In 
1947 there was "only a couple ten thousand million SEK in trade in each 
direction"(Ohlin, 1975:64), although the Agreement had envisioned 200 million. 
Statements made in 1948, such as one by Minister of Trade Gjores,'®  ^
expressing that the terms of the Credit Agreement were not being fulfilled to 
the extent anticipated, were growing more and more frequent Gjores 
mentioned that the Swedes had exported goods valued at 30 million^^^ and 
had imported 55 million SEK.^ ^^  Criticism was especially harsh from the
Hagglof(1984282) is critical here: "When one judges this episode in 
Swedish foreign policy one should not forget that at the end of the war, when 
the promise was made, the Swedish perception of the victorious Soviet Union 
was dominated by an illusion: 'rosenrod (altogether too hopeful) or blue-eyed' 
(naïve)..it varied...and of a deep lack of knowledge."
Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948: Gjores attributed the lack of trade 
and w hy the credit had not been utilized to: "sellers and buyers in most of the 
cases have not been able to agree on prices, or conditions." Because of this, 
"many of the Swedish offers have lapsed, because the Soviets disregarded 
them." He continued, "the aforementioned conditions, in any case for the 
foreseeable future, do not point to a realisation of the export envisioned under 
the Credit Agreement."
Soviet representatives requested goods from the machine industry, the 
metallic industry and the shipbuilding industry.
153 Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948.
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Bourgeois side, but even the Communists^^ acknowledged that the Agreement 
was not proceeding as planned.
A severe trade imbalance^^^ developed: the Soviet Union was exporting 
significantly more to Sweden than the reverse.^^ This imbalance would 
continue unabated through at least the late 1980's. Swedish decision-makers 
had to satisfy themselves with Soviet agreement to accept payment in goods, 
instead of dollars, for the outstanding trade on the Credit Account.^^
This growing gap between perception and reality can perhaps be explained 
by a combination of factors: First, domestic ones: psychological dispositions*^ 
of Swedish industrial leaders,*^’ and the impossibility of Swedish firms to 
make the requested Soviet deliveries. Furthermore, the Soviet delegations were
154 Johansson i Stockholm, Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 February, 1949: "We 
also know that trade between Sweden and the Soviet Union has not been as 
comprehensive as what was visualized in the Trade Agreement"
Not only Sweden "suffered" from a lack of orders from the Soviet Union; 
but other Western companies as well (FO 371.71718.N9377, 19 August, 1948).
Confirmed by Undén, Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 June, 1948. Flen attributed 
this to the fact "it has been easier for the Russians to offer us products that we 
w ant than it has been (the reverse)." J.E.G. Fast further remarked that "the 
Agreement has revised itself, and the deliveries have now fallen far under 
anticipated levels...they have not only sunk to one-half of what was expected, 
but far lower than that."
Swedish Trade Representative Book, FO 371.71718.N10200, 8 September,
1948.
Erlander's explanation was such: "There was hesitation in business circles, 
not to speak of aversion, towards opening up a foreign market, such as the 
Russian when there existed dependable Western markets." Further he noted 
business leaders' scepticism regarding 'break(ing) in a new, unsure piece of 
territory, which was directed by a socialistic, inimical ideology" (Erlander, 
1973:274)
Managing Director of ASEA, Mr. Overgârd, (FO 188.603.87/2c/47, 24 
February, 1947): "The Russians had been very serious, w ithout hum our of any 
kind and obviously very suspicious. When it was pointed out that we could 
not make immediate deliveries the Russians immediately accused us of 
sabotaging the Trade Agreement."
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consistently requesting goods that the Swedes either did not w a n f^  or could 
not export to them.^^^ The Russian negotiating style was also seen as 
foreign/^^
Soviet representatives grew increasingly anxious for Swedish Government 
intervention, in order to apply pressure on the Swedish firms to enforce the 
Agreement's terms.^^ However, the Swedish Government's policy was clear: 
agreements were reached between Soviet organisations and private Swedish 
firms, and the Government would have nothing to do with enforcement, since 
it could not guarantee the performance of Swedish firms.^^
The Bourgeois parties, rather than immediately advocating a revocation of 
the Agreement, first suggested that certain adjustm ents'^ be made and
An unsigned report stated: "One of the greatest objections from the 
Swedish industrialist's point of view is his fear of industrial espionage to which 
his firm will be subjected by the numerous controllers in Russian legation in 
Stockholm to supervise contracts." (FO 188.603, no marking, 11 January, 1947).
Ambassador Sohlman felt that the Soviet authorities were "surprisingly 
uninterested" in the goods available to them from Sweden. (FO
371.77718.N10431, 30 November, 1949).
Those who were sent to negotiate with the Swedes were seen as "tools" 
who had little freedom of movement, always having to consult w ith Moscow 
before any decision could be made. (S56) The head of a Swedish Trade 
delegation, Mr. Modig, also characterised two particular Soviet negotiators as 
being "formalistic and bureaucratic, fussing over little details and having to refer 
everything...but nevertheless not unreasonable." (FO 371.77718.N10431, 30 
November, 1949).
A member of the British legation in Moscow, G.G. Buzzard reported (FO 
371.66497.N10187, 26 August, 1947) that "A Swedish delegation which has just 
returned from Moscow...has been meeting with pressure from the Russians to 
guarantee deliveries."
FO 188.603.35/3/47, 26 August, 1947 or FO 371.77718.N10431, 30 
November, 1949.
Conservative Party Leader F. Domo, Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948: 
"It is much better to openly try to bring about necessary revisions of the 
Agreement than to find ourselves in a situation where we suddenly find 
ourselves in a position of not being able to fulfil a binding agreement."
71
pressure'^ brought to bear on the Soviets in order to salvage the Agreement. 
In essence, many hoped the Russians would alter their strategy and begin 
ordering goods in much greater quantity.^^^ It is interesting that the will to 
salvage, rather than discard, the Agreement was shared across the political 
party spectrum. However, these arguments for adjustments and pressure came 
to no avail: after five years had lapsed the Agreement had yielded a SEK 554 
million, far below all expectafions(Moller, 1986:272).
Norwe^n-Soviet Economic Relations
Spectacular efforts to promote Soviet economic welfare or Soviet trade have 
been absent from the Soviet-Norwegian economic relationship. In fact, the 
political angle of Soviet-Norwegian trade is ambiguous in this period. As one 
person near the Norwegian negotiations of the period remarked, "trade with the 
Soviet Union always had a political angle." The political angle seemed to be 
best reflected in the sort of goods the Soviet Union wanted to trade. "The 
Russians were always trying for hard-to-get materials, not because they 
desperately needed them, but just because they wanted to prove they could 
obtain them,"^^ recalled one MFA official. As opposed to Stockholm, 
commercial terms were the key concept for Oslo and the Government had little 
plans to intervene for purposes of trade promotion.
Ohlin, Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 June, 1948, said "we have to demonstrate to 
the Russians that we care about keeping up the value of our trade with 
them...that on the Russian side they have to exert themselves to create the 
conditions for a fruitful trade between our countries which everyone has hoped 
for."
There was reason to believe this was not forthcoming. Sohlman (FO
371.77718.N10431, 30 November, 1949) said that "the Soviets wanted trade to 
occur in goods because Swedish prices were high and the Soviet authorities 
reluctant to sign contracts for which payment would, in the majority of cases, 
not fall due for several years...by which time the price of Soviet exports might 
have fallen."
168 N 4 9
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The Volume, Composition and Character of Trade: Sweden and Norway Compared
Norwegian trade with the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1949 lacked the 
idealism present in Swedish-Soviet trade following the 'miljardkredit/ The flow 
of Norwegian-Soviet trade relations was above all dictated by commercial 
considerations—grand plans of trade promotion were absent in Oslo. As such, 
trade was not used to support or enhance Norway's chosen foreign policy line.
One similarity with Sweden was that the Norwegian relationship was 
defined by formal trade agreements. A Norwegian-Soviet trade agreement was 
signed on 6 January, 1948, which had been preceded by a two-year trade 
agreement reached in 1946. Even Norway kept a relatively formalized, planned 
trade strategy with the Soviet Union. As with Sweden, this structure would 
disappear in the late 1980's.
As contrasted to the Soviet trade requests from Sweden for manufactured 
goods such as generators and other electrical goods, the Soviet Union desired 
raw materials from Norway. One former official expressed that the Soviets 
were particularly interested in obtaining these "strategic m a te r ia ls ,r e q u e s ts  
which gave some political flavour to Norwegian-Soviet trade. Here the Soviet 
Union particularly desired molybdenum^^®, aluminum and lithium. The Soviet 
Union was also interested in a somewhat broader selection of goods: whale 
oil^^\ grain^^, salted herring, sulphur pyrite '^  for example. The
169 N49
A silver-white brittle metallic element used in steel in the making of high­
speed tools. The Soviet interest for this element is mentioned throughout the 
Foreign Ministry archives, for example see UDN "Notât" 44.4/99,5 March, 1949, 
Jnr. 03969: "Mr. Petrov was especially interested in molybdenum...and said that 
if a contract was not signed including this the Soviet authorities would react 
strongly."
UDN 44.4/99, 1 September, 1947.
UDN 44.4/99, 17 June, 1948.
UDN 44.4/99, Jnr. 00489, no date.
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Norwegians were also interested in an assortment of products from the Soviet 
Union, which included: Glycerine, Montanvoks, gold, copper, brass, lead, sheet 
bars, steel bars, wirerods and wirebars, iron reinforcing bars, amongst other 
things.^^^ Although Moscow-based Ambassador Berg^^ writes that the 
Soviet Union, in the aftermath of the War, was mostly interested mostly in 
importing capital goods, such as electrical motors, water turbines and machine 
tools, Norway's strength did not lie in these areas.
The Norwegian pattern of trade with the Soviet Union seemed markedly 
more balanced than the Swedish directly following the War. In great part, the 
Norwegians would, through to the early 1990's have a much smaller trade 
deficit than the Swedes with Moscow. The Foreign Ministry remarked that "our 
trade with the countries within the Russian sphere of interest has witnessed a 
significant increase after the war."^^  ^ A report remarked further that the 
"value of our trade with the Soviet Union in 1947 was over six times larger than 
the average trade between the 1935-1938."^^ The Norwegian Trade Delegation 
reported that trade between the two countries "had developed as had been 
e n v i s a g e d . I n  1949, the Foreign Ministry commented that trade with the 
Soviet Union had been somewhat larger than had been expected, especially with 
respect to Norway's imports from the Soviet Union.^^’ In terms of contracts, 
the Soviets demonstrated a consistent interest in entering into long-term
6 June, 1947 (UDN 44.4/99, Jnr. 57239).
UDN 45/99.2, Moscow, 25 April, 1948.
UDN 44.4/99, 2 April, 1948.
UDN 44.4/99, 2 April, 1948.ibid.
UDN 44,4/99 Jnr. 00489, (no date, approx. beginning of 1949). 
UDN 44.4/99, 25 November, 1949.
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agreements w ith the Soviets^*®, but the Norwegians seemed to be much more 
interested in keeping them on one-year terms.
Again contrasted with Sweden, Norwegian trade officials expressed an 
overall satisfaction with respect to the level and composition of their Soviet 
trade. It seems as though trade goals which were set were met, although the 
level of trade was never significant. This satisfaction also extended to the Soviet 
authorities.^*^ The Norwegians remarked that the Soviets had made deliveries 
ahead of time, a punctuality which the Norwegians had difficulties in 
reciprocating.^*^ But the authorities professed to understand the risks of the 
East-West conflict on their possibilities to develop further trade relations w ith 
the Soviet Union.^**
The Marshall Plan
The Road to Swedish Adoption of the Marshall Plan
It is interesting to note that the Credit Agreement never had any explicit 
overtones relating to Sweden's security commitment. However, it was assumed 
that the Credit Agreement was an attempt to bring Sweden's relationships 
between the developing superpower blocs into balance. A closer study of the 
Swedish leadership's perceptions and behaviour leading up to Swedish 
participation in the U.S.-sponsored Marshall Plan, however portray a Swedish 
leadership intensely grappling with the dilemma of its chosen security policy's 
compatibility w ith economic necessity and desire.
*^° UDN 44.4/99, 1 September, 1947.
*^^ "Both sides had expressed satisfaction over the trade and were in 
agreement that it should be expanded." (UDN 44.4/99, 1 September, 1947).
*^2 UDN 44.4/99 17 June, 1948.
*^^  UDN 44.4/99, 17 June, 1948.
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The political divisions
Was a Swedish acceptance of the Marshall Plan compatible w ith the 
overarching Swedish foreign policy goals? While the governing Social 
Democratic Party seemed to be the most sensitive to this particular angle, it 
would be misleading to say that Marshall's invitation to Sweden and other 
countries for financial assistance to re-construct a wore-tom Europe created a 
well-defined division of opinion between the Swedish political blocs. In fact, 
the Social Democratic Party itself was divided over the issue, the Bourgeois in 
general had supported it from the outset, while the Communists stringently 
opposed it. In time, consensus did arise within the Social Democratic ranks, 
leading in time to Swedish participation, but not before some preliminary 
discussion of the Marshall Plan's groundwork had been covered.
Molotov's ”Nyet"
Molotov's impending attendance at the Paris Conference was met with hope 
in Sweden.^^ If the Soviet Union also participated, surely Sweden could not 
be seen as taking sides. With Soviet participation, the offer could have been 
considered on its economic merits. Instead, the proposal became a bone of 
political contention in the Cold War.
When Molotov later chose to leave Paris, his departure was met with great 
disappointment.^®^ From the Swedish viewpoint, Russian suspicion, 
unwillingness, and the closed nature of Soviet society, made Molotov's refusal 
to participate seem logical^®^—but not ideal. Prime Minister Erlander perceived 
the withdrawal of the East European states' as very s e r i o u s . M F A  Political 






negative answer in Paris, later writing, "the antagonism between East and West 
has never been as naked (exposed) as it is at present."'®*
Discussion within the Government
Two central considerations needed to be weighted against each other within 
the Government: the price Sweden would have to pay in terms of foreign policy 
credibility vis-à-vis the Soviets and the realisation that "Sweden could not stay 
out of the Marshall Plan" (economic necessity argument).
The Government was not entirely united in its initial responses to the 
question. It was reported'®^ that Undén was extremely suspicious'^, not 
unexpected given Undén's complex notion of neutrality.'^' As for the initial 
reactions of other key figures, Gjores reportedly favoured, Wigforss 
opposed,'’  ^ but Erlander was in favour. Moscow Ambassador Sohlman's 
position was difficult to pinpoint, but Grafstrom intimates that he was in 
opposition.'^®
'®® Grafstrom(1989), 3 July, 1947.
'®^ S51
'90 "It was like taking sides..the OEEC was an instrument for the Western 
powers," (S53)
'^' Ivar Andersson said both Wigforss and Undén had been affected by 
Moscow's harsh campaign of opposition of the Marshall P lan-he attributed it 
to "their socialistic beliefs, as well as the increasingly strong division between 
East and West." (Moller, 1986:295)
Bertil Ohlin's writes(1975:160): "Even Ernst Wigforss, who has tended to 
perceive the Soviets behaviour with unparalleled understanding declared the 14 
of March, 1947 that while the Marshall Plan has 'clearly a political element to 
it...the principle motive of the assistance is such that we will surely like the 
anticipated result."
Grafstrom(1989), 5 July, 1947: "Sohlman's contribution has been to put the 
words, this time into the mouth of the Czechoslovak chargé d'affaires, who says 
that the Marshall Plan is feared for its chiefly political aims, namely to isolate 
the Soviet Union..."
77
Swedish Minister in London, Boheman, reported that earlier Swedish fears 
of its Russian relationship were gradually being replaced by the conviction that 
effectiveness of West Europe's standing up to the Russia depends on the degree 
of success in deploying the Marshall Plan.^^ British Minister in Stockholm, 
Farquhar, mentioned that "the Swedish MF A has acquitted the USA of any 
political motives in extending Marshall Aid."^^ The Marshall Plan was 
perceived by some supporters as not contributing to "bloc building" any more 
than the Soviet-Swedish Credit Agreement did.^^ But as was commonplace 
the Communists had quite different ideas about w hat the Marshall offer 
implied.^^
Consensus-building surrounding the Plan was successful and Sweden 
decided in favour of participation.'^* While Sweden would surely have to pay
FO 371.71723.N1290, 4 February, 1948. 
FO 371.71967.UR.3624, 22 July, 1948.
Ohlin, Rikdsagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1948, explicitly said: "our countrys 
participation in the Marshall Plan does not does not mean that we have joined 
a Western bloc any more than our embarking on the Swedish-Soviet Credit 
Agreement meant joining the East Bloc." This view shared by Social Democratic 
MP, O. Harald Akerberg(ibid), saying, 'W e have a comprehensive trade 
agreement with the Soviets...does this mean that we have joined the Eastern 
Bloc?" He continued, "the Agreement with the U.S. implies, being formulated 
as innocently as it is, a great deal less involvement than the Soviet-Swedish 
Agreement."
Karl Hagberg, Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 July, 1948: "Sweden, through its 
agreement w ith the U.S. and the Marshall countries, has involved itself in an 
American bloc with a military angle."
An interesting change was, according to London Ambassador Boheman, 
Undén, who was to have "stiffened his attitude in the right direction...now, I am 
authorized to say, the Swedish Government wholeheartedly supports the 
Marshall Aid programme and regards it as a step forward in the eventual 
understanding with Russia." (FO 371.71723.N601, 20 January, 1948 with similar 
evidence in FO 371.71723.N767, 20 January, 1948) It is likely that events in 
Czechoslovakia and Finland had increased Undén's support for the Plan, (see 
Grafstr6m(l989), 16 March, 1948)
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a political price to the Soviet Union, economic necessity was seen as sufficiently 
acute so as to give the Swedish Marshall supporters the upper hand.
Only a Slight Doubt: Norway and the Marshall Plan
To understand Norwegian perceptions, and especially Norway's initial 
hesitancy towards the Marshall Plan, one should consider Norway's pre-War 
foreign policy orientation, embodied in its "Bridge-building policy." Bridge- 
building, both in theory and in practice, carried overtones very similar to 
neutrality as debated in Sweden. In Norway, as in Sweden, there were marked 
differences of opinion within the ruling Labour Party. The struggle between 
politicians and officials was chiefly a battle over the degree to which Norway's 
acceptance of Marshall aid could damage both its own foreign policy values and 
credibility—specifically with respect to the Soviet Union.
Responsible Norwegian Debate
According to a figure close to Lange, Lange was immediately negative to the 
plan with the attitude "stay out if we can."^^ Then, according one observer, 
"Stalin tipped the scales...and we decided to participate."^ On 9 July, 1947 
Lange maintained that Norway's decision on the Marshall Plan should not be 
construed as any form of bloc-building. Quite the opposite, it could contribute 
to strengthen and increase economic cooperation between East and West.^^ 
Specifically, a positive decision to join the Marshall Plan should not be seen as 
allying politically with the Western bloc, neither should a negative response 
mean a decision to join a political. Eastern bloc(Lie, 1985:204). The fact that 
Lange felt he needed to make a statement, which just as well could have come
N50. The explicit reasoning was that Norway would become a "prisoner 
of events."
^ N 5 0
UDN 25.2/63, 8 April, 1948.
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from the m outh of a Swedish Governmental official, is telling that Norway's 
formerly neutral role was not dead.
In the Stortinget Lange mentioned that though the Soviets had been in contact 
w ith him over the Marshall Plan and "they had not expressed a preference in 
one direction or the other. In fact, Helgeby intimated that the Soviet Union 
in fact might have regretted not taking part in the Marshall Plan.^^ It m ust 
have been personally painful for Lange to witness the Soviet request of the 
Czechoslovaks to w ithdraw their application to join the Marshall Plan. 
Gerhardsen mentioned that the day that Czechoslovakia was forced to "say no" 
to the Marshall Plan was the day it ceased being an independent state. 
(Salumsmoen and Larsen, 1967:60-1) Lange stressed on April 19, 1948^ that 
"the fact that the Soviet Union and the Communists have rejected the Marshall 
Plan has not prevented Norway from taking part..."^  A key Labour figure, 
Martin Tranmael, supported the Marshall Plan(Lie, 1985:208), seemingly from 
the outset—although he admitted that it entailed political obligations (Lie, 
1985:255). At the public level support for the Marshall Plan was 
considerable.^
The Minister of Finance, Erik Brofoss, was one of the main pillars of 
opposition. While Lie(1985:207) argues that Brofoss was afraid of external
202 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, as quoted U dgaard(1973:211).
UDN 25.2/63 Jnr. 017061, 7 June, 1948: "Perhaps they are finding reason 
to ask themselves why they couldn't attain more, by instead of attacking the 
Marshall Plan had joined in the systematic opposition, so that the Plan could 
not reach its goals."
204 FO 371.71485.N4816, 21 April, 1948.
Confirmed in another of Lange's speeches, reported in FO 
371.71485.N1791,11 February, 1948. He adds that "It is clear in the Norwegian 
case that its foreign economy is oriented towards the U.S. and the other 
countries who took part in the Paris conference."
^  Lie(l985:224): In a Gallup Poll, 85% of those w ho knew what the Plan 
was about, supported it...this included about 50% of the Communist Party 
voters.
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pressure to liberalise the Norwegian economy which would put the Norwegian 
planned economy in danger, Udgaard finds the answer in a deep mistrust of 
American economic policy .^ Udgaard's is an interesting argument because 
it seems that Norway may have used ''bridge-building" as a shield (and all of 
the possible Soviet reactions as a sword) in an attempt to shelter a planned 
Norwegian economy from the economic policies of countries governed by a 
different economic ideology (Udgaard, 1973:219). Another tangible point of 
opposition was the untimely nature of the Marshall proposal, coming, as it did, 
on the heels of the Truman Doctrine. As such, the Marshall assistance was 
partially seen as a continuation of the Truman doctrine, and as symbolizing a 
further widening of the gap between East and West(Lie, 1985:208).
The Communists were not as critical of the Plan itself as they were of the 
way assistance was rendered. In fact, the overall tone of Norwegian 
Communist opposition was less critical than in Sweden. The Communist party 
proposed at one stage that Marshall Aid be funnelled through the United 
N ations,^  a logical step in view of Norway's strong convictions about the role 
of this body. Communist M.P., Vogt, felt that "it was correct to say that the 
Marshall Plan for (Norway) does not imply any sort of aggression against an 
Eastern bloc...it is a natural form of economic and cultural cooperation with 
what we call the Western democracies."^
It should be emphasized that when Norway first decided to enlist the 
Marshall Plan's assistance, it had only requested $100 million, which the 
American Government promptly increased to $170 million. One of the reasons 
which has been forwarded for this is that Norway made a conservative estimate, 
since it only wanted to make a minor political commitment. Irrespective, the
^  U dgaard(1973:218): "Brofoss said the Marshall Plan countries risked 
importing not only American goods, but also an American depression."
^  Communist Party leader, Emil Lovlien quoted in Aftenposten, July 11, 
1947, as quoted in Udgaars(l973:227).
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 12 February, 1948.
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Norwegian decision to participate was one of the first landmarks of her 
convinced Western orientation—which would not be formalized until two years 
hence. Norway's initial approach leading to its participation in the Marshall 
Plan was similar to Sweden's. At this early stage, 1946-7, Norway's and 
Sweden's security orientations were alike—both countries pursued neutralist 
policies—although Sweden called it neutrality and Norway called it bridge- 
building. In practice, this meant that the core concern that the Marshall initiative 
could collide with neutralist aspirations, first had to be resolved.
TRADE STATISTICS'^®




Plant oil,fat 58% Plant oil,fat 68%
Fish 39% Fish 20%
Fish oil 6% Aluminum 6%
Sweden
1947 1949
Transp equip 45% Machine-app 58%
Machine-app 15% Non-prec metal 37%
Fur-leather 13% Transp equip 2%
Trade volume for 1947,1949 is given in chapter on Soviet trade 1987-1991.
U tenrikshandel (Oslo: Statistisk Sentralbyrâ;
Sveriges Offentliga Statistik, Handel (Stockholm: Kommerskollegium) and 





Grain 63% Grain 87%
Fuels 9% Ore 4%
Ore 9% Fuels 2%
Sweden
1947 1949
Fur-leather 31% Min prod 's 76%
Min prod's 30% Veg m at's 12%
Non-prec m et's 19% Fur-leather 5%
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TIMETABLE OF IMPORTANT EVENTS: 1957-1991
1957 Soviet "Baltic as Sea of Peace" proposal
1958 Bulganin's Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal
1959 Osten Undén's response to Bulganin's proposal
1961 The 'U ndén Plan' launched
1963 'Kekkonen Plan' launched
1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty signed
1975 Norwegian "Bratelli Doctrine" on Port calls formulated
1978 Norway signs Grey Zone agreement with S.U.
1979 NATO's Double Track Decision
1980 Evensen NNWFZ "initiative"
1981 Soviet U-137 incident in Karlskrona
1983 Olof Palme speech clarifying Swedish stance on NNWFZ 
1984-6 Stockholm Conference on CSBM
1985 Inter-parliamentary group founded to study NNWFZ
3/1986 Swedish ordnance regarding export control (COCOM)
9/1986 Inter-MFA group founded to study NNWFZ
10/1986 Reykjavik Summit: U.S.-S.U.
7/1987 Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk scandal becomes public 
10/1987 Gorbachev's Murmansk speech 
12/1987 INF signed
1/1988 Swedish-Soviet Baltic delimitation treaty signed 
12/1988 Gorbachev UN speech announcing unilateral cutbacks 
3-6/1989 Soviet submarine accidents in Norwegian Sea
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11/1989 Gorbachev speech in Helsinki
11/1989 FM Andersson trip to Baltic republics
1/1990 Lightening of COCOM regulations
3/1990 Lithuanian declaration of independence
4/1990 Lithuanian PM Prunskiene trip to Scandinavia
5/1990 Superpower summit in Malta
6/1990 Lightening of COCOM regulations
9/1990 Ronneby conference with SU and Baltic participation
9-10/1990 Serious Soviet payment problems begin
9/1990 Soviet proposal and Swedish rejection of Incidents-at-Sea Treaty
10/1990 Nuclear testing resumes at Novaya Zemlya
10/1990 Soviet-Norwegian Incidents-at-Sea Treaty signed
11/1990 EKN and GIEK decide to restrict export credit guarantees to SU
11/1990 CPE Agreement signed in Paris
1/1991 Violence, result, in deaths in Baltic capitals
2/1991 Nordic Council's support for Baltic cause heightened at 39th session 
3/1991 'final' report of inter-MFA grp on NNWFZ presented 
3-6/1991 Swedish and Soviet Defence Ministers; Defence Chiefs resume visits 
5/1991 Lightening of COCOM regulations 
19-22.8.91 Soviet coup d'état
25.9.91 Norwegian recognition of Baltic state independence
27.9.91 Swedish recognition of Baltic state independence
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Chapter Three
Soviet disarmament proposals in historical perspective: The Nordic Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone
Background
The Soviet proposal for a Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone(NNWFZ) has 
been one of the longest lived themes in Soviet-Nordic relations/ effectively 
spanning from the mid-1950's to 1991. However, varying Nordic perceptions 
regarding Soviet motivations and intentions which underlay the proposal have 
underm ined its credibility and potentially constructive aspects. Much of the 
reason the Nordic countries have been unable to reach agreement is that the 
region is dominated by divergent security policies. The proposal has run 
contrary to central elements of Norway's alignment policy. Key Swedish élites 
have long supported the establishment of an NNWFZ, but even here it has 
fallen along the wayside partially because it also violated certain key aspects of 
neutrality. Namely, an NNWFZ had to be seen, not from a limited geographical 
perspective, but rather in a wider international perspective—and including the 
participation of both superpowers.
An in-depth examination and comparison of Norwegian and Swedish élite 
perceptions of the Soviet Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone forms part of this 
inquiry because of the tremendous spectrum of Soviet foreign policy behaviour 
that it encapsulates. The NNWFZ is also a proposal w ith strong historical 
referents. Finally, the issue has proven to be a recurrent and resilient theme in 
the relations between Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union.
The debate in Sweden and Nord en has focused upon three central themes: 
the zone's extent: both geographically and in terms of weapons, centring about 
the status of the Baltic Sea, and which measures the Soviet Union should take
 ^The literature on the NNWFZ is substantial. See Lindahl (1988), Maude 
(1983), Môttôllâ (1983), Tunberger (1982).
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with respect to its own territory; guarantees from the nuclear powers: discussed 
from the standpoint of Sweden's neutrality and independence; the eventual 
connection between the NNWFZ and the greater, European context and to the 
military balance(Braconier and Christiansson, 1985218).
Brief History
The first Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone proposal, forwarded by Soviet
Premier Bulganin in a note to his Norwegian and Danish colleagues in January,
1958,^ occurred against the background of a string of W arsaw Pact-inspired
nuclear free zone initiatives—the most famous of which was the Rapacki Plan.
In Riga in 1959, Khrushchev made clear the NATO connection:
"It would be very advantageous for the Scandinavian peoples 
if the Nordic area could be a nuclear-free zone, wherein there 
are no foreign military bases...I hope that this will be correctly 
interpreted by Norway and Denmark if I say that these 
countries have ended up in NATO as a result of a mistake."
(Dahlberg, 1990:167)
Thus, it was no wonder that the original target of the plan was perceived by 
the Nordic region to be the NATO countries. The proposal was immediately 
seen as an attempt to split off Norway and Denmark from NATO, and thus 
interpreted by some leaders as attempting to upset the reigning security policy 
status quo in the Nordic region. It was further seen as an attem pt to rid the 
Scandinavian area of the NATO presence—and if this was not possible, at least 
to neutralize its effect. These initial perceptions would pervade all later Soviet 
efforts to press the issue in Norway. Even for Sweden, a Norway isolated from 
NATO would have serious consequences for stability in the region.
Many of the first Swedish and Norwegian reactions witnessed puzzlement 
of w hy Soviet territorial areas were not included. A speech by Foreign Minister
 ^ Lindahl (1958:52) writes "the 1958 move can be considered as a Soviet 
"feeler," while it would not be until Khrushchev held a speech in Riga in June, 
1959 that the feeler would become a "major initiative."
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Undén^ in 1959 lay the basis for Swedish policy until the early 1980's. A 
speech in the same vein was given by Undén in 1960, where he reminded the 
Soviet Union:
"for the time being the only state on the Baltic coast which 
has nuclear weapons is the Soviet Union...! find it hard to 
imagine that the Soviet Union would be willing to ban 
nuclear weapons from a significant zone of her territory in 
conjunction with an eventual establishment of a nuclear- 
free Baltic!"^
Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen, responded: "I cannot neglect to mention 
to you Norway's bewonderment regarding the expression of interest in such a 
(zone), w ithout any hint or reference to the part of Northern Europe that lies 
within the Soviet Union's frontiers"(Holst, 1967:116).
Since the proposal's launching, advocacy for the measure has been mostly 
on the side of the Nordic neutrals Finland and Sweden, while the bastion of 
opposition has been the Nordic NATO members, Norway the most prominent. 
The Soviet proposal aimed at splitting Norway off from common NATO 
strategy. A basic difference between Sweden and Norway is that nuclear 
weapons play a key part in NATO's military strategy, whilst being largely 
absent from Sweden's strategy. As said one former Norwegian official, "(the 
NNWFZ) would mean that the flexible response strategy would not cover 
Norway."^ The proposal also was said to hinder one of NATO's core strategies, 
the so-called "flexible response" strategy. For Sweden, it was important to point 
to and actively work against the spread of nuclear weapons in public fora. 
Thus the NNWFZ provided a suitable opportunity to publicize a foreign policy 
goal, the achievement of which would not be perceived to benefit either bloc
 ^ "Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1959" (Stockholm: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 1960), p.26
 ^Utrikesfrâgor (Stockholm: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1960), p.2.
^N4
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more than the other. However, the Swedish leaders had to be very sensitive not 
to push the issue so hard that they could be interpreted as taking sides, in what 
was chiefly seen to be a Soviet proposal.
The Undén Plan
The first positive reception of the Soviet Union's proposals came from the 
Swedish side in the form of the so-called "Undén plan" presented to the United 
Nations on October 26,1961. Foreign Minister Undén mentioned that he would 
like to see a ban on nuclear testing, as well as mentioning certain regional zone 
arrangements (including the Baltic Free Nuclear Zone (hereafter BFNZ) 
proposal. For the times, the proposal seemed futuristic, for the Nuclear 
Proliferation Treaty (1968) and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty would not come 
until several years thereafter. The UN's General Assembly approved Undén's 
plan. According to it, the UN's General Secretary was to inquire which 
demands the nuclear-free zone states would put, in order to (promise) to refrain 
from manufacturing, or by any other way obtain, nuclear weapons or to accept 
nuclear weapons on its territory on another party's behalf."^ At the time, the 
Swedish position on the NNWFZ reflected Sweden's general opposition to 
nuclear weapons and its desire to see the issue discussed in larger international 
fora.^
Norway could not hide its displeasure. The initial Norwegian reaction 
would be repeated, in varying forms throughout the life of the NNWFZ 
proposal. Foreign Minister Lange responded that the problem with a NNWFZ 
was two-fold.® One, it would require Norway to commit itself not to receive 
nuclear arms on Norwegicin territory under any circumstances. This option may
6 IIEn karnvapenfri zon i Nord en" (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1984:8)
 ^ Another motivation was of a domestic political character, namely 
opposition to the development of an independent Swedish nuclear capacity. 
(Tunberger, 1982:35)
® Gerhardsen (1972) cited in Lindahl(1988:70).
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be seen as 'a  card up its sleeve' in the case of Soviet aggression against Norway. 
As a matter of policy, Norway forbids the placement of nuclear weapons on 
Norwegian territory. But Norway enjoys the option of revoking this policy if 
the Norwegian threat perception were to change drastically to the negative. The 
second problem was that the plan seemed to have as a consequence the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe, resulting in a radical shift in the balance 
of power. Former Labour Party leader Haakon Lie wrote that the result would 
be an inherent imbalance in the favour of one side(l983:97).
The 'Kekkonen Plan'
Finland also responded in a positive vein to the Soviet proposals. The Finns, 
and especially President Urho Kekkonen, may have been more vocal than any 
other Western nation over the proposal due to the possibilities which an 
advocacy of this proposal gave to "gain points in Moscow." The problem for 
the Finns came when the Nordic countries started to take the measure 
seriously.’ Finland may even have caused some minor tensions in this region 
by making proposals and adopting roles that strained its relations with its 
Scandinavian neighbours(Hakovirta, 1985:29).
Kekkonen launched his own "Kekkonen Plan" in 1963, an initiative which 
shared many points with the Undén Plan launched two years previously. In 
fact, Kekkonen called his plan "a localized adaptation and application of 
Undén's proposal,"^® a typification which the Swedes disliked. However, there 
was a substantial difference between the two: while Undén's was an
’ Interview, Finn Sollie in Norway. Additionally, one Swedish official said 
that in the 1970's "Kekkonen renewed the idea, assuming that general Nordic 
reactions would be negative. But he created a process not anticipated by 
Kekkonen and his advisors, something that the Soviet Union nevertheless tried 
to exploit." (S30)
En karnvapenfri zon i Norden (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1984),
p. 9.
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international proposai, which reflected the Swedish Government's overall efforts 
to stem the spread and use of nuclear weapons, the Finnish proposal was, 
although also reflective of Finland's advocacy against nuclear weapons, was 
interpreted as being foremost regional in character and thus was seen, in certain 
circles, as promoting the Soviet strategy to split the Nordic area.
The Norwegian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister both issued statements 
saying the initiative was imbalanced." Gerhardsen pointed directly to whom 
he perceived as the source: "the initiative has come from the Soviet Union. 
Both the Swedes and the Norwegians pointed out that the question of European 
nuclear-free zones m ust be seen in a broader context: together with efforts to 
achieve a test ban and disarmament concerns more generally.^^ This position, 
of the necessity of seeing the issue in a wider geographical and conceptual 
context would be repeated when the proposal was formally "put to sleep," in 
1991."
Between 1963 and 1978, Kekkonen's personal involvement in the question 
was minimal (Tunberger, 1982:70). However, in 1978 he made a speech in 
Stockholm pointing to the importance of an NNWFZ chiefly, he said, because 
rapid technological developments meant that nuclear weapons could now reach 
Norden, Then-Centre Party Foreign Minister, Karin Soder, politely shelved the 
issue by declaring that the issue needed further study, noting the nuclear 
weapon-bearing Soviet Golf-class submarines which had, in the meantime, 
moved into the Baltic Sea(Tunberger, 1982:74). Norway's then-Foreign Minister,
"  Lange, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 10 October, 1963 and Gerhardsen in 
Arbeiderbladet, 21 April, 1964 (Holst, 1976:185-6, as quoted in Lindahl, 1988:82)
Dagbladet, 14 March, 1964, as quoted in Lindahl, 1988:82.
Holst (1967:184) and Dagens Nyheter, 30 May, 1963 as quoted in 
Tunberger (1982:40)
"  By the Inter-Nordic MF A Group formally investigating the possibilities for 
an NNWFZ. Rapport frân Nordiska am betsm annagruppen for undersoktiing 
av forutsattningam a for en karnvapenfri zon i nordiskt omrâde(Karlshamn: 
Swedish Foreign Ministry, 23 March, 1991).
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Knut Frydenlund, said he shared Kekkonen's worries about the pace of 
technological advancement, however adding that the Norwegian viewpoint in 
the matter was unchanged.
Intermittent Interest from 1980 to the Present
Moscow conducted, in the early 1980's an intensive Ccimpaign for a 
regionally-delimited NNWFZi, which became Moscow's standard solution to the 
Nordic security policy problem(Jonson, 1990a:144). One Norwegian advisor 
explained that a part of this activity might have been attributable to "the 
Russians becoming increasingly disturbed by some particular U.S. naval 
exercises by carriers near the Lofoten islands."^^ Furthermore, it was 
suggested, they also thought that the nuclear threat was increasing with the 
presence of the U.S.S. Iowa in the Baltic.^^ Yet another official considered that 
this effort coincided with a Soviet effort to 'get at the INF's in West 
Germany.'^®
The Evensen Diversion
Perhaps the most important departure from the Norwegian NNWFZ 
opposition of some twenty years(Tamnes, 1983:225) came in the form of a 
speech by Norwegian Labour Law of the Sea Minister, Jens Evensen,^’ held at
J. Tunberger's quote of Frydenlund (found in Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry's Press Release, 2 June, 1978): "The thought of putting a Nordic 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone into treaty form should be seen in a wider 
geographical framework than (solely) the Nordic countries."
16 Finn Sollie, 17 January, 1991.
During a large NATO manoeuvre in 1985 the Iowa sailed into the 
Southern Baltic and exercised. (Dahlgren, 1990:170)
Written comment by I. Lindahl.
Evensen's full view on the NNWFZ can be found in his article, 
"Refleksjoner omkring atomvâpen og atomvâpenfrie soner i Europa," in Eckhoff 
and Owe, 1983.
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the Chemical Association on October 3 ,198(P. Evensen's initiative broke open 
a debate on the issue which had been largely absent in Norway. Evensen 
advocated discussions between the Nordic countries on the possibilities of 
formally creating an NNWFZ. Evensen likewise warned of the consequences 
of the Norwegian decision to increase the quantities of heavy NATO armament 
in Trondelag in Northern Norway(Lindberg, 1980:28).
Such was the climate at the time that Evensen and other supporters of the 
NNWFZ initiative could not have foreseen neither the fallout nor the attraction 
the move would bring forth(Tunberger, 1982:79). Norway's NATO allies, the 
U.S., West Germany and the U.K. inquired whether a change in the Norwegian 
NATO policy and its attitude to the NNWFZ was to be expected(Lindberg, 
1980:29). The Norwegian leadership split over the initiative, dividing a 
leadership which had previously presented a united front of opposition to the 
NNWFZ idea. Foreign Minister Frydenlund was quoted as having said "I feel 
personally offended...I don't understand why he had to come out w ith his 
initiative at this very m o m e n t.F ry d e n lu n d 's  successor, Svenn Stray, the new 
Conservative Norwegian Foreign Minister from 1981, was likewise negatively 
disposed to what seemed to be a one-man démarche, alongside but not parallel 
to Norwegian official policy^ and threatened to let Evensen go.^
^  Bring (1987:169) writes that Evensen advocated the establishment of an 
NNWFZ; in exchange the nuclear states would give the signatories guarantees 
not to attack or threaten these countries with nuclear weapons.
Tunberger, 1982:80; Aftenposten, 11 October, 1982.
^  N.M. Udgaard, "Norge, Evensen og Barentshavet," Aftenposten, 15 
October, 1980.
^  B.I. Bye, "Jens Evensen er truet med sparken," A rbeiderbladet, 29 October, 
1981. The threat to remove Evensen, the chief negotiator in the Barents Sea 
jurisdictional dispute, became a, what may be regarded in some quarters as, 
major domestic political battle with relatively clear political lines: The Labour 
Party and Trade Union, LO, on the one hand and the Conservative Party, on the 
other.
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There were two chief reasons that the démarche drew  so much attention: 
Evensen's strategic position as Law of the Sea Minister and his connection with 
Ame Treholt, the diplomat who had negotiated the Norwegian-Soviet Grey 
Zone Agreement (arrested for espionage in 1985).^ That an individual of such 
high official standing could publicly go against the grain of accepted NATO and 
Norwegian practice and policy was unthinkable.
There were several other causes for heightened interest in the NNWFZ in the 
early 1980's. One proximate cause could have been the Double-Track decision 
which NATO took in 1979.^ The issue became contentious in the Labour 
Party, due to some comments by U.S. officials about nuclear w ar and the 
feasibility of nuclear weapons, further fuelled by harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric and 
a general chill of East-West relations.^ In the Fall of 1982 the Labour Party 
decided not to appropriate money for the part of NATO's Infrastructure 
Program which would fund the deployment of U.S. intermediate missiles in 
Europe in 1983.^  ^ A later element which contributed to the heightened interest 
in the early 1980's was, according to one Swedish Foreign Ministry source, 
Brezhnev's indicated willingness to include Soviet territory into such a zone 
arrangement.^
^  N.M. Udgaard poses the essential question: "How do Ambassador Jens 
Evensen's opinions and his position as the Chief Negotiator with the Russians, 
affect the Kremlin's anticipations and the policy formulated in the Kremlin?" 
("Norge, Evensen og Barentshavet," Aftenposten, 15 October, 1980).
^  J.J. Holst, "Norwegian Security Policy," in Holst, Sjaastad and H unt 
(1985:226, 239)
“  Kelleher, "Norwegian Defense Policy," in Kelleher and Mattox (1985:308). 
27 Kelleher(1985:308).
2* S40. This willingness was expressed in a June, 1981 interview with 
Finnish Suomen Sosialdemokratti; Pravda, 27 June, 1981.
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Consensus Building in the Government
A key step in the battle to re-gain consensus within the Norwegian 
leadership was the then-Labour Party Chairman, Reiulf Steen's, announcement 
on 2 December, 1980 that "Norway wants to work towards a Nordic Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zone, as a part of the work for nuclear free zones in a w ider 
European context"(Tunberger, 1982:81). Summing up the period 1982-1984 one 
Norwegian diplomat said: "the left wing of the Labour Party supported the 
demands of the peace movement^—their new lease on the NNWFZ was part 
of that."^ The issue then was officially placed on the Norwegian political 
agenda. The 1981 Labour Party Congress resulted in a formulation practically 
identical to Steen's statement—except the formulation "disarmament efforts in 
a wider European context" replaced "nuclear free zones in a wider European 
context."^^ The Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting clarified the issue 
three years later (May, 1984), when it made a clear distinction between an 
"isolated zone" and a NNWFZ in "a broader European context.
Conservative Prime Minister, Willoch, would distance himself from the 
Labour Party line.^^ In fact, Brundtland and Willoch, as representatives of their 
respective parties, would debate the issue despite the ostensible parliamentary
According to Tamnes, Holst was one of the chief architects of the new 
Norwegian Labour Party zone concept in the early 1980's (Tamnes, 1983:242)
^ N 3
Tunberger (1982:86) One high Norwegian Labour official said, "when we 
changed our line in 1981, we meant that it should be developed in cooperation 
with the other NATO countries—but we also meant that a part of the Soviet 
Union should be included !"(N27)
“  Lindahl (1988:133): The Committee stressed the necessity of such a 
NNWFZ proposal taking place in the context of Norway's NATO membership. 
As such, indeed, the zone proposal's breakthrough in Norway did not mean as 
much—since the U.S. and the U.K. had earlier made it clear to Norway that the 
idea was incompatible with her NATO membership.(Ausland, 1986:57-8)
"Gro Harlem Brundtland om zonen: Aktiv norsk regering tar kontakt for 
handlingsplan," Hufvudstadsbladet, 8 December, 1984.
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consensus which ostensibly existed over the issue.^ Willoch's standpoint was 
clarified in 1986, when Willoch clearly singled out the Soviet factor in the 
NNWFZ,^^ At the core of Willoch's personal and much of the Conservative 
Party's general opposition is found in the effects (an NNWFZ) would have on 
Norway's NATO ties and upon the underlying consequences for Norwegian- 
Soviet relations the conclusion of such an agreement would have.
In 1985 the Norwegian Foreign Ministry issued a feasibility study of the 
NNWFZ called the "Colding-Committee Report." The report itself was 
interpreted in varying ways in Norway. From the Socialist Left Party, Theo 
Koritzinsky said the report "should have been entitled 'The dangers of a nuclear 
free zone in Norden' instead of the real title 'The question of a nuclear free zone 
in Norden.'"^ Centre Party's Johan Buttedahl called the report "interesting; it 
illuminates both questions and possibilities of an NNWFZ.
Swedish Reactions in the Aftermath of Evensen
In Sweden, enthusiasm for the zone idea gained an audience in the aftermath 
of the Evensen initiative. However, Evensen's move did cause some splintering 
of opinions across the political spectrum.^ There also occurred an important
^  Ibid, H ufvudstadsbladet Brundtland points out that "even the 
(Conservative) Party is ready to (join) in the work for an NNWFZ."
7 April, 1986 (NUPI, 1986): "our point of departure in the question of the
zone is that nowhere in the Nordic countries are stored nuclear weapons. A
declaration of an NNWFZ would mean supplementing this reality w ith a 
guarantee that a Soviet attack of the Nordic area would not be met by the use 
of nuclear weapons."
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 December, 1985.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 December, 1985.
^  The Conservative Party has spoken out most boldly against the NNWFZ. 
Carl Bildt (on 21 June, 1981, Svenska Dagbladet called the NNWFZ proposal 
a 1950-style solution to a 1980-1990-style problem." For Bildt, the greatest Soviet 
nuclear threat did not come from n u c le i  weapons based in Norden's vicinity, 
rather the SS-20's which were placed near the Urals.
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division of opinion within the Social Democratic ranks.^’ The Swedish Riksdag's 
Foreign Affairs Committee,^ expressed a desire for the "Swedish Government 
to establish contacts with its fellow Nordic Governments to examine the 
possibilities of reaching common ground, towards the establishment of a 
(NNWFZ), as a link in the (more general) work for a nuclear free Europe.
Flowever, the grounding of a Soviet submarine in Karlskrona in 1981 
sounded the death knell of all but the most utopian aspects of an NNWFZ for 
Sweden.^ The contradictory nature of Soviet policies was illuminated by the 
fact that the submarine was said to have contained nuclear weapons 
onboard.(Leitenberg, 1982:17-28) The recurrent Soviet declarations that the 
Baltic should be free of nuclear weapons^^ had been put into a new light.^ 
The Foreign Affairs Committee report of 27 May, 1982 contained a reference to
Inga Thorsson, a powerful Social Democratic figure in disarmament 
questions—put into question the proposal's realism. According to her a zone in 
Norden would hardly lead to a nuclear-free Europe. Svenska Dagbladet, 30 
January, 1983.(Braconier and Christiansson, 1985:222)
^  Riksdagstryck 1980/81: UU26), 3 June, 1981.
"En karnvapenfri zon i Norden," (Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet, 1984),
p .l l .
^  The submarine incursion had two direct effects on the NNWFZ: in the 
first place it forced—for a while—the plan to be placed on the backbum er by 
supporting Nordic states and the Soviet Union. Secondly, it forced all Swedish 
political parties into a consensus that the Baltic Sea would have to be included 
in any zone arrangement. (Lindahl, 1988:173)
See the first Swedish official statement in 1978 by then-Foreign Minister, 
Hans Blix, Utrikesfrâgor 1987 (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1978).
^  Brundtland writes ("Nedrustning i Europa vâr utfordring," in Jagland and 
Johansen, (1982:386): "The episode in the Fall of 1981 of a Soviet submarine in 
the (Karlsl&ona) archipelago did not extinguish the 'thought of an (NNWFZ.'"
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the Karlskrona incident's impact on viability of the NNWFZ proposal.^ It 
became clear that if the Soviets felt they could violate the neutral Sweden's 
sacrosanct borders, especially with nuclear weapons, little credibility could be 
allotted Soviet disarmament proposals.
The shift to a Bourgeois government in 1982 would sound the starting gun 
for a new Social Democratic NNWFZ promotion drive.^ These drives were 
important, for they enhanced the declaratory value of Sweden's neutral policy— 
in a way that many would regard as impartial. On 1 June, 1983^  ^ Palme 
again^ took up the NNWFZ. The speech's timing coincided with the first 
concrete Soviet proposal to provide guarantees for an NNWFZ.^’ According 
to Palme the NNWFZ proposal should not be subordinated to the developments 
in the European negotiations(Palme, 1983:10). Palme wrote: "we are not able to 
judge how a particular duty from one side will be reciprocated by a measure 
on the other side, such that the basic security-political stability in Norden will 
not be damaged." This speech bears remarkable similarities to the statement 
contained in the final report of the Nordic Foreign Ministry Study Group in late 
1991.
^  Riksdagstryck 1981/82:UU23, 27 May, 1982: "...through the occurrence of 
the Soviet submarine's violation in Swedish militarily-restricted area...(this 
event) focused attention on the Baltic's status in connection with a (NNWFZ). 
A natural demand would be that the Baltic be made nuclear-free."
^  Braconier and Christiansson (1985:224) write that the responsibility for its 
advocacy now fell on Sweden's shoulders. Swedish Liberal Party MP, Hans 
Lindblad, said that "Palme's taking over the question upset the Finns."
One Swedish Foreign Ministry advisor said "the re-surfacing of the 
initiative 1982-3 emerged amongst the advancement of (a barage) of other Soviet 
peace initiatives." (S31)
^  Several Social Democratic interview politicians and party officials referred 
to this speech as the turning point in Social Democratic policy towards the 
issue.
Nordic Social Democratic Group for study of NNWFZ, (1988:22)
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Variations of Palme's thoughts would be repeated in following years“ , 
however not w ithout the usually attendant divergent opinion.®^ This speech 
would effectively eliminate any remnants of neutral Sweden's previous attempts 
to advocate a zone detached from the trends in other parts of Europe. Now it 
was important to have the support and guarantees from NATO, W arsaw Pact 
and neutral states alike. This seemed a sheer impossibility in the case of an 
isolated NNW FZ
NNWFZ Descends the Political Agenda: 1985-1991
With Gorbachev's ascent to power, the NNWFZ as a bilateral issue between 
Sweden or Norway and the USSR, faded into the background. However, there 
occurred two important events during Gorbachev's tenure. One was the 
formation of a Nordic parliamentary study group of the proposal, essentially a 
Social Democratic-Centre Party-Left Party®  ^ grouping—founded by former 
Danish Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen in 1985. The group has entered into 
several discussions in Moscow in recent years.®  ^ One of the group's functions 
is to emphasise the amount of consensus between the political parties that the 
initiative has mustered.^ The group can however not boast participation from 
all of the Nordic political parties—most notably the Conservative parties—those 
which have thought most positively of the NATO role in the area. According
“  Riksdagstryck 1983/84:UU1,13 December, 1983.
Bourgeois Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom in Svenska Dagbladet, 8 
April, 1983, wrote an NNWFZ "should be judged upon its own merits, and 
should not become dependent on developments in other parts of Europe." (a 
statement which contrasted to the Palme line)
In Norway, the Centre Party participates as observers and Christian 
People's Party participates as member.
Nordic Social Democratic Group for study of NNWFZ (1988)
^  Olof Johansson (Centre Party), Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987: "a 
unified Riksdag has united itself behind the thought of an NNWFZ."
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to Conservative Swedish MP, Margaretha af Ugglas, a formal parliamentary 
group over the question "has not fit into the Nordic political pattem...this is a 
question for the Government."
A second event was the founding of a formal inter-Nordic Foreign Ministry 
study group at the Nordic Foreign Ministers' meeting on 15 August, 1986 in 
Copenhagen.^ The group's formal work got underway in 1987 over the 
NNWFZ proposal. The goal of the ongoing study was to arrive at a consensual 
document regarding the background to and possibilities of forming a NNWFZ. 
The group's w ork was significant not because of w hat it produced, bu t rather 
because of the group's formal nature in an area of cooperation which was 
generally regarded as forbidden terrain.^ The NATO position with respect to 
the group's undertaking was well expressed by Danish Foreign Minister 
Ellemann-Jensen that a thorough study of the issue would get more people to 
understand that the (achievement of a NNWFZ) is more difficult than it may 
seem.^ The group was headed by the Chiefs of the respective Nordic political 
departments within the Foreign Ministries—the most sensitive department 
within any of the foreign ministries. Sweden and Norway's positions with 
respect to the study group were alike in that both saw a need to develop a 
formal response to a Soviet proposal which had never received such a reaction.
Speculation as to release of the Group's final document came to an end with 
the Foreign Minister Meeting in Karlshamn, 22-23 March, 1991.“  The report.
“  "Utredning av atomfri sone ble utsatt," Aftenposten, 15 August, 1986.
“  But, as the Swedish Foreign Minister emphasised, the "civil servant group 
must of course respect the Nordic countries' different points of departure in 
their work." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987).
"Utredning av atomfri sone ble utsatt."
“  "Atomvâpenfri sone er utredet," Aftenposten, 24 March, 1991 or K. 
Eneberg, "Karnvapenfri zon till ESK," Dagens Nyheter, 24 March, 1991.
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an examination of the "conditions for a nuclear free zone in the Nordic
region,"^’ contained no surprises. The report placed a NNWFZ in a much
wider framework, a mere formalisation of what Sweden, Norway and the other 
Nordic countries had been speaking about for quite a long time. The wording 
of the document was familiar to those who had studied the zone question for 
any amount of time:
"The answer to the question must continue to be found in 
the dialogue between the Nordic countries, both Neutral
and Aligned, between the Nuclear powers, in the 
international community."
The report read further:
"In the ongoing negotiation process, aimed at the creation 
of a new European security policy architecture, the 
thoughts of special zone arrangements have as yet not 
been treated... Against this background it is not possible to 
decide to what extent the idea of a Nuclear Free Zone in 
the Nordic area could be tit into this process in the long 
run."
An Old Proposal Dusted ojf: a Nuclear-Free Baltic
In order to neutralize the nuclear threat near their borderlands, the Soviet 
Union, starting with their concept of the Baltic Sea of Peace in 1957, repeatedly 
advocated a nuclear-free Baltic. Many have seen this proposal as naturally 
linked to Soviet enjoyment over Swedish and Norwegian debate regarding the 
regulation of port-calls. Both issues may be seen as attempts to delimit US/ 
NATO influence in a sea, which, without them, would only have one naval 
power presence.
Rapport frân Nordiska am betsm annagruppen for undersokning av 
forutsattningam a for en karnvapenfri zon i nordiskt omrâde (Swedish 
Version) (Karlshamn: Swedish Foreign Ministry, 23 March, 1991).
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New life was breathed into the proposal with Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Shevardnadze's, letter to the Swedish Foreign Minister on April 28,1990“  The 
Swedish news service, TT, described the letter's content as follows: "...in a letter 
to Sten Andersson and a number of other Foreign Ministers, (Shevardnadze) has 
offered to refrain from the (deployment) of nuclear weapons in the Baltic in 
peacetime, in connection with the effort of making the area a nuclear-free area." 
Further, the proposal allegedly contained a desire to, in the future, not have any 
nuclear-armed vessels or planes in the Baltic, nor to place nuclear weapons on 
the sea-bottom in peacetime. Signals conflicted, for only one year earlier, 
Shevardnadze was quoted as having said "The Baltic is naturally not the only 
body of water on the beaches of Northern Europe. It is clear that the question 
of the nuclear race at sea should be resolved on much broader and radical 
grounds."^^
Carl Bildt responded that "the substantial question is not new...the Soviet 
Union has always wanted to have some sort of controls upon the navies in the 
Baltic." When Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori was asked by IT  w hy he would 
not make the details of the letter public, Schori responded: "Lots of letters are 
e x c h a n g e d . T o  be sure, this was not the first time the Gorbachev leadership 
had raised the m atter.^ Theoretically, the Swedish view of the NNWFZ has 
consistently always included a nuclear-free Baltic.^ But it has not been until
“  Swedish News Service, TT, report, 16 June, 1990, "Sovjetiskt brev till 
Svenska regeringen om ubâtar i ostersjon,"
Dahlgren (1990:169)
62 YY "Utrikesdepartementet tiger om brev frân Sovjet," 16 May, 1990.
“  Raised during a trip in 1988 by the Parliamentary Committee study group. 
(Nordic Social Democratic Group for study of NNWFZ, (1988:22); O.T. Storvik, 
"Moskva med nytt sone-utspill," Aftenposten, 7 October, 1988.
^  "Sverker Âstrôm om Ostersjon som kamvapenfri zon: 'Viktigt for oss att 
driva frâgan.'" Svenska Dagbladet, 25 February, 1983. Sweden has, according 
to Âstrôm, "always stood for the idea that an eventual zone should comprise, 
not only the four (or five) Nordic countries' sea or land territories..."
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fairly recently that the Soviet Union has demonstrated a genuine willingness to 
accept regulations pertaining to their own territory.
Singling out the Baltic area has not been received positively in Sweden.^ 
This attempt at geographically isolating the issue m ay be a result of, on the one 
hand, a failure of reaching a more comprehensive Nordic solution, or an 
attem pt to secure the Nordic countries' participation in more regionally-oriented 
arrangements. The proposal only served to strengthen the Swedish perception 
that w hat the Soviet Union had in mind was to isolate Sweden's position. For 
a neutral country it is of the utmost importance that such a wide-sweeping 
measure, with an appeal to many nations, be dealt w ith in a forum befitting this 
character.
With the blooming of previously-forbidden forms of Nordic foreign policy 
cooperation, voices have been raised that the proposal of a nuclear-free Baltic 
should be handled as a cooperative effort amongst the Nordics. But 
consistently, these formal efforts over the Baltic, like efforts over the NNWFZ 
generally, have been resisted.^
Yet a new Soviet proposal was sent by the Soviet Union on 18 October, 
1990^7 whose addressees this time were: all the Baltic states, France, Norway, 
the U.K., and the U.S. Both Finland and Sweden responded in much the same 
vein, both referring to the ongoing Nordic foreign ministry group study of the 
NNWFZ.^ One consultant to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Finn Sollie,
Even Disarmament Ambassador Theorin, as early as 9 December, 1986 
(Riksdagsprotokoll), expressed an aversion to the idea of making the Baltic a 
nuclear free zone: "it's an impossibility," she said, "because the Baltic is a free 
sea—if we were to include the Baltic in a NNNWFZ it would make the Baltic a 
Russian possession."
^  Swedish Foreign Relations Committee position paper: "Nordiskt 
samarbete," (1990/91:UU9), December, 1990, p.98 for such an example.
"Soyjetfrâgor for Norden," Dagens Nyheter, 27 October, 1990.
68 YY "Finland: Kamvapenfri ostersjo ocksâ langst kustema," 12 November, 
1990.
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summed up the Norwegian response to the Baltic proposal, "it's all shared 
nonsense...how could the Soviet Union argue for such a thing?...what it mezmt 
was that Sweden and the Soviet Union could prevent non-Baltic (nations) from 
getting in."^’
Why the Soviets Pressed the Issue
What lies behind the Soviet NNWFZ proposal?
Why, if the NNWFZ has, at certain key junctures, mustered enthusiasm in 
Norwegian and Swedish decision-making circles, did the proposal never become 
reality? As described above, one should first look at the relationship between 
w hat the NNWFZ required of Sweden and Norway and what was acceptable 
given their existing security policy commitments. Norway was clearly more 
restrained by its NATO ties than Sweden's neutrality. Also, an understanding 
of leaders' perceptions of what lay behind the Soviet proposal—namely that 
Soviet motives were more "sinister" than what they said publicly—provided one 
major explanation of Swedish and Norwegian Swedish scepticism towards the 
NNWFZ. On this point, Norwegian and Swedish élite attributions of Soviet 
motivation were shockingly similar.
The Strategic-Historical Angle
Some explained that the NNWFZ proposal was rooted in the Soviet Union's 
historical experience and geographical position. One Swedish diplomat argued, 
that "it is because of the concentration of the population in those areas and the 
(fixation) of the population on peace...thus they desire stability (in the
Sollie, interview.
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region)...that's the reason for the proposals."^® From a more negative 
standpoint, he argued, there is a clear "military-strategic interest in keeping 
NATO, and especially the U.S7' as far away as possible."^ One Norwegian 
official said succinctly: "this would be making a country which is already de- 
facto nuclear undertake legal-political commitments to uphold a situation which 
has been the same since 1950."^ One senior Swedish military source simplified 
the Soviet Union's motivation: "it was because of the Soviet Union's own, 
egotistical need for security—they are scared that (the aggressor) can quickly 
reach the country's heart."^^ This was echoed by a Norwegian militairy source 
was said, "it was entirely a propaganda measure, which was to the Soviet 
advantage; to state the obvious, the intention was to tie our hands, while they 
were able to move their forces freely back and f o r t h . T h i s  Swedish official 
developed the theoretical basis somewhat, saying that "the creation of 
lebensraum" was an important consideration in this respect.^^ One individual 
in the Swedish defence establishment summed up Soviet motivation thus:^
1. the Soviets saw the strategic importance of the area—even before 
the advent of nuclear weapons-bearing submarines.
2. the Nordic area is close to vital Soviet areas.
70 S5
According to one senior military official (S32) "it's the control aspect: 1. 
how can we make sure that the Baltic remains a free sea? 2. how will we be able 
to get NATO to adhere under those conditions? 3. how willing are (the powers) 
to show and account for the weapons they have?"
^S32
^  N24. One senior Labour Party official: "the situation in which it was 






3. the Nordic area is an area of U.S. strategic bombers.
4. the Soviets wish to influence Nordic policies—through any number 
of channels—(and to see which one is successful).
Another factor was the traditional Soviet encirclement theory. One Norwegian 
Socialist Left MP explained: "while the U.S. talks of being an island w ith big 
security problems, the Soviet Union has the feeling of being surrounded by 
enemies, having been attacked several times; thus, they feel that NNWFZ would 
improve their security."^* Another Swedish Foreign Ministry advisor pointed 
out that "the basic reasoning at the beginning was to impede NATO if it got any 
ideas of going into the Baltic with nuclear weapons."^
The Inconsistent Soviet view of Nordic Foreign Policy Cooperation
For all practical purposes, the Soviet Union has historically opposed every 
major step at Nordic foreign policy cooperation.^ Against this background, 
it is logical to ask why the Soviet Union encouraged cooperation over the 
NNWFZ proposal while criticizing all other Nordic joint foreign policy 
cooperative efforts.
In fact, the proposal which, from the outside looks like it is supposed to 
promote Nordic cooperation was perceived to be motivated by quite the 
opposite intention: to split the Nordic region and split NATO.®  ^ One respected 
Swedish Sovietologist and former Foreign Ministry official, Anders Aslund, said 
that the NNWFZ proposal should 'T>e seen as part of the de-nuclearization of
78 Chaffey, interview.
From the Soviet perspective, said this advisor, the position of NATO was 
"unfavourable, being that NATO had nuclear weapons on ships, while the 
Soviets had them on their territory." (S31)
^  NORDEK negotiations. Customs Union negotiations, Nordic Council 
negotiations, joint stances on the EEC question, Nordic Defence Union, are 
amongst the most prominent examples.
The Soviet Union has objected to the existence of the conception of 
"Nordic Balance." The most detailed account appeared in Hegge (1979)
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the Nordic area."*^ "The Soviet Union has been interested in the fragmentation 
of the West," he continued, "while the Soviet Union has been against all defence 
cooperation—that's why the Soviets are so positive on the N N W F Z . C a r l  I. 
Hagen, head of the Progressive Party put it simply: "it was a part of Soviet 
divide and rule strategy."^ As one well-placed Swedish military m an simply 
stated, using the explanation which, in varying forms, was repeated in nearly 
all interviews: "the proposal bore the intention of creating and being able to 
utilize cracks and points of opposition between the Nordic nations."*® Others 
would argue that the proposal was intended to create cracks in the NATO 
alliance. One Swedish Social Democrat said the NNWFZ proposal was 
obviously a proposal directed right at the NATO options in the North."*^ "The 
issue," he said, "was a good example of how to exploit—not coordinate— 
discussion on Nordic matters."*^
Why the Soviets, Norwegians and Swedes have Issue on H old '
NNWFZ De-Prioritized
Practically as important as understanding why the Soviet Union has 
advocated the proposal in the past is an investigation of why, recently, the
*^  This logic was re-stated, though in modified form by Willoch (interview): 
"the Soviet aim was quite simple: create cracks in NATO, and might be a step 
in the neutralization of the Nordic area."
*® Aslund, interview.
*^  Hagen, interview.
*® S7. A very serious charge indeed, from the perspective of the Nordic 
Balance. The oft-repeated logic that in planning cooperative foreign policy 
ventures, the Nordic countries continuously emphasize that their points of 




Soviet Union seemingly has de-prioritized the issue. One of the chief reasons for 
the low priority on the Nordic agenda was the issue's connection w ith the 
Double Track decision in 1979. Another reason is that Gorbachev has not 
wanted to provoke NATO sentiment since 1986-7, in such a way that could go 
against his foreign policy reform strategy. Perhaps a third reason, especially 
pertinent in the Swedish case, the Soviet Union did not w ant to accentuate the 
distance between policy and practice—by advocating nuclear disarmament while 
submarine incursions in Sweden continued. There seems to have arisen a silent, 
un-pronounced consensus that as general disarmament has taken positive 
strides, the advantages gained from advocating the NNWFZ have decreased. 
Norwegian and Swedish diplomats even perceive that the Soviets themselves 
have de-prioritized the issue "although they would never admit this."**
This contention is strengthened by a Norwegian Foreign Ministry official 
who had the opportunity of regularly following Soviet publications: "I haven't 
felt that it's a priority...there was an article in Pravda or Izvestiya last year— 
from that article (it was clear) that the issue didn 't show any high-level support 
any longer...however, this doesn't mean it's forgotten!*’ A well-placed Swedish 
ambassador said, "there hasn't been much said about it lately from the Soviet 
side, while they have talked about this Baltic nuclear weapons free proposal." 
He continued saying that, in any case, the proposal is only important "given the 
general Soviet foreign policy line."’® Further support is gained from a former 
senior Norwegian Foreign Ministry official, who said that "in my conversations 
with Shevardnadze and the embassy in Oslo, they presented some ideas from 





those was an NNWFZ this was never the top of the list, being only mentioned 
sometimes."’^
NNWFZ: De-Prioritized in Norway in Sweden?
Whereas one retired Swedish diplomat said, "the NNWFZ is not topical any 
longer, though the Soviet Union still favours the initiative,"’  ^ some sectors of 
official Sweden’  ^were still busy, through the Gorbachev years, expressing the 
traditional willingness both to discuss and bring about an NNWFZ. The same 
could not be said in Norway. Socialist Left Party MP, Paul Chaffey said, "if s 
been buried in the bureaucracy." "The Labour Party put it in a part of its party 
programme, then it disappeared," Chaffey added. One representative of the 
Swedish Left Party, Gudrun Schyman, said "now the old thought of the 
NNWFZ has been successfully buried and de-politicized by the civil servant 
(Foreign Ministry group)"’ .^
The Swedish and Norwegian political parties have not been willing to 
emphasise unity over this question. Privately, there has evolved a silent 
consensus’ ;^ an agreement over the question that few of the parties would
N41
’^S5
The consensual, annual position-papers of the Swedish Riksdags Foreign 
Affairs Committee on disarmament (1984/85:UU16, UU1986/87:UU4,1987/88:1, 
1988/89:UU4,1989/90:UU6) and the Official Document SOU 1985:23 and SOU 
1990: 5), p. 57 reflect this trend. The latest of the Committee's papers on 
disarmament reads in part(1990/91:UU4,18 October, 1990, p. 21-4):
- the efforts towards the establishment of an NNWFZ have as an ultimate goal 
to strengthen Sweden's and the other Nordic countries' security—and should be 
seen in an European context.
- a nuclear free zone cannot be concluded in the form of a formal Agreement 
with the nuclear powers.
^  Schyman, interview.
Consensus is not total. Witness Theorin: "I don 't see the Soviets as being 
positively or negatively m ore/less eager than before. They have always been
(continued...)
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publicly admit.^ To now turn one's back on the NNWFZ, just because it is no 
longer a Soviet priority, would be tantamount to saying that the issue never had 
any domestic Swedish or Norwegian support. When we speak of de­
prioritization in the Swedish case, it is proper to date such a change to at least 
1986/7. As late as 10 October, 1985, Foreign Minister, Lennart Bodstrom, said 
"I want to confirm that on practically every opportunity of bilateral contact with 
the Soviet Union either I have taken up the NNWFZ or my conversation partner 
has done so, in any case if my talk has been of any greater length."^.
Possibly as early as 1986 Norwegian élites dismissed the NNWFZ 
proposal,’® and the issue would not arise again until June, 1987” . However, 
when Gorbachev placed the issue of the NNWFZ prominently onto his agenda 
in Murmansk^®® in October of the same year, Norwegians again took an
’^(...continued)
interested." (interview). Neither would Norwegian Socialist Left Party's Paul 
Chaffey agree:" "the Soviet proposals, are, in any case, in our own interest—both 
the Nordic and the Baltic zones are of interest here." (interview)
^  See Foreign Minister Sten Andersson's speeches in Riksdagsprotokoll on 
19 March, 1986 and 18 March, 1987 to the extent that "Sweden is working to 
promote Nordic stability through working for an NNWFZ."
”  Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1985.
”  It is noticeable that reference to the issue clearly takes a back-seat to the 
discussion of the Soviet military buildup in the Nordic area in 1986 
(Forhandlinger i Stortinget), 16 June, 1986. Neither is the issue raised by 
Foreign Minister Frydenlund in his Foreign Policy statement on 3 December, 
1986, by Defence Minister Holst, or by Prime Minister Brundtland.
”  Foreign Minister Stoltenberg allotted only a minute place to discussion of 
the NNWFZ in his foreign policy statement of 1 June, 1987 (Forhandlinger i 
Stortinget). Stoltenberg expressly says that he does not want to go into the 
issue in any greater detail, referring to the Foreign Relations and Constitutional 
Committee's position paper, St. Meld. nr. 58 (1986/87), 15 May, 1987.
One highly-placed Norwegian diplomat said "while it was his first 
measure in the M urmansk speech, the NNWFZ part of it was not pursued 
actively; reason being that nuclear arms were treated in other fora." (Nl)
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interest.^®  ^ It might be suggested that the re-initiation of nuclear testing on the 
island of Novaya Zemlya in the Fall of 1990 has taken the Soviet NNWFZ 
proposal off the Norwegian agenda for the foreseeable future.^®  ^ This problem 
is especially acute for Sweden, which has been extremely active in pursuing a 
superpower test ban.
Reason for De-Prioritization
The reasoning for the issue's fall on the foreign policy agenda m ust be 
sought in the amelioration of the international climate as a whole (and 
especially in the context of changed U.S.-Soviet relations). As such, neutrality- 
in-practice should have been adjusted—and one would expect that the 
superpower rivalry element would have been diffused—thus increasing the 
chances of NNWFZ realisation. But for Norway, this new climate did not 
eliminate its basic commitments to NATO strategy and practices.
One Swedish ambassador said that "the proposal has been taken over by the 
speed of events in the nuclear area (especially U.S. reductions)—as such, the 
issue has been m a r g i n a l i z e d . O n e  Swedish diplomat made the point: "the 
coupling with other things in Europe, for example conventional disarmament.
Stoltenberg, in his assessment of the Murmansk speech in October 
skipped over reference to the NNWFZ in his address of 2 December, 1987. 
(Forhandlinger i Stortinget). However, Christian People Party leader, 
Bondevik, stressed the positive aspects of the zone, as a step in the direction of 
the "thinning out of nuclear weapons" altogether. Also note the relative absence 
of mention of the NNWFZ in the following Foreign Ministers' addresses of 13 
January and 18 December, 1989, 22 May, 1990.
One Norwegian military official said, "If the initiative had come from the 
Nordic countries things would have been different—it would probably go on." 
But, "the Soviets have got credibility problems: as long as nuclear testing on 
Novaya Zemlya and efforts to define parts of the Kola as outside the 
geographical area continue." (N35).
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dilutes the issue—by d e f a u l t . O n e  should bear in mind that at the time the 
initiative was spearheaded, as well as the points at which the proposal assumed 
a prominent position, international tensions were high. Seen in this context, the 
NNWFZ was only one of a series of proposals which at face value seemed 
sufficiently lofty and realistic to gain support, while at the same time "chipping 
away" at the international peace and security (seen from a narrowly Soviet 
perspective). Swedish Centre Party politician. Par Granstedt, pointed out that 
"on the one hand- détente has taken away the political leverage behind the 
zone," and on the other "there is not at all the same sort of political press from 
(our domestic opinion)." One Swedish Foreign Ministry official gave an 
interesting analysis of the position the NNWFZ took in the overall fold of Soviet 
proposals:^®^
"the Soviets made a tremendous amount of proposals from 1986 
onwards. These were the days of proposals—but there was no 
coordination between them. Some were only declaratory: you 
couldn't negotiate on them, since you don't get the 'negotiatory basis' 
on which to discuss. But some were serious—those were negotiable."
In Norway, Willoch typified the situation such: "disarmament negotiations 
have brought such success in recent times, in such a way as to confirm that 
drives for the NNWFZ lie to the side of the constructive way of attacking 
problems." "If we adopt a special position within NATO, through our 
participation in a special zone together with neutral countries, this (act) will 
desert the opportunities (which we could have) in influencing the policies of the
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S25. This reflection was echoed from one defence official who said "the 
Soviets don't play on national opinions (in the same way) anymore." (S30)
106 840. The reason behind the Soviet position was, according to one Swedish 
diplomat, "to always keep the pot boiling... let things boil, they said...it's a 
'process.'" (S44)
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alliance, while simultaneously pointing out ourselves as a special target for 
Soviet influence," added Willoch.^®^
Swedish Centre MP Granstedt pointed out "the possibility of realisation of 
the idea has grown enormously," pointing to two factors: "One, the Soviet Union 
as a military threat has declined—(witness) their preparedness to withdraw  Golf 
submarines'®* from the Baltic,'®’ and two, a change of Western doctrine— 
from where the biggest resistance came—the nuclear component is less 
important now, and (we have met) a more flexible attitude from the U.S.""® 
However, most élites felt as did Norwegian advisor Finn Sollie about the 
removal of the Golfs: "in any case the Golfs were very dated—they made the 
offer to withdraw  the Golfs when they were slated to be withdrawn in any
case.""'
Another stream of thinking held that with the transformation of Soviet 
foreign policy thought from confrontation to greater cooperation, the motivation 
of trying to create "splits" in the facades of disliked organisations, e.g. NATO, 
decreased or altogether vanished. As Kâre Willoch mentioned, "what good 
would it be for them to create new cracks?" "They have, for the time being.
107 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987
'®* Granstedt pointed out that the withdrawal of Golf submarines was a 
reflection of the Soviet's intention of utilizing a "leaner, meaner policy," since 
the submarines were "no good," and "not up to date." Thus, they "stood to gain 
politically out of it." Militaerbalansen 1990-91 showed that 86 tactical nuclear 
weapons were still present in the Baltic. (See "Soyjet har gott om kam vapen i 
Ostersjon, Blekinge Lans Tidning, 11 March, 1991.)
'®^ According to Tamnes (1983:228) the answer must be "no." Tamnes, 
quoting Dagens Nyheter, 8 March, 1983, Soviet General, Nicolai Chernov, in a 
Swedish television interview, said the Soviets could contemplate the withdrawal 
of their six Golf-class submarines...in connection with the establishment of a 
Nordic zone."
"® Granstedt, interview.
'"  Sollie, interview.
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given up their confrontational policies—the possible gain for reducing the 
coalition in NATO is now less," Willoch added."^
Yet others saw the NNWFZ proposal against the background of other Soviet 
proposals for confidence-building in the North. A prime example is 
Gorbachev's October, 1987's speech in Murmansk in which was mentioned a 
Soviet willingness to "guarantee" an eventual NNWFZ solution."^ But one 
former Norwegian defence figure, said that "I wrote at the time that a Soviet 
guarantee was pretty dicey," and above all "a Soviet guarantee would not be 
good enough to use as an argument via our allies.""^ Former Norwegian 
Chief-of-Defence, General F. Bull-Hansen argues that a "Soviet offer to all of the 
Nordics to go in for a NNWFZ is limited to a guarantee that the Soviet Union 
will respect the zone... if one has even had a limited military-political and 
political experience with this question, the chances of this must be seen as 
weak"(Bull-Hansen, 1988:10). Norwegian Centre Party's Johan Jakobsen related 
the proposal to "Soviet long-term thinking and strategy," linking the issue with 
"efforts to drive wedges between the NATO countries (e.g. Barents Sea 
delineation).""^ Norwegian Labour MP, B.T. Godal, explained that the Soviet 
Union "welcomed any arrangement that was against U.S. interests; one can see 
the idea of a unilateral NNWFZ in that vein.""^
On the other side of the spectrum were officials which saw an unchanged 
Soviet interest in the NNWFZ today. These individuals felt the Soviet 
leadership was still advocating the idea however by using different methods. 
One Swedish diplomat said, "indeed the NNWFZ (today) represents a change
Willoch, interview.






of position: they thought that in order to get it moving—they know the U.S. 
attitude-they had to encourage Nordic contacts (in the matter).""^
Droit de Regard
Norwegian suspicions that the Soviet Union desires a 'say ' or droit de regard 
in Norwegian affairs has negatively coloured Norwegian reactions to Soviet 
initiatives generally and to the NNWFZ in particular. One former Norwegian 
defence official said: "we don't want to give the Soviet Union a legitimate right 
to interfere in Norwegian domestic politics on a bilateral basis.""^ So, when 
discussing the Soviet proposal Norway has attempted to clarify the term s and 
implications that such an agreement would have for Norwegian-Soviet or 
NATO-Soviet relations. What obligations would accompany such a treaty? 
W hat sort of say would such an arrangement give the Soviets in Norwegian 
domestic affairs? How could the NNWFZ be used as a Soviet political tool to 
pressure the Norwegians on solutions to, say, the Svalbard question, or the 
Barents Sea delineation? Norwegians have despised every hint of ambiguity in 
their affairs with the Soviets and with NATO. One senior Norwegian Labour 
Party official stressed that the "Soviet proposal was m uch the same—although 
somewhat more sophisticated...the Soviets have always tried to engage Norway 
in bilateral fields (e.g.dividing line).""^
Another reason that the Norwegians never mustered enough interest was 
because the NNWFZ was not seen to give full consideration to Norway's NATO 
responsibilities. Norwegian Undersecretary of State, Oddm und 




A. Seeland, "Sverige vil arbeide for nordisk sone," Aftenposten 27 June,
1985.
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from NATO was an absolute 'm ust' for the Norwegians to enter into any 
eventual NNWFZ arrangement. Then-Prime Minister, Brundtland, stated that 
"it is difficult to imagine the realization of a zone arrangement, independent of 
the understanding and the participation of the U.S." According to Brundtland, 
the zone should be developed as a part of a change in NATO's strategy, and 
also requires reciprocation from the Soviet Union.^^* There exists consensus 
across the political scale in the pursuit of this goal.'^
A high point in the Norwegian debate over the NNWFZ was 1986-1987, 
where the NATO connection achieved clarity. On 13 August, 1986, then-Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairman, Kâre Willoch commented that a Nordic 
commission to study the NNWFZ would mean that "neutral states such as 
Sweden and Finland were going to examine a vital question in Norwegian 
security policy...it is, from the standpoint of the Conservative Party, an 
inescapable pre-requisite: we must have the participation and understanding of 
our allies."^^ Labour Party's Vice-Chairman, Einar Forde, clarified Labour's 
line on the NNWFZ thus: "the Norwegian Labour Party is not out on a one- 
handed adventure to the Soviet Union, Sweden and Finland, regarding nuclear- 
freedom in Norden." "Nobody in the Labour party believes that a NNWFZ can 
come about as a result of an agreement between the Nordic countries and the 
Soviet Union, " added Forde.
W hat also tended to decrease the importance of the issue in the Norwegian 
eyes was that no change in NATO strategy was in the making, even in the 
midst of a full-scale amelioration of U.S.-Soviet relations. Then-Foreign
"-Sone bor ha USA-aksept," Aftenposten, 10 September, 1986
It is surprising to see that this consensus even extends to the Socialist Left 
Party parliamentarians. According to two Socialist Left MP's, the NNWFZ 
should be discussed in cooperation with NATO and the Nordic countries. (M. 
Malmo and R. 0hm an, "Atomfri sone 'ikke forenlig med NATO-forpliktelsene'" 
Aftenposten, 28 June, 1982).
123 "Willoch imot nordisk atomutredning," Aftenposten, 13 August, 1986
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Minister, Stoltenberg, pointed out that, in consultations w ith his NATO 
colleagues, if changes were to occur, it would most certainly take time (things 
don 't change in foreign policy overnight).
The NNWFZ: Success or Failure?
States generally only pursue foreign policies to which are attached a material 
dividend. After looking back at their almost 23 years of experience w ith it, the 
Soviet Union had to make an audit: did their NNWFZ line achieve its desired 
result? Depending on the definition of the result, the answer in almost all cases 
from the Swedish and Norwegian sides, would have to be 'no.'
One of the logical reasons why one has not seen a continuation of the Soviet 
NNWFZ offensive is that its value as a foreign policy instrument has 
diminished. Kâre Willoch hinted that the Soviets' hopes of realizing their 
proposal were linked to expected political benefits within the Norwegian 
political system. However the Soviet anticipation of splitting the Norwegian 
parliament for the most part had f a i l e d o n e  reason less for advocating a 
NNWFZ. As one official explained "the Soviets have realized that there is no 
way to split Sweden internally...the Social Democrats w on't push the issue—they 
just keep delaying it."^^ In Norway, the anti-nuclear sentiment was high and
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987. Even the anti-nuclear group, 
"Nei til atomvâpen" stated on 2 April, 1987 that an NNWFZ would be 
incompatible with NATO's then-strategy. (A. B. Godager, "NATO-strategi- 
problem for sone?" Aftenposten, 3 April, 1987).
"In the Norwegian Social Democratic Party," Willoch said, "there were 
some people for and against: on the left wing shrewd idealists and the people 
on the right wing were frustrated." "The Soviet Union may have thought that 
with the fall of the Conservative Government in Parliament that it m ight result 
in a majority of supporters for an NNWFZ," he continued in interview.
S30
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the Soviet knew this.^^  ^ But even here the Soviet Union has been unable to 
mobilize public opinion in support of such a zone. Whereas the overall fear of 
nuclear weapons has decreased with U.S.-Soviet détente, so has the Soviet Union 
realized that the use of such measures would be less effective.
Both Norwegian and Swedish leaders saw one of the chief Soviet motivations 
as being to cause havoc in NATO. Even this effort m ust be seen as a failure. 
Norwegian Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, explained that "the purpose of the 
Soviet advocacy has been political (the division of the Western alliance)—and 
that's w hy they are not really interested anymore."^^ As the head of the 
Norwegian trade Union, LG's, international secretariat, Kâre Sandegren said, 
"the Soviets never thought that it was realizable without negotiations between 
the alliances."'^’
From another perspective, the NNWFZ proposal did, as one Swedish Foreign 
Ministry official said, "keep the pot boiling."^^ As such the NNWFZ initiated 
a debate and quite successfully kept the issue on decision-makers' agendas. 
"Previously," said one former Swedish Foreign Ministry official, close to the 
question, "the Soviets just wanted to see what the reaction would be." "Today," 
he continued, "the Soviets are satisfied with gaining political points of it."^ ^^  
One Social Democrat said "from time to time these proposals just had a
Both one Norwegian Conservative MP (N13) and Finn Malvig of the 
Defence Department emphasised this point. One Norwegian source close to 
Government said "it was an element of propaganda from ti\e very beginning- 
wanting to attract the popular opinion of various countries, knowing that we 






declaratory value—their proposals were numerous; thus one had to question 
just how serious they were."^^^
However, as Soviet foreign policy style has gradually changed from a 
declaratory to a more action-oriented foreign policy in arms control, the 
propagandistic import of "empty words" has sharply diminished. A Swedish 
Social Democratic official said "the issue has less value today because i f  s not 





Sweden, Norway and Boundary Issues with the Soviet Union: the Security 
Realm
Boundary Violations
Sweden—because of its neutrality and Norway—because of its NATO 
commitments have approached their boundary-related affairs w ith the Soviet 
Union in different ways. This chapter seeks to illuminate the effect of security 
policy upon the perceptions and behaviour of Swedish and Norwegian leaders 
towards the Soviet Union in the realm of security-related boundary issues.
The inviolability of boundaries is a central principle in a neutral state's 
foreign policy. Incursions put into question the viability and credibility of a 
neutral state's defence commitment, making a state feel isolated and defenceless. 
All small states have an inferiority complex with respect to their own military 
potential. Norway is compensated for this by its NATO membership, while in 
Sweden this feeling is only partially made up for by maintaining a strong 
defence force. Violations of neutral state boundaries transform this inferiority 
complex into a major self-confidence problem w ith serious ramifications for 
both élite perceptions and behaviour.
Sweden finds maximum security in the consensus it is able to generate for 
certain causes in the international community. Sweden thus plays upon the 
violating nation's fear of being discovered and exposed to an international 
audience—an extremely embarrassing situation for a great power in which to 
find itself. Violations run counter some of the basic tenets of international law 
to which a neutral state is wed. Therefore, every violation, where intentional, 
shall be met w ith the full force of protest. By referring to international legal 
principles, it is able to muster maximum consensus among states while still 
appearing to be impartial.
The presence of an international legal regime or international opinion, while 
comforting, is a secondary resort in certain aspects of the Norwegian security
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policy. Norway has the luxury of relying on the consensus, in the first case, 
which it can muster within the NATO community. Norway relies on its policy 
of deterrence and confidence-building, two policies embedded in the NATO 
backbone, to assess the gravity of territorial violations and to determine the 
proper responses. With this support, it can be much more magnanimous in 
interpreting boundary violations and more flexible in finding solutions which 
are pragmatic and suitable.
The Shock of '^Whisky on the Rocks”
A Soviet, Whisky Class submarine went aground in the archipelago of 
Karlskrona, Sweden's second largest Naval base, in the Fall of 1981.  ^ What 
may be called the "Karlskrona phenomenon" is the psychological shock dealt the 
Swedish élites and general public as a reaction to the grounding of the 
submarine, with markings 'U-137.' The dilemmas posed the Swedish leadership 
by this event and subsequent incursions illuminate some essential aspects of a 
neutral state leadership's perceptions and behaviour towards the Soviet Union.
The Norwegians have no such single event to which they can point in their 
relations w ith the Soviet Union. Norwegian-Soviet relations are markedly free 
of such shocking occurrences—not least because the Norwegians have learned 
to live with threat scenarios which incorporate such an event actually occurring. 
Especially for the Swedish public, U-137 was a solemn reminder that her 
strategic position in the Baltic was of importance for the Soviet Union.
Several scenarios had been constructed previous to the event—but it is fair 
to say that few seriously predicted that such an event would become reality. 
One of the reasons that the possibility was not seriously pondered by élites was 
that such a scenario would confront a neutral state with a true crisis. Such a
 ^There have been three 'confirmed' violations by submarines until present 
(1981 in Gâsefjârden and 1982 in HorsQarden—both confirmed to be of Soviet 
origin) and Havringe in 1988 (of unknown nationality). (A. Ohman, "OB:s stab 
tvivlar pâ krânkningar," Dagens Nyheter, 31 August, 1991).
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scenario could be liable to split a national élite, between on the one hand a 
political élite intent on maintaining the facade of neutrality and on the other 
hand, a military élite whose pride had been wounded and which was intent on 
following military standard-operating-procedures in the matter.
The Karlskrona event brought this very dilemma to the fore, and posed some 
very complex and sensitive questions for the Swedish leadership. The Swedish 
Government had to answer one recurrent question: Would its behaviour in the 
issue be interpreted as becoming of a neutral state? Sweden's behaviour would 
thus be measured in relation to some of the following questions: W hat should 
the Swedish proper response be? How should extra-military relations w ith the 
Soviet Union be affected?^ How would the Soviet Union react to any potential 
Swedish military moves? How should this event be interpreted against the 
background of other Soviet foreign policy behaviour? W hat sort of impact 
would it have on the credibility of Swedish neutrality generally?
Incursions in perspective
Submarine incursions in Swedish territorial waters are not a novel 
phenomenon. Soviet submarines have violated Swedish territorial waters since 
the late 1960's and 1970's, the first incursion being registered in 1962(Salicath 
and Storen, 1988:95-7), with other commentators estimating that such events 
have occurred since the 1940's.^ No one would question the fact that the 
submarine ordeal has burdened Swedish-Soviet relations over a long period of
 ^A case-in-point of the balancing rope Sweden was forced to walk during 
then-Soviet Premier Ryzhkov's visit to Sweden in 1988 where Sweden both 
deeply desired an agreement regarding the economic division of the Baltic Sea 
and felt a need to protest regarding continuing submarine incursions. (L. 
Christiansson, "Krânkningar dilemma vid samtsJen med Ryzjkov," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 10 January, 1988).
 ^ Agrell (1986:197). This contention is supported by Carl Bildt (M. 
Holmstrom, "Sovjetisk ubâtsstyrka organiserar spaningar," Svenska Dagbladet, 
5 December, 1990.)
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time. However, most élites would agree that not only the submarine issue-per- 
se's importance has declined during Gorbachev's tenure, but further that a 
study of numbers would likewise even confirm a numerical decrease.^ One 
strategically-placed official in the Foreign Ministry, felt that "the issue of 
submarines has rather receded from the forefront of our relations w ith the 
Soviets,"^ as a part of an overall issue shift in Swedish-Soviet relations.
The Nationality Question? One Dilemma of Neutrality-in-Practice 
The official Swedish standpoint in the nationality question has m uch in 
common with the common legal principle "assumed innocent until proven 
guilty." The theory of neutrality dictates that in the face of uncertain evidence, 
one m ust assume that the chances of the violator being a Warsaw Treaty 
member are at least equally as large as the possibilities of the violator being 
from NATO. The Swedish press corps, for example, have convincingly 
presumed that the violator was the Soviet Union and thus breaking this legal 
principle.^ However, even Swedish officials have made every insinuation that 
the submarines which continue to violate Swedish territorial waters are of Soviet 
origin. One of neutrality's dilemmas is how to appear impartial, while being 
confronted with a combination of subjective-objective evidence pointing to only 
one superpower.
 ^According to General Gustafsson, quoted in the article, "Stormakt bakom 
intrâng," Svenska Dagbladet 12 March, 1990, in 1989 there was a decrease in 
"the number of observations," which could be explained by "a changed security- 
policy climate." The number of violations in 1989 was less than both 1987 and 
1988, though (M. Holmstrom, "Ubâtskrânkningar okar âter," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 28 February, 1991). This is nonetheless a subject of dispute.
^S9
 ^Chief-of-Defence Gustafsson hinted at this point, while pointing out the 
nuances of national identification in his article "Ingen idé peka ut nâgot land," 
Dagens Nyheter, 14 March, 1991. One of the reasons why the Swedes (by 
implication) have not pointed out which nationality is responsible is because it 
is not international praxis. "Norway does not publicly accuse the Soviet Union 
or any other state for her 'proven' incursions during the 1980's," he writes.
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The Norwegians, by contrast, have a much easier equation to solve. Quite 
simply, who would w ant to violate Norwegian territorial waters besides the 
Soviet Union? Therefore, the question of determining the nationality is not a 
m ystery-rather a question of whether it occurs at all. While Sweden is 
uncertain both about the number of actual violations and the national origin of 
the violators, Norway is only unsure about the number of actual 
violations. (Agrell, 1986:198)
The Nationality Question in Practice
The Soviet Union has officially been pointed out as the violater on two 
occasions: 1981 and 1983^—this as differentiated from "private speculation."* 
Since then, the Swedish Chief of Defence has not been able to pinpoint the 
national origin(s) of the violating submarines.’ Neither have the political 
leadership or professional foreign policy officials felt the time ripe or evidence 
compelling enough to draw  any official conclusions about the nationality 
question.** Official Sweden has been, in short, quite uncommital about the
 ^The Soviet Union violated Swedish airspace over Gotland in the Summer 
of 1984—this was admitted by the Soviet Union and confirmed by Sweden. See 
R. Aschberg, "Sex frâgor om Sverige-Sovjet," Expressen, 5 February, 1985 or S. 
Âstrôm, "Misstag eller nonchalans âr ingen ursakt," Svenska Dagbladet, 17 
September, 1984.
* According to Environmental Party MP Per Gahrton (Riksdagprotokoll, 2 
February) "Sten Andersson made a positive suggestion to convene a commission 
of experts, with Soviet participation, but the Chief of Defence dismissed this..."
’ A typical report states: "during the course of 1989 (we) have been unable 
to procure evidence of the national origin of the violating submarines." 
("Stormakt bakom intrâng," Svenska Dagbladet, 12 March, 1990.)
** The various "updates" given through the years by the Foreign Minister 
with respect to the nationality question essentially follow the same line of his 
statement of 16 March, 1988, (Riksagsprotokoll): "...one has not been able to 
secure evidence regarding the violator's or the violators' national origin. 
Sweden will never accept violations of her territorial integrity." Defence 
Minister, Roine Carlsson, gave similar statements through the years 
(e.g.Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 February, 1988 and 2 February, 1989.)
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national origin of the intruders. The 1984 Defence Committee, in a section 
discussing submarine activity pointed out that:
"There have been two types of general violations of Swedish 
territorial waters in the past years: on the surface and under the 
water, (the first category) violations were relatively equally 
divided between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. The majority of 
these violations have been made by civilian vessels.""
The work within the 1988 Defence Committee reflects many of the same 
conclusions and explanations as its predecessors. Aside from its re-statement 
of extreme concern regarding underwater violations, because of their intentional 
nature, the Committee writes:
"In the official analyses which were..performed during the during 
the 1980's...the reason for (the continued violations) should, in 
essence, be some form of preparations for future crisis and war 
situations. The fact that underwater violations have even 
continued through the past years is a reminder that even in the 
future, military realities must be factored into a comprehensive 
judgement of the security-political developments in our part of the 
world.""
Nevertheless, the working assumptions in practically all quarters—whether 
understood or explicit-has been that incursions have been of WTO, and more 
specifically, of Soviet origin. The power behind assumptions is that while they 
cannot be either disproved or proved, they penetrate every dimension of any 
relationship. Some individuals have been more forthcoming in revealing the 
nationality which feel is violating Swedish waters. While there is a detectable
"  SOU 1985:23:41. It should be noted that this Defence Committee consists 
of representatives from across the political spectrum. The document this 
Committee produces is a consensus document.
"  SOU 1990:5 Remarkable here is the flag which the Committee raised, 
indicating that although there may be comprehensive political change (especially 
in the Soviet Union—which is discussed intensively and in-depth throughout the 
report), the military realities can and do remain.
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official consensus that the violater is a "superpower/*^^ for the most part, that 
is where the ojficial consensus ends, if it ever existed at all. Assumptions and 
official policy have collided. What is the substance of these assumptions and 
w hat effect have they had on Sweden's relationship w ith the Soviet Union?
Unchanged Military-(political?) Motivation
In the absence of concrete evidence, élites have reasoned themselves to the 
conclusion that the intruder must be the Soviet Union. Some individuals argue 
that while there has been undisputed political-economic change in the Soviet 
Union, it has not extended into the military realm. Akin to this thinking is the 
argument that the Baltic Sea is of continuing strategic importance, such that the 
Soviet Union needs to maintain free passage and movement of its submarines 
and to insure the security of its forward bases and existing air defence warning 
systems in the region.^^ Thus, the military's former mandate to plan for 
different war scenarios remains in great part unchanged today.
Depending on one's view on military-political relations in the Soviet Union, 
the military may in fact be the sole decision-maker w ith respect to the alleged 
incursions. A majority of the interviewees acquitted the Soviet political 
establishment of any sinister motives in the incursions. One Centre Party MP, 
Par Granstedt, felt that "the operation of submarines in the archipelago is a 
continuing ambiguity," adding that "this may be proof that (military) planning 
is still going on with respect to attack on Sweden."^^ Carl Bildt has
R. Magnergârd and M. Holmstrom, "Stormakt bakom intrâng," Svenska 
Dagbladet 12 March, 1990. Gustafsson put forth several theories of w hy 
violations were continuing. The common factor in Gustafsson's theories was 
that "a superpower with a special responsibility for security" was the cause for 
incursions.
14 S30
Par Granstedt, interview. Furthermore, Granstedt interpreted the 
incursions as "the military trying to keep its options open-w hereby at some 
time they could switch to an offensive strategy."
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maintained that the Soviet Union's military is keeping on at the same pace as 
p re v io u s ly .A c c o rd in g  to Bildt, the Soviet military has lied to the political 
establishment, and in turn, the political establishment has lied to the outside 
world."^ ^
Bildt was immediately challenged on his conclusions, by Swedes^* and 
Soviets^’ alike. Per Gahrton, foreign policy spokesman for the Environmental 
Party, said "I don 't think that the Soviet submarines are a 'left-over' from old 
Soviet foreign policy...but if things are as Bildt has described, this is a veiy 
serious matter and leftover from the past...nonetheless I tend to be a sceptic."^ 
Oijan Bemer, twice Swedish Moscow ambassador dismissed the theory that 
political pressures were the cause of submarine incursions.^^ If the Russians 
wanted to apply political pressure (on Sweden) they would have hinted that 
they wanted changes in Swedish policy. With only few exceptions, such has not 
been the case, according to Berner.^ Gudrun Schyman, a Communist Party 
parliamentarian, urged that the Swedish budgetary contribution to the
Speech, 4 December, 1990, "Ubâtskrânkningarna mot Sverige- Bakgrund, 
Monster och Motiv."; M. Holmstrom, "Sovjetisk ubâtsstyrka organiserar 
spaningar," Svenska Dagbladet, 5 December, 1990.
Carl Bildt, speech held at Spegelsalen, Grand Hotel, Stockholm, 4 
December, 1990.
O. Alsén, "Bildt har gâtt pâ grund," Dagens Nyheter, 17 December, 1990.
The most scathing criticism was dealt by Vitaly Ivanov, Commander of 
the Soviet Baltic Fleet (S. Olofsson, "Sovjetamiral angriper Bildt," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 24 February, 1991): "Carl Bildt's speech was uncomfortable and was 
replete with misguiding information...Bildt is trying to get the Swedish 
taxpayers to open their wallets for increased military expenditures."
“  Gahrton, interview.
"Handfasta metoder fâr Sovjet pâ retràtt," Dagens Nyheter, 22 December,
1984.
^  "Handfasta metoder fâr Sovjet pâ retràtt."
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submarine chase should be seen in relation to the visits of certain American 
vessels which carry nuclear weapons.^
Chief of Defence Bengt Gustafsson gave a relatively open analysis of what 
he thought lay behind the incidents.^ Gustafsson forwarded the following 
three theories:
a. intelligence organisations work in the long-term and 
then decide upon a policy. The policy may not later be 
re-evaluated and keeps on in old, worn tracks which it 
has always used—irrespective of fluctuations in 
international tensions.
b. that the incursions have been sanctioned by the 
violating state's politicians, but that they had not changed 
the operative paradigm. In that case the motive must be 
that the area m ust be regarded as an extremely important 
security question for the public and the state itself.
c. that there exist organisations in countries which are not 
under full political control.
Anders Âslund reasoned that "it is likely that the submarine incursions have 
occurred because of a decision made in the 1970's by the Politburo that the Baltic 
Fleet was allowed to perform such exercises—then, the decision held, year after 
year."^ He continued, "it is possible that the new incursions, of a novel 
character, mean that the Politburo has made a decision to forbid exercises in 
Swedish waters... But since they continue after all, it could mean that another 
organisation is acting here. The KGB's international department has its own 
navy in its frontier troop units—it could be they who are acting now."^
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1988. Schyman felt such efforts were 
"remarkable, especially when one compares the incredible energy put into the 
effort of identif^ng submarines which violate our borders."
^ "Stormakt bakom intrâng," Svenska Dagbladet, 12 March, 1990.
^  L. Bjorkvall, "Gorbatjovs sista strid," Expressen, 19 December, 1989.
^  "Gorbatjovs sista strid."
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Not the U.S.: Process of Elimination
Another school of individuals concluded the Soviet Union was the violator 
through a process of eliminating the U.S.. "If it were NATO, they would have 
sent in much better material than an ageing submarine, w ith loud motors, 
directly into the Swedish archipelago,"^ said one interviewee. Others argue 
that the reason which underlies the incursions is a need for war-time planning. 
"If NATO wanted this information it could (and does) get it through 
conventional channels," said another interviewee.^ Carl Bildt, in reference to 
allegations of formal intelligence-gathering cooperation between the U.S. and 
Sweden responded: "the Americans don't need our help with that sort of 
activity."^’ Built into these statements are, inter alia, assumptions of Soviet 
clumsiness, explicit Soviet designs on Sweden, a need to go through 
extraordinary channels to obtain information which it could not otherwise 
obtain. Almost by default, the Soviet Union, or one of its allies, becomes the 
culpable party. Logically one could say that Swedish élites are far from 
impartial in analyzing the continuing nature of submarine incursions.
In the theory of neutrality, when one lacks evidence, one m ust fall back on 
its original threat perception—that threats can emanate equally from West and 
East. However, in practice it seems quite clear that responsible Swedes assume 
that the violator is none other than the Soviet Union—and as will be 








W hat is the most effective way for Sweden to react? This is one of 
neutrality's trickiest questions, for Sweden's manoeuvrability is circumscribed 
by the fact that it must appear to be acting as a neutral. A neutral m ust be 
vocal and firm in indicating where violations of sovereignty occur, but must 
simultaneously keep communication channels open with its chief international 
partners. It is doubtful whether Sweden's leadership could cope with isolation. 
Sweden must likewise bear in mind that it is a small nation, with small 
resources and with limited capacity to affect the behaviour of her enormous 
neighbour. Harsh responses, for example by cutting diplomatic ties, or 
minimizing economic exchange, would undoubtedly be met by equivalent 
measures from the Soviet side. The more reserved Sweden's response, surely 
one could anticipate a less violent reaction from the Soviet Union. However, 
the deterrent effect upon perceived Soviet submarine operations (if any) would 
be minimal.
It is of the essence to react quickly to the events. One highly placed Foreign 
Ministry official said "of course we've got all these provocations from 
submarines, but I feel it is important to react strongly as a sovereign country 
and to do so within a short tim e-w hy should you keep shooting yourself in the 
foot by curtailing parts of bilateral relations which are also in your own 
interest?"^
Sweden has attempted to employ a complex mixture of reactions, all the 
while treasuring the hopes that either the motivation for the incursions would 
disappear and that its sanctions would have some impact on "Soviet" behaviour. 
Private and public protests (and constant reminders) to the Soviet Government, 
the scaling back of certain exchanges: cultural, political and military, changes
^  S5. This interviewee mentioned agricultural exchanges as an example.
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in law, among other measures have been undertaken.^^ Additionally, the 
standards of evidence required to officially claim an incursion were raised in
1989.^ 2
The Swedish response has been especially pointed w ith respect to military 
exchanges—curtailed until their resumption in the Spring of 1991. In response 
to the question of why there had been no official Soviet naval visits since 1981, 
one official with a prominent military background responded: "when we have 
chased 'territorial water intruders' for ten years, it's a psychological question 
towards your personnel whether you wül permit visits from nations which 
'could be the potential intruder.'"^^ From this quote, one may conclude that 
the Soviet Union (or related countries) are "the intruder," since there have been 
several U.S. military (especially naval) visits since then. An advisor within the 
Defence bureaucracy pronounced clearly: "there have not been any Soviet port 
visits in the 1980's at all— due to the submarine issue."^ As Ambassador 
Sverker Âstrôm put it, "the submarines cut off the conversation for a time, and
There were two official Swedish ordinances passed, either as a direct or 
indirect consequence of the 1981 Karlskrona incident. SFS 1982:755 ("The 
Passage Ordinance.") and SFS 1982:756 (the "IKFN Ordinance"). Swedish Foreign 
Ministry's international law expert. Bo Johnson Theutenberg, stated that these 
were an attem pt to tighten the legal boundaries of Sweden. Another 
consideration was that, given these boundaries, the Swedish Government and 
military was granted more power for enforcement. (Klara och entydiga signaler 
mot krânkningar," (Svenska Dagbladet, 28 October, 1983)
A. Ohman, "Fortsatta rapporter om ubâtar," Dagens Nyheter, 2 March, 
1991; S. Olofson, "Inga konstaterade krânkningar," Svenska Dagbladet, 2 March, 
1991; B. Gustafsson, "Ingen idé peka ut nâgot land," Dagens Nyheter, 14 March, 
1991
S32. We must note that there has been an exchange of military 
delegations since 1981 nonetheless. Until 1985 Soviet invitations were declined. 
(Lindblad, interview). Lindblad added that "when we travel (over there) like 
in the case of the Head of the Swedish Air Force, while we know that 
submarines are still violating our waters, this gives them the wrong signal."
^ S19
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there will not be any increased amount of rejoinder again until the violations 
(by whatever state it may be) cease.^^
In the early 1990's there was a resumption of some exchanges. In the 
Summer of 1991 the Soviet Defence Minister, Yazov, returned a Moscow visit 
by Swedish Defence Minister, Roine Carlsson—the first visit by a Soviet Defence 
Minister in over twenty years.^ In addition, in April of 1991 Chief-of-Defence, 
Bengt Gustafsson, travelled to the Soviet Union.^^ A reciprocal visit from his 
colleague, Moisev, was planned.
The submarine incidents have likewise coloured Swedish leaders' reception 
of various Soviet proposals. One of the chief ones is the proposal for a Nordic 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. Another proposal in a similar vein is the Soviet 
proposal for a Nuclear Free Baltic Sea region. In the first case, the grounding 
of U-137 coincided precisely with a high point in Soviet advocacy of its thirty- 
year old proposal. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, rhetoric ran 
dangerously counter to actual Soviet behaviour. In the second case, the Soviet 
Union attempted to further regionalize the nuclear free zone idea—an attem pt 
vehemently opposed by small, neutral states, which see such idea's realisation 
only in the context of multilateral diplomacy and wider geographical 
framework.
In a third proposal oriented to Norway and Sweden in the Summer of 1990, 
the Soviet Union proposed a treaty regulating incidents at sea. The Swedish 
handling of the treaty is interesting for it is revealing about how small, neutral 
states see proposals from big, superpower neighbours. The Swedes were
S. Âstrôm, "En svensk ôsteuropapolitik efterlyses," Svenska Dagbladet, 
24 July, 1988.
^  S. Olofson, "Jazov till Sverige i sommar," Svenska Dagbladet, 13 March, 
1991.
S. Olofson, "Ob reser till Sovjetunionen," Svenska Dagbladet, 28 February, 
1991: Gustafsson and his Soviet colleague, Moiseyev, agreed in April, 1990, to 
a two-year exchange programme—the first step was Gustafsson's Spring, 1991 
trip to Moscow.
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formally offered such a treaty during Defence Minister, Roine Carlsson's, trip 
to the Soviet Union in September, 1990.^
Carlsson promised to "take a look at the proposal," however saying "I have 
already presented our principal view on the subject, which is that we have 
consistently pursued our preference for a multilateral treaty in the United 
Nations."^’ Prime Minister Carlsson was to have stated in reference to the 
bilateral proposal: "In the Baltic, there are more than two states."^ The 
proposed treaty held out a definition of the rules of conduct towards Sweden 
in an area which Swedes felt never had been respected before. The Soviet 
motivation for such a treaty was perceived as being, on the one hand, more 
lofty goals such as confidence-building measures between Sweden and the 
Soviet Union, but on the other, less complementary side, as an attempt to gain 
a military droit de regard. Small states have been taught to be cautious when 
big powers offer an agreement in order to safeguard their 'common interests.' 
Foreign Ministry officials^^ and military officials echoed this realisation, one 
military official saying, "the day we start signing separate bilateral agreements 
is the day we relinquish collective security."^ As one highly placed Foreign 
Ministry official said, "it's always a sensitive issue to be in bed with a huge 
country w ith strategic interests—and especially so since the submarine
^  This particular visit was the first by a Swedish Defence Minister for 19 
years. The Soviet proposal was formally pu t forth by the Soviets on 24 
September, 1990. (T. Hamberg, "Inget incidentavtal med Sovjet," Arbetet, 28 
September, 1990.)
Sten Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 February, 1989; see elaboration on 
Swedish attempts in 1989. See UN Documents A/CN.0/121 and A/CN.10/129, 
quoted in Prawitz (1990a); A. Steinvall, "Svenskt nej till Sovjetavtal," Dagens 
Nyheter, 27 September, 1990





violations...it's a sound reticence."^ Norway, as we will examine in a 
subsequent section, with the presence of its NATO backbone, took a positive 
decision to sign a bilateral treaty near in content to the one proposed to Sweden.
U-137: To believe or not believe the Soviet explanation
The Soviets have repeatedly, and in varying forms, maintained that the U-137 
incident was an accident— a result of navigational error. But key Swedish 
leaders have shown little signs of re-evaluating their beliefs that the Soviet 
submarine intentionally entered the Karlskrona archipelago. Whereas this belief 
in and of itself could be defended on several objective grounds, one of the chief 
reasons w hy Swedish élites have continued not to believe their Soviet 
counterparts is because they do not see this incident as an isolated event.^ 
Rather, they see it as a recurrent phenomenon which fits into the greater picture 
of Soviet foreign policy behaviour.
Irrespective of who lies behind the continuing incursions, the Soviet Union 
has been forced to pay the price tag for every reported incursion. One might 
even say that NATO submarines could quietly probe the Swedish archipelago, 
and if they were detected—but not identified, they knew the Soviet Union would 
be perceived as the culpable party
43 S5.
^  Falldin, who was Prime Minister during 1981, said "the whole submarine 
affair was so incredibly embarrassing for the Soviet Union that it would clearly 
be in the military service's interest to try and demonstrate that this was an 
isolated misfortune." ("Slapp hemligstampeln," Dagens Nyheter, 11 February,
1991.
Commander Karl Andersson supports this particular point of view. (C. 
Svahn, "Kommendoren tror pâ en svâr omvàrdering," Dagens Nyheter, 11 
February, 1991)
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The Soviet efforts to convince Sweden of its innocence (that is, above and 
beyond navigational negligence) have received cold receptions in Sweden.^ 
With a barrage of Soviet-authored articles on the Debate pages of Dagens 
Nyheter have come various forms of revelations relating to the 1981 incident 
Today one could reasonably conclude that the Soviet Union has made as much 
information public about the incident as it ever intends to do. The traditional 
Soviet argument of mis-navigation was forwarded by Vasiliy Besedin, then- 
Political Officer on U-137.^^ The effort reached its crescendo w ith the 
publication of a previously unreleased report, authored by a Soviet commission 
set to examine the events surrounding the U-137 incident which seemed to 
provide objective evidence that confirmed the navigational error theory.^
The Swedish reaction to these public revelations is representative of the 
arguments which have appeared since 1981 regarding whether or not to believe 
the Soviet explanation. On the one hand, Karl Andersson who was, at the time 
of the incident. Chief of Staff for Karlskrona Naval Base (and who also led the 
interrogations with the crew), has reached the conclusion that the newly- 
published report is truthful.^’ However, Andersson points out that "too much 
prestige and too many public statements from the Swedish side regarding Soviet 
espionage will make it difficult for the Government and the Defence 
establishment to change their view."^ Sweden's commitment to the Soviet
^  A good example: B. Stâhl, head of the Swedish Marine Staff's nautical 
section, "Osannolik felnavigering," Dagens Nyheter, 11 March, 1991.
What is of interest in what Besedin writes is that if the Swedes made any 
attempt to capture the boat, Soviet warships, waiting off the coast, had orders 
to intervene. ("Vi navigerade fel," Dagens Nyheter, 11 November, 1990).
^  V. Verbitsky, ’Dags satta punkt i fallet U 137," Dagens Nyheter, 10 
February, 1991.
C. Svahn, "Kommendoren tror pâ svâr omvàrdering," Dagens Nyheter, 11 
February, 1991; K. Andersson, "Kan bli en arbetsam omprovning," Dagens 
Nyheter, 10 February, 1991.
^  "Kan bli en arbetsam omprovning."
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incursion theory made a thorough revision, short of the presentation of 
irrefutable evidence, unthinkable. Sweden's neutrality had been wounded and 
it would take something dramatically positive to make the élites change their 
minds.
Former Marine Chief Bengt Schuback presents a more sceptical view: "the 
(Soviet) explanation sounds totally incredible for a professional...that's not the 
way things happen...it seems likely that the Soviets no longer dare to provide 
an explanation other than that of navigational error."^^ Another sceptic is 
Commander Emil Svensson, who has analyzed the report about the grounding: 
"U 137 navigated to the scene and the crew knew very well where the 
submarine was located."^^ In response to a Soviet claim that a new policy had 
been instituted prohibiting Soviet submarines not to go nearer than 50-70 
kilometres from a foreign state's coastline,®^ one of the submarine-debate 
leaders, von Hofsten, writes, "We know that foreign submarines are carrying out 
large-scale operations deep in our territorial waters—and have been doing so 
with great frequency and for a long time." "Aside from that," continues von 
Hofsten, responding to a Soviet colleague, "we are convinced that they are your 
submarines...Even during these days the bear doesn't stay on his side of the 
bed."^ In a somewhat later article^^ von Hofsten asks: "How do you expect 
me to have confidence in a country which energetically, routinely and even in 
the face of repeated, powerful diplomatic protests (feels it necessary) to have its 
attack units train all the way in our harbours?"
"Kan bli en arbetsam omprovning."
“  "Kan bli arbetsam omprovning."
V. Myashnikov, "Ryska flottan âr numera defensiv," Svenska Dagbladet, 
20 January, 1989.
^  "Talar bjornen sanning," Svenska Dagbladet, 2 February, 1989.
55 "Varfor, Valerij, varfor," Svenska Dagbladet, 23 March, 1989.
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Norwegian security-related boundary issues with the Soviets
Norway has also been faced with boundary violations, bu t to some extent the 
leadership has responded differently. It can be said that the Norwegians have 
viewed boundary violations less menacingly than the Swedes. Norway's NATO 
membership is a powerful explanatory factor for this. In NATO the competitive 
behaviour of the superpowers is a given—thus when one superpower infringes 
on the other's rights it is seen as part and parcel of w hat superpowers do to 
each other. It is not a question of identifying the violator—or assessing its 
motives—both of these are givens. Neither are violations as serious for a nation 
which has the armed backing of its allies. The measure of its security is not 
whether, on isolated opportunities, another state violates its boundary—but 
rather that a collective force of nations will respond if a threat materializes. 
Thus, there has been no reason for the Norwegians to call on international 
norms or a greater international public to the same extent as the Swedes in 
order to attract attention to an issue which it sees as minor in the wider 
perspective of its relations with the Soviet Union.
The Soviet submarine violation issue in Norway:
Insignificant or Absent?
The whole issue of incursions in territorial waters in Norway has not 
assumed nearly the same significance nor generated the amount of heat as has 
the issue of submarine incursions in Sweden. In fact both Norwegians and 
Finns judge the many submarine hunts in Sweden as somewhat senseless; not 
as much because they feel that the Swedes are searching for objects that don 't 
exist as much as that the Swedes do not accept incursions as a fact-of-life with 
which all states m ust bear. One Norwegian military official summed up 
Norway's experience with violating submarines well, saying:
"I think we could go in and count ...concluding that 96% 
of the reports are not for submarines at all. NATO 
guidelines are very strict on this matter. There is a strict
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categorization scheme: where one has 'confirmed' and 
'possible' subs. We have seen many incidents where 
rotating fishing buoys are often reported as 'possible' 
submarines. We don't want to reject tiie possible presence 
of third-nation submarines (non-WTO or NATO) either.
In sum, we don't reject that we have 'visits'—but they are 
few and there do not exist any confirmed reports. For the 
political establishment they are significant while they are 
insignificant for the military."^
From this quote, it is interesting to contrast Sweden's position where the 
reputation of the military's interest is seen to be high, while the political 
establishment has seen to be low. One can also see the contrast in standards— 
whereas NATO has common, established policies regarding identification of 
submarines, Sweden's policy, only in the past ten years has undergone at least 
two instances of tightening.
Then-Labour Party Leader, Brundtland, in an in terview ^, was asked about 
the importance of the Swedish submarine incidents. She pointed out two 
significant details:
1. "the Swedish submarine incidents have clearly affected (us) 
indirectly, giving us the impression that a superpower is trying 
to force itself in an unacceptable manner on the Nordic area.
2. the Norwegian incidents are supplementary to the Swedish 
incidents, which are the most serious. Soviet submarines have 
not able to be identified in Norway in as (clear) terms as in 
Sweden."
One should not totally discount that the Soviet submarines have intentionally 
performed different missions vis-à-vis Sweden than Norway to explain the lack 
of Norwegian preoccupation w ith the submarine issue. An important difference 
between the Baltic and the Northern Fleets is the absolute dependence which
56 N34
^  " Aktiv norsk regering tar kontakt for handlingsplan," H ufvudstadsbladet, 
8 December, 1984.
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the Soviet Union places upon the Northern Fleet's nuclear missile-bearing 
submarines in time of w ar—the strategic perspective. One may rightly argue 
that the Baltic Fleet's submarines have been much more interested in 
intelligence gathering in the Soviet 'tackyard." Another factor may be a simple, 
inexplicable difference in Soviet behaviour between the two Fleets. Or it may 
be as one Swedish military figure proposed, a simple result of the "better 
behaviour of Soviet submarines in the Norwegian Sea."“
Other boundary violations
In the recent past (1983-) there have been two incidents which have left their 
m ark on Norway. These two incidents were of no outstanding military 
importance. Rather they were symbolic—telling of the tense security-policy 
climate that exists in the area, and especially what sort of security interest the 
area attracts. These events are also results of varying interpretations of national 
interests and objective boundaries—not to say the utter absence of rules of 
conduct in the area.
One incident involved an accidental firing of a Soviet missile which on New 
Year's 1984/5 flew over Norwegian airspace, landing in a Finnish lake. The 
second incident involved a Soviet frigate which cut the cable from a Norwegian 
seismic vessel operating "well inside the Norwegian mainland zone."(Sollie, 
1988:40) Following an official Soviet apology, the Norwegian Government chose 
to disregard misdoing in the affair, stating that the ship operated on the 'safe 
side of a margin of error.'^’ It might be said that most élites would share one 
Norwegian military official's conclusion that the cable incident was a "mid­
management decision, rather than any continuing trend..."“  It would be
58 S41
See also related articles: "Akseptabel unnskyldning," Aftenposten, July 20, 
1985; "Krehkelse," Verdens Gang, 12 July, 1985; G. A. Johansen, "Splittet i kabel- 
affaeren," Arbeiderbladet, 16 July, 1985.
"N34
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reasonable to propose that one major difference between the Norwegian and 
Swedish border incidents is that the Swedes see the repetitive, intentional nature 
of such, while the Norwegians, in great part, explain such behaviour as erratic 
a n d /o r accidental.
The picture of non-maritime border violations painted by Norwegian élites 
strengthens this argument, as the Norwegians more often portray themselves 
as being the violators rather than the violated. The Swedes do not paint such 
pictures—at least not publicly. Sweden has never publicly admitted to violating 
another nation's air or sea space.^^ Next to maritime violations, land-based 
violations m ust be seen as the most serious. Being that Norway has a land 
boundary with the Soviets, border incursions are nonetheless a fact of life with 
which Sweden will never have to come to terms. In 1987 the Norwegian 
Frontier Commissioner, Colonel I. Torhaug, reported that there had been 25 
border violations, of which one-third could be regarded as being of "a serious 
nature."^^ A well-placed military figure characterized the Soviet behaviour as 
being generally "very careful...except in 1968 when two (Soviet) divisions 
crossed the Norwegian border." He continued "it is actually remarkable how 
little of this we have seen."^^
It is interesting to note the tone of cross-border relations between the 
Norwegians and the Soviets in the far North. When asked if there was any
Here the Catalina Affair is an interesting case-in-point. The Swedes have, 
to date, maintained that the DC-3 was shot down over international waters, 
while Soviet officials have held that the aircraft was over Soviet airspace at the 
time.
O.S. Storvik, "Krenkelser utfordrer Sovjet," Aftenposten, 13 October, 1987. 
Torhaug says that "the Soviets see this sort of occurrence as very serious 
indeed," further recommending Norwegians to "put themselves more into 




degree of decreased readiness as a result of the "North Norway feeling,"^ one 
military figure with direct experience in the area responded "not very much... 
although it is important to understand that this ("North Norway feeling") is a 
good basis for communicating with the Russians—for, if we can really 
understand what World War Two meant to the Soviet Union, we can use this 
(knowledge) in an efficient way to establish good forms of dialogue (e.g. give 
appreciation for w hat the Soviets did at the time.)"^ Above and beyond the 
usual mishaps^, there seems to be a general perception of Soviet border 
violations being few and far in between.
Even in the air, officials pointed to Norway as being more frequently 
culpable than the Soviet Union. One senior military official said "it's much 
more proper to talk about the Norwegian violations of Soviet airspace or 
territory than the reverse...we are far more to blame than they are—we infringe 
on their borders more than they."^^ From time to time this judgement is also 
uttered publicly.^ In the airspace over both Norway and Sweden, there seems 
to be a shared perception that the Soviets follow their borders, to such an extent 
that incursions can usually be classified as navigational errors.^’ The Swedes
^  A reference to the positive feeling towards the Soviet Union in the North 
of Norway (Troms, Finnmark etc)., as a consequence of the Soviet liberation of 
that area from German occupation during World War Two.
65 N35
“  Example: there was an apparent border crossing by Soviet border guards, 
where they shot at a Norwegian fisherman, in July, 1990. See M. Danbolt, 
"Norsk-Sovjetisk grensebefaring," Aftenposten, 13 July, 1990; M. Rod, "Uenige 
om grenselo-enkelse," Aftenposten, 9 July, 1990.
67 NIO
^  O.S. Storvik, "Norge krenket Soyjet-farvann, hevder militære," 
Aftenposten, 17 March, 1989: the Norwegian intelligence-gathering vessel, 
"Maijata" was said to have crossed into Soviet territorial waters.
"On the subject of air incursions," said one Norwegian military official, 
"we are speaking of 2 over the past 20 to 30 years. In those cases, it would be 
fair to conclude that the cause was navigational error." (NIO)
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are willing to admit to more frequent air incursions by the Soviet Union, which 
were, according to one official, approximately one a year, which was "not that 
many."^® The most publicized overflight by a Soviet aircraft took place over 
the island of Gotland in 19847^ In a later incident, when a Soviet aircraft went 
down in international waters off Gotland on 7 January, 1991, one official felt 
that "everything went well...the Soviets were relaxed about it"—attributing the 
success to the new international climate.^
The Norwegian-Soviet Incidents-at-Sea Treaty (1990)
Something very important happened between Norway and the Soviet Union 
in the Fall of 1990, but which was hardly even recognized in the press.^ The 
event is interesting for it reveals a significant difference that Norway's 
alignment makes in its behaviour towards the USSR. On 1 October, 1990 the 
Norwegians and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral, so-called "Incidents-at-Sea 
Treaty" with the Soviet Union. The treaty was an attem pt to prevent episodes 
at sea and in the air outside of territorial waters.^^ The agreement comprises 
the relationship between military ships and planes outside of territorial waters, 
as well as to civilian ships and planes. The agreement further sets down rules 
of behaviour and communication between the partners.
S41, who added that the Soviet fliers average about as many air hours as 
they always have. With respect to the Soviet Air Force's exercise pattern, "They 
are still flying out of Germany and Poland, but even there we now may be 
seeing a weaker tendency to exercise from these spots."
Âstrôm, "Misstag eller nonchalans âr ingen ursakt," Svenska Dagbladet, 
17 September, 1984 for background.
^S41
^  For the Storting debate on the background of the first nuclear accident see 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget 12 April, 1989.
Aftenposten, "Soyjet-avtale undertegnet igâr," 2 October, 1990.
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The most proximate cause of discussion leading up to the treaty was a series 
of Soviet nuclear submarine accidents^ which perked the ears of Norwegian 
public officials and citizens alike/^ Since 1977 there had been an average of 
one such submarine incident per year. In total there were fourteen such 
incidents outside of the territorial sea which have been made public.^ Two 
of those incidents took place in 1989 outside of Norwegian coastal waters. One 
of the key failures in connection with the incidents was the lack of 
communication or tardiness in Soviet notification of the proper Norwegian 
officials.
Who made the proposal and why?
It is difficult to specify who originally proposed the treaty, though the most 
reliable information reveals that it was in fact a Soviet proposal, to which the 
Norwegians were first in presenting a draft, in all likelihood in the Summer of 
1989.^* One of the first mentions the Foreign Minister made of the matter was 
in January, 1989, before any of the incidents occurred.^ Nonetheless, a high
^  These accidents were caused by one, a reactor fault (M. Fyhn, "Reaktorfeil 
pâ ubâten," Aftenposten, 18 July, 1989) and two, by a fire on-board (T. Flay, 
"Forsvarets ubâtsrapport aw iser utslippfare," Aftenposten, 19 April, 1989).
The am ount of reactivity in the submarine was about 40% that of that 
released by Chernobyl—a mere 250 SSW of Bear Island, (the April 7 incident). 
(Bamaby,1989:296-7)
^  28 August, 1977(in the Pacific); 19 August, 1978 (Northwest of Scotland); 
21 August, 1980 (East of Okinawa); September, 1981 (Baltic Sea); June, 1983(at 
Kamchatka Peninsula); September, 1983(Northem Pacific); 31 October, 1983(East 
Coast of U.S.); 21 March, 1984(Japan Sea); 20 September, 1984 (Japan Sea); 21 
September, 1984 (Gibraltar); 13 January, 1986(Northwest of Okinawa); 3 October, 
1986(East of Bermuda); 7 April, 1989 (North Sea); 26 June, 1989(North Sea). 
(O.T. Storvik, "...-Alarmen gâr i Moskva," Aftenposten, 1 July, 1989.)
One MF A official proximate to the different texts (N28).
Stoltenberg's foreign policy declaration, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 
January, 1989: "The Government has placed considerable weight on trying to 
establish the worth of confidence-building measures which can contribute to
(continued...)
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Foreign Ministry official stated that it in fact was a Norwegian proposal.*® One 
could also argue that the string of similar treaties signed between the USSR on 
the one hand and the US (1972), the UK (1986) and the FRG on the other were 
concrete Soviet steps towards normalisation of maritime relations w ith the 
West.*^ Formal negotiations got underway on 12 December that very year.*^ 
According to one Norwegian Foreign Ministry official, the background of the 
agreement included a "Soviet (affinity) for bilateral agreements."*^ As had 
become commonplace in negotiations with the Soviet Union, all suspicions of 
a Soviet attempt at gaining a droit de regard had to be resolved so that consensus 
could be reached.*^ According to several sources, none of whom could be 
attributed, the Soviets had first proposed texts which in varying degrees gave 
them, as perceived by the Norwegians, a foothold in Norwegian domestic and 
foreign policy-making.
The Character of the Proposal
There were items in the early Soviet drafts which immediately put 
Norwegian officials on the defensive. "The Soviet Union especially wanted to
^(...continued)
prevent episodes-at-sea...among those measures being considered are so-called 
'Incidents at Sea' treaties...the Government intends to start w ork towards a 
treaty to prevent such episodes both at sea and in the air over sea areas."
80 N24
*^ Oldberg (1990) supports the conclusion that there was a Soviet naval 
revision of thought over maritime conduct in this area.





include points on military actions, said one MFA official."®  ^ According to one 
high Foreign Ministry official, "we could not have any military provisions (in 
the text) which could in any way limit the use of these waters beyond either the 
practical needs nor beyond the proposed agreement."®® These clauses were 
eliminated from the final draft. A separate examination of those sentences or 
phrases that did not appear in the final draft, would surely reveal more details 
of the present Soviet security policy interests in the area.
The Norwegian Leadership's Perception of Opportunity and Necessity
It was the coalescence of, on the one hand Norwegian élites' perceptions of 
an opportunity to better define their Soviet relationship and on the other hand, 
the same leadership's perception of the necessity of having a treaty which 
would formalize procedures in the event of future sea emergencies which led 
the Norwegians to favour a Sea Incidents treaty.
The Agreement was an outgrowth of a number of yet smaller factors. First, 
the Agreement was the logical attempt at resolving a military reality: of the 
amount of submarine traffic through the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United 
Kingdom) Gap, as well as the overall increased strategic importance of the 
aquatic areas off of the Norwegian coast for both the U.S. and the Soviets® .^ 
This in turn may have led to the realisation that the strategic importance of the 
Soviet submarine fleet would in any case not decrease in the proximate time 
span. Furthermore, a re-invigorated climate of discussion with Moscow opened
®^ N28. Two examples: the opportunity to close parts of the Barents Sea 
during military manoeuvres: discussion of possibility of agreement on 
dangerous military behaviour (with a basis in the Soviet-American agreement).
86 N24
®^ This particular submarine was said to have been returning (in all 
likelihood to Kola) from a routine patrol in the Mediterranean. ("Argusoyne pâ 
Sovjet," Aftenposten, 1 July, 1989)
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new doors of opportunity. Finally, the Norwegians saw the matter as very 
much in their own political (for some political party-related) interest.
In all likelihood the Norwegians had such an agreement in the back of their 
minds at least since the occurrence of the first accident in April, 1989.“  The 
attainment of such an agreement became more credible through the Gorbachev 
years, given that the Soviets had been significantly more forthcoming in 
exchanges of information, monitoring*^ and verification—central aspects of any 
future treaty.
While Soviet Oslo ambassador, Teterin, characterised the second incident as 
"sad,"^ the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Stoltenberg was saying that "it is 
obviously unacceptable that a superpower does not brief the Norwegian officials 
in such a situation."’  ^ The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Janis Bjom Kenavin, 
said "The Russians should have understood that the occurrence would become 
known in Norway and would cause (negative) reactions—not least because of 
the two serious accidents only a short time ago."’  ^ One senior diplomat 
argued that "you must also see the event against the background of the Soviet 
nuclear detonations on Novaya Zemlya—there was a growing threat, which also 
combined nuclear environmental waste attached to the strategic weapons 
systems deployed on our doorstep...for that reason we proposed them a treaty 
in December of 1989 in New York."^^
** Aftenposten, while not revealing the source, points out that a draft of an 
agreement to prevent these sort of incidents is already in the works. (18 July, 
1989).
*’ With respect to the Nickel project, which we will discuss in more detail 
later on, Norwegian decision-makers perceived "major changes in w hat sort of 
on-site monitoring of environmental data the Soviets would accept." (N44)
^  "Det gode naboskap," Aftenposten, 18 July, 1989.
"Det gode naboskap," Aftenposten, 18 July, 1989.
^  M. Fyhn, "Reaktorfeil pâ ubâten," Aftenposten, 19 July, 1989.
’*N1
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The Importance of Precedent
These perceptions of necessity and opportunity however likely would have 
fallen on infertile ground if the Norwegians felt they were circumventing the 
NATO framework in order to gain a solely bilateral advantage. Thus, the fact 
that various other NATO countries had signed similar treaties with the Soviet 
Union provided important background to the Norwegian decision to proceed 
in pursuing such an agreement. The first of these agreements was the "USA- 
USSR Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas" 
signed in 1972. It is widely regarded as a success, having reduced the frequency 
and severity of superpower naval incidents while building greater trust and 
confidence at sea(Lynn-Jones, 1990:203). This Agreement provided a model for 
similar bilateral agreements in 1986 between the USSR and UK^ and in 1988 
between the FRG and the USSR. The 1972 Agreement sought to limit the 
number and dangers of naval incidents through regulation of dangerous 
manoeuvres, restriction of other forms of harassment, increased communication 
at sea and finally convening regular naval consultations and exchanges of 
information(Lynn-Jones, 1990:205). The Norwegian-Soviet treaty’®, is, both in 
terms of spirit and the letter, identical to these other agreements.
Had this precedent been absent, it is unlikely that the Norwegians would 
have accepted the wording and the spirit of such a "bilateral" treaty. As one FM 
official recounted, "we tried to have an agreement very similar to the other (UK, 
USA, FRG) because we wanted to avoid—in our contacts with the Soviet Union— 
to have too much bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union on security in the
^  This treaty differs from the US-USSR in that it includes non-military 
vessels and refers to ^beyond the territorial sea' instead of 'high seas', reflecting 
the fact that the 1982 UNCLOS establishes other categories such as the 200- 
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone, which is neither territorial waters or 
high seas. (Lynn-Jones, 1990:214-5)
^  "Avtale mellom Kongeriket Norges Regjering og Regjeringen i Unionen 
av Sovjetiske Socialistiske Republikker om forhindring av episoder till sjos 
utenfor territorialfarvannet," 1 October, 1990. (courtesy MFA, Oslo)
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North." "If we have problems with the agreement," he added, "we will know 
that since there are similar NATO agreements we will have this support"^  
According to Norway's present Stockholm ambassador^ the logic was such:
"The Soviet Union wanted something more comprehensive, 
something tied to confidence building measures. There was 
precedent in the form of the United Kingdom-Soviet Union 
treaty and other similar treaties—as such we had a pattern on 
which we could base our decision. It was a good idea which 
served a useful purpose. In the first case we could hope to 
avoid incidents which were uncomfortable for us, and in the 
second case it opened contact in a new area."
One individual close to the matter recounted some important details of this 
changed Norwegian approach:
"Although we consulted both the U.S. and U.K. on this 
matter—we had always considered that, for m, it was less 
appropriate. We could only have a discussion of this 
issue by weaving it into a wider multilateral 
framework."’®
The Soviet Union later took the Norwegian-Soviet agreement and held it up to 
the Swedes—in an attempt to use precedent to solicit Swedish acceptance of a 
similar agreement.”  This effort failed.
A changed international climate and changes within the Soviet Union in 
particular brought about a change in the Labour Party's approach and 
estimation of what was possible under the conditions. As one official explained:
% N55
”  Olav Bücher-Johannessen, long time Moscow ambassador and diplomat. 
Ambassador Bücher-Johannessen agreed to be cited under the condition that 
any quote which was used in the thesis had to be regarded as his "personal 
views."
98 N26
”  V. Myashnikov, "Avtal med Sovjet okar sakerheten," Sydsvenska 
Dagbladet, 25 September, 1990,
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"During early 1989 there was a shift from the emphasis on 
a multilateral framework in the speeches of both (Moscow 
Ambassador) Dagfinn Stenseth and Johan Jorgen Holst.
The Government, and especially (Foreign Minister)
Stoltenberg pronounced that the climate changed and now 
we have to start looking at these things more flexibly.
Stoltenberg's personal change played the main role in this 
change of direction. Before we had done things with the 
Soviet Union according to certain firm, particular 
principles."
The same official stated that Stoltenberg's reasoning incorporated two central 
considerations. First, the political climate had been changed ("we'd moved into 
a new atmosphere") and additionally, the fact that the treaty was purely 
technical in character—no political pressure could be applied. "If there would 
have been a political consultation clause, things would have turned out 
differently," mentioned this official.^ ®®
Seen from the domestic Norwegian political standpoint, the treaty was also 
well-timed. One interviewee expressed a "need for an agreement as big as 
this."^°  ^ Another Foreign Ministry official related that "Norway needed the 
treaty for political reasons," continuing that "some politicians felt that we 
needed such a treaty in order to be able to say to some segments of public 
opinion that we had achieved something in naval d i s a r m a m e n t . O n e  
Norwegian contrasted Sweden's position saying, "Sweden is free to say that she 
favours naval disarm am ent-and has been very active in pursuing it."^ °^  One
100 "Avtal med Sovjet okar sakerheten."
N24. One could draw  the conclusion that Norway needed an agreement 
with the Soviet Union based on the significant frustration she has suffered over 
the Barents dividing line issue.
N23.
One can read here that although certain segments of Norwegian opinion 
have favoured naval measures that NATO—and especially the U.S. reticence to 
enter into naval arms control, has placed limits on how far Norway could go in 
advocating the same. "As a practical-technical agreement," he continued, "it was 
an easy way out of a tricky question." (N23)
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military figure hinted that "maybe (the treaty) was more for political than 'real' 
reasons."^^
One Aspect of the Agreement's Significance: A n Exceptional Shift from Multilateral 
to Bilateral Diplomacy
The signing of the Soviet-Norwegian Incidents-at-Sea Treaty marked an 
aberration from the traditional Norwegian disdain of entering into bilateral 
treaties with the Soviet Union in the security policy realm. At the same time, 
the agreement symbolized a concrete step towards resolution of an extremely 
dangerous problem-area.^°^ While the treaty was in-and-of-itself an objectively 
interesting move, the perceptual and behaviourial shift from multi- to bilateral 
diplomacy is of param ount interest for this project. It is clear that Norway's 
NATO membership made this exception possible.
The background has several dimensions. One of the basic tenets of 
Norwegian Soviet policy has been to avoid Soviet attempts to regionalize or 
isolate their bilateral relationship—such that the superpower counterpart could 
gain what they perceived as being undue advantage. Historically the 
Norwegians have dismissed Soviet efforts to negotiate the jurisdictional issue 
on Svalbard, have avoided Soviet attempts to solve the dividing line in the 
Barents Sea by anything less than a clear division. The Soviet Union, on the 
other hand, has proposed "zones of confidence," "joint condominium" among 
other concepts. The Norwegians have also resisted Soviet attempts to 
regionalize such issues as arms control, with the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free 
Zone proposal as case-in-point.
N34. "Our experience with the Soviets was that when we checked their 
ships they were indeed following international law," he said. "In fact, they 
probably obey the rules of the sea as well as anyone else...even if the Russians 
had not signed the Agreement they would have reported (such an incident) 
today," he continued. He concluded "But for political reasons, and because of 
the unease in the Norwegian population we needed a treaty."
105 Yp "Ubât orsak till massdod," Svenska Dagbladet, 7 March, 1991.
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Neutral Sweden refused a Soviet incident treaty and Norway accepted. In 
principle the Norwegians would have also objected to both the text, intention 
and spirit of such an incidents treaty with the Soviet Union—and, w hat is more, 
for many (if not all) of the same reasons as Sweden. However, officials 
confirmed that the NATO backbone gave Norway a different manoeuvrability 
in the issue which Sweden could and would not enjoy. One Swedish official 
said simply, the Norwegians had the confidence of being under the NATO 
umbrella.*®^ One Norwegian arms control specialist added, "seeing things 
within the NATO context, we could afford to be more magnanimous."
Port Calls: To Declare or not to Declare?
Introduction
A  close examination of the issue of port calls by potentially nuclear weapons- 
bearing ships reveals critical junctures where neutrality and alignment impact 
upon the way Swedish and Norwegian leaders perceive and behave towards the 
Soviet Union. Norway has not regarded such visits as "violations" in the same 
way as Sweden has.
Sweden's core principle of territorial inviolability is key to understanding 
w hy the Swedes have been so adamant in demanding guarantees from visiting 
vessels that they do not carry nuclear weapons. For Sweden, it is not as 
important to prove that a ship is carrying nuclear weapons—for obtaining this 
information would entail violating international law and praxis. W hat is 
important is that the visiting state makes a declaration, which coincides with 




paper" Sweden appears to be simultaneously maintaining impartiality'®* and 
enforcing an important pillar of its foreign policy. In Sweden there presently 
exist two options: "to trust the visitor or refuse the visit."'®’ The Swedish 
Social Democrats have made an anti-nuclear port call regime a central theme of 
their foreign policy. This policy has, in theory, gained political points with a 
deeply anti-nuclear sentiment, while simultaneously acting to strengthen 
Sweden's neutral policy.
Norway has a far less formal policy. While a policy has been laid down, it 
has not been followed. The key point is that Norway is unwilling to surrender 
its "Atlantic lifeline" for what some quarters feel is ideologically and morally 
desirable. Another central Norwegian dilemma is to w hat extent it can apply 
rules to selected areas of its foreign policy, such as the visits of nuclear ships, 
w ithout being interpreted within the alliance as being an disloyal member. 
How many restrictions can Norway impose without being considered a bad 
member of the club? Membership carries with it responsibilities. Norway, as 
an ally of the U.S., has never felt it proper to go against its ally in this very 
sensitive area. Only certain sections of the left-flank of the Norwegian Labour 
Party and the Socialist Left Party have been vocally opposed to port calls—both 
as political issues in and of themselves, and as an attempt to please the strong 
anti-nuclear sentiment in Norway.
The port call issue is of much greater importance for the U.S. and NATO 
than for the Soviet Union. Unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. has a need to 
demonstrate its presence in Northern Waters. The Soviet Union, by 
geographical default, is a permanent fixture of that same environment. The port 
call issue does not directly concern the Soviet Union to any great degree on a
'®* Foreign Minister Bodstrom stated "the Government regards naval visits 
as a question between the host country and the visiting nation...we don 't want 
to have the issue of naval visits be regarded as a matter between Sweden and 
one or another military pact." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1985).
'®^ Prawitz (1990b.T5)
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day-to-day basis. The only real impact can be found in the spin-off effect that 
these countries' port visitation policies have on wide-scale Soviet military 
planning. This is illustrated in the number of U.S.-NATO port calls—which far 
outnumber Soviet-WTO force visits."^ In fact there have been no Soviet naval 
visits to Sweden since the Karlskrona incident of 1983.“ '
The Superpower Port Call Policies
Unlike the U.S. policy of "neither confirm nor deny" the presence of nuclear 
weapons on board its ships, the Soviet policy towards port visits has been 
ambiguous from the start. But presently Soviet "policy" seems to be in a state 
of clarification and transition. Reportedly, the Soviets had a policy of NiCNod 
(Neither Confirm Nor Deny) policies until at least the mid-1980's. The litmus 
test of this Soviet policy occurred in two instances: once when a stranded Soviet 
submarine was towed through Japanese territorial waters in August of 1980. 
As a response to a Governmental request, and once the submarine had cleared 
Japanese territorial waters, the Soviet Union declared that they had no nuclear 
weapons on-board (Prawitz, 1990b:4). In the case of the Karlskrona incident, the 
Soviets responded that "the Soviet submarine U-137 carries, as do all other naval 
vessels at sea, the necessary weapons and ammunition.""^
In more recent years, the Soviet position has become somewhat clearer. 
Commenting on the extraordinary general election in Denmark in 1988, Soviet 
General Batenin stated that Soviet ships generally respect nuclear weapon-free
Since 1980, 239 naval visits have taken place in Sweden. Of those only 
two of them have been from the Warsaw Pact—one from East Germany, 1988, 
and one from Poland, 1989, while 209 have been from NATO countries. Of 
NATO vessels, 8.5%, on the average, are said to "in all likelihood" carry nuclear 
weapons. (Oberg, 1989:546). A conflicting account is found in J. Prawitz, O. 
Tunander, O. Wæver, P. Joenniemi, S. Lodgaard (1990).
Measurements of U-137's hull for radiation indicated the probable 
presence of nuclear weapons on board. (Prawitz, 1990a:13)
Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1981. (Stockholm: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs), p. 81-101; O. Sundstrom, FOA-Tidningen, (December, 1981).
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zones and the policies of the host countries: "When Soviet ships call on foreign 
ports, e.g. in Mexico, Ireland or Greece, their captains declare, on request, that 
the ships have no nuclear weapons on board.""^ Finally, in June 1988, 
Edward Shevardnadze stated before the United Nations Assembly that "on the 
basis of reciprocity with the United States and other nuclear powers, the USSR 
is prepared to announce the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board 
its naval vessels calling at foreign p o r t s . O t h e r  statements even hint at a 
change in the direction of abandoning Soviet NiCNoD policies."^ According 
to Jan Prawitz at the Swedish Defence Ministry, "it seems that the Soviet policy 
has become one of denunciation instead of non-disclosure."(Prawitz et al, 
1990:340)
Port Calls To Sweden
One of the reasons that there have been no naval visits to Sweden from the 
Soviet Union since the early 1980's is because of an informal ban on such visits 
due to the submarine issue. Another possible reason is the respect that the 
Soviet Union holds for Sweden and Norway's non-nuclear policies. A third 
reason could be that the Soviet Union has never felt port calls to be important 
because it already occupies a central strategic location in the North.
The thinking which underlies the Swedish policy on port calls is similar to 
New Zealand's decision in 1985^ ^^  which makes a comprehensive ban on
G. Batenin, 20 April, 1988 as quoted in Prawitz et al (1990:340).
UN Document A/S15/PV.12 as quoted in Prawitz et al. (1990:340).
115 "There will be no nuclear weapons aboard the ships going to Norfolk; it 
is not the policy of the Soviet Union to bring nuclear weapons into another 
country," a senior Soviet official said. Feinstein (1989:32) as quoted in Prawitz 
et al (1990:340).
Maj Britt Theorin (Social Democrat), Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 
1988: "it is clear that the difference between Sweden and New Zealand is not 
terribly large."
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nudear-carrying or powered vessels."^ However, in Sweden, the prindple of 
no naval nudear visits has never been translated into law. Prior to 1983 the 
issue was not considered a problem,(Prawitz, 1990b:17) only entering the 
parliamentary agenda in 1987. One law, called the "law about nuclear-technical 
activity," seems to touch the periphery of the issue, but is of doubtful 
application in this problem-area.” * "Instead," argues Oberg, "the nuclear 
weapon ban is based upon an express political desire to keep nuclear weapons 
away from Swedish territory."(Oberg, 1989:550) This desire is then anchored in 
international law through the right which each sovereign state possesses to, on 
its own terms, decide over the utilization of its territory.
When a warship informs Sweden that it has the intention of visiting, the 
permission which Sweden extends bears the reminder:
"there is a general prohibition against foreign naval vessels 
carrying nuclear weapons when visiting Sweden...the Swedish 
Government assumes that this prohibition will be strictly 
observed..."
The Swedish Government has found solace in its oft-repeated phrase that ’W e 
have no reason to believe that this particular policy has ever been 
abrogated."^
Thakur (1987:16). New Zealand's move entailed: a prohibition of visits by 
nuclear-powered ships of any country; prohibition of visits by nuclear-armed 
ships of any country; permits visits by ships which are neither nuclear-propelled 
nor nuclear-armed; permits visits by conventionally-powered ships which are 
capable of carrying nuclear arms, but are known not to be doing so.
Oberg (1989:550). Oberg argues that the grounds for this are: the law is 
not intended for this purpose and second, the law requires permission— not a 
ban. The law is contained in SFS 1984:3 Sect. 5 (12 January, 1984). According 
to the law the transfer of uranium and plutonium into Sweden requires 
permission by the Government. (Prawitz, 1990b:17)
For example. Foreign Minister Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 24 October,
1985.
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Port Calls to Norway
Norwegian policy on port visits was formulated in 1957, on the occasion of 
an impending visit from the USS Nimitz. The risks were not considered worth 
the visit, which the Government accordingly cancelled (Thakur, 1987:19), 
However, a formal Government articulation of the policy would have to wait 
for the tenure of Labour Prime Minister Trygve Bratteli. In 1975 Bratteli, in 
cooperation with Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, formulated w hat has been 
called the "Bratteli doctrine," which would serve as a milepost for Norwegian 
port call policy:^^
"Both our Allies and other nuclear powers are familiar with this 
policy. Our terms have been and are that nuclear weapons 
shall not be carried on board foreign military vessels during 
port calls in Norway. The Norwegian authorities presume both 
our Allies and other nuclear powers respect this policy.
According to Bratteli, if foreign warships were to carry nuclear weapons into 
Norwegian harbours, this would not constitute any "legal deviation" from 
Norwegian nuclear policy (Prawitz et al, 1990:343).
Unlike the Swedish policy, the Norwegian is markedly less concerned about 
a strict administration of the Bratteli doctrine. The spirit and the principle of 
the Norwegian port call policy seems significantly less stringent than the 
Swedish. Norwegian letters of clearance, unlike Swedish letters, do not reiterate 
the established guidelines. Norwegians have felt that the publicity of its port 
call policy by diplomatic channels is unnecessary, simply assuming the policy
As one Progress Party politician, Hans Rosjorde, explained (the doctrine) 
was formulated because "Bratteli was forced to calm the leftists in the Labour 
Party-he was forced to have a peace agreement in his group." He continued 
"while he d idn 't expressly forward the 'do 's and the don 'ts' of his policy, he did 
believe that all allied forces knew the Norwegian policy towards nuclear 
weapons (on ships)."
Thakur (1987:19) further points out that this does not imply that countries 
should abandon their own confirm or deny policies.
156
is known through international seminars, commentaries in the media and the 
like.(Prawitz et al., 1990:344) Contrasted to the Norwegians, the Swedes have 
a recurring need to demarcate the independent nature of its foreign policy 
decision-making. The Norwegians, by contrast, have to demarcate their 
attachment to alliance principles and de-emphasize desirable goals which may 
run  counter alliance policy.
The Political Debate
The Swedish Left Party and the Environmental Parties have been willing to 
go further than any of the other parties in demanding a more stringent 
enforcement of the Swedish port call policy.'^ The Swedish Communist Party 
has in past years gained much support from the Environmental Party in this 
striving, a political support which Norway lacks. Thus, formal opposition to the 
existing policies has been difficult to m uster and maintain given the 
overwhelming majority of the political spectrum which is less vocal about the 
policy. The Social Democratic Party has also been an ardent supporter, 
however the question of port call policy enforcement has split the party. Even 
the Centre Party^^ and to a lesser extent the Liberal party '^  have also
Riksdagsprotokoll: for the Left Party see, MP Viola Claesson on 23 
January, 1986 or Gudrun Schyman on 7 December, 1988. For the Environmental 
Party see Carl Frick or Elizabeth Franzén (29 May, 1989) or Per Gahrton (29 
November, 1989).
In a reservation to Foreign Affairs Committee position paper, "Om 
Nedrustning," Riksdagstryck, 1989/1990:UU6 (9 November, 1989) the Centre 
Party (Hambraeus and Soder) joins hands with the Environmental Party 
(Gahrton) and the Left Party (Hurtig) in stating: "...while waiting for 
international results, Sweden should not feel hindered in demanding notification 
that during naval visits Sweden's law is being respected—or in some other way 
assured that such happens."
Ingela Mârtensson has been the most vocal. E.g. see motion in Foreign 
Relations Committee document "Nedrustning" Riksdagstryck, 1990/91:UU4 (18 
October, 1990).
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played an important role in the debate, at times dem anding a tighter port call 
regime.
The debate has taken on another interesting dimension in both Norway*^ 
and Sweden^^: the local authorities versus the national authorities over legal 
jurisdiction over the port call issue. Since in both countries the central 
government bears the formal responsibility for foreign policy, these moves have 
been interpreted as mere displays or outbursts of public opinion.
In Norway the issue has been much more contained politically. It would be 
fair to say that, as in Sweden, the Norwegian Socialist Left party has in fact led 
the crusade^^, with only minimal support from the Labour Party over the 
issue. The Norwegian Socialist Left party has campaigned for a ban on nuclear 
visits, but this particular standpoint must be seen against the background of its 
advocacy of a total break with the common NATO nuclear strategy.'^
Guarantees and the Problems of Enforcement^^
Neutrality introduces certain complications into the enforcement process. 
The Swedish policy places a premium on the production of evidence before 
making a judgement. Swedish neutrality dictates that objective facts, not
Hans Rosjorde, head of the Stortinget's Defence Committee mentioned 
that several municipal boards have been voting for proposals which have the 
same text, as that proposed by the Socialist Left party.
J. Nygren and P. Schori, "Vi kan bara ha en utrikespolitik," Dagens 
Nyheter, 19 April, 1989.
Year after year Socialist Left politicians have posed difficult questions to 
the Norwegian leadership. An example was Paul Chaffey's question in the 
Storting, "...and what about the proposals for nuclear free zones, nuclear-free 
harbours and disarmament in the Northern areas?" (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 
4 January, 1990).
128 Theo Koritzinsky, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
Lin (1990:105-6) illuminates the question of reliability connected with any 
less than obtrusive verificatory procedures.
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assumptions, should be the basis for excluding foreign ships from Swedish 
territorial waters. This standpoint is perceived by Sweden as the only way to 
judge the issue on its objective merits—but also to avoid accusations of Swedish 
partiality in the East-West conflict.
Senior Swedish'^ officials have warned of the political and technical 
dangers of accepting evidence which is any less than definitive. The heart of 
this reservation stems from the stated lack of technical possibilities to check the 
actual presence of nuclear weapons on-board. Sweden has repeatedly pointed 
out the technical complications related to verifying whether a ship does or does 
not carry nuclear weapons.^^' There are even international legal statutes, to 
which Sweden is undeniably wed, which have to be respected in this 
context.^^^ Carl Frick of the Environmental Party said that "given what the 
Foreign Minister has told about the absence of technical capabilities to see 
whether there are nuclear weapons on-board...(this) is a pretty strange statement 
against the background of what happened in Karlskrona a few years ago... where 
we stated we were able to establish that there were nuclear weapons on- 
board."^^^ Another representative of the Environmental Party, Elizabeth 
Franzén, asked whether this statement was a political judgement.*^
Sten Andersson, stated "Carl Frick has referred to a detailed and 
comprehensive Greenpeace study. Our analysis is that it does not present 
evidence that nuclear weapons have been on-board (visiting vessels) in Swedish 
harbours...the Government cannot act on the basis of suppositions and 
indications." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1990).
Andersson, 2 February, 1989: "W e cannot be sure, short of boarding the 
vessel," (whether the vessel contains nuclear weapons.") (Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 
February, 1989)
Andersson (Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 April, 1989):"The question of whether 
we should demand guarantees, and whether such guarantees should be 
delivered, is determined by international immunity, which gives no right of 
inspection of naval vessels to check the actual state of affairs."
Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 May, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 May, 1989.
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Norwegian offidals^^^ have no grounds to draw  different conclusions. The 
real difference is that while the Swedes have used the technical argument as the 
underlying objective reason why it cannot enforce stiffer regulations, the 
Norwegians have essentially let this point rest, instead emphasizing its NATO 
commitment as the objective hindrance for a more aggressive enforcement 
policy.^^
Consequences of a Strict Port Call Policy
One of the main points of opposition to a tighter port call policy in both 
Norway and Sweden is that such a move would restrain w hat is seen as the 
necessary freedom of superpower movement in the states' territorial waters and 
adjoining high seas, leading in turn to isolation for both Sweden and Norway.
Sweden's Baltic face poses particular problems for Sweden. Sweden has 
historically advocated freedom of navigation through this water body since the 
18th century. While both Sweden^^^ and Norway both strongly favour 
upholding the principle of freedom of movement in the seas, Sweden has 
perhaps felt more uncomfortable about proposals relating to the port issue, 
because their full implementation would mean that Sweden would be closed
135 have no technical possibility to see if the ships carry nuclear 
weapons." (N27)
Anders Sjaastad, 22 January, 1986 Forhandlinger i Stortinget: "I w ant to 
remind that it is of decisive importance for Norway's security to maintain an 
allied naval presence in the waters off the Norwegian coast. It is these allies 
which will guarantee our connections between Norway and our allies in times 
of crisis or war. It is for that reason, not of present importance to institute rules 
which will make it more difficult or impossible to maintain exchange w ith and 
support from allied sea forces."
The Swedish Foreign Relations Committee states ("Nedrustning" 
Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU4): "...it is also in line that Sweden would like to 
maintain the Baltic as a free sea." See also Anders Thunborg's statement that 
"all states, including the U.S. are welcome to sail (in the Baltic)...it creates a 
balance in the Baltic." He added that "it is partly for this reason we w ant port 
calls." (L. Christiansson, "Aren i Moskva tillgâng for Thunborg," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 12 July, 1989)
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into a sea system where the only other sea power would be the Soviet 
Union.^^ Many intimate^^’ that were the U.S. shut out of the Baltic, the 
superpower nuclear balance would be offset in the region.^^
The Norwegian "lifeline over the Atlantic"^^* would be endangered by 
enforcement measures more strict than the Bratteli policy sets forth. Such a 
policy would undeniably have an impact on its relations with the Soviet Union. 
On the positive side, a stricter Norwegian policy would receive a warm 
welcome in M oscow-being that it entails a greater regulation of sea-bound 
NATO nuclear weapons traffic in its immediate neighbourhood. Seen from the 
Soviet perspective, one negative aspect could be that it would put a tighter 
clamp on the freedom of Soviet nuclear weapons traffic in its most important 
strategic arena. Seen from yet another perspective, it is clear that Norway's 
historical desire to act as a bridge-builder between East and West would be 
enhanced by a more strict port calls policy.
Future Prospects of the Port Call Policies
It is unclear which steps will now be taken on the question in Sweden. In 
the Swedish Social Democratic party different voices have been heard. At the
One Foreign Ministry official said that the Soviet motivation behind 
proposing the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone was expressly "to impede 
NATO if NATO gets the idea of going into the Baltic with nuclear weapons." 
(S31)
139 "Nedrustning," Riksdagstryck (1988/89:UU4): "Sweden does not have any 
interest in shutting out any nation's seapower from the Baltic."
One senior military official summed up several aspects of the issue: "what 
sort of position will we be in to check up on these ships if the Baltic is supposed 
to be a free sea?" Also, how will we be able to get NATO in on it, if we have 
such controls? Lastly, how ready is NATO or the Soviet Union to account for 
their weaponry. (I often say that even Sweden is averse to revealing which 
weapons we have!") (S32)
Johan Buttedahl, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
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time of the 1990 Social Democratic Party congress, it was said that Foreign 
Minister had taken a relatively "conservative" approach to the m atter/^  
Andersson's speech in the Riksdag 16 November, 1990 strengthens this assertion:
"Port calls are a part of a larger and important pattern: military 
exchanges increase confidence between countries, and 
confidence is an absolutely necessary element in our w ork for 
peace and disarmament...The Baltic is international water and 
port calls should be welcomed, as long as Swedish law is 
respected...such a move would result in not being able to 
continue the dialogue with those states which we are trying to 
influence."^^^
Andersson's position was rumoured to have been opposed by such figures as 
Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin who demanded a more rigorous 
enforcement of the port call p o l i c y . F o r  one flank of the Social Democratic 
Party^'^, said one observer, "they w ouldn't mind if you put nuclear arms on 
ships—what people are irritated about is not knowing, because this constitutes 
a violation of confidence.
According one Defence source, "Andersson's preference was that Sweden 
be permitted to tackle the larger issues, and forget about the smaller issues 
(such as port calls—which were only two a year on the average)....if harsher 
measures were adopted Sweden would be' frozen out.'"(S19)
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1990; see also Andersson, 
"Besoksforbud ingen losning," Arbetet, 8 September, 1990.
Theorin: "We haven't had many Soviet ships visiting here...if they can 
demonstrate that they are not bringing weapons into Sweden and you are able 
to check that, we have no argument." She continued: "I have proposed that 
marine disarmament issues generally be brought up in the General Assembly 
of the UN—all have voted 'yes' but the U.S" "I feel that the Soviets wiU follow 
the U.S. in this regard." (Theorin interview)
Called in Swedish "grdsossar" usually meaning bourgeois-leaning Social 
Democrats.
146 5 2 9
162
At the 1990 Congress, the Party's Governing Board declared, as it had done 
before on at least one other opportunity,'^^" if the nuclear powers do not 
abandon their principle of denying to give notice about the presence of nuclear 
weapons on-board of visiting naval vessels, (we intend) to demand an express 
notification that no nuclear weapons are present on b o a r d . A t  the time of 
writing no change of the sort had been enacted in the policy realm. W ith the 
change to a Centre-Right coalition Government in September, 1991, the outlook 
for a tighter port call policy seemed dim.
The future of the policy is much clearer in Norway. According to one 
senior Norwegian foreign policy source'^^, one Labour Party figure and one 
Socialist Left Party figure desire a change in the policy. "But at our last 
convention we refused...to demand declarations from the vessel's captain, since 
this is a part of NATO nuclear strategy." One Norwegian Defence official said, 
"in any case, nowadays, nuclear weapons on naval vessels are less popular than 
yesterday (at least for the U.S.), since they are such a nuisance on-board."'^
If a tougher regime were to come about, it would likely be enacted in a 
wider context, perhaps as a part of a coordinated Nordic strategy. Unilateral 
Swedish moves have been frowned upon by certain quarters.'^' An 
important question," said Swedish Liberal MP Hans Lindblad, "is whether
Schori and Nygren, "Vi kan bara ha en utrikespolitik," mention that the 
1987 Social Democratic congress adopted a similar posture towards the problem 
area.
Protocol document from the Social Democratic Party Congress, 1990. The 
document reads further that "such a declaration should be demanded prior to 
the issuing of permission..."
N27
150 n 4
The Foreign Affairs Committee felt that one consequence of making a 
unilateral Swedish move would bring about a systematic cancellation of naval 
visits, this create long-term difficulties of vindicating the principle of the Baltic 
as a free sea." ("Nedrustning", Riksdagsprotokoll, 1990/91:UU4, 18 October, 
1990).
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Norway would follow suit if Sweden made a tough dedsion."^^^ If stricter 
measures did succeed in getting through the Storting, he said, "this would have 
an extremely destructive impact on the United States' behaviour towards 
Norway," translating Norway into a New Zealand case scenario/^^ If Norway 
were to make such a move, Norway would be become "a second class NATO 
member" said one former Norwegian offidal.'^ As Socialist Left MP Chaffey 
pu t it "the Norwegian problem is a problem of our status in NATO becoming 
debatable." He continued, "we are party to NATO/US's nuclear capadty, e.g. 
Norwegian airports are ready for nuclear strike of U.S. planes on the Soviet 
Union—all of these aspects would have to be changed," if a stricter policy were 
to be instituted.^®®
152 Nygren and Schori, "Vi kan bara ha en utrikespolitik,": "a transformed 
Swedish policy...runs the risk of having a spin-off effect on Denmark and 
Norway" where "foreign naval visits play a much different role than for Finland 
or Sweden. For them, naval visits and common training manoeuvres are an 
important part of their NATO memberships...the Norwegian Government 
desires a certain presence of the NATO navy off of her coasts, in a way that 
strengthens the credibility of Norwegian capabilities and will to strengthen 
Norway in a crisis situation..."
®^® Hans Lindblad, interview. "We know," he went on, "that the Norwegian 






Maritime Jurisdictional Disputes w ith the Soviet Union
Introduction
W hen Gorbachev came to power in 1985 he found himself confronted with 
serious jurisdictional disputes with Sweden and Norway. Norway had two 
problems: one, a delimitation disagreement of 155,000 square nautical miles and 
two, a dispute over the utilization of the Svalbard shelf (Churchill, 1988:44).^ 
Sweden disputed an area in the Baltic Sea of 13,500 square kilometres. While 
the zones were significant from both the economic and legal viewpoints, what 
really was at stake was who was in control of two key Nordic bodies of water. 
W hat is interesting to ascertain is whether neutrality influenced Sweden's 
perceptions and behaviour on the issue differently than NATO did N orw ays 
position—and if so, where these points of influence lie.
Differences and Similarities of the disputes
One of the chief differences between the two is that Sweden solved its 
problem in 1988, while Norway still is grappling with the problem today. Here 
it is interesting whether élites perceived the Soviet Union as having either a 
unified or two separate approaches—perhaps connected with Swedish and 
Norwegian security policy— to the two questions. Another important difference 
between the two cases is the clearly more strategic positioning of the Barents 
over the Baltic, especially given the strategic importance allotted the Kola 
Peninsula. However, seen from the vantage point of intelligence platforms, the 
Kola and the Baltic play equally as important roles.^ A third difference, while
 ^ For more on the Svalbard question see 0streng  (1974) and (1978).
 ^Viklund-Persson (1988): "from the military point of view it is significant 
that no Soviet oil platforms are built near the Swedish territorial waters
(continued...)
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of potential interest for seabed mining or other resource purposes, the Baltic 
does not have proven oil reserve potential, such as dominates the Barents Sea 
problem area.^ The Baltic Sea's chief economic draw  was its fishing.
Precisely this reason reveals yet another point of difference: in 1978 Norway 
signed^ a provisional "Grey Zone" agreement, Sweden resisted such 
tendencies.® One of the recurring themes of small state foreign policy is a 
striving to achieve certainty in its relations with large neighbours. This foreign 
policy principle dominated the Swedish insistence on a clear demarcation, and 
opposition to a grey zone arrangement.^ Thus in lieu of a clear agreement, the
^(...continued)
frontier...this would increase the Soviet Union's possibilities of placing radar 
and reconnaissance equipment there."
® Said Anders Âslund, "I do not believe geologists think that there is oil on 
the Swedish side —but it is possible that close to Lithuania there might be." 
(Interview). Swedish MFA Legal Department Head Hans Corell (Corell, 
1989:106) wrote, the agreement gave "our oil prospectors and our fishers better 
possibilities to plan for the future."
 ^The Grey Zone constituted one small portion of the disputed sea and some 
undisputed water. The Agreement involved fishermen adding together their 
catches and dividing them equally—a step towards clarity in relations between 
the countries, but remarkably short of true certainty
® A Swedish inter-departmental review has however recommended that an 
exclusive economic zone be established. See Sveriges ekonom iska zon 
(Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1990), Document Ds 1990:41
 ^ Many officials argued such as one Swedish official: "It is always more 
difficult to be neutral and cooperate with a non-neutral than to do so as party 
to an alliance...especially between a large and small power, where the rights and 
duties are not spelled out." (S22) Pierre Schori pointed out that "we found that 
there were 'foreign policy reasons' which spoke against a grey zone, where we 
would share supervision in an area which extended up to our territory, with a 
superpower." (Schori, 1988)
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disputed area became a "white zone."^ This consideration is especially strong 
for a neutral state which has no backing of its allies.®
That having been said, there are almost as many remarkable similarities 
which unite the two as there are differences which separate them. The 
coincidence of political, military, economic factors penetrated both of the 
disputes, and as such the disputes were somewhat more complex than they may 
seem at first glance. Thus, the issue is, in many senses, a perfect comparative 
and contrast case study of Swedish and Norwegian élites' perceptions of Soviet 
foreign policy. Both the Swedish and the Norwegian negotiations have taken 
place side-by-side historically. By 1988 the Swedes had negotiated nineteen 
years and the Norwegians for fourteen.’ Thus, the Norwegians and the Swedes 
had ample opportunity to share their experiences regarding the Soviet positions 
towards the issue.^° A final similarity is that both may be subject to similar 
Soviet foreign policy variables."
 ^A clearly-plotted delimitation between two states, such as is characteristic 
of state-to-state borders; a "grey zone," whose borders are the disputed areas. 
Within this grey zone, the disputing parties have common jurisdiction, 
effectively locking out third parties; and a "white zone," whose borders are 
clearly demarcated, but which nevertheless remains part of the high sea and 
consequently is open for exploitation by third countries.
® "I remember several incidents involving Soviet trawlers—which were very 
easy to explain in terms of traditional Soviet behaviour—this is the precise 
reason w hy we did not want a grey zone agreement," one Swedish official said. 
(S18)
’ Thorvald Stoltenberg (1988:10) argues that the Norwegians have been 
negotiating for 17 years, while Churchill (1988:45) maintains that formal 
negotiations started in 1974.
While one Swede said "(the Norwegians and the Swedes) had different 
interests (between the conflicts), we did have an agreement w ith respect to the 
Continental Shelf in Skaggerak—it was quite natural that we cooperated and 
discussed."(S22)
"  Churchill (1988:52) the Soviet Union's traditional aversion to referring 




For both Sweden and Norway the delimitation negotiations were of a highly 
sensitive nature. While interviews revealed that Riksdag and Storting members 
were kept abreast of the progress of negotiations at set intervals, the amount of 
individuals directly connected with the negotiations was intentionally minimal. 
Both negotiations involved the political department of the respective Foreign 
Ministries, and in particular the head of the Soviet and East European Affairs 
Department, the Legal Department of the Foreign Ministry. In the Swedish 
case, the delegation was led by a Chief Negotiator. In the Norwegian case, the 
negotiations were at times led by the chief of the Foreign Ministry's Legal 
Department, even by a Sea-use Minister and Undersecretary until 1985. Both 
negotiating teams utilize(d) expertise both from inside and outside of the 
Foreign Ministry.
There were two main interest groups in Sweden: the fishermen and the 
military. Fishermen^^ wanted to be granted as liberal movement as possible 
in order to increase their catches, and personal security in the area. The military 
establishment's main concern was intelligence. An advantageous agreement for 
the Swedes would provide better access to Soviet radio and other intelligence 
traffic, chiefly over the Baltic. A stingy Ôstersjôavtal=Bà[tic Delimitation 
Agreement or ÔA, could broaden the possibilities for Soviet monitoring of their 
counterparts, in the Swedish Intelligence Radio Service.
For more detail on the Swedish and Soviet approaches, see Mahmoudi 
(1989).
There are two perspectives on this point. One official said "the fishermen 
were not so important, there were not so many individuals involved...the West 
Coast is of greater economic importance—the Baltic is meagre." (S22) 
Corell(l989:104) argues that "there were more and more frequent demands from 
the fishing side towards the realisation of an agreement leading to a joint 
administration of the disputed area."
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Overview of events
The area of dispute concerned a continental shelf delimitation and an 
economic border between the Soviet Union and Sweden.^^ Sweden began 
formal negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1969, once it became clear that 
Sweden had established agreement in principle over the delimitation issue with 
Finland(Magnusson:!988:6)/^ Further formal negotiating rounds were held in 
1970,1974,1982 and 1986-88. The respective Soviet and Swedish positions were 
clear: both parties agreed that the median line principle should be employed 
(unlike the sector principle in the case of the Norway-Soviet conflict). However, 
Sweden stood by the principle that the island of Gotland should be incorporated 
into its jurisdiction Eastward, while the Soviet Union maintained that the point- 
of-departure should be the Swedish mainland.^^ For precedent, it called upon 
earlier delimitations and in particular upon international legal standards:
"according to the 1958 and 1982 conventions and in the practice 
between states, it has become clear that islands, which are
The interest of Sweden and the Soviet Union in research into 
environmental problems and windpower cannot be fully discounted as further 
reasons to seek delimitation. See Riksdagstryck 1987/88:UU33 ("Om 
godkannande av en overenskommelse m ellan Sverige och Sovjetunionen om 
avgransning..."), 19 November, 1987.
The Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee clarifies that "the reason why we 
have not been able to conclude delimitation agreements w ith Poland and the 
Soviet Union is because there exists disagreement over the weight that Gotland 
should be allotted." (Riksdagstryck 1985/86:UU10 ("Om fisket i zonen oster om 
Gotland"), 28 November, 1985. The Committee notes successful delimitations 
with Finland, Norway, East Germany and Denmark.
Magnusson (1988:6) notes that the Swedes and the Soviet Union have held 
parallel positions, e.g. in its dispute with the Danes over the inhabited island of 
Hesselo, (Corell, 1989:103) points out that this consideration included the islands 
Læes0  and Anholt) did not consider the island in negotiations. Furthermore, 
the USSR employed the median line principle from her island of Osmejiniy, in 
the context of a dispute w ith Rumania in the Black Sea. (Magnusson, ibid)
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inhabited and have an independent economic life, should be 
taken into consideration during delimitations.”^ ^
Furthermore, Sweden's principle stance was that the unresolved matter could 
effectively be referred to the International Court of Justice. But as one former 
official said ”we tried from the 1970's to suggest to the Soviets that we go to the 
ICJ—but the Soviets stated that 'we don't do this on border issues.'"'*
As Magnusson states, the turning point in the Swedish position was the 
abandonment of a "100-0%" solution(Magnusson, 1988:6). There were many 
Swedish and Soviet changes in position throughout the years leading up to 
solution on January 11, 1988,'’ resulting in an agreement in principle between
Riksdagstryck 1985/1986: UUIO ("Om fisket i zonen oster om Gotland").
'* S22
' ’ Magnusson (1988) charts the development:
1. 1982 change from "100-0" to "92-8" in Swedish favour (proposal by Foreign 
Minister Ullsten)
2. Soviet proposal of "10%-90%" in Soviet favour, then immediately to "23%- 
77%."
3. At this point, the Conservative Party put a stop to negotiations, by stating 
they would not accept less than 100-0. The Russians defied Swedish efforts to 
bring the matter in front of the IÇJ in Den Haag.
4. Several trips by Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori to Moscow in 1985 resulted 
in two changes: The Russian softening of positions to 75% in their favour, 
followed by a change in Spring, 1986 whereby the Soviets lessened their 
demands to 50%.
5. On the initiative of Soviet Premier Ryzhkov, in a letter to Swedish Prime 
Minister Carlsson, Moscow was said to be prepared to accept a 35% portion of 
the zone. This particular 'concession' put some spin on the negotiations.
6. The Swedish Government's demands, after furfiier negotiations, sunk to 80- 
20% in Swedish favour.
(according to the Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagstryck 
1987/88:UU7, the first negotiating prior to December was in January, 1987),
7. 2 December, 1987: the Soviets were said to be able to accept a 70-30% 
solution.
8. December 15: Carlsson wrote to Ryzhkov, in support of a 75-25% solution.
9. 31 December: the Soviet delegation held their 70-30% solution.
10. During Ryzhkov's trip to Stockholm, 11 January, the Russians agreed to a 
75-25% division, in Swedish favour.
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Ryzhkov and Carlsson on 13 January, 1988. Small details, for example the exact 
extent of the fishing quotas, would make the final signature wait until the 18th 
of April, between then-Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Sten 
Andersson(Schori, 1988).
Evolution of agreement, 1985-
At the time Gorbachev took power, the Baltic delimitation question was high 
on the Swedish Riksdags agenda. Agreement between the parties was high over 
the desirability of an agreement and the overall Swedish approach. Centre MP, 
Par Granstedt, in union with other parliamentarians spoke in late 1985 of wishes 
to "regulate fishing in the Baltic, such that we can, in the long-term retain 
worthwhile fish families, who are in rapid decline because whoever so pleases 
can fish as much as they want in the area."^ Complaints of Soviet 
misbehaviour towards Swedish fishing vessels only added to the pressing 
nature of the dispute. Speaking of one particular case. Conservative Party's 
Carl Bildt^  ^ said "there is absolutely no excuse for the Soviet behaviour. No 
matter how much the fishermen were listening to the radio and how much the 
radio stations had forwarded the message, this should not have (legitimized) 
that which is incorrect about the Soviet behaviour." Granstedt said: "the Soviet 
Union has no right to escort (the fishing vessels) away from international water. 
We have to get guarantees from the Soviets that they will behave correctly 
towards Swedish fishermen in international waters—this is not a Soviet fishing 
zone!"^ The Foreign Affairs Committee noted that Sweden, in various contexts 
had made efforts towards a ban on submarine activity in fishing zones—the
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1985.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 February, 1986. 
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 February, 1986.
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ostensible reason being that (seemingly Soviet) submarines in underwater 
position had been creating havoc with fishermen's nets.^
The Swedish Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee contented itself with timely 
reminders to the Government of its pressing interest in seeing a negotiated 
settlement. On 28 November, 1985 the Committee echoed^ these concerns, 
and reminded the Riksdag that "since 1982 four rounds of negotiations have been 
held with the Soviet Union...continued sounding-outs and contacts have also 
taken place."
One of the consistent themes in the Swedish negotiatory position was that 
an unclear relationship over the issue was unacceptable to a small neutral 
Sweden. "When we started to negotiate in earnest in 1985," said one official, 
"one of the things (the Swedish side) did not want was a grey zone 
arrangement—because it could create incidents of who is boss in the Baltic."^ 
According to one official, the amount of incidents was, on the average, two a 
year.^ These violations acted to sensitize the question of territory and space 
for neutral Sweden. A Grey Zone may have acted to legitimize further Soviet 
misbehaviour in the area.
Baltic Agreement Concluded: Élite Reactions
The public reactions of élites was limited, for all intents and purposes and 
excepting the Moderate Party, to laudatory remarks regarding the ÔA's 
outcome. Conservative Party Leader, Carl Bildt, criticized w hat he saw as the
^  Riksdagstryck 1985/6: UU24 ("Om ubâtsôvningar i fiskeom riden"). 'W e
should remember," writes Corell (1989:103) "the occurrence w ith U-137 in the 
Fall of 1981 did affect the negotiating climate." Schori argues that negotiations 
were broken off because the "Soviet position was so far away from our own that 
we thought it best that we take a break in the negotiations." (Schori, 1988)




Government's abandonment of the median line principle, an allegation which 
both the Foreign and Prime Ministers denied (Ronnow, 1988:6).^ In fact the 
agreement would be finally be concluded without reservations from all but the 
Swedish Moderate Party
The Foreign Minister felt that the Conservative criticism was unwarranted 
based on international legal practice:
"there exists total agreement amongst international legal experts 
that the so-called median line principle (which would give 
Sweden '100% right' to the disputed area) has been weakened 
through the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention...international legal 
praxis has never given any quarrelling state 100% of the 
disputed area. Neither would Sweden receive (100%) if the case 
were referred to international arbitration..."^
Sweden, as a small, neutral, exposed state so close to a superpower truly saw 
the Agreement as a foreign policy triumph. Interesting is that while Norway 
points to precedent in acceding to security-related agreements, Sweden 
emphasized an independent line on the issue. "There is no previous model," 
Prime Minister Carlsson said, "where a small state has so advantageously 
vindicated its interests with respect to a superpower in such a vital area^...it
^  According to A. Hoff, "Sovjet fâr for mye i 0stersjoen," Aftenposten 7 
January, 1988): "there are many in the (Swedish) Conservative Party who feel 
that this is going too far—not least bearing in mind the recurrent submarine 
incursions in Swedish territorial waters."
“  A. Hoff, "Dagsorden i Oslo: Grâsonen," Aftenposten, 14 January, 1988.
^  Svenska Dagbladet, 7 January, 1988, quoted in Ronnow, (1988:5) clarifies 
some of the questions surrounding the median line principle. Schori confirms 
the weakening effect that the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention upon the median 
principle: "the UN convention stipulated that the international legal principle of 
'w ith  the intention of reaching a reasonable solution."(Schori, 1988) See also 
Chief Negotiator L. Myrsten, "Nu âr det slut pâ utfiskningen," Sydsvenska 
Dagbladet, 13 January, 1988.
30 Anonymous, "Avtalet bidrar till stabilitet," Tempus 2 (1988).
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is a unique agreement between a superpower and small c o u n t r y . L i b e r a l  
Party MP, Ingemar Eliasson said the Government "deserved a feather in their 
hat for the a g r e e m e n t . C e n t r e  Party Leader, Olof Johansson termed the 
agreement "acceptable in terms of international law."^^ A high degree of élite 
consensus regarding the Swedish approach greatly contributed to success. "The 
OA is a current example of the value of concord in last year's negotiations," said 
Foreign Minister Sten Andersson.^ Social Democratic Chair of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Stig Alemyr said "...I want to express my satisfaction over 
the fact that twenty years of negotiations have now led to a beneficial result for 
Sweden."^ Conservative MP, Jens Eriksson elaborated somewhat on the 
practical consequences of ÔA thus:
1. Sweden must have expanded possibilities for fishing in 
the area.
2. The threatened remainders of cod and salmon must be 
protected.^
3. Sweden has a responsibility to make sure the Soviet 
Union has the possibility of fishing up to the agreed-upon 
quotas.^^
"Nu âr det slut pâ utfiskningen."
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
Anonymous, "Fp och centem nojda," Tempus 2 (1988). 
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
35 Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 June, 1988.
^  One Swedish official said the main concern was cod and salmon. While 
people in the Baltic republics were fond of eating "sprat" (herring) and fished 
that, we took the Baltic herring and things were alright." (S22)
37 Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 June, 1988.
174
Diplomats, whether of known right or left-wing political persuasion, lauded the 
Government over the Agreement. One known Conservative diplomat said "I 
felt it was in our own interest to go back to a 50-50% solution—(seeing the 
result) it's a great tribute to Swedish negotiating skill."^
While Sweden usually preferred to bring matters of such a sensitive nature 
to higher levels of international consensus, this particular bilateral negotiation 
reached the desired result. To negotiate on a bilateral basis traditionally puts the 
smaller power in a disadvantageous position. Said Foreign Minister Andersson
"the ÔA's significance is found in the clarity it creates in an 
important area which could have caused future security 
problems.^^ Since it promotes stability between our countries 
and is economically advantageous...it eliminates the risk for 
exploitation...it guarantees continued fishing rights for Swedish 
fishermen for many years...it provides advantageous conditions 
for environmental protection in a very sensitive sea-area."^
A ttribution of Soviet M otivation
ÔA's Significance
Diplomats and officials who were active in foreign policy at the time pointed to 
a plethora of factors which were significant in bringing about the ÔA. "The 
agreement was significant because of the long time it took to negotiate, because of the 
very firm Soviet position and because the Soviet forfeited its economic interests," one 
trade official mentioned.^' As such, the ÔA effectively put an end to any remaining 
élite doubt that serious change was occurring in the Soviet Union. Liberal Party 
leader, Bengt Westerberg said, "while the issue was not important for our relations.
^ S 5
(Magnusson, 1988:6-7)
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988. 
S8
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it was important in order to improve our relations."^ "The Soviets accepted our point 
of departure (75-25%)'* .^..this was the first concrete illustration that something had 
changed in the Soviet Union."^ Part of the Swedish negotiating strategy, according 
to one official, was to try to press the Soviets for proof or validization of the sincerity 
of their announced changes: "if you want good relations, do this! we said," a strategy 
which was very sensitive for the political opposition," he said.^ The ÔA "may be 
the most satisfying moment of my career," said one well-placed official. "If I may be 
a little egotistical in answering (your) question (which events were the most important 
indicators for you that there was fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy): I 
would definitely have to say the ÔA," this official continued.^ "More than anything 
else," said one higher élite, "the ÔA symbolized Soviet foreign policy change for me 
p e rso n a lly .A n o th e r  part of the agreement's significance for Sweden was summed 
by one official: "it demonstrated that a nineteen-year stalemate could be broken even 
in the midst of strained 'submarine relations.'"^
ÛA as Soviet foreign policy aberration
Some élites did not see the event as fitting into the overall pattern of Soviet foreign 
policy change. As one élite recounted: "at the time, it could not be seen against the 
background of a comprehensive foreign policy change—Soviet foreign policy had not
42 Westerberg, interview.
^  It should be noted that many of those closely familiar with the chain of 
events leading up to ÔA mentioned that "nobody thought it realistic that we 
would get 100%," (this can be discounted from Swedish negotiating strategy.) 
(Examples :S22, S45)
^  Westerberg, interview.






changed."'^’ Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori said "in the Fall of 1985 we could not see 
the contours of any new Soviet foreign policy...! think it is fair to say that the first 
signs of new movement in terms of Soviet foreign policy thinking only appeared 
during the first half of 1986."(Schori, 1988) "The event was a concession given the 
background of Soviet foreign policy," said one former official.^ As another official 
recounted "the sign of a new foreign policy (that the initiative presented) were 
brushed aside as the proposal was initially seen in a traditional light of a general 
Soviet unwillingness to negotiate."^^
ÔA as Consistent with Soviet foreign policy
In interviews, the Soviet willingness to change its position was accorded a 
dominant place in analyses of how the ÔA came about. But attributions also lauded 
Swedish perseverance and steadfastedness. "I was under the impression that the 
Soviets were ready to negotiate about ten years back; Sweden was in fact the hardline 
state here-not the S o v i e t s . A p a r t  from this, said one official, "the Swedish 
(Moscow) embassy was markedly more dogmatic than those in Stockholm—it was 
from Stockholm that the creative initiatives emanated, not from the e m b a s s y . B u t  
once change came about it seemed clear that increased flexibility had a high Swedish 
Governmental sanction. This demonstrates that there were conflicting indications of 
the Soviet position and some division in the Swedish decision-making bureaucracy 
over the issue.
However, most élites attributed change to an explicit, Soviet-determined change. 





This élite named in particular Cabinet Secretary Schori's meeting with 
Ryzhkov in March (1987)—"the press didn't even get wind of that," he said. (S18)
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accepted...we would have been lucky with 50-50% under the old régime."^ One 
official saw it as one part of a general trend "to come to terms with the West."^^ 
Another official told, "the common denominator of all of the indicators points in the 
direction...of the needs of the Soviet leadership, coinciding with perestroika." Related 
to this strain of thought one official called the ÔA a "logical consequence of cost- 
benefit analysis.
The real turning point for one official was "when we first realized the Soviets were 
willing to (forfeit) over 50%—at that point it became a real gesture from their side."^^ 
The Soviet chief negotiator and Law-of-the-Sea expert, Rybakov, "was certainly not 
going to give anything away—it was quite clear that when he forwarded proposals he 
was trying to reach a more propitious p o s i t i o n . O n e  has to remember that both 







Following the ÔA, Rybakov was quoted as saying that the OA was "more 
than a compromise from our perspective," adding "I should probably say that 
we lost." (A. Hoff, "Dagsorden i Oslo: Grâsonen")
“  One official typified the Soviet negotiating style "much more centralized 
than in a democracy—where, if you could find a way to a result, you could 
explore it." The Soviet side created a civil servant atmosphere which did not 
give the diplomats freedom of movement—all important issues had to be 
constantly checked with the centre before being brought forward, the official 
said. As such, he said, "we should remember that superpower such as the 
Soviet Union seldom finds itself in a situation (except with another superpower) 
where it felt the need to improvise—it was in their hands whether a result would 
be arrived at," he emphasised. (S22)
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High-Level Soviet Political Support for ÔA
There was consensus that without high-ranking Soviet political establishment 
support, there would have been little, if any, movement on the issue. "(The ÔA) was 
200% in the Soviet hands the whole way," said one official—international law had no 
bearing here—it was purely a question of political i n t e r e s t . " I t  was not until the 
matter reached a high political level," said one official, "that the technical details went 
quickly."^^
The change came when "someone high above started asking new questions, e.g. 
don 't look from the traditional maritime point-of-view, bu t rather towards visions 
such as 'the new Europe' or 'integration,' or that 'we don 't have any other problem 
w ith Sweden.'"^^ One official made clear that "it was not anyone in the (Foreign 
Ministry's) Legal Department or the (Ministry's) Northern (Europe) Department— 
surely someone who did not deal with sea delimitations or with Scandinavia."^ It 
is very much in line to guess that Ryzhkov himself was one of the chief players, in 
fact.^ "I can imagine," said one official, "that Ryzhkov was instrumental in bringing 
(this) about.
But it is clear that the Soviet side also shared some serious practical concern 
regarding the area's status as a white zone. There were certain Soviet foreign policy 
trends which were reflected in Soviet behaviourial patterns in the Baltic. Sweden, as 
the Soviet Union, disliked the white zone arrangement which allowed for the usage
61 S22
S31. Schori employed a similar logic, writing "negotiations of this sort are 
in the end of a political character." (Schori, 1988)
^S18
64 S18
^  As one Swedish official recounted, "Ryzhkov, when he went to Olof 
Palme's funeral (March, 1986), met Carlsson and there was high bravado 
surrounding his visit to Swedish industry—where he caught his fancy." Since 
then, "there has been a special interest in Sweden for Ryzhkov," said SI 8.
“ S22
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by third parties. But the Soviet Union chose a different method to show its 
displeasure.^^ "They were inclined to chase Germans, and the Danes away and cause 
difficulties for us," he added.^ As he explained, "when the Russians chased away, 
say, a Dane, and the Danes called this illegitimate based on the presence of a white 
zone, we felt obliged to take the Danish pa r t y . I n t e r na t i o n a l  waters were from the 
Soviet Baltic perspective Soviet sovereign interests.
^^522 
“  S22 
’^ S22
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The Barents Sea Delimitation
Introduction
The Barents Sea delimitation problem concerns both the continental shelf boundary 
between Norway and the Soviet Union and the placement of the 200-mile economic 
zones between them. The inability of Norway and the Soviet Union to reach 
agreement regarding the delimitation of the Barents Sea is a problem which, both in 
the past and in the present, has precluded cooperation in a host of areas and an 
amelioration of relations generally. The Barents Sea delimitation question is today the 
greatest outstanding bone of contention between the Norwegians and the Soviet 
Union. The Norwegian position in the negotiations has been indirectly influenced by 
the experiences of their fellow NATO members in similar situations. Additionally, 
as Sweden, the Norwegian position has been greatly influenced by international law.
Both the Swedes and the Norwegians have shared an aversion to entering into 
agreements which bind themselves to cooperation with a superpower on ostensibly 
unfavourable and perhaps unclear terms. For these reasons, small states, such as 
Sweden and Norway, strive for clarity in their relations with superpowers in areas 
which are of interest to both partners, striving for the precise definition of relevant 
details.
The Barents Sea delimitation question and Northern territorial questions generally 
(e.g. the Svalbard shelf) are, for Norwegians, prime examples of an expression of 
Soviet willingness to expose and exploit a small state through demanding firm 
cooperation, but without detailing what this cooperation actually entails. Furthermore 
the Barents Sea question is an example of the ability of superpowers to live with 
outstanding conflicts, irrespective of the price they have to pay for this reticence. 
Small powers perceive always having to pay a larger price under such conditions and 
thus have traditionally striven for rapid, effective and propitious solutions to 
outstanding disputes with other states.
However, Norway's NATO status has given it an extra amount of leeway in the 
question vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: Norway has been able to enter into a compromise
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agreement with the Soviets over the Grey Zone-an arrangement which the Swedes 
fervently resisted in the Baltic. Also, the NATO backing has infused the Norwegians 
w ith some 'superpower' patience of their own: they could stand the lack of clarity 
since Norway had the NATO backbone. The tolerance limits of small states may be 
extended if they have guarantees (e.g. alliance ties) which support the justice of their 
claims.
As was pointed out earlier. Swedes saw the Norwegian situation as being different 
from their own, not least owing to the NATO membership in the Norwegian favour. 
One could argue that the NATO connection has proved helpful in resisting Soviet 
attempts to link the Barents Sea question with other issue areas—keeping it as a legal 
dispute. The Soviet Union has nevertheless resisted suggestions that the disputes be 
referred to the ICJ.
Through this guarantee, the Norwegians have been, some would say successfully, 
able to hold the Soviet Union at arms length over the question of closer cooperation 
in oil exploration, a key area key for obtaining hard, foreign currency^. Also, 
through the NATO presence in the high seas, the Soviet Union has not succeeded in 
challenging Norwegian interests there (i.e. Swedish fishing boats were often chased 
out of the White Zone by Soviet boats).
The Players
As in Sweden, the military and the fishermen played the primary roles in the 
dispute. The fishermen, since the Grey Zone Agreement of 1978 have been calmed 
somewhat—however even this is no optimal arrangement, since catches are finally 
divided between the parties. It is clear that even the fishermen, the professional 
grouping which is a stable link in the Norwegian economy, would benefit morally, 
spiritually and materially from a clear dividing line further East than the Westernmost 
part of the Grey Zone.
^  Alstad(1985:20) points out that in 1984 West Siberia accounted for some 
62% of Soviet oil production.
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From all that one could glean, the military pressure on successive Norwegian 
governments has been equally as high if not as high as the Swedish military pressure 
over the Baltic delimitation question. As one Norwegian Defence Ministry official, 
Finn Malvig said, "military interests (this is just outside the playground of the 
Northern fleet) and economic issues both pull in the same direction."^ Both the 
Norwegian and Swedish militaries were primarily interested in increasing their own 
intelligence capabilities while diminishing the Soviet chances to do the same. But 
there exist other, less obvious details. One official pointed out "the delimitation 
question is linked with the possibility for submarines to get in and out of the area, 
essentially a question of ocean floor topography."^
The role of the Storting was approximately equal to that of the Riksdag. Storting 
members spoke of having been continually apprised and consulted when positions 
had changed.^ But, very much as in Sweden, for reasons of both sensitivity and the 
need to call upon specialists, the decision-making and advisory power was moved to 
the Foreign Ministry.^'* It was important that the political parties unite behind the 
banner of the national good^; the Norwegian political parties however seemed more 
unified than the Swedish. As Conservative MP, Jan Petersen told, "we usually don 't 
say very m uch more than the official line because the question has to do with Soviet- 
Norwegian bilateral relations; in such important negotiations we think it is proper to
^ Malvig, interview. 
^ N I O
^  Socialist Left MP Chaffey noted "we get to know about these things 
through the 'D et utvidede utenriks- og konstitusjonskomité"). However Chaffey 
noted that "we have not been called in by the present Government at all—the 
reason being that nothing happened." (interview)
Centre Party MP Jakobsen said "my impression is that the Soviet Union 
is more interested than before to have an agreement...but I can't say much more 
about that (I was a member of Government...)", (interview)
^  Indications of this found in Stortings Meld. 11, 1989-90 ("Om 
utviklingstrekk i det intemasjonale samfunn og virkninger for norsk 
utenrikspolitikk"), as well as in the case of Svalbard S t  Meld. 40 (1985-86).
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allow the Government to do what they must."^^ Nonetheless, one cannot totally 
exclude timely reminders that, for some, the issue was a hot 'political po tato /^  
Year after year, the Foreign Minister has mentioned the issue in his foreign policy 
address, usually as part of general developments in the Northern areas. However 
until 1986 these declarations were filled with dashed expectations.^*
The Norwegian Approach
In Norway, much like in Sweden, the 1958 Continental Shelf Convention created 
a need to better define Norway's shelf status with respect to the Soviet Union. The 
Swedish and Norwegian conflicts w ith the Soviet Union differ in that Norway-Soviet 
Union concerns a question of which basic line-drawing principle is valid. Unlike 
Sweden, where the question of whether Gotland should be considered was 
paramount, the Norwegian dispute concerned Soviet insistence on utilizing the so- 
called 'sector line principle,'^ bom  into Soviet thinking in 1926(0streng, 1986:134). 
One Conservative MP dismissed the resemblance between the Swedish and 
Norwegian cases, saying "the principal Soviet standpoint in the Baltic was so
76 Petersen, interview.
^  See Labour Party MP, Oddvar J. Majala, 9 December, 1985 (Forhandlinger 
i Stortinget) for an example of the political battle over the issue. See also the 
exchange between Labour MP, Finn Knutsen, Labour MP, Gunnar Skaug, and 
Prime Minister Brundtland in Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987.
*^ See a marked change in Stoltenberg's address on 9 June, 1986 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget): Stoltenberg here accounts for changes on many 
fronts in the Soviet Union, hinting that this may, in turn, affect the situation in 
the Barents case.
^  Swedish Foreign Ministry International Law specialist. Bo Johnson 
Theutenberg (1988:308) writes that the origin of the Soviet utilization of the 
sector principle dates back to 1926. The sector principle degree sets out all areas 
between the Western and Eastern boundaries of Soviet territory, draw n 
sectorally up towards the North Pole, including, in the words of the document, 
'all land and islands in the Arctic,' as being under Soviet sovereignty.
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unreasonable and so clearly in violation of international law, that the (Swedes) had 
probably not expected to get more than what they actually got."^
All the while the Norwegians have maintained the rectitude of the 'm edian line 
principle/ The Norwegians have precedent in the delimitation of the North Sea 
continental shelf in agreements with the U.K. and Denmark in 1965(0streng and 
Traavik, 1977:354). The area which lies between these two lines totals some 155,000 
square nautical miles.*' "I have never felt that the Soviets were equally as committed 
to the Baltic as they were the North—thus they employed the sector line concept, 
which does not apply to the Baltic," said one official. "In the Baltic the m edian line 
principle would not cost the Soviet Union—(it) would not have to go back on 
principle."*^
It m ust be nonetheless noted that the NATO angle can only be said to have had 
an indirect effect upon the Norwegian bargaining position. Worth noting is that the 
U.S. position of dismissing the use of sector lines in negotiating disputes** has 
provided support to the Norwegian position. 0streng  writes, it can be argued that 
the USSR has demonstrated great caution in its relationship with the USA on the 
boundary issue—another source of strength for the Norwegian stance(l986:147-89). 
Negotiations with respect to the Northern Shelf in the early 1980's also provide 
another point of NATO influence on the Norwegian position.
The Soviet Approach
While the Norwegians have based themselves on legal arguments and the 
Continental Shelf Convention as a points-of-departure, the Soviets have argued that
*^  H.C. Erlandsen, "Kâre Willoch, "-Fellesomrâde dodfodt tanke," 
Aftenposten, 15 January, 1988.
*' K. Dragnes, "Norge pâ dagsorden i Kreml," Aftenposten, 15 November,
1986.
**N4
** Harris (1983:181); Skogan and Sjaastad (1976291)
185
the median line principle is invalid for the area contains 'special circumstances/ The 
Norwegian Government has made public^ the Soviet claims which revolve about 
first, the Soviet Union's greater size, and second, the greater population on the Kola 
Peninsula (compared to Northern Norway) and its security interests. Furthermore, 
the Soviet position^ is tied to the notion of 'historical waters' to which the Soviet 
Union itself feels it has a historical, legal right.^ Official Soviet maps, in fact, depict 
the sector lines as boundaries for 'Soviet Arctic areas.'(0streng, 1979:165-182)
Seen in a wider geographical perspective the opposing Soviet argument—namely 
that of the security aspects of the area, was the chief difference between the 
Norwegians and Swedes during interviews. A dominant theme during interviews 
was, as one Foreign Ministry official put it, "the strategic unity of the area."*^ One 
military official clearly pointed to the issue as "strategy being the key issue—not the 
fish, not the legal aspects, as much as many in Norway believe in this tendency."** 
The question of economic cooperation has dangled like a carrot in front of hungry 
Soviet eyes. The Norwegians have, at least in the 1980's when the true oil explorative 
potential*’ of the area became public, made sure to remind the Soviets that if the
*^  UD Informas]on 30, speech of Foreign Minister, Knut Frydenlund: 
"Nordomrâdene i norsk utenrikspolitikk" (22 June, 1977): pp. 18-23.
*^  Churchill (1988:51) concludes that, based on the available evidence and the 
factors presented by the Soviets, "the sector line is clearly not a special 
circumstance."
** Soviet legal minds Lakthine (1930) and Vyshnepolsky (1950's) were two 
of the earlier loud proponents of the sector principle. (Theutenberg, 1986:308)
87 N1
** N7. For an opposite opinion on the importance of fishing interests see 
Centre Party MP, Gudm und Restad speech, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 
January, 1989; Norges Handels og Sjofartstidende leader, 17 October, 1980.
*’ The Soviets have begun oil exploration in a field just East of the disputed 
area, in the Stockmanovsl^ya field. There have also been reports over the years 
of the Soviets drilling West of the line which Norway claims should be the 
dividing line. For an example of such see E. Kjekstad, "-Bekymringsfull russisk 
oppforsel," Nationen, 3 May, 1983. The first sale of offshore technology and
(continued...)
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delimitation question could be resolved, concrete benefits were waiting on the other 
side.^ The Swedes could never hope to, and never did employ the same marketing 
technique in their negotiations. An example of typical Norwegian logic was provided 
by one well-placed advisor: "the Soviets could benefit immensely from economic 
cooperation up N orth—we could provide the technology for exploitation—but we are 
careful as long as the border question remains u n s e t t l e d . T h e  Norwegians have 
attempted to engage private actors in order to limit Soviet influence in the area. 
According to one researcher: "There was one group of opinion which thought it was 
very important to involve the U.S. companies, give them favourable conditions 
(operator-status) in the North Sea—this was opposed to another view that because of 
security sensitiveness of the area, we should keep them  out and from doing 
something bad against the Russians."’^
Evolution of Events
While the Norwegians first requested negotiations w ith the Soviet Union over the 
continental shelf in 1967, and in 1970 informal discussions on the matter got 
underway, formal negotiations would have to wait until 1974.^ Since then 
negotiations have occurred sporadically.^ Unlike Sweden, in Norway(Churchill,
’^(...continued)
services for exploration on the Soviet undisputed part of the continental shelf 
took place in April, 1983. ("Norsk-Sovjetisk avtale," Arbeiderbladet, 18 April, 
1983.
^  Foreign Minister Stoltenberg hints at this strategy, 1 June, 1987 
(Forhandlinger 1 Stortinget) Stoltenberg elsewhere (1988:8-9) clearly exposes 
the 'carrot' in the form of oil exploration.
N3
One researcher who refused to be cited by name.
N.M. Udgaard, "Veien til Rysjkovs sone-utspill," Aftenposten, 18 January,
1988.
^  It is difficult to ascertain how many formal negotiating rounds have come 
to pass since 1974. Up until 16 December, 1986, A. Willersrud writes, ten 
rounds had taken place (including the one at that present time) "Ny runde om 
dele-linjen i Moskva," Aftenposten, 16 December, 1986.
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1988:47), the task of reaching agreement has been complicated by the establishment 
by both Norway and Sweden of 200-mile economic zones.
In order to resolve the problem of clashing fishing interests in the disputed area, 
Norway signed a "Grey Zone" agreement with the Soviet Union in January, 1978.^ 
Sweden resisted such a move with full force. The fact nevertheless remains, like in 
the earlier-studied case of an Incidents-at-Sea Treaty: the Norwegians did it while the 
Swedes resisted.^
The Oslo Trip: Unfulfilled Expectations
There was minimal activity on the problem until well into Gorbachev's tenure. 
Gorbachev's Murmansk speech was one of the first indirect signs of motion on the 
issue. Thorvald Stoltenberg, in a foreign policy address not long after Gorbachev's 
speech told the Storting that, during his discussions with Shevardnadze earlier in the 
Fall, Shevardnadze had forewarned Stoltenberg that Prime Minister Ryzhkov would 
be arriving in January (1988) with some "new assessments" of the (delimitation 
issue)^.
It could be argued that Premier Ryzhkov's trip to Oslo from 14 January, 1988 was 
perhaps the most important event in Norwegian-Soviet relations during the 
Gorbachev years. The trip was so very important since Ryzhkov flew directly from 
Stockholm, after signature of the ÔA, to Oslo. This naturally created expectations
For more on the Grey Zone, see Skogan (1978:459-469). We should note 
the Norwegian Conservative Party's opposition to the Grey Zone agreement 
here. (N.M. Udgaard, "Veien til Rysjkovs sone-utspill," Aftenposten, 18 January, 
1988)
^  Churchill (1988) points out the rules that govern the treaty: the agreement 
is temporary,(annual, but has been extended yearly since then); the agreement 
sets out various regulatory measures (e.g. fishing gear and minimum fish sizes); 
each party may exercise jurisdiction only in respect to its own fishing vessels; 
total allowable catches are summed and roughly divided between the parties, 
with some quotas going to third states upon mutual consultation.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 2 December, 1987; these hopes also echoed by 
Labour MP, Gunnar Skaug, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987
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from the Norwegian public and élites for a favourable resolution of their outstanding 
dispute in the Barents.’* It was clear that the Government expected a concrete 
initiative, which showed signs of will to compromise.”
It would not be unfair to say that Ryzhkov's proposed solution was perceived as 
187 a mere extension and modification of the already-existing Grey Zone arrangem ent 
As one source said, "the Soviets have been satisfied with the Grey Zone arrangement, 
we have not..."'*® Ryzhkov, while saying the discussions he had entered into were 
a "good beginning,"'*' pointed out that there were in fact important differences 
between the Baltic and the Barents, not least an historical difference, which led to the 
Swedes getting a modified median line solution.'*^
Finn Sollie claimed that "it was a total surprise that (Ryzhkov) did not have 
anything in his baggage."'** Instead, said Sollie, "Ryzhkov said 'things are so mixed 
up in the Barents Sea that the Soviet Union is not willing to accept a fixed border': a
98 "When we got our ÔA," said one Swedish official, the Norwegians were 
a bit unhappy...but in fact the negotiations were product of two different 
concepts. In the Barents you had the strategic situation with nuclear 
submarines, while in the Baltic it was an economic zone," he continued. (S45)
”  It is interesting to note the public signals which added to the highly 
charged climate of expectation. (M. Fyhn, "Norge venter delelinje-utspill fra 
Rysjkov," Aftenposten, 11 January, 1988. Further signals came during Foreign 
Minister Stoltenberg's trip to Moscow in September, 1987 that Ryzhkov would 
have with him "new evaluations " regarding the issue when he would come in 
January, 1988.
'** "Norsk skuffelse- ingen losning i nord," Aftenposten, 15 January, 1988.
'*' "Norsk skuffelse- ingen losning i nord," Aftenposten, 15 January, 1988.
1*2 "Norge holder fast pâ klar delelinje," Aftenposten, 16 January, 1988.
'** Also see Sollie, "En iskald dusj fra Rysjkov," Aftenposten, 4 March, 1988.
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surprising statement."^^ Brundtland called Ryzhkov's proposals as 'l)elong(ing) to 
the past history of negotiations."^®^
It seemed the Soviet Union, as had become traditional in its foreign policy, wanted 
a 'package solution.' One élite expressed Ryzhkov's thoughts thus: "he said 'w e don't 
think that a distinct dividing line is important here...instead, let's have a joint, 
common zone of cooperation and mutual trust' another w ord for condominium."^®^ 
By this, said Sollie, the Soviet Union introduced a new principle in international law: 
"the zone of mutual confidence and cooperation, which in practice meant 50-50% 
resource utilization—very close to the grey zone idea."^®  ^ In effect, said Sollie, "this 
would give the Russians a 50% vote in determining projects, determining the parties 
which would join in (e.g. ELF, Statoil), the areas which to develop in the zone—in 
short the when, where and who in offshore developments."^®*
Brundtland commented, saying the 50-50% "model of common utilization (is a 
proposal) to which we cannot agree," explaining "the situation is such that it is 
important to clarify responsibilities and juridical relationships in this area..."^®’ But 
when asked why the Soviets had solved the problem with Sweden on a differential 
basis, Brundtland responded, "that question is best answered by the Soviet
®^^ Sollie, interview. Sollie elaborated why it was such a surprise such: there 
were statements by the Soviet Union of the will to compromise, but also the last 
couple of years there seemed to be movements in the Soviet position. Thus 
there seemed to be a real modification of the Soviet position—leading (some) to 
think that we could go much further.




i®9 "Norge holder fast pâ klar delelinje," Aftenposten, 16 January, 1988.
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Union."” ® Conservative MP, Kâre Willoch called the idea of "common area over the 
continental shelf in the North stillborn."” ^
The Soviet view of Norway's alliance membership may also be a factor which 
influenced the Soviet position. When Conservative MP Kâre Willoch and certain 
Storting members travelled to Moscow three months following Ryzhkov's trip, Willoch 
was asked whether "it (was) not unrealistic to think that the Soviet Union (could) 
agree to agree to a dividing line as long as Norway is a base for NATO."” ^
But this trip was not totally absent of positive signs. For Foreign Minister 
Stoltenberg, the Ryzhkov trip "confirmed a Soviet will to push relations further and 
to develop cooperation in areas of common concern."”  ^ But he made clear that 
"from the Government's side, we cannot accept cooperative arrangements which push 
aside the central question regarding delimitation."”  ^ This judgement would be 
shared across the political scale and would continue over party lines.”  ^ Stoltenberg 
however noted a new positive element in the "slight modification of the sector line in 
the North...(which was presented) as a proposal in addition to Ryzhkov's proposal of 
common resource usage."”  ^ Prime Minister Brundtland would call the modification
” ® Norsk skuffelse- ingen losning i nord."
"Kâre Willoch: -Fellesomrâde dodfodt tanke."
T. Andreassen, "-Nodvendig med delelinje i nord," Aftenposten, 9 April,
1988.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 January, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, ibid.
Foreign Minister Bondevik's address on the Barents Sea delimitation for 
an example of continuity between the Labour Government's and the Bourgeois 
Government's standpoint in the issue. (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 
December, 1989).
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 January, 1988. A further change of position 
occurred immediately before Christmas, 1988, during a special Soviet 
entourage's trip to Oslo, with the message: "The Soviet Union, for the first time, 
can (imagine accepting, a diversion in (her) demands that the point-of-departure 
for delimitation should be the sector line." (Fyhn, "Sovjetisk delelinje-utspill,"
(continued...)
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"the first time the Soviet Union has presented such a proposal.""^ Christian 
People's Party's Kjell Magne Bondevik agreed with Stoltenberg in that "it is a positive 
and interesting signal when the Soviets have announced that they are willing to 
accept a certain divergence from the sector principle.""^ Centre Party's Johan 
Buttedahl here joins in the views of Bondevik and Stoltenberg."^ Even Progress 
Party's Rosjorde said "the last initiative from the Soviets could mean that it now is 
possible to go further (on the issue) now."'^
Norwegian Explanations of the lack of movement in the Soviet Position
Many individuals felt that the Soviet sense of history regarding the area best 
explained Soviet unwillingness to change on the Barents Sea question. These same 
individuals explained Soviet foreign policy stability in terms of constants—history, 
national interests, as both chief considerations and determinants alike. Finn Sollie 
explained the core of Soviet motivation in the Baltic agreement such: "The Soviet 
demands in the Baltic were a result of Soviet greed: she wanted to get as much she 
could of the Baltic." He added, "they never considered a 'package agreem ent,""
"^(...continued)
Aftenposten, 17 January, 1989). This initiative was to have been followed by 
a trip to the Soviet Union by Brundtland before Summer, 1989. But as M. Fyhn 
writes ("Kreml har ikke tid til norsk besok," Aftenposten 1 July, 1989) the 
Government gave up hopes for such a visit later in the year.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Sollie said "while they never officially said they would like to see a 
linkage between aborder agreement and other issues, they nevertheless pursued 
a policy that demonstrated they wanted a package deal: a collusion between 
foreign policy strategists and military strategists; the mix of a juridical
(continued...)
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and stuck to their 'ink guns' to get as much as possible; the line they pursued with 
respect to Oland and Gotland was evidence of this."'^ Kâre Willoch felt that the 
Russian tendency to think in terms of spheres-of-influence'^ was still present'^: 
"in smaller proportion...the Soviet model for solution of the border question...can be 
seen against the background of traditional Russian thinking."'^
Explaining the difference between the Baltic agreement and the Barents Sea 
discussions, one élite made the situation sound clear: "traditional history does not 
have the same weight in the Baltic as it carries in the North."^^ "You have to go 
back to the Seventeenth Century," said one official "when this area was very 
important to Russia—Russia was then confined on its Western border by Lithuania 
and its Southern border by Turkey and thus the only route of communications was 
through the North."^^^ Since the Wair, said one former defence official, "the Soviet 
Union has toyed with different concepts to manage the situation in the North—not 
least the joint condominium proposals for Svalbard and Bjomoya—especially the
^^\...continued)
settlement with political understanding in the North and military advantage," 
Sollie said.
Sollie, interview: "I think the Swedes gave too much—the Russians felt 
that it might be possible to use disagreement as a lever to other agreements." 
He further noted the Grey Zone as evidence of this motive: "if you look, about 
one-third of the Grey Zone is to the West of the sector line."
123 See also I Ytreland, Aftenposten, 26 January, 1988.
Labour's Einar Forde mentioned that this tendency could not be called 
specifically Russian. (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989).
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
"The line is so deeply ingrained into them," said one élite, "on a Moscow 
weather map the second line (their sector line) is clearly drawn."(N4) Another 
Norwegian élite said "they can't pull back because this is defined as the Soviet 
border—and the Soviet Union holds its borders; this is a part of the 'whole' of 
the Soviet Union." (N28)
127 N4
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attempts made in 1944 with Trygve Lie and by Bratteli in 1974."^^ As said one élite, 
"If you get Norway to accept this special position between Norway and the Soviet 
Union, you get Norway to accept the joint condominium idea—theoretically giving 
Norway influence on decisions and vice verse...but in practice this is something which 
gives the Soviet Union a way to pressurize Norwegian decisions."^^
The arrest of Norwegian Ame Treholt for espionage in connection with his position 
as delegate in the Norwegian negotiations between the Soviet Union and Norway 
opened up the issue to the outside world. As one élite said "the Soviets originally 
wanted joint jurisdiction in a defined area (another word for 'condominium'), in line 
with the border dispute" adding that he had "evidence that Treholt tried to get 
Evensen to accept the idea—Evensen resisted nevertheless."*^
One can also explain stability in Soviet policy towards the area as principle-based. 
Socialist Left MP, Theo Koritzinsky attributed the lack of progress to a mixture of one, 
Soviet stubbornness on the border principle and two, a low priority."*^* "Although 
gradually the Soviet Union stopped referring to the sector principle as an argument, 
its proposals nevertheless clearly followed the sector line," said one élite familiar with 
the negotiations.*^^ Interesting is the Soviet argument of 'special circumstances.' 
One high official, commenting on the Soviet claims, said "we find these most 
extraordinary."*^^ In the process of dismissing the population argument, this official 
refuted another traditional Soviet claim on how the East-West line should be drawn, 
saying: "the coast does not go in a straight East-West direction...the natural and logical
*  ^ N4. Sollie added the "Tsarist unwillingness to accept Norwegian 
sovereignty over Svalbard when it was proposed in 1871—Russia was the only 
nation to object to Norwegian sovereignty on Spitzbergen.
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thing is that the boundary should follow the (contours of the coast)."^^ With 
respect to the population argument, said one official, "the larger population only came 
about during the 1930's—thus, I can't find that argument so strong since such 
(variables) change over time."^^
Norwegians Explain Change in the Soviet Position
Several élites indicated progress on the Norwegian-Soviet talks, both sides giving 
in some of their claim s/^ One senior official mentioned that there had been 
progress since 1986 onwards."'^^ According to one individual in-the-know, "there 
was real progress in the negotiations...! had met with Shevardnadze and he promised 
that he would follow the matter personally."'^ One élite saw wider change in the 
traditional Soviet positions. "They did not stick to their original claims in the Baltic; 
over the years they have widened their perceptions of the (significance) of islands, 
continental shelf, and developed such concepts as 'special international waters' in 
their stead," he told.'^’ One senior official said "we have always expressed our 
willingness to compromise (between median and sector lines)—but they haven't 
responded until recently, where only now they are at least sitting down w ith 
maps."'^
134 n 2 4  
'^ 5 N28 
' ^ N 2 8
137 N45
138 N41. Thus, for this individual, "a change in Soviet Foreign Ministers could 




Others saw change against the background of East-West changes, coupled w ith a 
strategy of Soviet willingness to resolve outstanding conflicts/^^ For Conservative 
MP, Anders Talleraas, Gorbachev's Helsinki address in Fall, 1989 "indicated that the 
Soviet Union is willing to see with new eyes on the negotiations."^^
Socialist Left MP, Paul Chaffey said "we have seen a more compromising view in 
later years, but the problem at the moment is that we don 't know who to talk to in 
Moscow."'^ To this added one Conservative MP, "maybe we should just wait the 
whole thing out until we just have Russia to deal with."^^ Chaffey thought that the 
changed situation on Svalbard illustrated Soviet foreign policy change. "The Soviet 
Union, by treaty, has rights to demonstrate '(a presence)—but now we hear that the 
towns might be shut down because of economic reasons...this could show a shift from 
military-strategic interests in Northern areas to more pragmatic considerations," 
Chaffey added.'^
Still other élites felt a change in Soviet approach was attributable to economic 
necessity. One high official explained it simply, "they probably need oil and gas for 
their c u r r e n c y . I n  a sense, said this official, "they are a bit over the barrel: they 
w ant resources, on the one hand, but they also fear provoking a Norwegian reaction 
on the other."^^^ "The Soviet Union is not independent in energy terms and the 
Soviet Union wants a better energy supply," expressed Centre Party MP, Johan J. 
Jakobsen, as one of the reasons for a Soviet change. If the Soviet Union is in deep 
economic problems and is desperate for assistance in offshore, they might be tempted
N41. It should be noted, though, that such logic however was much more 
prom inent in Sweden.
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to buy support over and beyond true economic considerations—but they are too busy 
today to think about these things," Sollie said.^^
But as one Conservative MP noted, "it's a question of timing: the Soviets will use 
all available time to get the result they desire."^^^ Even Labour MP, Bjom Tore 
Godal joined in this logic saying "normally in these sorts of questions the Soviet 
Union has a lot of time—it is a vast country, and they usually deal with things on a 
one-by-one basis." A small country, he contrasted, "could be more hurried...but we 
are not in a hurry though."^^ One official pointed out the value in demonstrating 
that Norway had time.'^^ Although Norway was a small country, it was also a 
NATO member, which minimized the danger of leaving the matter unsolved. NATO 
membership limited the universe of tools of pressure alternatives which could be 
brought to bear on Norway from the Soviet Union(Traavik and Ostreng, 1977:361).
Sollie summed up a portion of opposing thinking, saying: "some in Norway see 'a  
window of opportunity' and perceive an opportunity while Gorbachev is still there: 
before he either becomes a dictator or succumbs to the m i l i t a r y . O n e  official 
pointed to the negative outcome of the Union's disintegration, saying "lately views 
have been presented that if the Soviet Union breaks up, maybe the RSFSR will not be 
interested in giving it away."^^^ Another high official pointed to pressing 
Norwegian environmental concerns as one of the factors which could indirectly 
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more forthcoming and aggressive in extending cooperative offers," "there is no way 
they can solve these problems alone—we must do it together.
Prospects
The Norwegian public and many élites were still hoping for a godsend during 1990 
and 1991. First hopes were attached to Gorbachev's impending trip to Oslo to accept 
the Nobel Peace Prize in December, 1990.^^ When this became unrealistic due to 
internal political turmoil, remaining hopes for a rapid solution were pinned to 
Gorbachev's impending Nobel address, preliminarily set for May-June, 1991.^“  As 
Rosjorde mentioned, Gorbachev's trip "could be an important opportunity to signal, 
by 'bringing something in his bag.'"^^ One high élite said "we expect that there will 
be new talks in the Spring, and as a matter of fact today (29 January, 1991), 
Brundtland will bring the matter up with (Soviet Vice President) Yenaev."^^ 
Gorbachev's Nobel speech on 5-6 June was accompanied only by symbols of a more 
flexible Soviet attitude and progress on the negotiations.^^^
N26. The linkage between environmental concerns and the jurisdictional 
dispute is made clear by Stoltenberg's, 13 January, 1989 (Forhandlinger i 
Stortinget).
155 "Gorbatsjov i tale," Aftenposten, 18 October, 1990.
M. Fyhn, "Hâp om losning for delelinjen," Aftenposten, 3 November, 
1990: the last negotiation round occurred in Moscow two weeks earlier: ’W e are 
well past halfway regarding reaching compromise on a reasonable division of 
the disputed area," one 'well-informed' source was to have said.
Rosjorde, interview.
158 N48
M. Fyhn, "Stoltenberg snart til Moskva," Aftenposten, 3 April, 1991. This 
article points out that the Norwegian Government was hoping to stage a 
Foreign Minister visit, which would have been the first in eleven years, to 
Moscow before Gorbachev's arrival in Oslo. Even the Swedes took the 
opportunity to invite Gorbachev to 'stop by' Sweden on his way to Oslo 
("Gorbatjov snart till Sverige," Svenska Dagbladet, 14 May, 1991).
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Chapter Six
The question of recognition and adaptation to new political realities: aspects 
of Norwegian and Swedish policies towards the Baltic independence question
The Awakening
In a span of two years, the goal of Baltic independence became the Swedish 
and Norwegian cause. Comparing Gorbachev's earliest two years with the 
period from at least early 1989 onwards, Swedish perceptions of and behaviour 
towards the Baltic question have undergone total transformation. Norwegian 
behaviour in the question has essentially been a question of a dramatically 
increased degree of involvement in the Baltic question. Both efforts logically 
culminated in full diplomatic recognitions of the three Baltic nations in late 
August, 1991.
There were several shared dilemmas which confronted the Norwegian and 
Swedish élites. The answers to these questions reveal interesting aspects of 
Norwegian and Swedish élite perceptions of Soviet foreign policy. An 
examination of Norwegian and Swedish behaviour in the question also exposes 
two similar, yet different approaches to the same problem—which have part of 
the origins in the differing security policy environments of Sweden and 
Norway. In this, neutrality in Sweden and alignment in Norway played a 
small, yet important role. The questions revolve around how best to unify 
otherwise incompatible foreign policy goals. How could they adapt support for 
independence for a 'brother people' while retaining the benefits of dealing with 
a unified Soviet Union? How could they best unite their desire to see 
independence for the appendages while maintaining a working relationship 
with the centre? How could one leadership's approach be adapted/coordinated 
to other nations' approaches in the same question? Another challenge was to 
balance the past with that which was desirable in the future.
While the evolution of the Swedish approach to the Baltic nations can be 
called a dramatic re-orientation, the Norwegian approach can be dubbed a 'shift
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of emphasis' in its foreign policy priorities. The Swedish re-orientation was 
essentially a product of three factors: one, it resulted from an emotive analysis 
of the situation in Balticum (and as a 'natural reaction' to w ant to help 'brothers 
in need.') A second factor was the realisation that the Soviet Union could not 
forever remain intact. Thus, w ouldn't it be more logical and strategically 
intelligent to develop strong ties w ith ostensibly, soon-to-be countries? A third 
factor which was very important for the Swedes was the desire to ^gora upp'^) 
past history. Sweden, after Nazi-Germany, was the first country to recognise 
the incorporation of the Baltic states^ into the Soviet Union in Summer, 1940. 
This decision, coupled with the Baltic Deportation of 1944^, and the surrendering 
of an Estonian gold reserve^ in 1940 acted to create a bad national conscience 
of immeasurable proportions. Sweden's historical past w ith the Baltics 
generally stands in stark contrast to Norway's.^
Norway, in union with the majority of other NATO countries, did not 
recognize the incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. Neither
' A common Swedish expression. Could be translated as a combination of 
the following: take responsibility for, pay for, come to terms with, settle the 
count with.
 ^D. Isacson, "Sverige, Baltikum och guldreserven," Uppsala Nya Tidning, 
25 June, 1990.
 ^The 1946 deportation from Sweden to the Baltics of slightly less than 200 
refugees. An event which first surrounded promises allegedly by the Swedish 
Government in 1945-6 that Balts fleeing from Soviet consolidation would be 
welcome to seek refuge in Sweden. It so happened that the Swedish 
Government later reversed this decision, and the Balts were sent back, and that 
with foreseeable results.
 ^ "Sverige mâste ersatta Estland for guldet," Dagens Industri, 26 August, 
1991. The Swedish Wartime Government surrendered the reserve in connection 
with Sweden's recognition of the Baltic countries' annexation. The current value 
of the reserve is estimated to between SEK 300-400 Million.
 ^ Most Norwegians would agree with Norwegian Stockholm-based 
Ambassador, Olav Bücher-Johannessen: "Sweden has a long history of concrete 
involvement in the Baltic and relations with the Baltic nations, while we have 
been traditionally oriented to the West, especially the United Kingdom."
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did Norway need to make up lost time for an unpleasant historical past. These 
two facts allowed for greater policy manoeuvrability and imposed certain 
restraints upon the Norwegian-Baltic relationship. So, when the Norwegians 
finally became active in the Baltic question in 1990, it was really only a question 
of raising the Baltic question relative to its hierarchy of foreign policy priorities. 
One former high Norwegian official contrasted the Norwegian and Swedish 
approaches thus: "the Balts have expressed scepticism to the Swedish policy; so 
to get into a position where the Balts trusted them they had to use harsher 
words...they already trusted Norwegian leaders."^
Discussion w hen the topic was not p opu lar 1986-1988
Sweden's official position
Sweden's official position in the Baltic matter was laid down by Foreign 
Minister, Christian Gunther on 13 December, 1944. He described the chain of 
events such^:
"We have based our relationship to these states on the fact that 
when their incorporation into the Soviet-Russia took place, the 
present Baltic states' ministers surrendered their legations to the 
Soviet-Russian legation and notified me, that they had ceased 
to be representatives for any Government in the respective 
countries. This is, in other words, a fact, in which our country 
did not take the initiative, but which we, on the other hand, 
could not refuse to accept."
In 1968 the Foreign Minister further clarified Sweden's stance:*
"the Soviet Union, on the eve of the incorporation of the Baltic 
states, was considered to have actual control over these areas 
and to be in a position to exercise sovereign powers there."
*N41





In Sweden, the far Right Bourgeois parties, especially the Moderate Party, 
were the first to take the initiative in the Baltic question.’ It was in fact only 
much later that the Social Democratic^® and the Communist Parties joined these 
efforts-in fact falling in behind the Conservative Partys, and to some extent, the 
Liberal Party's efforts rather than blazing their own route in the question."
The road to consensus in Sweden proved to be far rougher than in Norway. 
The content of the first true Norwegian Parliamentary debate about the area in 
1990 could be characterized as 'consensual' compared with the Swedish debate. 
There was no reason to change policy for the Norwegians, only to strengthen 
and articulate it. It is interesting to note that in a methodical survey of Storting 
debate, only two references to the Baltic question could be found prior to 1990. 
It is worth pointing out that both of these references emanate from the Christian 
People's Party and both chiefly concern human rights violations in the Baltic 
region." Not even the Foreign Minister, in his accounting of progress on the 
CSCE-process and human rights in particular, ever stopped at the Baltic 
question in any one of his bi-annual foreign policy Addresses well into the 
Gorbachev years." The first reference we have located of the Foreign
’ One Swedish élite characterized the chain-of-events: the Liberals and the 
Moderates have led the way for support of Baltic groupings...all the other 
parties just hung on for the ride." (S38)
"  We note that the decision to recognise incorporation in 1944 was made by 
the interparty Wartime Government, whereas the Baltutlamning was the decision 
of a Social Democratic Government.
"  S. Leijonhufvud, "Sverige har bytt fot i utrikespolitiken," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 29 January, 1991, points out the deeper historical roots of this 
question could be found as far back as 1981.
"  MP Bondevik, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986 and 19 January,
1989.
"  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 26 November, 1986; 1 June, 1987; 2 December,
1987.
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Minister's raising the issue was on 18 December, 1989, but even there, only in 
passing.^^ The first major debate over Norwegian Baltic policy in fact took 
place as late as late as 31 May, 1990. To be sure, this debate in 1990 could be 
called consensual contrasted with the Swedish.
Early discussion of "Balticum”^  ^in Sweden
The problem of Baltic expatriates provided one of the early sources of debate 
in Sweden. The question of Baltic immigrants was a uniquely Swedish question; 
there were only sparse amounts of Baltic immigrants in Norway. The key issue 
was that Baltic citizens were still seen by the Soviet Union as Soviet citizens. 
Conservative MP, Birger Hâgârd provides one early manifestation of this 
concern in April, 1986:
"...it is the source of much humiliation and concern that tens of 
thousands of Swedes of Baltic heritage, even in their second 
and third generations, are still regarded by the Soviet 
occupation forces as being Soviet citizens."^^
Even at this early point the sharp contrast between the Left and Right was 
c l e a r . T h i s  sort of question did bring attention to the fact that the far-right 
parties felt that the Soviet presence in the Baltic republics was an occupation 
and that the states were annexed by the Soviet Union. The Conservative 
typification of conditions in and the status of the Baltic republics was replete
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989. The issue was also taken 
up by Norwegian Centre Party MP, Edvard Grimstad, on 4 January, 1990, but 
even there, in passing.
A Scandinavian word comprising Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 April, 1986.
Liberal Party leader Bengt Westerberg (interview) mentioned that before 
1988 and Gorbachev "the Social Democrats preferred better relations with 
Moscow over relations with Riga...they always wanted to reach Balticum 
through Moscow."
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with unmistakably bold language. The tone is not unlike that of élites following 
the Czech coup of 1948. MP, Per Olof Strindberg:
"What I am soliciting...is an opinion which constantly points out 
the oppression in the once-free nations of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania; these nations are still occupied by the Soviet Union, 
although the Second World War ended forty-two years ago...In 
a reply, the Foreign Minister implied that the situation in South 
Africa is unique, since oppression has been occurring for 
decenniums. Well, that has also been the case for Lithuania,
Estonia and Latvia."^*
The Social Democratic tone was qualitatively different. Prime Minister Ingvar 
Carlsson*’ confirmed "there are large numbers of those with Baltic origin, the 
majority of them against their will," however reminded that "we cannot hope 
to change the Soviet citizenship laws..."^ While Social Democratic MP, Bengt 
Silverstrand, felt that one should continue to be critical of the Baltic peoples' 
situation within Soviet frontiers, he felt that "it does not serve the Baltic peoples 
to make vain, public declarations." This precise division of opinion between the 
political parties would penetrate Swedish domestic debate over the Baltic 
question until at least 1989-90. This precise tone, to accept the 'reality of the 
situation,' and to 'satisfy oneself with the status quo,' would be the consistent 
Governmental message to the Swedish public and the Balts.
Social Democratic MP and Chief Spokesman for the Party in foreign policy 
matters, Sture Ericson^^ saw that "there are those that are looking to stir up
Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 15 May, 1986.
^  Baltic double-citizenship is discussed by the Foreign Affairs Committee 
in Riksdagstiyck 1985A986:UU28 ("Om baiters dubbla medborgarskap"), 
Riksdagstryck 1987/88:UU7. Within the first position paper, several motions, 
especially by the Liberal Party (MP's Cars, Bergdahl and Ahrland) urge the 
Government to apply pressure on the Soviet Union to release Baltic citizens 
from their Soviet citizenship.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
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turbulence in the Baltic area," mentioning that "a Moderate member of the 
Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee^, in an article, felt that Sweden should act 
to break off Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia from the Soviet Union." "It is 
dubious that these (crazy) foreign policy (suggestions)," Ericson^ added in a 
now-famous statement, "extended further than extreme-Moderate circles."^ If 
that w asn't enough, Ericson later added more must, stating: "such foreign policy 
initiatives, such as attempts to create three new states on the Baltic is nothing 
other than craziness which is naturally fostered on the extreme-Moderate 
(flank), in order to capture Baltic exile votes in this Fall's election."^ The piece 
by Gunnar Hokmark pointed out some sharp contrasts between the 
Conservative and Social Democratic viewpoints on the issue:
"there is a serious shortcoming in Swedish foreign 
policy...the Baltic countries' situation, which is (physically) 
closer, has been contracted in order to make room for other 
conflict areas, which are much further away, and in which 
the chances to play a meaningful role are significantly 
less...Sweden, in connection with the follow-up w ork of the 
Helsinki Convention and in her bilateral contacts with the 
Soviets, should forward its position that Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania should be given the right to, in open, 
democratic forms, decide if, in the future, they would like
“  Gunnar Hokmark, "Sverige bor agera for att bryta loss Estland, Lettland 
och Litauen frân Sovjetunionen.." Norrkopings Tidningar, 26 February, 
1988,(Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.)
23 Hâkan Holmberg mentioned that Sture Ericson was the most active of the 
Swedish Social Democrats in the Baltic question—"he has seen his task as 
defending the Government." (Holmberg, interview).
^  Ericson, ibid. Andres Küng found it strange how the Government 
encouraged wars for independence in other parts of the world, while 
simultaneously discouraging the Balts not to do anything without asking 
Moscow for permission. (Küng, "Sverige skadar baltema," Dagens Nyheter, 23 
October, 1989).
^ Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
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to belong to the Soviet Union“  or to establish national 
independence/^
Even three Moderate M Fs, Margaretha af Ugglas, Anita Brâkenhielm and Ivar 
Virgin^ stated that the right of self-determination for the Balts had been 
violated through the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet Union, citing the 
1966 United Nation's convention regarding citizens economic and political rights 
and the CSCE declaration. The suggestion to raise the matter to a higher 
international level of consensus is one of the chief traits of neutrality. In this 
issue, the Liberal and Moderate parties would not be joined in their request to 
internationalize the question until early 1990. Thus the debate actually 
concerned one of the pillars of neutrality.
It is interesting to note Governmental opposition for this move:^
"Sweden has not taken the issue up the question of the 
Baltic states' right to self-determination in the CSCE 
context, neither do we harbour any intention of doing so.
But this does NOT mean that we calmly accept violations 
against human rights in Balticum—we will never tolerate 
such encroachments, not in the Soviet Union nor 
elsewhere."^
^  Liberal MP, Hadar Cars emphasizes that the right to self-determination is 
guaranteed by the Soviet constitution. Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.
^  Anita Brâkenhielm, Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
“  Riksdagstryck 1985/86:UU28 ("Om baiters dubbla medborgarskap").
Backed by the Foreign Affairs Committee (Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU3 
("Sveriges relationer till de baltiska republikem a"), 8 November, 1988): "It can 
however not be Sweden's task to awaken the question of the various republics 
position within the Soviet Union within international organs..."
^ Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.
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The Social Democrats and the Environmental Party seemed to stand on the 
same side of the question^^
Baltic support: Perestroika Endangered?
No party in either Sweden or Norway was interested in endangering the 
Soviet reform strategy. But the interpretation of how much pressure would be 
counterproductive varied. The Swedish Government took a traditionally 
conservative inventory of the costs and benefits of increased Baltic support. 
Foreign Minister Sten Andersson said, "...if Sweden, in the present situation, 
behaves in such a way that the positive development which is now taking place 
is stopped, we will not have done anything that either the Baltic peoples or the 
Swedish will be able to appreciate."^^ Andersson does however allow some 
light to shine on Baltic independence hopes.
'There is a positive process now occurring in the Soviet Union, 
and the Baltic peoples' possibilities to give expression to an 
enhanced degree of self-determination is dependent upon the 
continuation of that positive process...this is being a realist—to 
do the possible to achieve a decisive goal."^^
Centre Party's Par Granstedt attempted to balance the interests stating: "...since 
there are limits to what the leadership in Moscow can accept, especially those 
things they can except very quickly...we don 't want to appear as any 
provocateurs."^ However, as Granstedt made clear, "we feel it is important that
Per Gahrton felt that "Hokmark's ultimate desire was to pull these 
countries into the West European cooperative structure—in other words, just an 
extension of the classical cold war." Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988. 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1988.
^  Granstedt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988. As late as 23 March, 
1990, the Foreign Minister still subscribed to this same school of logic. (Svenska 
Dagbladet, 23 March, 1990).
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the Soviet Union be made aware that it will have to pay a significant political 
price if more or less violent methods are employed in bringing the Baltic 
developments to a halt."^ To say publicly that the Government favoured a 
break-up of the Soviet Union would also have ramifications for Sweden's 
desired position as an impartial actor in the process.
An investigation of the risks involved in supporting the Baltics may explain 
some differences between the Swedish and Norwegian approaches to the 
question.^ NATO adopted a 'w ait and see' attitude towards the 
developments, not least because a disintegration of the Soviet Union could have 
m eant catastrophe for U.S.-Soviet disarmament and cooperation on other 
questions. As contrasted to Swedish Government statements, which indirectly 
imply that increased Swedish support for the Balts would endanger Soviet- 
Swedish relations, the Norwegian Government, represented by Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, mentions that his main concern is that Norwegian support should 
not endanger the Baltic-Moscow negotiations.^^ However, Stoltenberg shared 
with his Swedish counterparts the feeling that increased support would not 
serve the purposes of the Baltic peoples. Only once the situation is stabilized, 
states Stoltenberg, could Norway imagine sending an ambassador to the Baltic 
states—^  a move which Sweden seemed to be intent on taking sooner.
Granstedt, ibid.
^  As a sidenote, one Norwegian Foreign Ministry involved w ith these 
questions found that "the difference is not between the political parties in 
Norway, rather between degrees of activity amongst the different political 
personalities." (N5)
M. Fyhn, "Norge vil styrke Sovjet-kontakten," Aftenposten, 1 November,
1988.
^  M. Fyhn, "Norge vil sytrke Sovjet-kontakten." Norway, in keeping with 
praxis and not international legal understandings, has accepted the incorporation 
of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union. Thus, Norway made the decision to 
never send any Embassy officials on official missions there.
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The Seeds of Consensus: Fall 1988-Fall 1989
Massive political demonstrations occurred from late 1988, in the Baltic 
republics, especially Estonia. Estonia, in late 1988 found itself in a draw n out 
constitutional conflict with Moscow. The announcement by the Lithuanian 
Communist Party led by Brazauskas, in December, 1989 of its independence 
from the Soviet Communist Party was one of the first highlights of the Baltic 
independence movement(Jonson, 1990b:4).
With respect to domestic developments in the Baltic area, said Sture Ericson, 
"until now, the Baltic leaders have stood the test: they have acted wisely w ith 
authority and self-restraint..."^^ However, Ericson said, "there seem to be two 
restrictions which provide the framework for continuing developments in the 
Baltic: that the republics will remain parts of the Soviet Union and that the 
Communist Party will retain its leading role in a one party-state... the Balts Eire 
not helped by Governmental statements which in actuality imply direct 
involvement in the current constitutional debate in the Soviet Union.
Moderate Party leader, Carl Bildt felt that when Gorbachev spoke of the 
"Common European House...this house presupposes that one has cleaned up a 
little around the grounds...when this house is finished it will become obvious 
that there can be no locks on the doors between the r o o m s . L i b e r a l  Party's 
Hâkan Holmberg^^ placed a premium on Soviet moderation in the Baltic
Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988. Ericson adds the traditional 
Finnish argument: 'W e should always bear in mind that what is in the Finnish 
interests in terms of relations Eastward is, for all practical purposes, also in 
Swedish interests."
^  Sverker Âstrôm points out ("I det blinkande gula ljuset frân Moskva," 
Svenska Dagbladet, 13 November, 1988), "even if the Soviet constitution 
formally leaves the possibility for withdrawal from the Soviet Union, one 
should assume that such a possibility, in practice, should be seen as out-of-the- 
question, even for the present 'liberal' party leadership."
Bildt, "Estland har embryot till ett flerpartisystem," Svenska Dagbladet, 
18 January, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.
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conflict, saying, in union with his party leader, Westerberg^: "I think it is both 
important and correct to say that perestroika over the whole Soviet Union will 
either (succeed or fail) with the success of the Baltic states." Communist Party, 
Bertil M âbrink's, speaking style in the same debate stood in marked contrast to 
Ericson's and, strangely, much more like Bildt or Holmberg's:
"It is years of discrimination, encroachment and so-called 
Russification that the Baltic peoples are openly revolting 
against. They demand their apparent right to self- 
determination. They demand the right to freely be 
permitted to exercise their culture. They demand an end to 
the profound environmental destruction."^
Official statements slowly began to give way to more concrete proposals for 
cooperation across the political spectrum from 1988 onwards. The Swedish 
Foreign Affairs Committee in late 1988 stated the following:
"For a number of years it has not been possible to maintain 
as close relations with (the Baltic republics), as was both 
desirable and natural. Now there is reason for the 
Government to make an overview of Sweden's relations 
with the Baltic republics, so as to explore new areas and 
closer contacts.
By late 1989 practically all political parties had established either formal or 
informal discussion channels within the Baltics.^ It is m uch clearer which 
connections the opposition parties had, while the Government, perhaps 
intentionally, and in keeping with its traditional 'quiet diplom acy line, vaguely
^  "Svenskt statslân till Estland!" Svenska Dagbladet, 25 August, 1989.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 November, 1988.
^  Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU3 ("Sveriges relationer till de baltiska 
republikem a"), 8 November, 1988.
^  The Environmental Party and Centre Party accounted for their contacts in 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.
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continued to speak of increasing 'contact networks/^^ But Andersson, in the 
same breath, was cautious to remind that "in the meantime this question must 
be handled within the context of the framework of our agreements with the 
Soviet U n i o n . T h e  Swedish Government showed no hints of wanting to 
circumvent Moscow in its attempts to increase Baltic support.
Concretizing Cooperation
Great emphasis came to be placed on economic and cultural exchange w ith 
the Baltics. Economic and cultural aid could hardly be interpreted as 
compromising neutrality—and could only— with a stretch of the imagination—be 
interpreted as an attempt to assist the Baltics away from the Soviet Union. But 
even the Government gave these issues a low priority in the beginning. The 
Moderate Party proposed a 10 million SEK portion of the Foreign Ministry's 
budget to stimulate contacts and cultural exchange between Sweden and the 
Baltics.^^ But in 1989 only a budget of 2 million SEK, and that with at least 
one accompanying condition^, was the Government's contribution for Baltic- 
Swedish cultural exchange.^^
The Swedish Foreign Ministry had in the past directed its contacts with the 
Baltic republics through its Consular Office in Leningrad. From late 1988 there 
was serious discussion within the Foreign Ministry of expanding its contact 
network South- and Westwards in the Soviet Union. The Liberal Party,^^ the
"Breda kontakter med Baltikum," Svenska Dagbladet, 4 December, 1988.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 December, 1988.
Conservative MP, Alf Wennerfors, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.
^  The money should be connected with popular movements. (Alf 
Wennerfors, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989).
Wennerfors, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.
“  Hâkan Holmberg, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.
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Centre Party^^ and surely also the Conservative Party looked favourably upon 
efforts to establish Baltic branch offices extending from Leningrad—but chiefly 
only as 'stepping stones' to something more formal and official.^ In late 1988, 
Andersson hinted at such a development saying: "we have a frontier-trade 
agreement which might be able to facilitate Baltic trade...an expansion of our 
Baltic contacts could very well lead to the establishment of an official presence 
there."^ ^
Norway could not enter into any such discussion. Norway's official opinion 
was that the Baltic states were not a part of the Soviet Union, thus its diplomatic 
contacts to the area could not run through Moscow. Any attem pt to use 
Leningrad or Moscow as a hub for extending a Norwegian diplomatic presence 
into the Baltics could be interpreted as following the 'Moscow route.' In light 
of this, no Norwegian Ambassador could officially ever visit the Baltic capitals. 
A Norwegian diplomatic presence could only be contemplated in the context of 
three independent states.
The Government's foreign policy collision course with the opposition, November, 1989.
On a trip to the Soviet Union in early November, Swedish Foreign Minister 
Sten Andersson clearly said that which many had long assumed the 
Government's position to be on the legal status of the Baltics: "the Baltics are
Par Granstedt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 May, 1989.
^  The Foreign Affairs Committee mentions knowledge of planned 
strengthening of the General Consulate in Leningrad. (Riksdagstryck 
1988/89:UU21 ("Sveriges relationer till de baltiska republikem a"), 20 April,
1989.)
Riksdagsprotokoll, 9 December, 1988; Riksdagsprotokoll, 27 October,
1988.
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not occupied."^ This standpoint stood in opposition to the declarations of the 
Baltic parliaments made shortly after Andersson's return to Sweden. The 
statement caused a considerable uproar in Sweden which would not abate until 
well into 1990.^
It was not this message, as much as what it symbolized in terms of the 
Government's overall stance on the Baltic question, which was most significant. 
During the trip, Andersson weis reported to have spoken to the Balts about 
"political maturity," and "satisfying oneself with the possible" rather than 
achievement of independence.^ Andersson likewise cited directly and without 
reservation from Foreign Minister Gunther's 1944 statement on Baltic diplomatic 
status—an indication that conditions indeed had not changed since World War 
Two. However, in the political battle which followed Andersson's return to 
Sweden, there was some indication that the Government was willing to re-think 
its policy towards Balticum.^^
“  O. Santesson, "Motsagelsefulla budskap i Baltikum och Sovjet," Dagens 
Nyheter, 11 November, 1989. An interesting contrast w ith Sten Andersson's 
later statement:"there is not an international legal expert in this country who 
thinks anything but that the Baltic republics were occupied, in terms of 
international law, during one month in 1940...then the Baltic states were 
annexed..." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991).
Bengt Westerberg, in an interview traced the cause of Andersson's 
statement, saying: "he didn 't know what to answer when asked about the 
occupation of Baltics, and therefore he denied." (that they were occupied) He 
added, "he was advised by foreign policy experts and then decided to re-word 
what he had said from the beginning...he realized he used the wrong phrases." 
One MP said "he then realized he was 'out of touch...from then on, Andersson 
and the Foreign Ministry tried to play catch up." (S33)
58 O. Santesson, "Motsagelsefulla budskap i Baltikum och Sovjet."
B. Scheutz, "Svensk ostpolitik mâste omvarderas," Svenska Dagbladet, 16 
November, 1989.
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The Government's^ approach following the statement re-oriented the 
debate to the future tense, rather than to concentrate on the past^^ Ingvar 
Carlsson said that "the important question is not whether Balticum is occupied, 
but rather what Sweden can do to promote the developments there."^^ "My 
ambition is, for the Baltics sake, for the sake of perestroika, and Sweden's sake, 
to attempt to re-set Swedish foreign policy concord."^ "If I would have said 
that Estonia was occupied," said Andersson, "I might just as well go home," 
explaining that "we had not been even able to open the Consular offices,^ we 
couldn't have discussed future improvements for business opportunities there 
and we would not have been able to discuss tourism and environmental 
issues."^ In another statement, Andersson said "if I, as Swedish Foreign 
Minister had come to Balticum and said that you are occupied, I would have 
pointed out those who want to cooperate with the Soviet Union as quislings and 
cooperateurs."^ Andersson further points out that "one cannot recognise a 
country as a part of another country while simultaneously maintaining that it 
is occupied by this other country."^^
It is interesting to note a shift in tone from the previous emphasis in 
Andersson's statements upon assurances that Sweden's policy should not upset
^  Prime Minister Carlsson positioned himself squarely behind Andersson's 
treatment of the matter. (XT, "Fâr stod av statsministem," Sydsvenska 
Dagbladet, 19 November, 1989).
B. Scheutz, "Svensk ostpolitik mâste omvarderas."
62 Yp "Fâr stod av statsministem."
S. Svensson, "Mâste se riskema," Dagens Nyheter, 17 November, 1989.
^  We note that a Swedish Consular office was opened in mid-1991.
^  S. Svensson, "Mâste se riskema."
^  D. Ljungberg, "Vâr installning ger kontakter," Dagens Nyheter, 17 
November, 1989.
"Lât OSS se framât ifrâga om Baltikum."
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the ongoing perestroika process to statements ostensibly containing a more 
balanced assessment of the chances for perestroika and glasnosfs success.^ 
These statements may denote that the Government was now willing to balance 
its approach to the Soviet Central Government with its approach to the Baltic 
republics.
The reaction from the bourgeois parties was expectedly harsh. Moderate 
Leader, Carl Bildt, felt that Andersson's attempts at explaining his stance in the 
Riksdag "only made matters worse^’... it is totally clear that the picture of 
Swedish foreign policy has come a bit astray through several unfortunate 
statements."^® Bildt mentioned further that "it seems as though Sweden prefers 
to halt rather than support the popular fight in the direction of freedom, 
democracy and increased self-determination which is taking place in Balticum 
as in the heart of Europe—G e r m a n y . L i b e r a l  Party Leader, Westerberg 
joined, saying "it is totally unacceptable that Sweden's Foreign Minister publicly 
expresses himself that he thought the Balts wilfully merged with the Soviet 
Union and surrendered its legations in Sweden."^ "This recognition," said 
Centre's Par Granstedt, "does not mean approval."^
“  Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989: "Perestroika has equally large 
chances to fail as it has to succeed." "Therefore," continued Andersson, "it 
demands that, in the midst of the joy surrounding the positive developments 
in East Europe, a certain (sane) judgement."
"Dags att tiga, Sten!" Barmometem, 22 November, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989.
^  "Ofattbart och oacceptabelt," Dagens Nyheter, 16 November, 1989. Sten 
Andersson finds himself in agreement w ith the Foreign Affairs Committee's 
(Riksdagtiyck 1988/89:UU3) judgement that the Baltic states were incorporated 
into the Soviet Union using forceful forms (methods). (Andersson, "Lât oss se 
framât ifrâga om Baltikum," Skânska Dagbladet, 22 November, 1989).
^ Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 November, 1989.
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By late 1989, even leading Social Democrats, such as the previously 
outspoken Sture Ericson, were beginning to lighten their polemics. However 
Ericson, speaking of "(giving) our Baltic neighbours a real hand in their work 
towards construct(ing) their economy and increas(ing) their self-determination," 
still reminded that it would be wise "to not involve ourselves in the ongoing 
constitutional debate between Moscow and the three Baltic capitals."^^
To Recognise or Not: Test Case Lithuania, March, 1990.
Background: the problem of recognition
Each country applies different criteria for recognition of newly independent 
states. Two legal terms, de facto and de juré^ recognition are key in this 
context^^ Some states allow themselves to be influenced by subjective factors, 
such as a feeling of empathy with the particular state's independence drive. 
Other states may apply strictly objective criteria. Yet others may employ a 
combination of factors. One thing is certain: there exists no universally accepted 
standard measure of a state's independence. Sweden has been wed to following 
a set of established principles in its approach to the recognition question: the 
"universality and effectivity" principles. Norway's approach has been, in a 
sense, much more pragmatic—and tending to adjust its position in concert with
Riksdagsprotokoll, 13 December, 1989.
^  N. Gustafsson, "Sâldes for 20 miljoner?" Sydsvenska Dagbladet, 19 
November, 1989. De facto recognition occurs when another state considers that 
the Government is the prevailing one, without taking a stance as to its legal or 
constitutional rights. De jure recognition occurs according to the law, formally 
and properly—the opposite of de facto.
Quoting a Foreign Ministry international law expert. Environmental Party 
MP, Inger Schorling, notes that Sweden, on a number of opportunities, has 
allowed political considerations to enter into the recognition question. 
(Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990).
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its Western allies and its one principal standpoint: the Baltic states are occupied 
and not a part of the Soviet Union.
The Case of Lithuania
What is a pre-mature or a timely recognition of a state as independent? 
When is it opportune to establish diplomatic relations? These precise questions 
were highlighted in the case of the Lithuanian Sajudis' independence declaration 
of March 11, 1990. The issue of recognition was debated by élites in both 
Norway and Sweden. In Sweden's case, the March 11 event would be needed 
to finalize a working consensus between the parties over the Baltic issue. For 
Norway, it would not be totally unfair to say that the Lithuanian declaration of 
independence was the one single event which truly awoke Norwegian debate 
over the Baltic question.
Sweden: Establishing Consensus
Through the meetings of the Swedish Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee 
(Utrikesnamnden)^ and the Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee, the Swedish 
foreign policy establishment strove for a common understanding of the 
Lithuanian declaration of independence.
The Government's official stance was that the three conditions necessary for 
a Swedish recognition of an independent Lithuania had not been fulfilled. The 
Committee would, up until the time of an official Swedish recognition, repeat 
these criteria:^*
'W ith regards to the recognition of states, Sweden draws 
upon the so-called universality and effectivity-principles. 
(The first) means that we recognise all states which fulfil 
the international legal criteria for a state: a. the possession
^  Neither the Swedish Communist Left Party nor the Environmental Party 
is allowed a vote in these gatherings.
Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU19 ("Svenskt erkarmande av Litauen").
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of a defined territory, b. on this territory should be located 
a population, c. a Government must exercise effective 
authority over the territory in question...Effectivity means 
a test which solely takes into consideration the existing 
conditions. The test does not consider to w hat degree we 
feel political sympathy or indicate support for the new 
state."
This exact position was repeated in the time following by Foreign Minister 
Andersson.^ As Lena Jonson perceptibly points out, the Foreign Minister^s 
thinking was dominated by the imaginable consequences if Sweden pushed the 
Baltic cause further. Several of the most important aspects are mentioned 
here(Jonson, 1990b24):
a. the USSR could in this way be provoked
into taking further coercive measures which, in the worst 
instance, could lead to the resort to military force
b. Sweden could lose its chance of mediating between 
Moscow and Vilnius^
c. Sweden's relations with the Soviet Union could 
deteriorate
d. the enemies of perestroika would be strengthened
But the Social Democratic ranks were not without some difference of opinion. 
Former Social Democratic Defence Minister and W ashington Ambassador, 
Anders Thunborg, was quoted as saying that if Sweden is forced to choose 
between support for the Baltic states' freedom and a (for Sweden) good 
relationship w ith Moscow, the choice should be clear: in that case (Sweden) 
would support the Baltic cause.*^ Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schorl was
^  Echoed by Sten Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990: 
"...expressed in a less diplomatic way, a recognition of Lithuanian independence 
is not a declaration of love, rather a recognition of the actual conditions—namely 
that power has been left in other hands, that there now are new authorities 
which can establish and work with bilateral questions etc."
^  A role key to Sweden's policy of neutrality—related to impartiality.
L. Christiansson, "Vi skall ge baltema ett helhjartat stod," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 23 March, 1990.
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somewhat more reserved in saying "I would prefer not to irritate an already 
loaded situation."^
It took only three days, and the Riksdag was full of activity. A full-scale 
debate over the March 11th declaration ensued.®^ The Moderate Party leader, 
Carl Bildt® ,^ found it "clear that Sweden should recognise and respect these 
nations' right to national s e l f -de t e r m ina t i o n . Bu t ,  perhaps quite to the 
surprise of many observers, Bildt stopped short of advocating full Swedish 
diplomatic representation in Lithuania, calling such a step "the last, rather than 
the first step in a process where different steps must be taken, one-by-one."®® 
There was remarkable political party agreement that the Swedish principles of 
recognition should be followed.®^ For Bildt, the first step should be a 
recognition by Sweden that it does not accept the Soviet understanding that the 
conflict was solely an internal matter.®® Centre MP, Par Granstedt, felt that it 
was important that "we maintain a high degree of preparedness for a 
recognition of Lithuania...seen from the perspective of international law and in
®^ S. Olofson, "Vi vadjar om forhandlingar," Svenska Dagbladet, 23 March, 
1990.
®^ One Swedish élite noted that 11 March was a 'watershed in Swedish 
foreign policy,' noting that 'a t that time we were very formalistic regarding 
w hat we could or could not do.' (SI8)
®^ See also S. Leijonhufvud, "Svensk optimism trots Gorbatjovs hot," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 14 March, 1990.
®^ Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
®^ Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990. In "Altemativet en kinesisk losning," 
H ufvudstadsbladet (Finland), 7 April, 1990) Bildt says: "we should have 
immediately sent a political representative there to create a clearer picture of the 
situation...(a move that would also have been) a political signal, an official 
dialogue with the new Lithuanian Government."
®^ The Swedish embassy attempted to send a representative there on 21 
March, but the Soviet Foreign Ministry refused this request. (Svenska 
Dagbladet, 23 March, 1990)
®® Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
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keeping with the operational principles (of Swedish foreign policy)."*’ In 
keeping w ith the Foreign Affairs Committee, states Granstedt: the Swedish 
policy of recognition m ust be built upon the realities in Lithuania: the presence 
of Soviet troops,’® defence structures and all-Soviet companies in Lithuania.’* 
The Environmental Party, which had previously accused Conservative efforts 
to support the Balts as 'trying to pull them into the W estern fabric' now turned 
on the Government saying "the Government, faced w ith the Lithuanian 
declaration of independence, has been so scared of harming and (giving the 
impression) of provocation, that it, instead, has acted such that one gets the 
impression of obsequiousness."’^
In 1989 the Supreme Soviet declared the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 
illegal. Liberal Party's Ingemar Eliasson, saw that in view of that decision, "the 
formal legal grounds for the incorporation of the Baltic states should have 
fallen,"’* adding that two of the three conditions for a recognition have been 
fulfilled: "I should hasten to remind the Foreign Minister to not altogether too 
hastily emphasize the points of opposition towards the third criteria."’  ^
Hokmark however pointed out that "the fact that the country can be blockaded, 
that there are Soviet UNION and KGB border troops present and due to the
*’ Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
’® Liberal Party's Holmberg rejects as untenable Granstedt's argument that 
the presence of Soviet troops as hindering Swedish recognition of Lithuania, 
citing the particular case of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
’* Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.92
93* Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990. Same logic is used by Environmental 
Party's Schorling, Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.
94 Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
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economic situation" all prove that they are not in control of their own 
territory.
Further Progress towards Change
The Government continued to state that the first two conditions for 
recognition had been fulfilled, stating that the third condition of sovereign and 
effective control over territory was still in question.^ Excepting the 
Environmental Party, there remained inter-party agreement that the time was 
still not ripe for a Swedish recognition.^ However the Utrikesnamnden did 
make a declaration that the democratically-elected parliaments were determined 
to be the legitimate representatives of the respective republic's popular will.’* 
Another major consensual step was to transform an old Conservative Party 
proposal into a declaration for support for Lithuania's right to independence— 
specifically calling upon the spirit of the Helsinki document.”
As Moscow began to use debatable methods to show its displeasure with 
Lithuania, the oil spicket was turned off, amongst other dramatic moves. 
Perhaps w hat these moves best demonstrated was the absence of effective 
control by the Lithuanian authorities over said territory.'*® Prime Minister 
Carlsson was however not without criticism for the "Soviet behaviour towards
”  Hokmark, interview.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.
”  Eliasson, Granstedt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.
’* Eliasson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990; Cabinet Secretary, Schori, "Om 
den baltiska frâgan. Mânens baksida- och jordens," Arbetarbladet, 27 April, 
1990.
”  Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU19; 'Press Statement by Foreign Minister Sten 
Andersson following the March 13 meeting of the Advisory Committee on 
Foreign Affairs' quoted in Jonson (1990b:21)
'** Riksdagstryck 1989/90:111119.
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L i t h u a n i a . S w e d i s h  Communist Left Party's Bengt H urtig was more 
precise, saying that the "Soviet leadership is now dangerously considering the 
utilization of military methods...to a certain extent military personnel are being 
used to pressure Lithuania."^®^ There was agreement over, as Liberal MP, 
Charlotte Branting put it: "the attempts to shut out Western journalists and 
diplomats, and to occupy buildings."*®^ Even the Nordic Council, which had 
been planning a trip to, among other places, Lithuania between 10-16 May, was 
declared 'unwanted in Lithuania' by the Soviet authorities.^^ The Swedish 
Foreign Affairs Committee, in a position paper^^, stood behind the Prime 
Minister's speech, following the Un's meeting on 28 March: "all violence or 
threat of violence is unacceptable...the intervention of the Soviet military in 
Lithuania risks making an already bad situation worse."
One of the more symbolic, yet surprisingly concrete outcomes of the 
Lithuanian independence declaration was the founding of the so-called 'M onday 
meetings,' at Norrmalmstorg in Stockholm.^®^
Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 May, 1990.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 8 May, 1990.
G. Salvesen, H-P. Fagerli, "Nei fra Norden," Aftenposten, 18 April, 1990. 
The trip was subsequently cancelled. See also M. Nyby, "Nordisk râdet en 
inspirationskalla," Dagens Nyheter, 17 August, 1990. {Nordisk Râdet was going 
to try again in the Fall).
Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU16 ("Samarbete m ed Baltikum, Central- och 
Ôsteuropa"), 3 April, 1990.
These meetings, taken up on the initiative of Conservative MP, Hokmark, 
and Liberal MP, Holmberg and attended by decision-makers and masses alike 
came to be known as one of the most effective thermometers of élite and public 
Swedish sentiment in the Baltic question.
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Norway and Lithuanian independence 
Norway naturally did not have nearly as many problems as did Sweden with 
the Lithuanian independence declaration—simply because Norway never'°^ 
admitted the incorporation of the Baltics into the Soviet political web.^°* Thus, 
the Lithuanian declaration did not imply a change in that country's international 
legal status vis-à-vis Norway.^®’
Some preliminary reactions 
The real question for Norway was what position to take towards the events 
and just whether an d /o r how best to support the Lithuanian 'cause/ 
Conservative Prime Minister Jan Syse, in concert with many Swedish leaders, 
felt "Lithuania will be a test for the future and the credibility of Mikhail 
Gorbachev's reform policy," adding "the developments in Lithuania demand our 
support."” ®
The preliminary official Norwegian reactions to demonstrations of Soviet 
force were somewhat more reserved than Sweden's. Foreign Minister, 
Bondevik, said "the increasing military pressure from the Kremlin leader on the 
Lithuanians is not seen as especially unsettling...we still operate upon the 
assumption that the Soviet leadership excludes the use of military force."”  ^
The Government's preliminary positions stood in marked contrast with Progress
A possible exception was the brief discussion regarding a Norwegian- 
Soviet agreement of 1959, which in certain circles was interpreted as 
representing a recognition of sorts of Baltic annexation into the Soviet Union. 
(H. Width, "Tause om norsk avtale med Sovjet," Aftenposten, 25 April, 1991).
M. Fyhn, "Nâ vil Litauen ta tilbake tapt selvstendighet," Aftenposten, 10 
March, 1990.
109 vil Litauen ta tilbake tapt selvstendighet."
T. Andreassen, M. Fyhn, "-Provesten, mener Syse," Aftenposten 13 March,
1990.
U. Andenæs and G. Salvesen, "Bondevik onsker dialog om Litauen," 
Aftenposten, 23 March, 1990.
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Party's Carl I. Hagen, who was quoted as having said: "the Norwegian 
Government's position towards Gorbachev and the Soviet Union's continuing 
occupation of Lithuania is humiliating." Hagen continued, "in a situation where 
a small, occupied country is begging for its freedom, the Government, with 
Bondevik, slapped away this begging hand.""^
Oil diplomacy
Sweden played a minor role in then-Prime Minister, Prunskiene's, trips to the 
West to seek material"^ and moral support for the Lithuanian cause."^ But 
Sweden's ability or willingness to supply Lithuania with oil were similarly 
limited. The issue became a Norwegian topic. One of the only Swedish 
reactions came from Moderate MP, Margaretha af Ugglas, calling Prunskiene's 
trip and meetings with Western leaders, in praxis, support for Lithuania's 
independence drive."^ During her time in Stockholm, however, an account, 
where all interested parties were encouraged to contribute, was opened by the 
party leaders who had invited her to Stockholm. Prunskiene stated that the 
reason that this occurred in Stockholm and not in Oslo or Copenhagen was that 
"it gave the Swedes a chance to clear up the mistake with respect to the gold- 
reserve.""^ One may read Prunskiene as meaning more broadly that Sweden
"Bondevik onsker dialog om Litauen." Similar statements were repeated 
by Hagen (G. Salvesen, "Norsk protest mot oljeblokaden," Aftenposten, 20 
April, 1990).
The issue of foreign aid is discussed at some length in Riksdagstryck 
1989/90:UU16 and Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7 ("Samarbete m ed Ôsteuropa och 
vissa intem ationella miljoinsatser").
V. Landsbergis, "Appell til Norden," Aftenposten, 17 April, 1990; A. 
Willersrud, "Litauen ber om stotte," Aftenposten, 13 March, 1990.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 23 May, 1990.
N.C. Helle, "Sterk litauisk appell til Sverige," Aftenposten, 24 April, 1990.
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needed to resolve some historical problems in relation to the Baltic republics 
which Norway and Denmark did not.
As Kazimiera Prunskiene arrived in Oslo on 18 April after a one-hour 
stopover in Stockholm, Moscow had made the formal decision to cut oil 
supplies to the republic."^ On the eve of the Prime Minister's voyage, it 
seemed clear that the Norwegian Government would be unwilling to supply 
Lithuania with oil, in the case of a blockade."^
One interesting detail of the trip was that she was welcomed to Oslo, not by 
their Government, in the capacity as ministers, but rather by Syse, Johan J. 
Jakobsen and Bondevik as party leaders.^^’ This provides a contrast to the 
Swedish reception and underlines the fact that the situation of recognition was 
not as simple as many would have it s o u n d . T h e  invitation to visit Sweden 
was extended by other Party leaders, but one could be sure that Ingvar Carlsson 
would seize the opportunity of meeting the Balts once they arrived.^^^ This 
also stood in contrast to the invitation extended by Denmark's Foreign Minister, 
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen (as Foreign Minister)^^, where the Prime Minister 
Prunskiene was to visit after Norway.
Norway's principle stance in the question was that the Lithuanians should 
deal directly with the oil suppliers. The Government denied having made any
A. Willersrud, "Moskva skrur igjen oljekran," Aftenposten, 19 April, 1990.
G. Salvesen, H-P. Fagerli, "Nei fra Norden," Aftenposten, 18 April, 1990.
H. Hegtun, "Soker stotte i Norge," Aftenposten, 19 April, 1990.
In a humorous cartoon on the op-ed page of Aftenposten, 23 April, 1990, 
Prunskiene, looking at Landsbergis, says ' t u t  the Chairman of the Conservative 
Party asked me to say hello from the Prime Minister." (Here of course, the 
Conservative Party Chairman was the Prime Minister).
K. Eneberg, "Diskret diplomati med baltiska led are," Dagens Nyheter, 3 
June, 1990.
H. Tjonn, A. Willersrud, "Litauens danske hâp," Aftenposten, 21 April,
1990.
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promises to intervene on the Lithuanian behalf.^^ Bondevik thought it 
"obvious that we cannot use the oil supply as a tool of foreign policy 
pressure."^^ There was unity between the Norwegian parties in the Stortings 
Extended Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee on this point, with only 
the Progress Party being strongly opposed.^^ The major Norwegian oil 
suppliers, e.g. Statoil, however refused to sell oil to Lithuania on any less than 
commercial terms.^“
The most concrete argument which was m ounted towards a politically- 
inspired (subsidized) sale of oil to Lithuania were statements by those who saw 
Norway as having played such a role with Nicaragua two years previously.'^ 
To an extent, the Norwegian Labour Government, like the Swedish had 
gathered a reputation for funding and favouring far-lying countries in its aid 
policy. Norwegian MFA officials confirmed an offer, made under a Labour 
Government, when Nicaragua became the target of an U.S. oil embargo against 
Nicaragua.'^ But sources soon pointed out that not only was the offer not 
taken up, but that authorities had only offered the oil as a part of an already- 
existent foreign aid package.'^’ The Labour Party Chairman, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, denied any parallels between the Lithuanian and Nicaraguan case.
O. Nygaard, "Syse: Ingen lofter om oljesalg," Aftenposten, 19 April, 1990. 
"Norsk protest mot oljeblokaden."
T. Andreassen, "Norsk soloutspill uaktuelt," Aftenposten, 24 April, 1990. 
"-Statoil selger til full pris," Aftenposten, 19 April, 1990.
H. Tjonn, "Hjemmel for â selge olje," Aftenposten, 20 April, 1990.
G. Salvesen, "Nicaragua fâr olje, ikke Litauen," Aftenposten, 21 April,
1990.
129 "Nicaragua fâr olje, ikke Litauen."
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saying that the difference lay in the foreign policy pressure instrument angle in 
the Lithuanian case.^^
One of the less pronounced reasons for Norway's reserved position towards 
Lithuania was the NATO angle. One representative of the Norwegian 
Government, Undersecretary Kai Hide said: "while there should be no doubt of 
Norway's position towards the Lithuania conflict, the time is not right for un­
considered or spontaneous decisions."^^^ Hide pointed to Norway's efforts in 
bringing up the issue in NATO, but added we have to watch ourselves a bit 
against being brought into a conflict where we can lack backing amongst our 
NATO allies, for the policy which we follow."^^^ According to Foreign 
Ministry sources, Norway had been warned against going any further, after 
NATO had formally discussed the question.^^^ Conservative MP, Anders 
Talleraas, while stating that "we can be at the head (of NATO) in our reactions," 
noted that "when it comes to concrete measures we have to operate on the same 
level as our a l l i e s . . A n o t h e r  line of thinking assumed that Soviet pressure 
on both Norway and its oil companies had led to moderation in Norwegian oil 
support.^ ^^
When Prunskiene left Norway, her arms were void of material Norwegian 
assistance, but full of moralistic support for Lithuania's cause. After the trip
130 "Nicaragua fâr olje, ikke Litauen."
O.T. Storvik, "Ingen ensidig Litauen-stotte," Aftenposten, 19 April, 1990.
132 "ji^gen ensidig Litauen-stotte."
133 "Norsk protest mot oljeblokaden."
"Klok linje i Litauen-konflikten," Aftenposten, 27 April, 1990.
E. Egeland, "Store ord og smâ nasjoner," Aftenposten, 20 April, 1990. 
Anders Talleraas, "Klok linje i Litauen-konflikten," mentions several questions 
which may be left open with respect to this angle, amongst them:
- Which reaction was to be expected from the Soviet Navy, since Norwegian 
ships will be seen as going into what Moscow considers Soviet territorial 
waters? Will Norway have the backing of NATO for such a policy?
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concluded there was talk from both sides that oil never was the issue for the 
Prime Minister's trip to Oslo at all.^^ Thus, Prunskiene felt satisfied with 
moral support from Norway.
Polishing Norwegian Support for Balticum: May, 1990
It became clear that the Norwegian Government, before the Norwegian 
Storting recessed for the Summer, felt a need to clarify its way forward with 
respect to the Baltic question. One, if not THE clearest debate on the Baltic 
question in Norway would occur in late May, 1990. There, Foreign Minister 
Bondevik's foreign policy Address laid down the Government's view of the 
situation. Because of the statement's significance, clarity and scope, it is proper 
to reproduce key parts of it here:^“
"The Baltic peoples have traditionally been close to Norden.
This, together with the fact that Norway has never 
accepted the encroachments which the Baltic peoples have 
suffered through forceful annexation, provide the 
background for the Government's involvement, today, in 
these questions. It is the Government's clear desire that the 
Baltic republics m ust be put in a position whereby they 
can recover their lost independence. We have placed 
emphasis on developing contacts w ith the new political 
leadership in the Baltic republics, we have initiated 
dialogues regarding the possibilities for creating practical 
cooperation in the economic sphere, the environmental 
sector and with respect to cultural exchange...We have on 
a number of occasions encouraged the Soviet Union to 
refrain from the use of political, military and economic 
pressure and instead enter into dialogue with (the Baltic 
republics). From the Norwegian side we have focused the 
spotlight on Balticum in international fora."
Prunskiene herself said that the intention of the trip was not to solicit 
concrete Norwegian support. (H. Tjonn, "-Tilfreds med moralsk stotte," 
Aftenposten, 20 April, 1990).
137 ".Tilfreds med moralsk stotte."
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 22 May, 1990.
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Bondevik's statement was all the more important because it correctly 
represented a consensus across the political spectrum, excepting, as usual, the 
Progress Party. It was not important because it represented a change from 
descensus to consensus—for Norway had been traditionally characterised by 
one, low political involvement and two, minimal political splintering regarding 
the Baltic question. This stood in stark contrast with our previous exposé of the 
Swedish case. But in union with Sweden, Norway decided to bring the issue 
up onto the international level.
A small debate did take place in unlikely places: between the Conservative 
and Progress Party. Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, said he "positioned himself 
squarely behind the line which the Government has chosen in the question,(of 
recognition)" however cautioning that "although Norway has been amongst the 
countries which have demonstrated the most sympathy to Balticum, we must 
not promise the Balts anything which we can not fulfil...this would not be 
honest on our part and would not serve the Baltic c a u s e . T h e  Progress 
Party, much like the Swedish Environmental Party, were the chief dissenters. 
Party Leader, Carl I. Hagen, wanted to make sure that the Government thought 
about financial support for the Baltics, and advocated support for the Baltics in 
the United Nations.^^ But as opposed to Sweden's aid package which was 
said to be for 'Central-and Eastern Europe, including Balticum/ Petersen pointed 
out that Balticum could not be subsumed under East European aid—rather, it 
should be treated in a humanistic aid package of its own.^^  ^ Conservative MP, 
Annelise Hoegh, criticised the Progress Party, saying "today they w ant to place 
the whole reform process in danger by demanding concerted allied action to 
'help ' Lithuania, to an extent greater than the (Balts), themselves, have
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990. See also SL In n s t 181. 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.
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r e q u e s t e d . D u r i n g  this period, bilateral relations both between Sweden and 
the Baltics and Norway and the Baltics would come into their own. The 
amounts of official and unofficial visits became so numerous as to be literally 
impossible to track.
Among the most important developments one could count: the increase in 
Parliamentary exchanges,^^ cultural exchanges, economic cooperation. An 
interesting development was the establishment of Baltic informational offices in 
Norway and Sweden.*^ It is important to note that the Lithuanian 
information in Oslo, opened on 7 October, 1990 was the first of its sort in 
W estern Europe.^^ The information offices in Stockholm and Oslo were 
accorded no specific protection under the Vienna Convention for Diplomatic 
Relations of 1961 (Akehurst, 1987:114), but proved useful in terms of underhand 
informational exchanges between the Scandinavian Governments and Baltic 
representatives present in Sweden and Norway. By Fall, Sweden was alone in 
being the only country which had personnel, chancelleries and residences in all 
three Baltic capitals. Just before Sweden's recognition of Baltic independence 
in August, there were six civil servants already in Tallinn, four in Riga and one 
in Vilnius.'^ Norway's decision not to recognize the Baltics' annexation into 
the Soviet Union prevented any such presence for Norway.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.
Several Swedish interview subjects mentioned that after Sten Andersson's 
statements about Baltic occupation in November, 1989, ushered in a time of 
greater Riksdag involvement in the Baltic question—previously handled uniquely 
in the Foreign Ministry. (S9)
I. Lindmarker, "UD vill utoka i ost," Svenska Dagbladet, 24 November, 
1990: Chief for the Political Division of the MF A says establishment of Swedish 
presence in Lithuania was most urgent; An official diplomatic presence was 
planned for Tallinn in Spring, 1991 ("Svenskt kontor i Tallinn," Dagens Nyheter, 
27 November, 1990).
S.B. Bentzrod, "Litauen pâ plass i Norge," Aftenposten, 8 October, 1990.
"Sverige erkanner de baltiska republikerna" (Stockholm: Foreign Ministry 
Press Release, 27 August, 1991)
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Balticum  creeps onto the Nordic agenda: 1990-91^^^
One of the most visible new trends in Norwegian and Swedish foreign 
policies over late-Summer and Fall was their pronounced role within the Nordic 
Council over the Baltic question. Partial credit for opening this particular 
corridor of cooperation can in fact be attributed to Mr Gorbachëv himself, and 
in particular his Helsinki speech on 26 November, 1989 where he proposed 
cooperation between the Supreme Soviet and the Nordic Council(NR). The 
proposal was strange, given the historic Soviet opposition to Nordic foreign 
policy cooperation. From the Nordic side, the initiative for coordinated Nordic 
support for the Baltics arguably emanated from Danish Social Democratic MP, 
Anker Jorgensen.'^
Norwegian Foreign Minister, Bondevik, only one month following the 
Helsinki speech, alluded to the Baltic angle, in an overall analysis of the 
Helsinki initiative.'^’ Labour MP's, Gro Harlem Brundtland and Bjom Tore 
Godal, and Progress Party's Pâl A tie Slqervengen, in their speeches also made 
indirect references to increased 'opportunities for cooperation with East Europe' 
that Gorbachev's initiative presented.'^ Progress Party's Hagen was more 
specific, saying "...the invitation from Gorbachev for cooperation between the 
Nordiska Rddet and the northerly Soviet republics should be accepted 
positively."'^' Somewhat later,'^^ Socialist Left MP, Kjellbjorg Lunde, made
Motions supporting coordinated Nordic Council efforts for Baltic support 
were heard as far back as November, 1988. For motions in the Swedish 
Parliament see Swedish Liberal MP's Erling Bager and Lars Leijonborg motion 
1989/90:U2. Riksdagstiyck 1989/90:UU9 ("Nordiskt samarbete"), 7 December, 
1989).
Erling Bager, Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 October, 1989. 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989. 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
'^' Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990. 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.
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it clear that there the Nordic Council should play an active role in developing 
contacts especially with the Baltics, and that the Nordic Council should have 
given a much warmer reception to the Gorbachëv initiative than it had.'®^
In Sweden, Minister of Agriculture, Mats Hellstrom, as late as 17 October, 
1989 dismissed formal participation by the Baltics in Nordic Council 
deliberations.^^ This supports the argument that a clear Soviet "go ahead" 
was necessary for substantive, formal Nordic foreign policy cooperation. Even 
before Gorbachev's official initiative in November, early initiatives to bring the 
Balts into NR work were presented by Conservative MP, Carl Bildt and Labour 
M F s Erling Bager and Lars Le i j onb o r g . Ce n t r e  Party MP, Par Granstedt felt 
that a situation of closer European integration necessitated an increased 
cooperative emphasis on the Baltics, Poland (especially its Northernmost part), 
perhaps also Northern Germany, the Leningrad area and Karelia.^^ In its 
position paper written in April, 1990^^, the Swedish Foreign Affairs 
Committee, noted that "Gorbachev's initiative has given an impulse to increased 
contacts between NR and the Supreme Soviet." However, the Committee notes 
that 'even before then, NR's Presidium had given the Presidium's Secretariat 
instructions to w ork out concrete proposals as to how NR's contacts w ith Baltic 
and Soviet parliamentarians could be developed." In a particular reservation to 
this position paper, the Swedish Centre Party, the Liberal Party and the 
Conservative Party joined in a reservation which read:
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.
The grounds being that the so-called 'Helsinki Agreement' of 1962 
forbade direct participation from external parties. Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 
October, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 17 October, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
Riksdagstiyck 1989/90:UU16 ("Samarbete m ed Baltikiun, Central- och 
Ôsteuropa"), 3 April, 1990.
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"While the NR should, on its own, make a decision on the 
question of giving the Baltics the possibility to follow NR's 
work...it is urgent that there be established direct contacts 
between NR and the Baltic parliaments, without any unnecessary 
detour through Moscow
The NR's connection with the Baltic states would be touched upon in the 
context of NR's 38th session in Reykjavik between 27 February-2 March, 
199Q159 the Nordic Foreign Ministers meeting in Molde, Norway, 11-12 
September, the Ministers issued a communiqué which expressed the hope that 
the "negotiations between the Baltic republics and the Soviet leadership will 
contribute to realizing the independence towards which the Baltic peoples 
strive."^“  In November, 1990, at a NR meeting in November, 1990, the 
Swedish Agricultural Minister, Hellstrom went as far as to introduce the idea 
of establishing a 'Baltic Council' for cooperation around the shores of the 
Baltic.^^  ^ Parliamentary exchanges would be stepped up to unheard of levels, 
forcing the expansion of Swedish and Norwegian Parliamentary bureaucratic 
structures.^^^
The CSCE Conference, which took place in Paris in Mid-November, 1990, 
was interesting for the attention which Sweden and Norway dedicated to the 
question of Baltic representation. The Swedish delegation, ostensibly on its own 
initiative, as well as under certain political pressure from the opposition parties.
Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU16.
Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU9 ("Nordiskt samarbete"); H. Hagwall, "En 
vision av Norden i Europa," Svenska Dagbladet, 28 February, 1990.
"Communiqué from the Meeting of the Council of the Baltic States and 
the Delegation from the Nordic Council" (Stockholm and Tallinn: Nordic 
Council Secretariat, 19 October, 1990).
Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU9.
S. Svensson, "Talmannen i en ny roll," Dagens Nyheter, 14 December,
1990.
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agreed to raise the sensitive question of Baltic participation at the m eeting/^ 
Under Soviet protest, Ingvar Carlsson, much like the French Government, said 
the Baltic states were in Paris as "prominent guests...it is our hope that they will 
be able to join in, as full members, in the near future, after necessary 
negotiations."^^ Carlsson said further "the German people have re-established 
their full sovereignty and freedom...in the same way we look forward the day 
when Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia achieve the same goal."^^ The Norwegian 
Government was slightly more reserved saying, "the Baltic Governments travel 
to Paris with high expectations...they should have the opportunity to participate 
in the process."^^ The new Swedish tone was recognizable and provided 
further evidence that the Government now felt it proper to pursue the Baltic 
issue in international fora.
Ronneby
Even though Sweden and Norway's desire to cooperate with the Baltics 
continued to grow, both Governments continued to have their hands tied by 
diplomatic formality. Such was the case when Sweden hosted^^^ an 
international environmental conference on the Baltic, in the South Swedish city 
of Ronneby, in September, 1990. Ingvar Carlsson could not, regardless of his 
otherwise assiduous personal relationships with the Baltic politicians and the 
Government's view that they were natural participants, formally invite the Baltic
S. Svensson, "Carlsson tar upp den baltiska frâgan," Dagens Nyheter, 16 
November, 1990.
N.M. Udgaard, "Uenighet om Baltikum," Aftenposten, 21 November,
1990.
165 p  "Carlsson stodjer baltema," Dagens Nyheter, 29 November, 1990.
166 "Uenighet om Baltikum."
One Swedish advisor said, "Ronneby gave the Swedes the opportunity to 
push the Baltic cause on their behalf...although unsuccessful...the Government 
got very used to this task of 'speaking for the Baltic republics.' (SI8)
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Governments.'^ The official invitation would welcome Nikolai Ryzhkov, 
whom was kindly asked to keep the Baltic representatives in mind.'^’
Even after opposition from Moscow, the conference resulted in the 
participation of Latvia and Estonia, while Lithuania decided not to attend in 
protest.'^ A final conference document was passed by unanimous vote, and 
in such a way, avoided an open conflict between the attending Baltics and the 
Soviet representative.'^' It is worth noting that the Soviet Union dropped its 
opposition to Baltic participation in the Ronneby follow-up conference in early 
Summer 1991.'^
The Baltic Case Sealed: Janmry-Tebrmry, 1991
Between 1 January and 8 January Norwegian and Swedish support for Baltic 
independence became complete. In Riga the Press House was occupied, Soviet 
paratroopers landed in Lithuania 'to look for Army deserters,' and significant 
Soviet troop movements into the Baltics took place. Early signals, reported by 
élites in mid-late December remained only that.'^  It would not be until
K. Eneberg, "Diskret diplomati med baltiska ledare," Dagens Nyheter, 3 
June, 1990. It is however interesting to note that Ingvar Carlsson did officially 
invite Lithuanian P.M., Prunskiene for talks in Stockholm in mid-October, 1990. 
(K. Eneberg, "Priset forpliktar," Dagens Nyheter, 18 October, 1990).
"Diskret diplomati med baltiska ledare."
S. Leijonhufvud, "Optimism praglar Ostersjo-mote," Svenska Dagbladet, 
3 September, 1990. One month later, P.M. Carlsson invited Kazimiera 
Prunskiene to Stockholm chiefly to discuss the Lithuanian view on Baltic 
ecology ("Priset forpliktar")
'^' S. Leijonhufvud, "Ett genombrott for ekologin," Svenska Dagbladet, 4 
September, 1990.
"Balter deltar i Ostersjomote," Dagens Nyheter, 10 April, 1991.
Swedish Defence's Commander-in-Chief, Bengt Gustafsson, reported 
troop movements in order to bring in full Presidential powers (the same day 
Shevardnadze had warned for an impending dictatorship in the Soviet Union) 
(M. Holmstrom, "Sverige klarar inte analys av utvecklingen," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 14 January, 1991)
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immediately after New Year that the public became firmly aware of what was 
actually occurring across the water.
Norwegian and Swedish Reaction and Action^^*
The Swedish and Norwegian reactions were immediate, and to-the-point The 
respective Foreign Ministers, Sten Andersson and Thorvald Stoltenberg, called 
up the respective Soviet ambassadors, Uspensky and Teterin, to them.*^ Sten 
Andersson did so already on 8 January,'^^ expressing that "pressure, violence 
and threats of violence cannot be accepted...the existing points of opposition 
must be solved using political measures and negotiations."^^ "I see the events 
as a clear violation of the principle of self-determination set forth in the Helsinki 
document...and the Baltic peoples' liberation as a matter of international 
import,"^^* said Andersson on another occasion. Prime Minister Carlsson 
publicly attempted to clear up doubt about Sweden's stance, saying "every 
attempt to maintain that Sweden does not clearly express support for the Baltic 
people's right to self-determination is groundless."^^ "If Gorbachëv has not 
sanctioned this," Carlsson added, "we will have to ask ourselves whether he has 
lost control altogether—otherwise he has told us a blank lie and we can't trust
One of the most noticeable Swedish private reactions after the 
paratroopers had landed was that people started to speak of 'the breaking poinT 
and 'the limit of tolerance' had been reached. (S43, S44). I had only infrequently 
heard these expressions previously.
The Soviet Stockholm Ambassador, Uspensky, said that the Swedish 
Government was listening to Lithuanian propaganda (S. Leijonhufvud, 
"Kanslomassig reaktion," Svenska Dagbladet, 15 January, 1991).
E. Crona, "Markering mot Sovjet," Svenska Dagbladet, 9 January, 1991.
"Markering mot Sovjet."
Riksdagsprotokoll, 15 January, 1991.
"Markering mot Sovjet."
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his w o r d s . C e n t r e  Leader, Olof Johansson, felt that Sweden should implant 
a bum -m ark on Soviet behaviour-"it is the Central Government that bears the 
responsibility..(this) is proof of perestroika's failure.’’^ *' Similar reactions by all 
party leaders were registered at the Monday meeting at Norrmalmstorg on 15 
January.^“
Norwegian élites reacted in similar terms. Prime Minister Brundtland was 
quoted as saying: "brutal encroachments on the Lithuanian population threaten 
East-West relations," simultaneously threatening to withdraw  aid money.^^ 
She added, "there should be some relationship between the aid we provide and 
what is actually happening in the Soviet Union..."^^ Thorvald Stoltenberg, felt 
"these encroachments are violations of the duties which the Soviet Union has 
accepted, e.g. the CSCE, as well as other documents."^®^ Reminiscent of the 
Swedish line, Stoltenberg reminds, "the conflict must be solved through 
dialogue and negotiations."^®^ Socialist Left's Chaffey felt the encroachment 
"could turn the clock back to the 1960/1970's."'®^ Even some serious 
discussion regarding Gorbachev's reception of the Nobel Peace Prize was heard
®^® M. Holmstrom, "Sverige klarar inte analys av utvecklingen," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 14 January, 1991.
181 D. Ljungberg, "Protest till Sovjet," Dagens Nyheter, 12 January, 1991.
i®2 "Militart intâg vantas i Lettland," Svenska Dagbladet, 15 January, 1991; 
M. Ribbing, "Sorgflor pâ flaggoma," Dagens Nyheter, 15 January, 1991; B. 
Westerberg, "Blod pâ Gorbatjovs fingrar," Dagens Nyheter, 26 January, 1991; S. 
Boe, "Vâldet fick tala," Dagens Nyheter, 15 January, 1991.
'®^ A. Bonde, T. Holmqvist, "0st-vest-forholdet er truet," Aftenposten, 14 
January, 1991.
"_0st-vest-forholdet er truet."
®^^ Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 January, 1991.
®^^ Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 January, 1991.
'®^ Chaffey, interview.
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in certain quarters.'** The discussion went as far as to found an alternative, 
called the 'People's Peace Prize/'*^ the leading candidate for which was 
Vytautas Landsbergis.
The Parliaments busy with discussion
As events unfolded, key Baltic representatives were present in 
Stockholm'^. Foreign Minister Sten Andersson went further than he had ever 
gone before in extending the Baltic representatives the invitation to create exile 
governments in Sweden.'^' This move was interesting not least because 
Foreign Minister Osten Undén, directly after the War, explicitly forbade exile- 
Baltic activity of a similar sort in Sweden.'’  ^ A similar statement was 
previously issued by Danish Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen on 23 
January; a decision that one top Norwegian advisor favoured because 'it took 
the weight off of Norway' to do the same.'^^ The Riksdag was quick to 
appoint an investigative committee'^ and the Foreign Minister sent his
'** E. Holte, "Sandegren skuffet," Aftenposten, 14 January, 1991; T. Nordeng, 
"LO-kritikk av Litauen," Aftenposten, 8 February, 1991).
Moderate Party MP Jan Petersen, FFF Party's Anders Aune, 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
"Riksdagen tog emot baiter," Svenska Dagbladet, 17 January, 1991. 
Estonian Foreign Minister, Meri, Latvia's Vice President, Danis Ivans and 
Foreign Minister Jurkans, and Lithuania's Vice President, Kuzmickas were all 
present in Stockholm in mid-January.
Andersson remarked that there was money earmarked for that cause. (S. 
Svensson, "Sten Andersson valkomnar exilbaJterna," Dagens Nyheter, 18 
January, 1991; K. Eneberg, "Sverige bas for Balter," Dagens Nyheter, 29 January, 
1991). Denmark's Foreign Minister, Uffe Ellemann-Jensen extended a similar 
offer to the Balts.
K. Eneberg, "Krokig vag till enighet," Dagens Nyheter, 3 February, 1991 
N26
S. Svensson, "Politiker till Litauen," Dagens Nyheter, 15 January, 1991; 
"Riksdagsman till Baltikum," Dagens Nyheter, 16 January, 1991.
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Cabinet Secretary'’ —^ to orient themselves with the situation there. Amidst 
this, former Foreign Minister and Centre MP, Karin Sôder, promised Nordic 
Council parliamentarian support as a "human shield against the oppressors."*’  ^
One of the final major debates on the Baltic question occurred on 20 
February.*’  ^ Sten Andersson stated "Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have, in 
democratic order clearly expressed a desire for independence...we 
wholeheartedly support this..."*’* Carl Bildt felt that "in the long run  there is 
no middle-way between an admission by Russia of Baltic independence and 
new Russian attempts to depress and suffocate all of their freedom."*”  Bengt 
Westerberg felt "the fact that hundreds of thousands of people are taking to the 
streets is a sign that the situation is not totally hopeless."^ Centre Party's 
Olof Johansson proposed a concrete Swedish commitment of 300 million SEK 
(outside of the existing aid budget) for the Baltics—mainly for environmental 
uses.^* The Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee in mid-April decided the 
majority of 50 million SEK in aid for Central and East Europe should be 
earmarked to Baltic-related projects.^^ Environmental Party's Asa Domeij
*’* K. Eneberg, "Schori reser till Lettland," Dagens Nyheter, 22 January, 1991. 
While in Tallinn, Schori promised concrete Swedish economic and political 
support. (M. Kubu, "Schori utlovar hjalp," Dagens Nyheter, 27 January, 1991).
*’* "Schori reser till Lettland." See also, N.C. Helle, "Utsendinger til Litauen," 
Aftenposten, 29 January, 1991.
*’  ^The final major debate on the Baltic issue in the Riksdag took place in 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 May, 1991. The final Storting discussion of the issue also 
took place in May, 1991.
*’* Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
*”  Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1990.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
^* Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
E. Crona, "50 milj i stod till Baltikum," Svenska Dagbladet, 15 April,
1991.
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persistently reminded that her Party was the only one "who listened to the 
Lithuanians' request for a Swedish recognition of Lithuanian independence."^^ 
For neutral Sweden, reliance on international institutions for the resolution 
of conflict has been a central foreign policy tenet. However, in Sweden, only 
a small portion of the political spectrum showed early support for making the 
Baltic cause an international matter. Now it seemed to be a contest of which 
party could most effectively internationalize the issue. Carlsson stated that 
"Sweden is prepared to support every initiative which is taken with a view to 
raising the Baltic problem to an international level."^ While the Government 
preferred the CSCE context,^^ the L eft^  and Environmental Parties^  
seemed to emphasize a preference for the United Nations. We note though, the 
Government's intention to take up the matter for the UN's Committee on 
Hum an Rights, in February, 1991.^ Even the Council of Europe, under the 
leadership of Swedish Conservative MP, Anders Bjork, would become active in 
the Baltic question.^ All of this occurred amidst Stockholm-based Soviet
203 Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
^  K. Eneberg, "Forsiktig kritik mot baltledare," Dagens Nyheter, 18 January, 
1991.
This seemed to also be the Conservative Party's priority. (L. Lundquist, 
"M kraver extra ESK-mote," Svenska Dagbladet, 23 January, 1991; Â. Ekdahl, 
"Baltikum frâga for ESK-samtal," Dagens Nyheter, 23 January, 1991).
^  M. Ribbing, "Baltisk sjalvstandighet svensk frâga till ESK," Dagens 
Nyheter, 16 January, 1991.
^  P. Gahrton, Â. Domeij, M. Gisselberg, J. Axelsson, "Litauen frâgan till 
FN," Dagens Nyheter, 16 January, 1991. A related standpoint was again 
expressed in P. Gahrton, "Litauen vantar annu pâ Sveriges svar," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 19 February, 1991.
^  "Schori pâ vag mot Lettland." This was accomplished on 4 February, 1991 
(G. von Hall, "FN bor fordoma Sovjet," Svenska Dagbladet, 5 February, 1991).
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 2 February, 1991. See also, E. Crona, "Europarâdet 
skickar delegation," Svenska Dagbladet, 5 February, 1991.
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Ambassador, Uspensky opposition, under the familiar protest that the problems 
were an internal Soviet matter.^'®
Unlike the Swedes, who sent an official Governmental representative (Pierre 
Schori) to the republics, Norwegian official behaviour was reserved. Foreign 
Minister Stoltenberg sent one Professor of Law, Torkel Opsahl, and one Hum an 
Rights activist, Asbjom Hide, to examine the situation.^" Again unlike Schori, 
their role was not to give political advice to the Government. As in Sweden, 
there were some top-level political visits to the Baltics following the violence in 
January.^^^
When asked about the possibility of Norway establishing a diplomatic 
presence, a move desired by fellow NATO member Iceland^*^ Stoltenberg, 
despite rumours that former P.M., Syse had supported an "evaluation of the 
possibilities to recognise the three r e p u b l i c s , d e n i e d  such a move citing a 
"difference in the neighbourly relationships."^^^ NATO decided not to either
K. Eneberg, "Oro i Baltikum Sovjets ensak," Dagens Nyheter, 22 January,
1991.
B.E. Engesland, "Frykter en væpnet Baltikum-konflikt," Aftenposten, 29 
January, 1991.
H. Borud, B.E. Engesland, "Ingen endring av vâr Baltikum-linje," 
Aftenposten, 12 February, 1991.
On 12 February, 1991 Iceland became the first Western nation to fully 
recognize Lithuania's independence. Denmark and Iceland arguably played the 
most active role in Baltic support, Finland the most reserved and Sweden and 
Norway somewhere in between. (M. Fyhn, "Norden og baltemes kamp," 
Aftenposten, 15 November, 1988).
H. Borud, B.E. Engesland, "Ingen endring av vâr Baltikum-linje," 
Aftenposten, 12 February, 1991.
Â. Breian, "Norsk UD ikke til Baltikum nâ," Aftenposten, 27 January, 
1991. One high Norwegian labour source and another source close to 
Stoltenberg mentioned what may have been in Stoltenberg's thinking was the 
pressing Kola project, the negotiations of which would be felt to be in danger. 
(N26,N27) Another high official echoed Stoltenberg's concerns, saying "our 
possibilities to carry on a general political dialogue over: the Barents Sea
(continued...)
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break diplomatie bands with the Soviet Union nor cancel Gorbachev's 
impending trip to NATO Headquarters.^^^ "There is not much NATO as a 
whole can do...each country has to take responsibility for its own actions," one 
NATO source was quoted as having said.^^^
Instead, Norway, in keeping with Sweden, was set on working within both 
a wider Nordic context^** and the framework of the CSCE.^^’ Part of the 
confusion in Norway might have been connected with the change from a 
Bourgeois to Labour Government in December, 1991. Stoltenberg's personal 
advisor stated however that "as soon as the Baltics are able to stand on their 
own two feet, Norway will be first in line to establish an Embassy there."^ 
In concrete terms, the Norwegian Government earmarked NOK 9 million to the 
region, with a special emphasis on human rights promotion.^'
A full-fledged Norwegian Parliamentary debate would wait until 4 February. 
Social Democratic leader of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Godal, while seeing 
signs of a "pull-back from Vilnius and Riga as positive," however reminded that
^^^(...continued)
question, the question of Naval forces in the North, our dialogue on
disarmament and peace, would be influenced," further noting that 'having a
border with the Soviet Union was accompanied by a need to keep the political 
dialogue alive. (N41)
S. Petzell, "NATO bryter ej med Sovjet," Svenska Dagbladet, 19 January,
1991.
217 "NATO bryter ej med Sovjet."
218 "jngen endring av vâr Baltikum-linje."
"Norsk UD ikke til Baltikum nâ."
^  "Norsk UD ikke til Baltikum nâ."
The Norwegian Conservative Party (H-P. Fagerli, H. Width, "Hoyre vil 
sende hjelp til Litauen," Aftenposten, 2 February, 1991) and the Nordic 
Conservative parties collectively (G. Magnus, "-Send utstyr til Baltikum," 
Aftenposten, 5 February, 1991) were united in their desire to send technical 
equipment for communication and mass media uses to the Baltics.
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"these do not provide any guarantee against further encroachments."^ Party 
colleague, Brundtland, quite strangely led off her remarks with a rem inder that 
without the Gorbachëv the Baltic possibilities to fight for independence would 
have been circumscribed.^ Foreign Minister Stoltenberg cautioned that "we 
must constantly balance our interests in our relationship w ith the Soviet Union 
and the Baltic republics-in this there is no complaisance involved."^ 
Stoltenberg never clarified which interests these were, bu t several analysts felt 
that amongst other issues Stoltenberg was referring to the negotiations 
surrounding the yet unresolved Barents Sea delimitation.
Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, in concert with most who spoke on this 
opportunity, emphasized a politically united Norwegian approach to the 
question.^  Socialist Left's spokesman, Paul Chaffey, in no uncertain terms, 
condemned the "use of violence," while simultaneously supporting "the 
recognition of the Baltic states' right to self-determination."^ Chaffey felt the 
process of Baltic cooperation with the Nordic Council should be increased^ 
Christian Democratic Party representatives, Kâre Gjonnes and Bondevik both 
expressed that, irrespective of how much Gorbachëv was put under pressure, 
the use of violence was unacceptable.^ Centre Party's Anne Enger Lahnstein 
affirmed that the Government's decision to pursue the CSCE route was
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
™ Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991. A similar viewpoint was 
expressed by MP, Anders Aune.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
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correct.^  Practically "out of the blue," several cries to return to Norway's 
1921 recognition of the Baltic states' independence were heard from the 
Stortings plenary cham ber.^
Nordic Cooperation Flourishes: Kobenhavn and Karlshamn
The 39th Session of the Nordic Council was a landm ark in Nordic foreign 
policy cooperation towards the Baltic states. The invitation extended to Baltic 
representatives by the Nordic Council, not by the separate Governments, to 
attend,^^ effectively sealed a future Baltic role, informal or otherwise, in the 
NR's work. Closer Nordic cooperation over the Baltic issue acted to unite 
different countries' approaches to the same problem, which were partially 
determined by their varied security policies.
The meeting, which began in on 25 February, was inundated with Soviet 
protests.^^ Ingvar Carlsson said "we are listening to whatever the Soviets say, 
but that does not change our principle understanding of the Baltic 
situation."^^ Carlsson added that "it is because of a fundamental consensus 
between (the participants) that we...encourage real negotiations between the
229 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991.
^  Labour MP, Gunnar Skaug, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991; 
Progress Party's Terje Nyberget, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 1991; 
Christian People's Party's Per Sævik, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 February, 
1991.
The Finnish position on this point was made clear by P.M. Harri Holkeri. 
(A. Ekdahl, "Vaming awisas," Dagens Nyheter, 26 February, 1991).
"Sovjet vam ar for inblandning," Svenska Dagbladet, 26 February, 1991). 
Another account told of 'secret notes' to all of the Nordic capitals, speaking of 
'deep breaks in the relations between the Soviet Union and Northern Europe.' 
(E. Crona, "Hemlig sovjetisk vaming till de nordiska landema," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 28 February, 1991.) See also K. Eneberg, Â. Ekdahl, "Ny skarp 
protest," Dagens Nyheter, 28 February, 1991. .
Â. Ekdahl, "Yarning awisas," Dagens Nyheter, 26 February, 1991.
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Baltic countries and the Soviet Union over the subject of independence."^ 
Moderate MP, Bildt, said in welcoming the Baltics during the first plenary 
session "our welcome greeting is even warmer, when seen against the 
background of the cold warnings from Moscow.
"I am not here to (slow the efforts down)," said Gro Harlem B rundtland.^  
Brundtland merely referred to the content of the Soviet notes as "opinions and 
requests."^^ Denmark's Prime Minister, Poul Schlüter, commented: "if we in 
fact are involving ourselves in (Soviet internal affairs), we are doing so on firm 
legal grounds."^
Ten representatives from the Baltic republics with Estonia's Rüütel, Latvia's 
Gorbunovs and Lithuania's Kuzmickas in the lead, were in attendance at the 
Nordic Council's meeting.^’ There was discussion of the Baltic leaders' status 
from the outset. Agreement was reached that none of the representatives 
would be allowed to speak at the opening, plenary session.^ However, on 
the 27th, the Baltics were allowed to address the NR,^^ and spoke of a will to
^  G. Salvesen, "Awiser advarsel fra Sovjet," Aftenposten, 26 February, 
1991.
K. Eneberg, "Valkomna trots allt," Dagens Nyheter, 27 February, 1991.
^  "Awiser advarsel fra Sovjet."
E. Crona, "Hemlig sovjetisk varning till de nordiska landema," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 28 February, 1991.
^  "Aw iser advarsel fra Sovjet."
K. Eneberg, "Nordiskt stod till Baltikum," Dagens Nyheter, 20 February,
1991.
^  K. Eneberg, "Strid frân start," Dagens Nyheter, 26 February, 1991.
It is interesting that directly following the conclusion of NR's 39th 
Session, the NR extended a formal invitation to the Supreme Soviet to visit the 
Nordic Council's Presidium in Stockholm in October, 1991. ("Hogsta sovjet till 
Stockholm," Dagens Nyheter, 2 March, 1991)
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have an international conference on the Baltic issue.^^ One of the larger 
accomplishments of the meeting was the formal birth of Nordic Information 
Offices in the three Baltic capitals.^  The status of these offices was similar 
to the nations'(republics') offices in Oslo and Stockholm. However, as of June, 
1991 the representatives had only been able to obtain tourist visas for limited 
stays.^
In South Swedish Karlshamn on 22 and 23 March, yet another Nordic 
meeting was held between the Nordic Foreign Aid ministers and Governmental 
representatives. Further aid to the Baltic was discussed, but did not appear in 
the final document from the m eeting.^ The Swedish Foreign Aid Minister 
noted that while there was discussion, the question of aid administration was 
handled differently in the different Nordic countries.^  The meeting 
demanded the initiation of substantial negotiations between the Baltic and 
Soviet Governments, with a view to realising Baltic independence.^^
Recognition
The Soviet coup attempt, beginning with the takeover by a Conservative 
junta in the early morning of 19 August, 1991 would constitute the final step on 
the way to Norwegian and Swedish diplomatic recognition of the Baltic states
E. Crona, "Balter vill ha konferens," Svenska Dagbladet, 28 February, 
1991; K. Eneberg, "Ockupation pâgâr an," Dagens Nyheter, 28 February, 1991.
243 "Nordiska râdets farlighet betydligt overdriven," Dagens Nyheter, 27 
February, 1991.
^  K. Eneberg, "Sovjet sinkar nordisk insats i Baltikum," Dagens Nyheter, 
30 May, 1991.
K. Eneberg, "Nordiska ministrar eniga om Sydafrika," Dagens Nyheter, 
23 March, 1991.
^  I. Yxell, "Demokrati en fôrutsâttning for hjalp," Blekinge Lans Tidning, 
23 March, 1991.
I. Yxell, "Ministermote av stor vikt," Blekinge Lans Tidning, 25 March,
1991.
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as free. W hen Gorbachev returned to Moscow on the 22nd, it became 
immediately clear that Western recognition of Baltic independence was close at 
hand.
NATO member Iceland, followed by Denmark were the first countries to 
extend diplomatic recognition to the Baltic countries, while Denmark was the 
first to physically place an ambassador in the region: in Riga. N orw ay^  was 
before Sweden in its diplomatic recognition, doing so on the morning of 25 
August.^’ The Swedish Government had proposed a fuU recognition during 
the same week-end. However, final approval was received in the Utrikesmmnd 
for such a move on 27 August. The question of Baltic diplomatic status in 
Sweden and Norway would most likely be resolved by converting the Baltic 
information offices in Oslo and Stockholm to either consulates or embassies, 
with full diplomatic immunity and privileges.^ Foreign Minister 
Stoltenberg's comment on the event was a calm repetition of Norway's policy 
all along:
"Norway never accepted the annexation of the Baltic states. For 
that reason we avoid going through the backdoor regarding a 
recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which a number of 
countries are forced to do."^^
On the 27th of August, the three Baltic flags were flying in front of the Swedish 
Foreign Minister on Gustav Adolfs Torg. However formal bilateral diplomatic
^  It should be noted that Norway's position on the coup attempt was in 
concert w ith NATO's approach. (A. Bonde and G. Salvesen, "Gemyttlig kritikk 
i Utenrikskomitéen, Aftenposten, 23 August, 1991); N.M. Udgaard, "Baltikum 
nærmere Norden," (ibid), 24 August, 1991.
R. Taylor, "Baltic states join Nordic family," Financial Times, 27 August,
1991.
^  Â. Ekdahl, "Erkannande i morgon," Dagens Nyheter, 26 August, 1991.
"Sverige erkanner Baltikum pâ tisdag," Dagens Industii, 26 August, 1991; 
E. Holte, "Norge pâ vei til Baltikum."
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relations would not formally come into force until 28 August. Swedish Prime 
Minister Carlsson called the Swedish move "perhaps the happiest and positive 
decision the Government has ever made."^^ Conservative leader Carl Bildt 
dubbed the Utrikesmmnd meeting on the 27th "the most harmonious I have 
attended in the past decennium." Sten Andersson mentioned on 25 August that 
the two most important conditions for independence were now fulfilled 
The Government grounded its decision upon the fact that "international legal 
prerequisites for recognition were now fulfilled," presenting several examples 
which demonstrated that the Baltic countries now had control over their own 
territories.^
K. Eneberg, "Baltstatema erkanda," Dagens Nyheter, 28 August, 1991.
E. Holte, "Norge pâ vei til Baltikum," Aftenposten, 26 August, 1991.
^  Press Release, "Sverige erkanner de baltiska statema," (Stockholm: 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 27 August, 1991).
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Chapter Seven
Norwegian-Soviet, Swedish-Soviet Trade Relations
Trade relations between the Soviet Union and either Norway or Sweden have 
assumed a relatively unimportant place in their interstate relations/ In looking 
for the reasons one would be well served by first looking at economic realities 
and not at political factors, such as neutrality and alignment. Norwegian and 
Swedish security policy orientations have had the most effect in particularly 
sensitive niches of trade. While these areas are discussed in greater length, their 
significance relative to the overall amount and composition of goods is small.
The main cause of weak trade relations must be sought in traditional 
economic factors: profitability, market complexity, market structure, cost/benefit 
analyses inter alia. Trade with the Soviet Union from 1987-1991, as contrasted 
with 1947-9 can be seen as chaotic—characterized by Soviet domestic turmoil, 
vying economic interests of the republics, the de-centralisation of the locus of 
trade activity from the state to private interests or from the centre to the 
periphery, the emergence of new actors, among other factors. The charged East- 
West political climate, which had especially dominated trade considerations 
between Sweden and the Soviet Union directly after the war, has been gradually 
defused during the Gorbachëv years—placing commercial considerations at the 
fore of trade relations.
Several central questions will be addressed in the following section. First, 
how have Sweden's and Norway's respective security political commitments 
affected Soviet trade, and if so, in which areas? Also, where and how does the 
trade question fit into Norway's or Sweden's relationship with the Soviet 
Union? A third point of inquiry is how Norwegian and Swedish élites
 ^ For example, only between forty and fifty Norwegian companies have 
regular business with the USSR and the different republics (N25), while in 
Sweden there are at least 170 companies with Soviet interests. (J. Selander, 
"Lâttare att fâ betalt frân Sovjet," Svenska Dagbladet, 13 March, 1991.)
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perceive the factors affecting Soviet trade and how they characterize their Soviet 
business transactions generally.
Those who attempt to explain the reasons for the volume and composition 
of Soviet trade usually think in terms of factors which help trade and those 
which hinder i t  In fact the majority of writing about the topic of Swedish or 
Norwegian trade relations with the Soviet Union argues either with a view to 
the factors which encourage or discourage trade. These themes penetrate the views 
and behaviour of élites analyzed in this section on Soviet trade.
Statistics
A presentation of statistics regarding trade volume and composition provide 
a useful starting point for this section. The statistics may prove misleading, 
because business dealings, of any magnitude in a West European context stick 
out, as one élite expressed "like sore thumbs," because there are so few 
transactions occurring with the Soviet Union.^
SWEDEN
Volume
Exports and Im ports
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Exp 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7
Imp 2.3 1.5 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.4
(the Soviet Union's proportion of total Swedish Exports and Imports)'
 ^e.g. the Norwegian shipbuilding industry.
 ^ "Exportfakta: Sovjetunionen," Svensk Export 8 (1990), p. 15; Statistics 
Sweden (Stockholm: Swedish Trade Council, March, 1991).
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There are several things which should be noted in the statistics: Swedish exports 
to the Soviet Union have always accounted for only a small portion of Sweden's 
total trade with the Soviet Union. In fact, mainly due to Sweden's large fuel 
imports, Sweden's imports have traditionally been at least twice the amount 
exported.
Seen either from the perspective of Soviet imports or Swedish exports, the 
statistics tell a bleak story. The key figure for us is the proportion of trade 
which the Soviet Union accounts for, against Sweden's total exports. For all 
intents and purposes one must conclude that Soviet trade is insignificant in real 
figures or as a percentage of total exports or imports.
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Finally, the SEK amount of Soviet imports and exports has been remarkably 
stable.
Composition
Exports (percentages of selected products and branches)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Food 27 18 8 7 14 18
Fuels 2 3 .07 1 1 .003
Ppr&Brd 8 3 2 3 11 6
Engineer 23 39 42 56 42 51
Here it is interesting to note, in keeping with 1947-9, the prominent place that 
engineering exports have had in the overall Swedish export profile. 
Traditionally, machines for special industries, heating and cooling equipment, 
mechanical handling equipment and non-electrical machinery have been among 
the most interesting from the Soviet horizon. We also notice the prominent 
place that food exports to the Soviet Union have held. In recent years, the 
paper and board industry has become increasingly more important, as is also 
the case in the Norwegian case. Furthermore we should note that export of 
scientific instruments, in recent times, have been about 6% of total export 
(consistently the largest export in the "other manufactured goods" category.
Imports
The single most important import from the Soviet Union has been oil products. 
In percentage terms, oil imports from the Soviet Union increased in the
252
proximate 1988-1990 period/ Two other important sources were first, raw 
materials and second Chemical products:
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Fuel 75 66 67 50 53 65
Raw 7 15 18 24 21 13
Chem 12 12 9 14 13 9
NORWAY
Volume
Exports and Imports (total percentages)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Export 0.3 0.5 0.42 0.61 0.62 0.50
Import 1.0 0.52 0.64 0.74 1.1 1.3
(percentage of Norway's total imports from Soviet Union and percentage of 
Norway's total exports to the Soviet Union)
NOK Am ount of Exports and Imports (Soviet Union)
(stated in millions of NOK)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Export 629 672 618 896 1,162 1,069
Import 1,449 794 980 1,120 1,719 2,385
Bal -820 -122 -362 -224 -557 -1316
 ^ Statistics Sweden.
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Export Composition^ (proportion of selected products)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Pprpulp 13 30 44 47 41 15
Pstebrd 35 24 26 16 23 13
Mach+
Transp
16 13 5 13 13 17
Chempr 25 19 10 9 4 6
Fish .04 5 11 10 4 1
Industr
Machin
7 6 2 4 4 5
Import Composition (selected products)
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Raw
oil
48 16 33 10 2 14
Nonferr 
 ^metal
6 10 14 26 30 9
Chem 5 14 8 8 10 9
Petrof 23 27 10 5 17 19
Since 1985 there have been several significant shifts in the structure of 
Norwegian exports and imports from the Soviet Union. The most important of 
Norway's exports is today pulp and paper. In fact pulp and paper is one of the 
only markets where Norway's market share has increased.(Ferreira, 1990:51)
 ^ Norwegian Trade Council, 1991. Self-calculation of percentages. Note: 
machine, transp. does not include ships.
 ^Note sharp rise in the amount of import or iron ore and metal scrap from 
the Soviet Union, which was 21% of imports in 1989 to 31% in 1990.
 ^ There is an inconsistency in two Norwegian official statistics for petroleum 
imports for 1989. One points to it being 5%, while the other points to 17% of 
imports. (Norwegian Export Council, 1991).
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We see here that exports to the Soviet Union dropped significantly, mainly due 
to Soviet payment problems throughout 1990.
It is also noteworthy to see that the trade imbalance between Norway and the 
Soviet Union is less sharp than between Sweden and the Soviet Union. In great 
part this can be accounted for by the large Swedish fuel imports from the Soviet 
Union.® We also note the similarity between the portion of Sweden's and 
Norway's total exports to the Soviet Union, but should also observe the quite 
marked differences on the import side. Final attention should be draw n to 
sharp decreases in the import of Soviet oil, relative to total Norwegian imports 
over the period 1985-1989—in fact, taking those proportions and looking at 1989, 
oil imports as part of total imports decreased 90% since 1985. With the decrease 
in Soviet oil exports to the COMECON countries in 1990, brought about by the 
demand for hard currency trading, we again witness a significant rise.
A w ider historical perspective on trade
Although this thesis covers the periods 1947-9 and 1987-91 it may be 
nonetheless interesting to quickly chart the development of trade during the 
years which are not under direct consideration in order to gain a fuller view of 
the subject:
® Oil-based imports topped Norwegian imports from the Soviet Union, at 
one time topping 67% of total Norwegian exports from the Soviet Union (1985). 
(S. Elsrud, C. Norland, M. Woldsdal, "Voksende handelsunderskudd med 0st," 
Aftenposten, 15 January, 1988.)
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Most important imports from Soviet Union (as percentage of total trade)
Sweden
1955 1965 1975
Min prod 65% Min prod 61% Min fuel 70%
Veg prod 8% Raw mat 12% Raw mat 17%
Foodstuff 8% Food 5% Metals 6%
Norway
1955 1965 1975
Grain prod 61% Timber 28% Min oil prod 27%
Transp prod 14% Min oil prod 19% Fertilizer 26%
Iron 11% Aluminum 13% Ships/boats 15%
Most important exports to Soviet Union(as percentage of total trade)
Sweden
1955 1965 1975
Transp Mat 45% Machine-app 52% Machine-app 45%
Machine-app 15% Iron-steel 29% P aper/papp  36%
Skins-leath 13% Paper waste 8% Paper waste 8%
Norway
1955 1965 1975
Plant Oil 62% Oil Fat 49% Chemicals 25%
Fish 36% Fish 26% Paper papp 24%
Animals .03% Paper mass 9% Machine app 10%
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Portion of total export dedicated to Soviet Union 
1947 1949 1955 1965 1975
N 3.3 5.4 2.3 1.28 1.3
S 1.26 1.84 0.8 1.26 1.68
Portion of total import dedicated to Soviet Union’ 
1947 1949 1955 1965 1975
N 1.4 2.8 1.6 1.27 0.80
S 6.77 2.48 1.6 6.0 2.9
Government and Political Involvement in  Trade Questions
While the Norwegian and Swedish Governments have resisted getting 
unnecessarily involved in Soviet trade questions, the Soviet Union has 
consistently, as far back as 1947-9 insisted upon Swedish and Norwegian official 
involvement in the area. From the Norwegian and Swedish sides, there has 
existed an understanding that the judgements of risks and opportunities, and 
the enforcement of contracts are best left to the interested companies and their 
own judgements of the market on their own terms. However, the state has 
involved itself in certain circumscribed realms.
’ Sveriges Offentliga Statistik, Handel (Stockholm: Kommerskollegium) 
and Utrikeshandel (Stockholm: Statistisk Centralbyrâ).
257
Foreign Aid to the Soviet Union
The first exception has been the structure of foreign aid policy—which 
debatedly does not fall into the realm of trade policy at all.^° One locus of 
discussion with respect to foreign aid is: for which purposes should aid be 
used? Until the late 1980's the question of aid was not important. The question 
of catastrophic food aid to the Soviet Union has been highlighted since 1990. 
With a rapidly approaching Winter in the Soviet Union (1990-91), and an 
decreasingly effective food distribution system, Soviet cries for immediate 
cissistance were heard in Scandinavia and the whole Western w orld." The 
question fell in that the situation never reached imaginable proportions" and 
political violence in the Baltic made Scandinavian leaders re-think their offer." 
Another key question was where the aid might be best spent. Especially in 
Sweden, but to some extent in Norway, there were strong pressures that the aid 
should be oriented away from far lying areas and shifted towards the countries' 
proximate geographical needs: for Norway to the Kola" and to Balticum and
"  Excepting, as one Norwegian trade unionist termed it 'business as aid." 
(Sandegren, interview).
"  In Sweden see S. Olofsson, "Staten betalar Sovjetfrakt," Svenska Dagbladet 
13 December, 1990, L. Porne, "Kommission garanterar râtt adressât," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 13 December, 1990. In Norway see O. Mathismoen, "Norsk Sovjet- 
hjelp planlegges," Aftenposten, 17 November, 1990; B. Egjar Engesland, "Norsk 
krise-plan for Sovjet," Aftenposten, 23 November, 1990. For the chief 
parliamentary debate on the matter see Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 14 
December, 1990.
"  S. Boe, "Inget svenskt katastrofbistând till Sovjet," Dagens Nyheter, 14 
December, 1990.
"  In Norway, G. Magnus, "Syse: Hjelpen til Sovjet-mâ vurderes," 
Aftenposten, 10 January, 1991. In Sweden see Centre Party's Olof Johansson, 
"C vill frysa Sovjetbistând," Dagens Nyheter, 24 January, 1991.
"  O. Mathismoen, "Norsk kola-lân pâ en milliard," Aftenposten, 10 October,
1990.
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for Sweden to the Eastern Europe generally*^ and to the Baltic states in 
particular.
Trade Financing
Trade financing was another fertile area for Government involvement. The 
Norwegian and the Swedish parliaments have dealt a very slim mandate to the 
state credit guarantee institutions to "stay out of the red." However, beginning 
in the Spring-Summer, 1990, reports of serious Soviet payment delays made this 
mandate increasingly difficult to uphold. The credit guarantee institutions, the 
Swedish Exportkreditndmnden (EKN)^^ and the Norwegian Garanti Institua for 
Eksport Kreditgarantier (GIEK), operating under their tight parliamentary 
mandates, made the decision to table medium to long-term credit guarantees. 
The question in both countries became: would the respective Governments step 
in with so-called politically-inspired credit guarantees or credit so as to maintain 
the present level of trade? Given the 1946 Swedish 'Billion Credit' decision, one 
would expect that the Swedes would be more favourably disposed to this sort 
of action.
Export Promotion
The Soviet case has traditionally demanded more energy than in other more 
'natural' markets such as Germany or the U.S. for many of the same reasons as 
were present in 1947-9. First, the Soviet market is yet relatively uncharted 
territory for Swedish and Norwegian firms. Yet another reason has been
Of the Government's proposed aid to Central and East Europe, more than 
50% was intended for the Baltic republics. See Foreign Aid Minister, Hjelm- 
Wallén, Riksdagsprotokoll, 12 February, 1991.
According to one official, EKN has played a pronounced role in providing 
export credits to the Soviet Union since at least the first part of 1989, when, as 
he put it "the period when banks became risk-aversive." "Now only 
governments provide credit guarantees (to the Soviet Union)—a complete 
reversal of a trend." (S12).
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political— increased trade adds a different, perhaps supportive dimension to 
political relations between nations, establishing in its turn, useful contact nets 
between business and governmental élites. A third reason is that the Swedish 
and Norwegian leaders have seen it necessary to draw, from time-to-time, upon 
its knowledge and financial resources in order to promote domestic well-being 
in Sweden and Norway.
Export promotion has been the express goal of both the Norwegian and 
Swedish Exportrâds or Export Councils. Quasi-official groups, such as the 
Swedish Framjande Kommittén for ostlvdsthandel^^, have acted upon their own 
mandate to create an atmosphere where common opinions, initiatives, problems 
may be discussed. Both Sweden and Norway have Governmental 'Mixed 
Commissions' together with the Soviet Union. Traditionally the Swedish 
Minister of Industry and the Norwegian Minister of Trade and Shipping led the 
respective Mixed Commissions, backed by experts from inside and outside the 
bureaucracy. Meetings of the Commission have been opportunities for the 
airing of difficulties and the launching of new initiatives between both the 
countries.
Parliamentary Role
The Riksdag and the Storting have played minimal roles with respect to trade 
policy toward the Soviet Union. The categories of debate about Soviet trade can 
briefly be summarized. Most frequent were MP statements of w hat everyone 
already knew: Soviet trade is modest.^* For the Norwegians, the greatest trade
The new name: Swedish-Soviet Trade Council.
See Riksdagsprotokoll for the following MP's and dates: Swedish 
Conservative MP, Per Westerberg, 20 April, 1989; Swedish Centre MP, Per-Ola 
Eriksson, 12 April, 1991; Trade Minister Anita Gradin; 23 April, 1987; Moderate 
Party's Sten Andersson i Malmo, same date. Liberal Party MP, Ingemar 
Eliasson, 22 February, 1989. Social Democratic MP, Reynoldh Furustrand, 13 
December, 1989; Liberal MP, Hâkan Holmberg, Moderate MP, Margaretha af 
Ugglas, Centre Party's Par Granstedt, Left Party's Bengt Hurtig, 8 May, 1990.
(continued...)
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question was oil exploration. But that possibility was blocked by  the 
outstanding Barents Sea delimitation question.^’ In the Gorbachev years there 
have also been numerous debates regarding the success, failure and progress of 
Soviet economic reforms, but only infrequently have trade questions been 
discussed.^
Élite Characterizations of Trade w ith the Soviet Union
Dep’ee of Interest
Never has there been any lack of 'intellectual' interest in doing business in 
the Soviet Union. Many of the objective factors for trade already exist: ethnic 
similarities (in the Baltic case), geographic proximity, inexpensive materials and 
manpower being foremost amongst them. These natural reasons led to, as 
Anders Âslund said, "all Swedish companies are surveying the market.
*^(... continued)
See also Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7 ("Samarbete m ed ôsteuropa och vissa 
intem ationella miljoinsatser").
For Norwegian examples see Forhandlinger i Stortinget:
Progress Party MP, Hans Rosjorde, 19 January, 1989; Foreign Minister 
Stoltenberg, 13 January, 1989; Bjom Tore Codai, 4 January, 1990; FFF Party MP, 
Anders Aune, 31 May, 1990.
Labour MP, Finn Knutsen, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December,
1987.
^  See Norwegian Foreign Minister, Bondevik, and Conservative MP Petersen 
in Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989 and 4 January, 1990 
respectively regarding the progress of Gorbachev's economic reform strategy 
and the possibilities for increased Soviet-Norwegian trade. In Sweden see 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 May, 1988: Social Democratic MP, Stig Alemyr and Liberal 




However, interest in the Soviet Union has not been able to go the distance. 
Whereas some of these factors have driven Swedish-Soviet or Norwegian-Soviet 
trade up to the existing level, they have not been decisive in lifting trade out of 
these established levels and patterns.
It so happened that Swedish and Norwegian domestic economic difficulties 
conveniently coincided with Gorbachev's glasnost and perestroika. W hat set the 
train in motion was, of course, change in the Soviet Union and the awakening 
of a nearly three hundred million man strong market—w ith all the conceivable 
pitfalls and benefits. Very soon, though, it became obvious that production and 
the acquirement of raw materials from Sweden and Norway was very 
expensive. Companies became interested in gaining benefits—and many 
preferred to do that by first looking in their immediate neighbourhood. While 
larger conglomerates had a very clear idea of the risks and the pitfalls involved, 
medium and smaller companies, many naïvely, approached the Soviet market 
in particular and the East European market generally.^
Complicating Factors
Where does the Fault Lie?
Complicating factors are those factors that either complicate a decision to 
enter the Soviet market or, if already established, make the company's existence 
more difficult. Johnson Concern's Managing Director, Goran Ennerfelt, put it 
well in saying "there are many examples of failures on the Soviet market—but 
the real question is whether they can be a guide for the future."^
“  A typical characterization of the naiveté of firms planning to go onto the 
Soviet market was given by one Norwegian: "all sorts of small firms, claiming 
to know people in the Soviet Union, but that nonetheless having no experience 
with export to any country, want to start by exporting to the Soviet Union...and 
they want to export their firm out of troubles." (N22)
^ Ennerfelt, interview.
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Traditionally, élite attributions of Norwegian and Swedish lack of success in 
Soviet business centred about around a combination of factors: lack of 
courage/daring, a lack of persistence and patience,^ a lack of Swedish, 
Norwegian and Soviet effort generally, the absence of proper cooperation or 
suitable projects, or finally a lack of information and comprehension of the 
Soviet market.^
As one élite said, "in the old system getting credit was much less of a 
problem than getting companies to take risks."^ "Unless someone has either 
a religious commitment to do business with Eastern Europe or is assured 
extraordinary profit, businessmen will abstain from trade in Eastern Europe," 
said one prominent élite.^^ There are two alternatives, as Anders Âslund 
pointed out "either to plan with a long-term perspective (e.g. Tetra Pak, ABB) 
or trade in the short term, commodities trading)-it is difficult to justify anything 
in between tod ay.
^  There was general agreement that, as one Norwegian said, "it is not easy 
to build up a new business in the Soviet Union—you need a lot of patience and 
a lot of hard work." (N56) Another Norwegian pointed out that "small firms 
which are struggling to survive see the Soviet Union as their possible chance 
because it is near and that Norway has had good relations with the Soviet 
Union." Profit only comes in the long run...contrary to the desires of these firms, 
who need profit at once." (N22) These same sentiments echoed by Norwegian 
Trade Board's Terje Nilssen, "-Vâr eksport vil oke," Aftenposten, 15 January,
1988.
^  See T. Ek, Chairman of the Swedish Small Business Organisation, "Satsa 
pâ Sovjethandeln," Svenska Dagbladet, 30 August, 1989.
^  Ennerfelt, interview.
Ennerfelt, interview.
^  Âslund, interview.
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Decisional confusion, decisional complexity and lack of decisional power 
Seen from both the Norwegian and Swedish perspectives, the trade issue has 
to some extent filled the void left by the previously param ount security policy 
emphasis on Norwegian-Soviet or Swedish-Soviet foreign relations.^ This has 
in its turn placed increasing demands on Norwegian and Swedish domestic 
bureaucracies to show increasing flexibility and adapt to the new situation.
Sweden and Norway have begun to move away from acting as unitary actors 
towards the Soviet Union. Prior to 1985, "there was a tight circle of people 
involved in Soviet trade," said one businessman, 'T^ecause of the working of the 
Soviet system, we felt a need to act 'as a country  so that we could unify the 
Swedish position." 'Today," he added "there are more players in the field, and 
it is difficult to have an overview."^ Previous institutions in both Sweden and 
the Soviet Union have outlived themselves, as one business élite underlined, 
"(the bureaucrats) are dealing with a reality of fifteen years ago, which no 
longer exists."^*
Many Swedish and Norwegian officials and advisors felt decisional confusion 
on economic matters in the wake of political transformation as a chief hindrance 
to trade. One of the most common complaints is politically-related decisional 
apathy. As one Norwegian diplomat said, "no one has the power to make any 
decisions any more."^^ The perceived problems had a great deal to do with a 
near-total transformation of the way Soviet trade machinery worked. One 
official thoughtfully outlined:
As one élite said: "the Soviet Union has been transformed to an unknown 
(entity) to something known—and thus less threatening." (Sll)




"In the old system you never had any contact w ith the end 
users.^^ The only thing you had to do was find the key 
person in the trade organisations, who steered Soviet trade.
It was easy to find market channels. Now the Trade 
Ministry has (exaggerated) 20-25 bodies under her and 
they have lost their monopoly. Now there are masses of 
trading houses fighting for survival."^
A related, relatively common factor was well summed-up by one élite saying 
"the words they speak are the same, but we detect that there is much less 
authority from the centre...even when we talk at Prime Minister level."^^ "All 
of our contacts have disappeared," claimed one Director, "and with that all of 
the purchasing organisations."^ The Ministries, one individual mentioned, 
"have no control over what they used to have control over; we cannot rely on 
what we hear—we have to double check e v e r y t h i n g . T h e  conclusion drawn 
by one élite with great experience in the market was naturally, "we are very 
careful with whom we deal tod ay.
Getting paid: the most pressing problem
One of the greatest difficulties in trading with the Soviet Union became the 
Soviet payment problem in 1990. Norsk Hydro Vice President, Tor Sverre 
Jacobsen, recounted the chain of events leading up to the Soviet payment 
problem thus: "first it started with delayed payments, then they just started
As one Norwegian businessman said, "we still talk to exporters much as 
in the past—but now we are much more aware of the end-consumers, which 
have a stronger say in the product's use and purpose." (N56)
^  SI 3. Norwegian Trade Minister, Kaci Kullmann Five also elaborates on 
this phenomenon in Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 10 October, 1990.
Ennerfelt, interview.
^  S. Ryman, "Leverantorer drabbas av kaos i ost," Dagens Nyheter, 10 
November, 1990.
Ennerfelt, interview.
^  Ennerfelt, interview.
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paying the interest and in the third step they decided to stop paying 
altogether."^’ The problem did not solely concern Scandinavia, in fact 
comprising Soviet trading partners worldwide.^ No matter how the Soviet 
authorities tried to play the issue down in various fora,^^ the issue continued 
to plague Western exporters, albeit with some lightening,^ until the time of 
this writing.^ Even the previous-dependable Soviet Foreign Trade Bank, 
Vnesheconombank, was teetering on the edge of depleting its foreign currency 
reserves in late Fall, 1991.
Swedish and Norwegian Decisions in the wake of payment problems
In the Swedish case action was taken on November 8,1990^ resulting in the 
Swedish Export Guarantee Board, EKN, informing the Swedish Government that 
it was tabling all credits in excess of one year.^ This was a dramatic step.
39 Jacobsen, interview.
^  "Small U.S. Firms Stung By Soviet Union's Delays," International Herald 
Tribune, 23-24 March, 1991; G. Graham, "Soviet banker rejects debt payment 
fears," Financial Times, 9-10 March, 1991.
G. Graham, "Soviet banker rejects debt payment fears," Financial Times, 
9-10 March, 1991. Here Alibegov of Vnesheconombank pegs the total amount of 
outstanding external debts at "around $60 Billion," while rejecting Western 
payment fears. See also, "Sovjet ska betala skulder," Svenska Dagbladet, 29 
November, 1990. A similar statement is given by Soviet Vice Minister for 
Economic Ties, Oleg Davidov in K.O. Evensen, "Vi skal betale, lover russeme," 
Aftenposten, 22 May, 1990.
One Swedish Trade official (S56)
As late as 12 June, 1991 the Soviet Union still owed Norway NOK 128m 
(K. Fossli, "Norway protest on Soviet debt," Financial Times 12 June, 1991.
^  According to one official, the payment problem began in May-June, 1990. 
(S14)
M. Sundberg, "Drâpslag mot Sovjethandel— inga mer kreditgarantier," 
Dagens Industri, 10 November, 1990; "Tvarstopp for Sovjetgarantier," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 20 December, 1990.
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since never previously had the situation in the Soviet Union become so 
serious^ that EKN felt itself forced to establish such a rugged approach.^^ 
For business transactions of less than one year there was another regulation^: 
EKN would only guarantee transactions which already are counter-guaranteed 
by Vnesheconombank^^
The Swedish decision was explained by one of EKN's directors, Ragnar 
Sohlman thus: "how does one know with whom one will write a contract...even 
if one knows who the other contracting party is how do we know that this 
party will exist in three years, let alone that it is willing and able to pay?" 
According to Sohlman, EKN was of November 10 obliged to pay out SEK 27 
million. That debt stood in marked contrast to outstanding Soviet debt to 
Norway of approximately 70 million NOK in January, 1991.“  Sohlman 
mentioned that when the situation hit its high point, 55 billion SEK were in 
question.^^ The EKN decision is significant because it is a negative judgement 
of the current risk for exporting to or investing in the Soviet Union—and could
^  Most agreed that the Soviet payment problem came as a surprise to most 
who were used to a dependable Soviet payment track record. As Swedish Jan- 
Olof Nystrom said, (in rough translation) "many Swedish businesses were 
caught with their pants down, since the Soviets had always been such 
dependable payers." (Svensk Export 4 (1991). A similar Norwegian perception 
found in R. Mæhle, "Âpner for norsk eksport-satsning," Aftenposten, 14 
January, 1988.
One Swedish official pointed out that the first time the problem had ever 
been raised with the Soviet Union was in the Mixed Commission in the end of 
1989. (S14)
^  New export credit guarantees were provided for the rest of Eastern 
Europe by EKN on 9 January, 1991 ("Ny exportgaranti for Ôsteuropa," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 10 January, 1991).
Norwegian élite called Vnesheconombank "a bank that acts like a bank," 
taking no orders from the Soviet ministries.(N18)
“ N16
Dagens Industri, 10 November, 1990.
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be used as a guideline for Swedish banks to follow.^ It should also be noted 
that the decision was taken without considerations to w hat was politiccilly 
desirable, rather a clear cost-benefit analysis.
Not a totally dissimilar decision was made in Norway on 28 November, 
1 9 9 0  53 the differences in the Norwegian decision were four-fold: first, it 
was a decision by the Government, and thus was taken up in the Storting.^ 
Second, the decision had no special time limit. Third, the decision was final,®® 
and finally the credit framework was limited to NOK 750 million.
According to one high Norwegian official "until April of 1990 Norwegian 
industry was so confident of Soviet payment ability that they never deemed it 
important to secure a guarantee."®^ The Norwegian decision was, in the words 
of one Foreign Ministry official a simple result of political uncertainty and 
payment problems.®^ As one individual said "the banks are glad that they are 
not faced with the companies and they like to get rid of risk."®* "All
®^ EKN's Fridtjofsson pointed out, "only a small portion of Sweden's trade 
is guaranteed by the EKN."(interview). "Before," Fridtjofsson added, "the Soviet 
risk was seen as so small that banks themselves felt prepared to take on the 
risk" Carl Bildt pointed out in 1989 that "...bankers still consider the Soviet 
Union as credit-worthy...the Soviets have supposedly loaned relatively large 
amounts...but it appears that they haven't used this money." (Sparframj and et, 
1989:152)
®® One official said continuous contacts were held between the Norwegians, 
the Danes and the Swedes in the matter. (E. Heiio, GIEK). According to one 
GIEK official, "some of the earlier signs started to show in late 1989 w ith the 
huge payment difficulties to (e.g. Siemens). (Ingebretsen, interview)
®^ Decision taken by the Storting, 28 November, 1990. See also "Regeringen 
vedtar landramme for eksportkredittgarantier til Sovjetunionen pâ 750 millioner 






Norwegian banks are closed on the Soviet Union now /’ according to one 
financing expert.^’
In the Aftermath of the decisions
There were several ways out of this situation. One of the possibilities lay in 
the extension of politically-inspired credits by the Swedish^ or Norwegian 
Government.*^ This step would of course mean circumventing the strict EKN 
or GIEK mandates and mean a clear political intervention in trade questions.
"In Sweden," said one high trade official," there is no particular willingness 
to subsidize trade, although we know that other countries, for political reasons, 
have subsidized, for example, capital investments."*^ A similar observation 
was presented by one trade promoter: "Germany, Italy and France*^ have been 
very generous with their credit guarantees—Sweden m ust also show 
generosity...our political parties, the world around us and companies will act to 
pressure the Government."*^ Two businessmen agreed saying, "...look at what 
is going on in the EEC...the Swedish Government can't just sit back and wait;
59 N18
*° But, said Ennerfelt, "for long-range commitments (in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe) what is needed is a different attitude from the Swedish state" 
("Staten bor stodja investeringar i ost!" Handelskam martidningen, 21 December, 
1990)
*^ Norwegian Trade Minister, Nordbo, was prepared to consider the 
question of a separate guarantee framework for the Soviet Union. Finance 
Minister, Sigbjorn Johnsen confirmed that "Norway will establish a guarantee 
framework of NOK 750 million with (Vnesheconombank)." The chief motivation 
Johnsen gave was that the Government protect the approximately 2,000 paper- 
industry positions in 0stfold, which are so dependent on Soviet export. ("Egen 
garantiramme for Sovjetunionen," Eksportfinans, December, 1990)
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it would be better for the Government to do it itself (extend credit guarantees), 
rather than be asked to change."^ "In times like this, where Swedish industry 
has significant problems in marketing goods in the Soviet Union there is always 
pressure on the Government to change the situation,"^ said one official. 
Regardless of these expectations, action taken on the issue until the time of this 
writing was well summed up by one trade official: "Of course the Swedish 
Government could do more, but the (domestic) political and economic 
conditions are not conducive to that."^^
One Norwegian élite said, "Norway is in the same position as Sweden, as 
differed from countries like Spain, Germany and Spain) which offer heavy 
credits to help the Soviets pay for imports."^ One Norwegian FM official 
pointed out a double-stance in Norway: "Although official Norway is reluctant 
to encourage people to go ahead and does not want to raise too much 
enthusiasm for (Soviet trade) we also say it is important to position oneself now 
in order to be successful—if not we will be lost in the queue and Japan and the 
U.S. will exploit this opportunity."^’
Another alternative pathway would be, as one official put it, that the reasons 
for making the decision disappear and that "certainty is re-established."^ As 
time pushed on, the re-establishment of certainty was not on the horizon-so this 
alternative could also be discounted. A third alternative pathway was simply 
that the EKN would announce that it was moving its decision from being a
65 S42
“  S24. This individual added that one must remember that "it's the 






decision to table to totally closing down on the Soviet Union/^ One individual 
close to the matter found this alternative the most likely.^
Actual impact of the decision
The fall-out of the decision had several expected and unexpected results. 
"We would have expected all sorts of pressure on us to bring about a change 
in the decision," one official said, 'b u t there is not much lobbying at all...there 
is an understanding of our position."^ However, another individual with a 
slightly different organisational perspective said that " Alfa-Laval (a major player 
in Swedish-Soviet trade) complained lividly about the EKN d e c i s i o n . " S o m e  
Swedish companies are very badly hit here," said one official, "even those who 
have always looked at the Soviet Union as a very stable market."^ "Some 
companies," one official countered, "are finding creative sources of getting 
around the problem, such as buyback agreements or utilizing other funding 
facilities.
In Norway, there was talk of GIEK's negotiating a guarantee agreement 
which individual firms could use—but if negotiations failed, according to one 




SI4. Other sources confirmed that informal pressure to change the EKN 
decision was underway(S42)
75 S14
This individual claimed knowledge of a Swedish financing company in 
London which specialized in finding financing for the Soviet Union. (SI4)
^  The most fertile ground for soft Norwegian credits were projects which 
related to Soviet environmental problems. But as one Norwegian Foreign 
Ministry official pointed out:(to extend soft credits) "would be a long step to
(continued...)
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official, "it would be harder to introduce such measures since it would weaken 
multilateral efforts (e.g. in the G-24)."^* In Sweden there was no particular 
industry which could be said to have been particularly hit. However in 
Norway, the paper and pulp industry was particularly affected by payment 
difficulties.^ One individual confirmed that pressure was being applied on the 
authorities to establish a line of credit to finance export of products—adding 
"(paper and pulp exporters) can't just switch from the Soviet (market) 
o v e r n i g h t . T h u s ,  he pointed out, many have found untraditional ways of 
financing, the foremost being countertrade.*^ But, he added, "we m ust make 
a decision either to keep on relying on the Soviet Union or to change 
production." One Governmental official reflected this concern: "we need to keep 
up these markets for paper and pulp."“
It is worth noting that, against the background of payment problems, 
Norwegian Trade Council's representative in Moscow, Jarle Forbord, reported 
a 12.5% overall trade*^ increase up until October, 1990.*  ^This starkly contrasts
^(...continued)
take, since this would mean direct payment from the taxpayers." (N39)
One Norwegian MF A official confirmed that there was significant pressure 
on the Ministry to use the seven billion NOK aid for the Soviet Union and East 
Europe. Said this official, "an extension of broader soft credits has been 
suggested by the Ministry—but sent down again." (N31)
78 N14
The question was still burning in May of 1991 amidst lay-offs, ostensibly 
directly attributable to Soviet economic difficulties. (K. Aaserud, "Greaker 
permitterer," Aftenposten, 3 May, 1991).
“ N56
*' N16
Conservative Trade Minister, Kullmann Five, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 
10 October, 1990.
Note that Norwegian exports were off 32% in 1990 as compared to 1989 
(K. Fossli, "Norway protest at Soviet debt," Financial Times, 12 June, 1991)
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with Sweden's total Soviet trade, which from 1989 to 1990 decreased from SEK 
7,606,675,000 to 6,966,487,000.
These decisions left fairly narrow options open to Swedish and Norwegian 
exporters:^ cash transactions, pre-payment, letters of guarantee, w ith counter 
guarantee by Vnesheconombank in the short term, countertrade, keeping capital 
gains in a Soviet company, formation of a joint ventures, much favoured by the 
Soviet authorities. Two Norwegians added other, more creative ways to 
establish security: either opening of escrow accounts or taking physical goods 
(e.g. a part of a Soviet fleet) as security.^
Payment patterns and improvement?
In late 1990-early 1991, there were preliminary indications of an amelioration 
in the Soviet payment problem.*^ Some perceived the changing situation as 
a result of changing Soviet domestic priorities. There was wide agreement that 
the Soviet priority was to assure the production and distribution of consumer 
goods.®® Thus, those companies which concentrated on this sector were
®^(...continued)
®^ Broken down into exports and imports that indicated an import increase 
of 17.7%, while a fully-expected export decrease of a mere 5.2%. (K.O. Evensen, 
"0ket handel med Sovjet," Aftenposten, 18 December, 1990.)
®^ One Norwegian financier said, "you cannot find unsecured loans for 
investment in the Soviet Union." (N18)
®®N18
®^ In Sweden see J. Selander, "Lattare att fâ betalt frân Sovjet," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 13 March, 1991. According to a survey of 42 of 170 Swedish 
companies with dealings with the Soviet Union, outstanding claims were 
significantly reduced since Fall, 1990. The total amount of outstanding claims 
had decreased from SEK 400 million to SEK 256 million. A lightening trend in 
the Norwegian situation, was confirmed by GIEK's Elen Heiio (telephone, 17 
April, 1991).
®® For example see the debate between Swedish Cabinet Secretary Schorl, 
Moderate leader Bildt, and Axel Johnson President Ennerfelt, (Sparframjandet, 
1989:141-2) Schori finds that farming is the highest prioritized sector of the
(continued...)
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perceived to have been paid earlier than others.*^ As one Norwegian involved 
in the matter said, "we have noticed that greaseproof paper, commonly used in 
food production, is a prioritized product—and thus they usually get paid 
first."’® Another individual pointed to other papers, such as silk paper (used 
in jacket linings) as a low priority, adding by contrast that "without greasepaper 
they are unable to distribute butter and margarine."’  ^ One Norwegian élite, 
interviewed in late January, 1991 said: "up until a couple of months ago 
consumer products and distribution-related items were they only things which 
(the Soviets) paid for."’  ^ At this point, any existing agreement about patterns 
in Soviet payment broke down.
Excepting the food-related sector, individuals perceived an array of other 
domestic Soviet factors which affected the payment problem. One EKN official, 
Lennart Skarp, felt that the temporary amelioration of the payment problem 
could have been due to the increase in oil prices during the Kuwait crisis.’  ^
Others felt that there were Soviet political motives involved. EKN director, 
Ragnar Sohlman said, "although I do not have a firm basis for saying this, 
(Soviet payments) seem to go quicker with the govemmentally-'guaranteed' 
business transactions," (rather than private companies) hinting that the Soviets' 
payment pattern could have something to do with the willingness to retain
“ (...continued)
Soviet economy, while Bildt also felt that food supply was Gorbachev's largest 
political problem.
“  The successful conclusion of the negotiations between Soviet authorities 
and Swedish firm, Karlshamns AB, to build a factory for the production of 
margarine, cooking fats and animal feed resulting in Lipetsk is a sign of the 
priority the food sector was given. (L. Hallberg, "Klart med fabrik i Sovjet," 
Blekinge Lans Tidning, 13 March, 1991).





govemment-to-govemment relations at an even keel.^ Akin to this thinking 
was a former member of the Swedish military staff, Leif Kihlsten, who felt the 
Soviets "(had) a sudden interest to pay their foreign debts," mentioning that 
Sweden was a privileged country seen from the Soviet standpoint.^ "I see the 
groping attempt to re-pay as efforts to assure that they do not end up outside" 
of the economic and political developments in Europe, said Kihlsten. This 
conjecture runs counter the Swedish and Norwegian experience in the Mixed 
Commissions. However, this political motive seemed unrelated to security 
policy. Reportedly, the Norwegians had better success at extracting payment 
than the Swedes.^
It could also be denied that any patterns existed. EKN's Lennart Skarp 
stated that "quite to the contrary, we have seen the that there is a 'patternless 
pattern' (in Soviet payments)--even with respect to selected items."^ It was 
important, as many pointed out, that one not attribute but a pêirt of the 
responsibility for the improved payment climate to seemingly more lofty goals 
from the Soviet side. As Swedish Export Council's Nystrom pointed out, "the 
Swedish companies (and EKN) have become much more cautious...now
^  Sohlman, telephone interview, 18 April, 1991.
Kihlsten, interview, 26 March, 1991. In a later telephone interview one 
month later (16.4.91), Kihlsten noted that the trend had reversed: "the Soviets 
saw they could not handle it any longer—the Soviets are frightfully currency- 
poor."
^  One Norwegian official confirmed "we received 65 million NOK in 
connection with the last meeting (October, 1990) of the Mixed Commission." 
(N25). The situation seemed different in Sweden, said Nystrom: "the situation 
has not changed to the better in spite of the fact that Industry Minister, Rune 
Molin, raised the problem at the so-called Mixed Commission meeting in May 
(1990) in Moscow." (P-Y Bengtsson, "Sovjets skuldkaos," Svensk Export 8 (1990),
p. 6.
^  Skarp, telephone interview, 18 April, 1991.
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demanding payment in advance or letters of credit"^* But, according to 
Nystrom, although 16 of 25 Soviet foreign trade associations which had 
outstanding payments in September, 1990^ still remained 'on  the list' in 
March, 1991,^ °® the Soviets had also "learned the rules of the game."*°^ 
Refuting perhaps a pattern of payments to a certain country, Lennart Skarp 
inferred that other credit guarantee institutions in Western Europe had, barring 
only slight variations, similar experiences as did Sweden in the matter.'®^
Foreign Currency problems
Another area of difficulty is the exacerbation of the traditional problem 
surrounding shortage an d /o r mismanagement of foreign currency. As one élite 
said:
"The control instrument has disappeared. Before, when you 
received an order you knew funds could be allocated— 
otherwise there would have never have been an order. 
Now there is no control whatsoever. Now you have all 
sorts of companies with currency and no one really knows 
where the currency is located: it's like eight persons who 
are writing out checks on eight different accounts and no 
one keeps track of anything."^®^
^  J. Selander, "Lattare att fâ betalt frân Sovjet," Svenska Dagbladet, 13 
March, 1991.
^  P-Y Bengtsson, "Sovjets skuldkaos," Svensk Export 8 (1990), p.4-6. 
Svensk Export 4 (1991).
"Lattare att fâ betalt frân Sovjet."
Skarp, telephone interview, 18 April, 1991. The evidence Skarp 
mentioned was his conversations at an OECD group meeting in mid-December 
where Soviet payments were raised.
103 S 4
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Other individuals pointed to constantly changing currency retention quotas as 
problematic points, for Scandinavian and Soviet companies alike.'®* This point 
only acted to further complicate the profit-loss margins in calculating future 
enterprises. One Norwegian financing official illustrated the problem, pointing 
out that in the Soviet fishing industry only approximately 5% of the value of 
catches could be exported as desired.'®^ "Clearly," said one official, "the 
retention quotas of 100% are one of the chief reasons w hy companies choose the 
joint-venture route."'®^
A key problem is that of convertibility. Most agreed in both Norway and 
Sweden that it was premature to speak of convertibility even in the medium- 
range future. One Norwegian élite said that convertibility would take "not less 
than five years—probably ten years—the difference between the real rate and the 
official rate is so enormous, and the economic problems so basic, that we can't 
see how they could accomplish it any quicker."'®^ In an interesting Swedish 
debate in 1989, Moderate Party's Carl Bildt estimated convertibility would take 
"for example 24 or 36 years," Cabinet Secretary Pierre Schori estimated it would 
occur in the "year of the dragon" (which one not specified), economist Stefan 
Hedlund estimated "perhaps between 20 and 25 years," Ennerfelt to "the 
beginning of the next century-year 2001," and Soviet historian Kristian Gemer 
to "five years follow ing the convertibility of the Estonian 
Krona."(Sparframjandet, 1989:179)
A  leftover from the past: delivery problems
A prominent complaint was delivery problems, hardly a new problem during 
the Gorbachev period.(Sparframjandet, 1989:161) As Goran Ennerfelt outlined.




under the former system, "we knew the product which we had purchased 
would be delivered, even if it was not delivered in a timely manner." As one 
Norwegian advisor told, "you just can't be sure you will get the goods in time." 
However, he pointed out that "those experienced in Soviet trade 'factor' this into 
their equation—but the positive side is that the Soviets understand if Norwegian 
firms are late in making deliveries."^®* These comments provide a contrast 
with the situation in 1947-9 when Soviet deliveries were much more reliable 
than, say, the Swedish.
Interest incompatibility
Another perceived difficulty was the sheer incompatibility of buying or 
selling interests: the Scandinavians were not interested in w hat the Soviets were 
selling as well as the opposite—a common theme even directly following World 
War Two. In interviews, one often hears the expression, "the central question 
is finding suitable projects." "Sweden," said one élite, "prefers package deals 
including maintenance-which means a long-term cost and investment...the 
(Soviets) can't appreciate this."'®  ^ Alfa Laval, a major player in Swedish-Soviet 
trade, is a fitting example of a company which sells package solutions. But, as 
one élite pointed out, "the Soviets have never liked this.""® But even positive 
change has been seen here, in the context of Alfa-Laval's signature with two 
Moscow companies of a service joint venture in 1990.
One Norwegian élite felt that this problem was at the core of Soviet- 
Norwegian trade difficulties: "we just can't find the products, plus, the Soviets 
are not competitive in terms of quality or service.""^ As a sidenote, the





Norwegian Trade C oundrs office in Moscow had registered only fourteen 
Norwegian-Soviet joint-ventures by New Year, 1990. '^^
Overcoming the problems: The Multinational edge
Larger companies can afford to see the Soviet market in a much wider 
perspective than can small and medium sized Norwegian and Swedish 
companies. To a certain extent, the worldwide reach of larger Swedish or 
Norwegian companies, such as Norsk Hydro, Statoil, Asea Brown Boveri,"^ 
Electrolux, SAAB, Volvo or Ericsson, allowed company offidals to survey the 
possibilities worldwide."^ Smaller companies, by contrast, often tried to limit 
themselves to nearby markets. It was thus natural that smaller companies 
should seek export and import markets in their neighbourhood (which, some 
say, includes the Soviet Union). An example of the flexibility of the larger 
actors is that they have holding companies in third countries which can 
drcum vent the problems connected with foreign currency."^ As LO's Kâre 
Sandegren summed it up "Norwegian businesses are too reticent and reluctant—
G.A. Johansen, "Fortsatt stor sovjet-intresse," 0konom isk  Rapport, 4 
January, 1991.
"ABB:s chanser okar i Sovjet," Svenska Dagbladet, 6 January, 1991.
The 'industrial culture' in Norway is traditionally weaker than in Sweden, 
Norsk Hydro being one of the only true industrial, multinational giants. As one 
élite confirmed. Hydro was far and away the largest single participant in Soviet- 
Norwegian trade. (N14). Another individual adding "the Norwegians are much 
bigger on raw materials, while the Swedes are much more into industrial 
goods." (N18)
Ericsson Telecom, has a Yugoslavian holding company, Nicola Tesla, for 
solving, amongst other reasons, its currency problems. "The company has 
worked the U.S.S.R. since the stone age," said one individual." As one 
individual pointed out, going through third countries which have strong 
bilateral trade agreements (e.g. ABB's Finnish subsidiary), one is able to draw  
on the dependability of those agreements—both in terms of payments and 
deliveries. (S50, S23)
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they may be too lazy; a common trait for medium-sized Norwegian companies 
is that they have insufficient capabilities and insufficient follow-up.""^
Those who suffer are the medium and short term investors and medium and 
small-sized national companies. Larger firms are able to view risks and benefits 
in the long term. Confronted with problems, such as was the case since 
November, 1990, when GIEK and EKN closed themselves to the Soviet Union, 
as one élite said, "our larger industrial companies have started, especially over 
the last months, to make their own Soviet policy.""^ "If we speak of 
multinationals, they will quickly turn to the export credit guarantee facilities of 
other countries," one official said."^ As Tor Sverre Jacobsen of Norsk Hydro 
said, "the GIEK decision has no effect on us, since we have done business on a 
cash basis, against irrevocable letters of credit confirmed by a first-class West 
European bank, or countertrade(not so common.)""^
However, even the largest firms have been reticent to 'go East.' There have 
been many companies, such as Volvo during the late 1960's/beginning of 1970's 
which entered into negotiations. But, as one élite said, the talks never came to 
fruition because of a lack of daring on the part of Volvo at the time." "Those 
companies, like Volvo, which could take a risk, much rather would go West," 
this businessman added.^^ We note that Volvo itself finally received a 






121 ii('Sovjetisk order till Volvo," Dagens Nyheter, 12 January, 1991; P. Diising, 




No interviewees downplayed the potential importance of the Soviet market. 
Aside from comprising a population of just under 300 million people, the Soviet 
Union was first and foremost seen as a country whose primary attraction was 
its natural resources.^^ But, as one individual pointed out "these resources are 
only valuable if somehow brought to market or worked.
A perception which was shared across the spectrum^^ was that the Soviet 
Union, as an exporter, is not unlike the underdeveloped countries of today. 
But, as one Swede said, at both a large RSFSR-Swedish conference in Orebro in 
late 1990 and during the Mixed Commission meetings, the key message was 
that "Russians do not want to be treated like a developing country which only 
delivers raw materials."^^ While we are reasonably sure that the character 
and volume of exports will remain relatively stable in the near future, a more 
interesting question is the eventual possibility of the Soviet economy lifting itself 
beyond the raw materials exporter stage. As one individual said, next to raw
Two prime examples: opinion articles respectively authored by former 
Minister of Industry, Aberg, "Sovjet- en underskattad marknad," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 22 March, 1986 and Goran Ennerfelt, "Kraftgângen i sovjethandeln 
kan brytas," Svenska Dagbladet, 20 January, 1988.
Ennerfelt, interview.
One exception: Anders Âslund. When asked about Soviet credit­
worthiness, Aslund responded: "the Soviet Union is not credit worthy—it is not 
able to take care of anything." (Aslund, interview). A similar viewpoint was 
held by AB Svensk Exportkredit's Arnhof, who felt it would take at least ten 
years before the East European economies, including the Soviet Union, would 
be considered fully credit-worthy. (P-Y Bengtsson, "Stoppa risk-karusellen," 
Svensk Export 9 (1990), p.20)
S48. This individual continued "the Russians have really tried hard to sell 
machinery to modernize the steel industry, and otherwise tried to diversify (e.g. 
supplying helicopters and crews for the raising of electrical lines) but it seems 
like Swedish buyers are a little reluctant."
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goods "you would have to look at industries which are draw n from raw goods" 
for potential export-industries.*^ "The Soviet Union is good at supplying raw 
materials: wooden articles, minerals, non-ferrous metals and oil,"^^ one official 
concluded. The possibilities were varied: the heavy machine industry, cars, 
trucks, textile, and forest industry, all were perceived to potential sources of 
Soviet export strength.^^ But, clearly, some industries bore more potential 
than others.
Norway and Sweden: Soviet trade priorities?
An interesting question to pose is the priority and reputation held of Norway 
and Sweden in Moscow. Earlier were presented some examples of Sweden's 
ostensibly favoured trade status. One official summed the Soviet perspective: 
"we always used to hear that Swedish trade was given a priority—especially 
since we had the first bilateral trade agreement with the Soviets in 1924."^^ 
But in reality, as one élite reminded, "Sweden is small, although i f  s close. We 
don 't have any illusions about our being small when compared to such 
substantial giants as Japan, Germany and the U.S."^^ "In conversations with
126 S14
Since the middle of the 1980's oil prices have decreased significantly. " 
(Oil) is no small point, rather a large percentage of the foreign income for the 
Soviet Union—this has led to the extreme decrease in Soviet scope of action." 
(Ennerfelt in Sparframjandet, 1989:143) The Economist ("On the brink," 16 
March, 1991) illuminates the question: "crude oil production dropped from 
12.5m barrels a day in 1987 and 1988 to an estimated 11.4m b /d  last year...this 
year output could fall to around 10.5m b / d —a 16% fall from the peak, at a time 
when oil prices are weak," pointing out that "oil also accounts for 60% of 
(Soviet) export revenues."
128 S4
Sll .  This argument also forwarded in V. Leushkanov, "Svenskarna forst- 
igen," Dagens Industri, 27 June, 1990.
130 S 4
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them," said one official, "Germany is the most tasty; they are very impressed by 
the Germans."^^^
To make matters worse for Norwegian and Swedish exporters, Soviet buyers 
perceived their products as expensive, both in-and-of-themselves'^^ and with 
respect to world prices/^^ According to Goran Ennerfelt, some countries did 
have greater significance than others—e.g. the U S—thus, it is fair to say that 
with the opening of dialogue with such countries as the U.S., Sweden fell into 
a diminished p o s i t i o n . S o v i e t  trade to Sweden, according to one trade 
official, has traditionally been regulated by Soviet political whim —quite 
p r a g m a t i c a l l y . T h e  ideological tint in trade has become less im portant As 
evidence, one individual mentioned that the Soviet Union had seen a political- 
economic advantage in tying Sweden to natural gas deliveries through the 
planned constructions of a pipeline network through Scandinavia.^^ Before, 
he explained, "it was a political victory to supply energy, since it was so vital 
for basic national needs."^^^
The historical roots of Norwegian-Soviet trade were likewise strong and 
acted to affect the perception of business ties. "There has always been extensive 
trade between the Kola and Northern Norway—we still have special Russian 
expressions in our vocabulary which formed to a common language between
131 S48
As one official said: "they are always satisfied w ith Sweden but we are 
expensive and we sell ten-year solutions." (S48) Another official said, "although 
we have been known for high technical sophistication, Sweden's prices have for 







them: eg. Pomore trade ('seaboimd' trade),"^^ said one trade official. As one 
Foreign Ministry official said "there are many employment difficulties in this 
area (Finnmark), and people see that there are two million people on the other 
side of the border, and ask themselves 'w hy not trade w ith them?"'^^ The 
Norwegians have been traditionally very supportive of measures to increase 
trade between Troms and Finnmark and the Soviet Union.
Possible Szuedish and Norwegian inputs on the Soviet market
Where could Swedish and Norwegian companies best make their input on 
the Soviet market? One individual felt that farming equipment, forestry, 
transportation, the construction industry and the consulting business were the 
most hopeful Swedish exports to the Soviet Union.^^^ "We know," said one 
official "that they really have to squeeze out more effectivity from already 
existing m a c h i n e r y . " M a y b e  there is a market for simple machinery, but 
that's not for sure—is there a market?" said one official.'^ Swedes were often 
fond of telling stories of how the Soviets had imported products which 
remained in their original packaging because of the lack of technical expertise 
connected with their operation.^^ Thus, the Swedes, said one official, could
N15
N25
K.O. Evensen, "Balstad: Sovjet kan bli betydelig handelspartner," 
Aftenposten, 13 October, 1989. Minister of Trade, Balstad, says "in the 
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tap the short-term potential to effect!vize the machinery. One élite illustrated 
the problem, saying:
"say a factory was running at 60% of its operating capacity.
Instead of revamping, it has always been politically more 
glorious to buy a new factory instead of making repairs on 
ttie old one. Once this new plant is built it becomes a 
'm onum ent' to the people. But, today, even the USSR 
admits that this is too big. As they get more market 
oriented they will gradually change their way of thinking 
to buying more components and they will start buying 
smaller plants."
The Norwegians feel they could make their best contribution in terms of oil 
exploration in the Soviet-Norwegian continental shelf area. Norwegian 
BOCONOR (Barents Offshore Consortium of Norway), a consortium of eight 
oil-related industries, has traditionally shown a great interest in oil exploration 
in the Soviet Union.^^ There has only been minimal movement on the 
question due to restrictive COCOM regulations and the unsolved delimitation 
q u e s t i o n . I n  fact, in connection with its role as a coordinator of oil and gas 
deliveries from the Soviet Union, BOCONOR has also developed a 'master-plan' 
for potential oil field development in the Barents Sea.(Alstad, 1985:26) In these 
efforts, as pointed out earlier, there has been no absence of Soviet interest. But 
as the Barents Sea delimitation question remained unresolved, Norwegian 
companies, Statoil^^^ and Ellingsens, have shown interest in developing 
undisputed areas—such as potential oil reserves in E s t o n i a . T h e  Baltic was
M. Woldsdal, "Stor intéressé for oljeoppdrag i Sovjet," Aftenposten, 23 
August, 1985.
H. Henriksen, "Ja til industriavtaler med Sovjet," Arbeiderbladet, 12 
August, 1982.
"Svensk statoil in i Estland," Svenska Dagbladet, 21 March, 1991. Swedish 
statoil here is reported to form a daughter-company in Estonia.
A. Jonsson, "Norsk teknik ger Estland egen olja," Dagens Industri, 7 
March, 1991.
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seen by limited numbers as bearing potential exploitative potential even by 
other neighbours.'^’
To Trade with the Centre or the Periphery?
There existed a trade off between Norwegian and Swedish interests in 
trading through the separate bureaucratic machinery in the republics, as 
opposed to going through the Central Government in Moscow. To an extent, the 
dilemmas posed w ith favouring one over the other pathway mirrored the 
political dilemma of which side to emphasize: relations with the centre or 
relations w ith the periphery.'^ This created a special dynamism between that 
which was politically, economically and perhaps socially desirable and that 
which was politically possible. Part of the financial problem is the sovereignty 
problem, as one Norwegian official expressed.'^'
In practice, both Norwegian and Swedish companies and Governments have 
strategically kept several fires burning simultaneously. But great care has been 
taken not to outstep politically sensitive Government policies. Thus, while 
informally listening and discussing with potentially break-off republics (e.g. 
RSFSR and the respective Baltics being especially important for Norway), 
companies were still trading through the central trade machinery. As one 
Norwegian official told, "as long as there is no Russian counterpart we must 
deal with the Soviet Union, even though we see the RSFSR as the greatest 
(potential) partner (most of the natural resources being located there)."'“  
Both Norwegian political élites and businessmen admitted having extensive.
Finnish oil company, NESTE's, Hietarinta, in G. de Lange, "Ivrer for 
nordisk gassnett," Aftenposten, 13 March, 1991. For NESTE the 'Baltic area' iss 
the next area for development, if the peaceful developments in the region 
continued.





informal contacts with the RSFSR/^^ while the Swedes had extensive contact 
with representatives from the Baltic republics. One Foreign Ministry official 
mentioned that the MFA had received three official visits by the RSFSR as of 
January, 1991.^^ Asked of the character of these Soviet approaches. Chairman 
of the N orw e^an  fràmjandékomité or "Soviet Trade Promotion Committee," Odd 
Henrik Robbers tad, confirmed "we have been approached by the Soviets many 
times before, who consistently suggest: 'we are both practical people—don't 
preoccupy yourself with what the politicians say—let's make a deal and then we 
can discuss it with our g o v e r n m e n t s . O n e  industrialist added that the 
Soviet representatives "act as if in accordance with the RSFSR, and pretend of 
good contacts with RSFSR authorities and that they are acting with the 
understanding of those authorities; they say they are the most likely ones to be 
in charge."^^ Thus, in discussing potential business relations, "we are free in 
telling them that we also discuss with other authorities; they appreciate that— 
they know we have to look out for our own i n t e r e s t s . T h i s  picture 
provides a sharp contrast with much of the post-War period, where all decisions 
had to first be checked with the central authorities in Moscow.
One individual concerned with trade facilitation pointed out, "Norwegian 
industry tries very hard in North Norway, and companies w ant to concentrate 
on the RSFSR and the Soviet Union's Northwest."^^ Another élite expressed 
that the Baltic market was replete with difficulties. Quotes such as: "the Baltic 
is very difficult since there are only small markets,"^^’ were very common.
N15. One MFA official pointed to discussions regarding joint oil and gas 
exploration ventures and the exchange of delegations e.g. from Leningrad.
*^N25
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Others argued that "there is little infrastructure^'*—although being otherwise 
important on the political and social side."^^* In any case, as one financing 
expert put it, "Russia, eventually, because of its resource base, will become a 
much better risk than the Soviet Union is today," pointing out that "it is not 
possible to speak of a separate risk for, say, L i t h u a n i a . T h e s e  words, 
spoken in January, were overwhelmed to an extent by Baltic independence later 
in 1991.
Individuals stressed that Sweden's best contribution could be achieved 
through restricting itself to its special relationship with the Baltic.^^ However, 
economic and political realities have also forced the Swedes to travel the old 
Moscow bureaucratic route.^^ Said one Swedish trade official, "there are 
mixed motives for the Baltic emphasis: pecuniary on the one hand and 
sympathy (the Balts are prepared to expose themselves) on the other."*^ But 
as the Swedish Foreign Ministry's Kommerskollegium has noted^“ , although the 
amount of purely trade-related contacts has been significant, other statistics do 




See Centre Party MP Per-Ola Eriksson and Left Party's Rolf Nilsson 
regarding the special trading priority the Baltic area (especially the Baltic 
republics) should be allotted in Swedish trading priorities (Riksdagsprotokoll, 
12 April, 1991)i
One prominent example is Tetra Pak-Alfa Laval's establishment of three 
production facilities in Lipetsk, Kiev, Podolsk, (f. Thornhill, "Unpacking a fresh 
challenge," Financial Times 2 September, 1991).
S14
"Svenska kontakter med Baltikum. Rapport frân kommerskollegium," p. 
11 (Stockholm: Kommerskollegium, January, 1991): A thorough accounting of 
Swedish official contacts, in all fields, with the Baltic republics.
288
lack of risk capital and a reformed banking system.'^^ There are no 
indications that Norwegian trade with the Baltic has advanced significantly/^ 
irrespective of sustained interest from the Norwegian side/^’ The political 
instability in the Baltic republics was seen as yet a further reason for both 
Norwegian and Swedish reticence to invest and trade /^
One Norwegian financing expert pointed out the difficulties w ith the Baltic 
area thus: one, they have never had any export of their own of any significance, 
two, the Baltics have been partly subsidized in the exchange of goods, and 
three, their limited scope along the road of development of market
economies/^^
Soviet Trading Interests
The Soviet Union harboured varied interests in trading with Norway. But 
certain patterns and priorities can be discerned. The clearest and most 
traditional need, as easily can be discerned from the statistics where usually 
about 2 /3  of Norwegian exports lie, is for paper-related products: cellulose, 
paper, paper pulp foremost amongst them. Potentially, "what the Soviet Union
Lars Landemar, President of AxTrade East (Axel Johnson Concern), in A. 
Lundqvist, "Ax-Trade handlar som vanligt," Dagens Nyheter, 15 January, 1991 
notes that AxTrade's trade with the Baltic republics has been of only a minimal 
nature. Via the company NaxTrade, there is some exchange with Latvia—mostly 
in wood products, while trade with Estonia and Lithuania is close to non­
existent.
B. Westlie, "Norge Svikter handelen," Dagens Næringsliv, 28 November,
1989. Norway was unrepresented in the statistics of both state-owned 
Lithuanian, Litimpex, or Latvian Interlatvia trading associations.
Norsk Hydro's Moscow office Director, Reed: "Many (Norwegians) regard 
Baltikum as a gateway to the rest of the Soviet market," however reminding that 
"there are also great opportunities on the other side of the Soviet Union e.g. in 
Baku..." (K.O. Evensen, "Efterlyser nytenkning om handelen med 0 st," 
Aftenposten, 5 December, 1989)




wants," related one Foreign Ministry official, "is tourism, shipping, 
telecommunications, agro-equipment and ready-made houses."'^ The Soviet 
authorities had further expressed an interest in aluminum technology.'^ One 
Norwegian presented an entirely different perception: "(those in trade 
delegations) mainly want to come to a foreign country, to shop and have a nice 
time at the hotel. Extensive entertainment, although required to do business 
w ith them is no guarantee you will get business w ith them."'^^
The most obvious point of potential Soviet-Norwegian collaboration concerns 
oil exploration. As we pointed out during an earlier chapter, joint exploration 
efforts have heretofore been blocked by the inability to reach agreement over 
a clear delimitation in the Barents Sea. But other Norwegian contributions 
could be made in mineral exploration, offshore,'^ fishing, and in the shipping 
industry, according to most élites interviewed.
W hat does the Soviet Union most desire when it looks to Sweden? One 
individual stated the interests succinctly: one, high technology, traditional 
export industries (oil mining from Atlas Copco) and especially now consumer 
goods (which could be provided by Alfa Laval and Tetra Pak)."'^^
172 N15
A. Willersrud, "Sovjet vil ha norsk teknologi," Aftenposten, 3 April, 1987: 
Soviet representatives expressed an interest in smelting technology and Norsk 
Viftefabrikk's cleansing (filtering) process.
N22. Quoting from a Norwegian businessman, he said: "Now I start our 
conversation with terms of payment...then I talk of deliveries...just to be sure the 
delegation's work is not wasted...however this was an exceptional case."
N47: "most things in Norwegian offshore have a competitive edge."
S24
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COCOM: The Core of PoUtical Debate'^
Introduction
As opposed to trade regulated by traditional, commercial interests, a study 
which compares Norway's and Sweden's relationship to COCOM will reveal 
just how much each of the countries' security policy orientations can affect their 
Soviet trade ties. Not only has the question of participation and allegiance to 
COCOM differed the two from each other but has also clearly divided domestic 
opinion in both Sweden and Norway.
In November, 1949 the founding nations, U.S., U.K., France, Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands'^* created the 'Consultative Group,' 
which in its turn formed a permanent, working level Coordinating Committee 
for Multilateral Export Controls, or COCOM(Fungiello, 1985:4). The logic for 
the Committee's founding was to maintain a jointly acceptable list of goods and 
services of potentially military application which were subject to denial to the 
Soviet bloc. COCOM became the economic arm of Western (chiefly NATO) 
military interests.
The central question in this section is: How has Sweden's neutrality 
commitment, mediated by its adherence to the COCOM regime, led to 
perceptions of and behaviour towards the Soviet Union, different than that of 
NATO member Norway? Several related questions will inform this inquiry. 
How much influence do security policy orientations have upon the w ay Soviet 
trade is handled? Is there such a thing as 'trade neutrality?' How do these
The so-called "COCOM lists" contain three groups of products: 
Ammunition; Products relating to the nuclear power industry; 'Dual-Use' 
products and technology (military and civilian purposes). (S. Riishoj, "COCOM 
under revision," Vindue mod est (Denmark) 11 (1990), p.1-2.
'^ * Denmark, Norway, the FRG and Canada joined COCOM in the Spring 
of 1950, Japan and Portugal joined in 1952, while Greece and Turkey joined in 
1953. (Jacobsen, 1985)
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commitments affect what sort of trade is or is not undertaken? Do élites feel 
that Sweden's and Norway's relationship to COCOM has hindered trade with 
the Soviet Union—if so, how and in which areas? What role has COCOM 
played in Sweden's or Norway's overall foreign relations with the Soviet Union?
Different Points-offDeparture
There is an essential difference between the Norwegian and Swedish 
relationships with COCOM: Norway participates formally in COCOM policy­
making as member,^^ while Sweden, a non-member, has nonetheless 
promised to adhere to policies which COCOM sets forth. Norway's position in 
NATO could only be seen as a natural enhancement of its robust NATO 
commitment. This benefited Norway, for Norwegian participation in COCOM 
also enforced the credibility of Norway's NATO commitment in the eyes of the 
outside world. Thus, whatever pain Norway felt from the COCOM regulations 
would be of a commercial, and not of a political nature: potentially profitable 
goods and services could not be sold to the Soviet Union.
Sweden was faced with certain sensitive questions related to neutrality which 
were irrelevant for Norway's NATO policy. From the very start, COCOM has 
proved to be an 'achilles heel' for Swedish foreign and trade policy. A good 
relationship with Moscow assumed that there would be no obvious formal or 
informal obstacles in their interaction. Swedish post-War neutrality clearly 
dictated that Swedish behaviour which could be interpreted by either military 
bloc as 'taking sides' in the Cold War had to be seen as compromising Sweden's 
foreign policy principles. At the same time, Swedish industry was highly 
dependent upon gaining the very technology which the West had regulated as
Perhaps Friedrich Futschik of Philips, put it best, calling it "a gentlemen's 
agreement." (M. Agerberg, "-Riv teknilonuren, fiend en har forsvunnit," Ny 
Teknik, 14 (1990).
292
being politically sensitive.^*® Sweden would be forced to make difficult 
choices, and adjustments to both its neutrality and its dependence on Western 
high technology.
The Actors
In both Sweden and Norway the debate has engaged diverse sectors of 
decision-making. Businessmen, averse to restraints on free trade, have seen the 
COCOM regulations, at best, as understandable and a necessary evil. In both 
the Norwegian and Swedish parliaments, the main gulf of opinion exists 
between Norway's Left Wing and Sweden's Left and Environmental parties and 
the rest of the political spectrum. Whereas other political parties have shown 
occasional irritation over COCOM, it has been the far Left parties which have 
provided the core of opposition to not only the idea of COCOM's existence in 
principle, but to its constitutional and legal status altogether. In terms of 
executing COCOM statutes, the civil servants is that group which is charged 
with analyzing developments which could lead to changes in the rules, making 
recommendations, enforcing existing regulations and assisting exporters to 
export as much as possible—within a prescribed framework.
The Issues at Stake for Sweden and Norway
Is Norway's COCOM Membership legal?
One of the most important issues in some Norwegian circles was whether 
Norway's participation-adherence with respect to COCOM regulations also has 
legal-constitutional grounding. For Sweden, the question of the country's 
position, especially given its neutral commitment, vis-à-vis COCOM has been
To better understand where the COCOM rules affect Soviet trade it 
would be logical to look to those industries which are both internationally 
competitive and utilize technology: for Sweden an example would be computer 
technology or machine tools, for Norway, oil platform and exploration 
technology.
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the centre of debate. The question has been markedly more sensitive in Sweden 
for the Government, prior to 1986 never clearly stated that it was abiding by 
COCOM regulations. Since there was no Swedish policy on COCOM, the 
debate risked undermining Sweden's position vis-à-vis COCOM altogether. As 
a member, Norway has greatly avoided this discussion by virtue of its explicit 
membership in COCOM's decision-making organ. Thus, prominent challenges 
pu t to the Government by the Norwegian Socialist Left Party were mere points 
of argumentation versus an historically-established Government practice.
The underlying logic of Norway's participation in COCOM, according to one 
Storting document, rests upon:
"an admission that strategic products cannot be exported 
freely, rather must be placed under certain restrictions 
under the control of authorities. Norwegian authorities 
have a need that the West have coordinated rules for 
preventing export of products, services and technology 
which can contribute to a change in the international 
strategic balance. This has importance for our national 
security. The authorities further wish to place controls on 
products which can contribute to the military escalation in 
areas of cooperation which otherwise are not comprised by 
COCOM. It is therefore due to our own foreign and 
security policy interests that Norway participates in 
COCOM. It is also necessary that Norway be seen as a 
credible (trustworthy) trade partner, in order to secure the 
requisite access to products, especially technology.
Norwegian Socialist Left politicians Theo Koritzinsky and Hanna Kvanmo 
provided the core of the opposition to COCOM on legal-constitutional 
grounds.^*^ In one 1987 debate^®  ^ with Arent M. Henriksen (Socialist Left),
Storting S t  Meld. Nr. 111989-90, p.l45. There is political consensus about 
this text.
An example of the Party's concrete efforts to press Government on the 
issue came in the form of a challenge to a certain legal O delsting proposition 
(1987-88), whereby SV requested the Government withdraw its proposition on 
the grounds that "a new presentation of evidence should contain a thorough
(continued...)
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Einar Perde (Labour), Kjell Magne Bondevik (Christian People's Party) Kâre 
Willoch and Jan Petersen (Conservative), Carl I. Hagen (Progress)^^, 
Koritzinsky clarified his position on the issue thus:
"There exists no distinct line between so-called 'COCOM- 
country lists' and 'other countries.' The whole COCOM 'thing' 
has never been discussed or passed in Parliament. Our 
COCOM commitments were never formalized- thus it was an 
informal arrangement. Therefore it never had to be dealt w ith 
in formal constitutional terms when making international deals.
It's so complex and detailed—yet it is informal!...Even 
(Conservative Party Leader) Willoch admitted that my 
argument had constitutional merits."'*^
Swedish Adherence to COCOM: Legality and Neutrality
While the legality argument was used in Sweden, it was peripheral to the 
main stream of debate. The chief unanswered question was: w hat was 
Sweden's exact relationship to COCOM? Related questions such as: Was 
Sweden a mere bystander or was it participating? To w hat degree could one 
'abide by' the process, but be perceived to remain either neutral or non­
participant? Was Swedish practice in COCOM compatible with neutrality? also 
plagued the Swedish leadership.
^*^(...continued)
evaluation of the constitutional aspects of the relationship between Norway and 
COCOM." (Stortings In s t S. nr. 20 (1987-88)).
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 November, 1987.
Hagen found it "difficult to understand what could have gone w rong in 
the formal relationship between the Government and the Storting (over the 
COCOM matter)" (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 November, 1987).
Koritzinsky, interview.
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Sten Andersson's statement to parliaments^ could be used as a point-of- 
departure for the Swedish Government's view on COCOM:
’There are no restraints on Swedish technology. If we were to 
participate in a so-called technology war, even the export of 
Swedish technology would be put under the umbrella of 
restrictions and forbidden. On the other hand we have a duty 
to prevent Sweden from being utilized as a transit country for 
exported technology which the country of origin has decided 
shall be forbidden...! would naturally like to see the day of 
amelioration of relations between the superpower, such that the 
ban on technology transfer will be lifted.”
Andersson added the Soviet factor:
"Clearly the Soviet Union has a large and warranted interest in 
obtaining all sorts of foreign high technology, not only the 
Swedish but also the American. The Soviet Union naturally 
wants to be able to purchase such technology from us 
directly...but that is forbidden according to American law. In 
order that we can assure ourselves of access to high technology, 
we m ust make sure that Sweden is not utilized as a transit 
country."
The Foreign Relations Committee stated the policy thus:
"...there is no existing treaty or other agreement between the 
U.S. and Sweden in this area. As an alliance-free country,
Sweden stands outside of COCOM. The voluntary agreements 
between companies which have been concluded, the Decree of 
a ban on the (export), and the earlier mentioned arrangement 
under the Defence Material Agency's tutelage, have the ultimate 
intention of assuring Swedish industry's access to foreign 
advanced technology."
When compared with Swedish 'policy' on COCOM, Theo Koritzinsliy's 
characterization of Norway's participation in COCOM as 'informal' could be
Two separate statements combined, found in Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 
October, 1989.
Riksdagtryck 1987/88:UU10 ("Om export av hogteknologiska varor"), 19 
November, 1987.
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better called "ultra-formal." One would have to wait well into the 1 9 8 0 ' for 
a somewhat clear articulation of Sweden's policy on its adherence to COCOM. 
The topic of 'trade neutrality' is far from new. At least since the day that 
COCOM was bom  in 1949 there has been a debate about the topic.^*^
While Swedes were quick to point out their dependence on Western 
technology, few of COCOM's critics were prepared to pay the price of 
adherence which COCOM-countries required. This dilemma was illustrated by 
once-Undersecretary of Trade, C.J. Âberg: "on the one hand we, as a neutral 
country, cannot participate in anything that looks like a trade boycott of the 
Eastern countries." "On the other hand," added Aberg, "we don 't w ant to miss 
out on American technology, which always is a couple of strides ahead of our 
own."^^ Gudrun Schyman, Left Party MP said: 'Today Sweden is totally 
dependent upon the import of either American or some other NATO country's 
technology in order to manufacture several of our 'Swedish' weapons 
systems...if the U.S. or NATO wanted to pressure Sweden in a particular 
question the technology weapon would prove very effective..."^’^
But neutrality does not make any specific provision for trade questions, as 
Gudrun Schyman herself points out: "according to international law, neutrality 
is a legal status, which rests upon (the assumption) that states will refrain from 
all forms of participation in w ar between other states and remain impartial to
For a detailed accounting of Sweden's COCOM policy until 1984-5, see 
von Si vers and Holmstrom (1985)
The question of 'secret' Swedish postwar collusion in the American-led 
trade embargo on Eastern Europe was a hot topic of contention. The chief 
(though not exhaustive) Dagens Nyheter debate participants were: P. Cole, 
"Neutraliteten gavs upp," 31 October, 1990; S. Astrom, "Undén ingen Mr Hyde," 
7 November, 1990; B. Nilsson, "Vi spelade dubbelt," 6 November, 1990; Y. 
Moller, "Ingen kapitulation," 27 November, 1990.
A. Hoff, "USA-press mot svensk lekkasje av teknologi," Aftenposten, 24 
October, 1985.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989.
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warring states."^’  ^ Environmental Party's Per Gahrton, referring to the famed 
Hague Convention, states clearly that the international legal aspects of neutrality 
are only valid in war—therefore invalid in the Ccise of (peacetime) COCOM.'”
Sweden: 'Participation' or 'Adherence:' The Ddjate in the 1980s
A recurrent question throughout the Swedish COCOM debate in the 1980's 
(and to an extent earlier) is whether Sweden is either 'adhering ' (passive) or 
'participating' (active) with respect to COCOM. Irrespective of its ideological 
stance on COCOM, each Govemment-in-office has had to defend its position 
against those who accuse Sweden of infidelity to neutrality relating to the 
organisation. The fact remains: Sweden, although hesitatingly, is obliged to 
follow American rules of re-export of COCOM-regulated items if it wants to 
assure the future flow and access of those items. On the other hand, Sweden 
must prove to COCOM that it is a reliable, credible trading partner which will 
neither directly nor indirectly violate the COCOM statutes. Why should 
Sweden need to prove its loyalty to COCOM—the underlying ideas of which 
debatedly run counter to neutrality? Is it not a question of proving loyal to 
both COCOM and neutrality simultaneously?
This face-off is evident in Per Gahrton question in the Riksdag on the occasion 
of Pierre Schori's alleged denial of Swedish participation in the American 
embargo policy. At the same time. Undersecretary for Trade, Sohlman, 
pronounced himself, in Gahrton's words that 'indeed we do participate in the 
U.S. em bargo.''^ In his support Gahrton asks:'”
Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989. 
'”  Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989. 
'”  Riksdagsprotokoll, 10 October, 1989.
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"Is it not true that 400 Swedish companies have been 
inspected by the Swedish authorities in order to check if 
they were following American regulations? We are 
cooperating w ith the Customs authorities in the U.S. The 
U.S. demands import certificates, on which is clearly stated 
that the Swedish importers must (follow and approve of) 
the COCOM list and even the export-control of such 
technology!"
For reasons of COCOM credibility, Sweden cannot be seen as a transit country 
for COCOM-regulated goods. If this were to happen, Sweden could risk trade 
discrimination or be cut off from the COCOM goods stream altogether. Michael 
Sohlman states "the Government has executed all of its tightenings w ith the 
intention of ceasing '"transit,' nothing else."^^ Sohlman backs up his 
argument by pointing to the consistency in the intention of Governmental 
statements throughout the years, citing present Agriculture Minister Mats 
Hellstrom, 1983, then-Undersecretary for Trade, Carl Johan Aberg, 1986 and 
Trade Minister, Anita Gradin in 1989.^^
COCOM, Sweden and Norway During the Gorbachev Years
Tightening the bolts: 1986-88
During the early part of Gorbachev's tenure, both Norway and Sweden 
tightened their rules, administrative procedures and practices w ith respect to 
COCOM. It would be fair to say that this was not a result of an increasingly 
pessimistic perception of Soviet foreign or military policy. Rather, the tightening 
trend was a result of one, particular cases of COCOM violations which caused
T. von Sivers, "Visst deltar Sverige i USAs embargo," Ny Teknik, 37 
(1989), p. 16.
Michael Sohlman states that "until the present Sweden has not been 
discriminated against." (von Sivers, "Visst deltar vi i USAs embargo," p. 17. 
Ebba Dohlman nevertheless points out that "throughout the postwar world, 
Sweden has remained on a U.S. list of countries whose exports must be 
carefully monitored." (Dohlman, 1989:106-7)
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both Norway and Sweden to sacrifice credibility in the eyes of COCOM 
countries. Second, this constituted an attempt by both the Swedish and the 
Norwegian Governments to clarify the regulations such that a clearer line was 
draw n between what could be permissibly exported and w hat was regulated. 
This step was motivated by desires to increase exports, decrease barriers while 
simultaneously boosting Norwegian and Swedish credibility throughout the 
COCOM community.
The 'KV Affair'
For the Norwegians, the most important single event in their participation 
in COCOM was the state-owned Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk ordeal.^’* The 
Norwegian Government claimed this was the first and only violation of 
COCOM which it ever committed. Whereas the real 'dam age' in the affair 
occurred some years earlier, the KV scandal reached its high point in mid-July, 
1987. The essence of the issue concerned the unexpected 1986 discovery of a 
Soviet submarine which had effectively evaded U.S. underwater listening 
devices, a technology which had previously been able to detect submarines from 
as far away as 200 miles.'^ It was soon revealed that the Japanese company 
Toshiba, during 1983-84 and Norwegian KV,^ during 1982-84, had shipped 
computerized milling machinery capable of producing supercontoured 
propellers and computer control systems respectively to the Leningrad 
shipyards.^^ The upshot of the affair was a U.S. Senate vote on 1 July, 1987
For a thorough survey of the press' reactions to the KV affair, see NUPI 
(1987:484-500)
"Toshiba Bashing," Wall Street Journal, 3 July, 1987.
^  One Norwegian official said, "KV was really hurt by this since they 
produce numerically controlled drawing machines: both in terms of sales and 
politically." (N16)
"Toshiba Bashing." It should be noted that the connection between the 
final product and Toshiba's and KV's contributing role therein is not without
(continued...)
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banning sales to the U.S. by Toshiba^^ and KV for at least two years.^^ In 
great part all individuals who were in some way directly involved in the affair 
denied any more than sloppiness as a cause for the b reak .^
The central issue at stake was Norwegian credibility amongst its NATO allies 
and COCOM co-members. According to one source, after initial efforts by the 
Norwegian Government to downplay the affair, the Government then became 
busy making assurances that there would be no repetition .^  The 
Government, and Trade Minister Mosbakk in particular, while proposing higher 
penalties (e.g. increased jail terms) and the strengthening of eleven other 
statutes, denied that it was the KV affair which had brought about the change 
in la w .^  The Foreign Affairs Committee agreed with the Government on the
^^(...continued)
debate. (O.T. Storvik, "KV-teknologi hjalp ikke Sovjet," Aftenposten, 22 July, 
1987)
One Norwegian official said, "we felt that the point w ith the KV scandal 
was that the U.S. was after Japan...perhaps if it had concerned a direct delivery 
between Norway and the Soviet Union it would have never become a 
crisis."(N14)
One outcome of the KV affair was that Norway accepted a greater 
responsibility in keeping track of Soviet submarine traffic in the Barents. (O.T. 
Storvik, "Norge samler data i nord," Aftenposten, 20 April, 1991).
^  M.H. Simonsen, "COCOM-reglene ble aldri droftet," Dagens Næringsliv, 
10 July, 1987: KV Director Qvenild claims that COCOM rules were never 
discussed at the time the COCOM offense occurred. See also, J-E Nyland, 
Glem COCOM-reglene," Arbeiderbladet, 7 October, 1988.
P. Sherrid, "Such good friends: an old alliance under pressure," U.S. 
News and W orld Report, 5 October, 1987.
^  G. De Lange, "Strengere Cocom-straffer," Aftenposten, 9 October, 1987. 
For an illustration of the Government's motivation in pursuing the new law see 
the speech given by Foreign Policy Counsellor Kjeld Vibe on 27 November, UD- 
inform asjon 24 (1987). One of Vibe's main points is that one must appreciate 
the security political significance for Norway of technological progress in the 
military sector in the Soviet Union, (e.g. the Kola Base complex)
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need for a new law in its position paper, presented to the Storting on 19 
November, 1987.^ Discussion of the matter followed on 7 December, 
1987.2“
Sweden Strengthens the Rules
W hen Sweden tightened its belt and clarified its position with repect to 
COCOM regulations in the form of a 1986 decree, it was not the immediate 
result of any 'ordeal.'^^ Rather, the move by the Swedish Government 
seemed to be the result of a gradual build-up of several considerations, not least 
the necessity of making clear to manufacturers, customs authorities, and 
Governmental officials exactly what the COCOM rules said. After all, the 
original COCOM rules, somewhat aged after having been authored in 1946, 
could have been a contributing cause, but not an excuse, for both the 
Norwegian and Swedish 'affairs.'
Part of the reason for the change must be attributed to U.S. eagerness to see 
a tightening of the COCOM regime in so-called 5(K) countries,^^® and the
2®^ Innst. O. Nr.6 (1987-88) ("Instilling fra u tenriks- og 
konstitusjonskom iteen om lov om kontroll med eksport av strategiske varer, 
tjenster og teknologi" (O t prp.nr.9, 19 November, 1987.
2“  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, same date.
2“  Although Sweden has had its share of 'ordeals:' one in Helsingborg in the 
early 1980's, when Swedish authorities foiled an attempted export of computer 
products and two, in an infamous Data-SAAB affair, (von Sivers and 
Holmstrom, 1985) International Trade Review also mentions the case other 
Swedish violations (17 February, 1988): one of SUNITRON AB where from 
January, 1980 to November, 1982 the firm re-exported U.S. origin components 
from Germany, through Sweden to the Soviet Union.
2^ ° The 5(k) countries are broadly speaking the 'neutral countries:' Austria, 
Finland, Ireland, Singapore, S. Korea, Sweden and Switzerland. 5(k) status is 
advantageous, extending privileges such as: allowance of export of all strategic 
items (except super computer and crime control and detection instruments) to 
national government agencies of cooperating governments w ithout the need for 
validated license; a fast 15/15 day processing rule for licensing applications;
(continued...)
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Swedish desire to attain 5(k) status. It is interesting to note that of the six 
formal 'benefits' of the 5(k) by 1 June, 1991 Sweden^” had achieved only four, 
while Austria, Finland and Switzerland had received all six.^^  ^ Part of the 
background leading up to a 1986 ordnance on export control was given by  one 
official intimately involved with analyzing the U.S. standpoint^^^:
"Sweden was somehow deluded into thinking it had a super- 
dooper system (of controls). They wanted the regional 
chambers of commerce to take care of the regulations. The 
Central Government was always reluctant to take 
responsibility for the regulations: no penalties, no backup from 
the Government. The Swedes danced around for a while, it 
must have been politically motivated. Sweden is good at 
manoeuvring—it's a little like having the cake and eating it too.
Sweden is quite naïve, they also would say 'no one would ever 
do that.' Sweden continued behind a vague notion of 
neutrality...but we know it's an interdependent w orld—goods 
do flow over borders."
The resultant decree entitled Forordning om forbud mot viss utforsel was 
implemented on 27 February, 1986.^ ^^  Certain selected points in the official 
Governmental motivation were familiar
^^°(...continued)
(Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Export Administration, 22 
January, 1991, DOC/BXA/OTPA/CP/1/22/91).
International Trade Reporter 12 June, 1989 (p.1590) notes that as late as 
12 June, 1989, Swedish Undersecretary for Trade, Sohlman said Sweden hopes 
eventually to obtain 5(k) status. ITR reports on 22 August, 1990 (p.l297) that the 
U.S. had in principle agreed to offer Sweden 5(k) status, a decision reported in 
the Federal Register two weeks hence.
U.S. Commerce Department USDOC/BXA/OTPA/CP, 22 May, 1991.
U.S. Commerce Department official, non-attributional 23.7.1991.
Svensk Forfattarsamling (SFS 1986:89), 11 March, 1986.
Agriculture Minister, Hellstrom. See "Regeringens forordningsmotiv. 
Utrikesdepartementet. Utdrag 1986:1 (Protokoll vid regeringssammantrade), 27 
February, 1986.
303
1. the decision was a result of attempt to secure access to 
advanced high technology. A small country has limited 
possibilities to create the research resources and 
production capacity within all areas.
2. transit considerations, which led to countries trying to 
circumvent other countries' export regulations.
3. the decision concerned knowledge as well as products 
of high technological character.
Well worth noting here is the seemingly more explicit Swedish decision (relative 
to the Norwegian) in outlining what was acceptable to export and w hat was 
not. This could be an indication that the Norwegian COCOM lists of acceptable 
goods was sufficient, while the Swedish list was not. The Norwegian law 
chiefly seemed to be aimed at 'tightening the lid' on firms and individuals who 
violated the COCOM regulations, while the Swedish decision was an explicit 
formalization of much of what had been in practice for some time.^^  ^ One 
important part of the Swedish decision was thus that it appeared on paper.
Soviet and American Reactions
The Soviet Union was obviously not pleased. As far back as 1985, 
Kuznetsov^^^ claimed that Washington was worried by 'the development of 
economic and trade relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden and by the 
fact that in many fields contacts and cooperation had been developing of late."
This conclusion m aybe exaggerated given the author's limited knowledge 
of COCOM technicalities. Aside from the SFS document SFS 1986:89, which 
lays down the general guidelines, one would have to refer to Tullverkets 
forfattningsam ling, TFS 1986:22, V:2 (Stockholm: Swedish General Customs 
Board, 16 May, 1986), which became effective 1 June, 1986 or the from the same 
source, TFS 1987:37, V:2 (Stockholm: Swedish General Customs Board, 17 
December, 1987), which was valid from 1 January, 1988 for the more technical 
specifications of the regulations.
217 Fravda, 8 September, 1985, quoted in Jonson (1990c:7)
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In a prelude to the decision, Fravda attacked the Swedish Government's plans 
in January claiming that the new regulations would threaten Swedish foreign 
policy 'a t its base.'^^* Irrespective, Soviet representatives clearly indicated that 
they would have liked to see an enhancement of high technology trade with 
Sweden.^'’ The USSR nevertheless seemed to be informed of the 
consequences the move would have on Swedish-Soviet trade— once on a trip to 
Moscow on 14-17 April, 1986 and via a Governmental Commission (Mixed 
Commission) meeting in Stockholm 20-23 May, 1986.^ One representative 
of the Soviet Trade Ministry summed up the Soviet reaction thus: "we are both 
disappointed and surprised that Sweden bent under American pressure," adding 
"the new Swedish law regarding export of civilian high technology runs 
contrary to your non-alignment.
However, the U.S. was satisfied with both the spirit and practice of the 1986 
Swedish ordnance. U.S. Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration, 
Freedenberg returned on 3 July, 1986 from a trip to four European capitals "very 
much encouraged" by the improvements in national security export controls, 
specifically citing the Swedish law of 1 June.^
Developments 1989-1991
At the very essence of the debate surrounding an easing of COCOM 
regulations from approximately 1989 until the present, lay different evaluations
21* Fravda, January, 1986, quoted in Jonson, (1990c:7)
Jonson (1990c) quoting Dagens Nyheter, 1 March, 1986.
™ T. von Sivers, "-Svenska lag strider mot neutraliteten," Ny Teknik 30 
(1986), p. 8-9. One former Swedish official warned that the article "got (the 
interview subject, Piskolov J. Vasilyevich, of the Soviet Foreign Trade 
Department) into much trouble." He added "the Soviets did not react against 
this and the article did not represent majority opinion." (S50).
"-Svensk lag strider mot neutraliteten," p. 8.
^  International Trade Reporter, 9 July, 1986, p.892-3.
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of Gorbachëvian foreign policy. Previous to 1989 significant changes in 
COCOM regulations were not under serious discussion. Also, up until 1989, the 
motivation to change the COCOM rules was mostly in the direction of 
tightening—and that for chiefly domestic reasons,^ COCOM members now 
became more willing to adjust its regulations in concert with perceived 
optimistic change in Soviet foreign policy.
Questions such as these were central: When was Soviet foreign policy 
'change' sufficient to guarantee that previously-regulated technology would 
escape being used for purposes which the rules were meant to prevent? Has 
the original purpose of COCOM been served? What future does COCOM 
cooperation hold?
Political party membership was one determinant of how individuals 
answered these questions. From a systematic, yet unstatistical survey of the 
debate, it does seem that the further to the left one is on the political scale the 
earlier and more comprehensive have been the cries for the easing of COCOM 
regulations. The far Right parties based their advocacy of COCOM change on 
objective change in Soviet foreign policy intention and military capability. The 
far Left also joined in this reasoning but placed additional emphasis on the fact 
that Western technology was necessary for proper Soviet economic development 
early on.
During a time when profound change in Soviet foreign and military policy 
was, at best, still debatable, the Swedish Left Communist Party's Lars Wemer 
was already busy advocating a total break in Sweden's participation in 
COCOM .^ Of the mainstream parties, the Swedish Social Democratic voices 
began to be heard next favouring a lightening of strategic products and services. 
Social Democratic MP, Lennart Pettersson, felt in May, 1989, that "it is important
^  One international factor which contributed to the strengthening in the late 
1970's was the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan, 1979-1989.
^  Motion by MP Lars Wemer, Riksdagstxyck 1986/87:11542.
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that a certain easing be brought about in connection w ith the export of high 
technology products from West to East" because "the transformation which is 
now occurring in those countries needs that type of technology."^
The Soviet Economic Panacea: High Technology?
One of the common threads amongst those who advocated an early change 
of the COCOM rules was that high technology could quickly and effectively 
solve fundamental Soviet economic ills. In the early stages of perestroika and 
glasnost there was little doubt that the Soviet authorities, quite naïvely one could 
argue, saw that rapid economic development as being linked with the 
attainment high technology.
Not only the Soviets were misled. Key Swedish and Norwegian élites also 
shared this vision. Naturally, the Left Party, and in particular Bertil Mâbrink 
was a prominent voice here. It is noteworthy that Bourgeois Party politicians' 
voices in this context were low and inaudible if not altogether silen t.^  In a 
reservation to a Foreign Relations Committee position paper, Mâbrink felt the 
Committee should have stated:
"The Committee concludes that a continued liberalisation 
of the restrictions for export of certain high technology 
products to the East, which is still being employed by the 
Western countries, would also facilitate the development 
in Eastern Europe—in the environmental sphere as well as 
from the general economic perspective."^
Cabinet Secretary, Pierre Schori urged:
225 Riksdagsprotokoll, 3 May, 1989.
^  Norwegian Labour MP, Hallvard Bakke, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 
January, 1990.
Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7 ("Samarabete m ed ôsteu ropa och vissa 
intem ationellla miljoinsatser").
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"you have got to give Central Europe a hand. I am 
especially thinking of the high technology sphere. It is 
absurd to maintain a set position or even sharpen the 
COCOM lists, especially since a partial reason given for the 
sharpening (or rules) was the war in Afghanistan...It is in 
nobody's interest that the gap in high technology between 
East and West be widened ...no longer is it a question 
of kalashnikovs, rather of 'computers.' It is precisely in this 
area where the Soviet Union has its great dilemma: the 
technology gap."(Sparframjandet, 1989:177)
Swedish Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson, felt similarly although basing his 
judgement more on Soviet foreign policy outputs: "in the transformation of 
military to civilian production and services, there could be increasing burdens 
placed on the already-split economies in Eastern Europe," such that "easing of 
the West's technological embargo and economic aid contributions should be 
given a high priority.
A somewhat similar debate took place in Norway. During the famed debate 
regarding the constitutionality-legality of Norwegian participation in COCOM, 
Labour MP, Einar Forde, expressed a need for a discussion over the whole topic 
of COCOM-participation, "in light of both the current (Soviet) developments and 
developments within COCOM cooperation."^ A debate between Labour 
MP, Sigurd Verdal and Conservative MP, Jan Petersen further illustrates the 
technology-as-panacea argument.^^ Verdal argued:
"Petersen knows that technology is especially im portant for 
raising the living standard, for developing the economy, 
for advancing the societal structure, and for taking care of 
environmental problems...my point is that advanced
^  Pierre Schori in Sparframjandet (1989:156-7) 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 November, 1989.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 November, 1987. 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
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technology is probably the most important (factor) which 
will help East Europe raise the level of all important 
societal sectors which we desire."
A similar Labour argument was provided by Norwegian Labour
MP, Hallvard Bakke:
"There seems to be broad agreement that an important pre­
requisite for Gorbachev's success is that he can give the 
Soviet people a better living standard. Here, we in the 
West also bear a responsibility...The only thing (Progress 
Party's) Hagen forgot was (to bring up) a revision of the 
COCOM rules, such that the Soviet Union and the other 
East European countries can gain access to necessary 
advanced technology.
Petersen responded:
"...the point of COCOM, namely to hinder the ('cutting 
edge' class) of Western technologies from being used for 
military purposes is a point of departure which I feel we 
should retain...(and) I would like to add that I do not feel 
that this is the technological area in which we can count on 
the East needing knowledge in order to advance its 
economy."
First Signs of Change: Norway
First signs of an easing of COCOM started to be registered in Norway in 
December, 1989. The U.S. review seemed to be triggered by Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.^^ In a question by Labour MP, Kirsti Kolle G rondahl^,
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan set off discussion of COCOM 
lightening. According to Charles Redman, U.S. State Department, after 
Afghanistan "it was decided that all requests for exceptions to the COCOM 
strategic embargo should be denied, irrespective of the strategic significance of 
the export in question: the so-called 'no exception policy' of 1980." (State 
Departm ent Report, 7 February, 1989). Paul Freedenberg, Undersecretary of 
Commerce for Êcport Administration mentioned, "with the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan it is certain we'll have a review of 'no-exceptions policy.'" 
(Worldnet Broadcast, interview, 12 December, 1988; source: USIS, Stockholm).
309
Conservative Trade Minister, Kaci Kullmann Five, reports that "Norway will, 
in the near future, place particular weight upon work designed to re-evaluate 
COCOM's product-lists." The motivation being, as several interview objects in 
Norway phrased it "to have higher fences around fewer products."^ 
Kullmann Five indicated that Norway was taking an active part in speeding the 
revision process through bilateral consultations with its fellow members, 
participation in list revisions, and COCOM discussions generally .^ 
Conservative Party MP, Jan Petersen joined in his party"s colleague's stance 
saying "there is a need for a re-evaluation of COCOM-rules." Petersen was 
accompanied by Christian People's Party's Kâre Gjonnes, who also favoured a 
relaxation of the COCOM rules,^^ with one motivation being, interesting 
enough, "the rules are a sign of the division of Europe into two military 
alliances." Gjonnes saw that division being mended.
Meetings between Western leaders over the issue also pointed to a growing 
consensus among Western allies to relax the fourty-year old COCOM -rules.^ 
On 19 January, the American Commerce Secretary officially stated that the 
export control system was functioning unsatisfactorily and promised a 
liberalisation of the rules.^^ Norwegian Undersecretary of State, Sven-Erik 
Svedman called it "an adjustment of the regulations to a new reality," rather that 
"a heavy liberalisation," which, according to Svedman, "sounds too radical in
^(...continued)
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 December, 1989.
^  N25. A variation of this principle is elaborated upon by Kullmann Five, 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 December, 1989.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 December, 1989.
E. 0verli, "-Ny gjennomgang av Cocom-reglene," Arbeiderbladet, 5 
January, 1990.
238 Riishoj, "COCOM under revision," p.l.
"-Riv teknikmuren, fienden har forsvumnit."
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relation to that which is actually occurring."^ According to one source, 
before the Summer 1990 COCOM meeting, Bush had suggested slashing 30 of 
120 product categories, and simplifying the administration of 13 others.^* 
While companies were anxiously anticipating further liberalisations in Paris, 
the Norwegian MFA and the Customs officials were seeking to tighten the 
control over the products which still were present on the COCOM lis ts .^
A shared COCOM policy has been to place more stringent controls on fewer 
amounts and types of products. Although this policy was more clearly 
annunciated in Norway, Sweden in practice also adopted such a policy— 
particularly for the promotion of exports. One should footnote the effect which 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait had upon discussion of COCOM relaxation. As 
Norwegian Progress Party's Rosjorde pointed out "we have learned in the past 
days the full worth of high technology.
Those who had long advocated an easing and clarification of the COCOM 
regulations were renumerated in the Summer of 1990. It would not be 
exaggerating the case to say that this meeting constituted the single most 
important slimming of COCOM regulations since COCOM's founding. Only 
one week following the Bush-Gorbachëv summit, and during a meeting in Paris 
on 6-7 June, 1990,^ COCOM adopted a liberalisation regarding the export of 
computers, telecommunications equipment and machine to o ls^ —a move much 
more important for Sweden because of its specialization in these sectors. Most
^  G. Salvesen, "COCOM-regler skal entires," Aftenposten, 22 January, 1990.
S. Dahllof and M. Thorén, "Cocoms fasad spricker," Ny Teknik 22 (1990).
A.M. Jonassen, "Cocom liberaliserar, men skjerpet kontroll," Aftenposten, 
11 April, 1991.
Rosjorde, interview.
^  International Trade Reporter 20 June, 1990, p.935.
"COCOM myker opp, USA strammer til," Dagens Næringsliv, 8 June,
1990.
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Scandinavian officials agreed that, as much as they pushed for COCOM change 
in the past it was not until Bush took the initiative that "things began to
m ove."^
Swedish opinions of the lightening
It seemed as though special consideration was being taken to Sweden's 
position as 1990 drew to a close. According to one source, Swedish companies 
in November, 1990 received 'relaxations' regarding their import of American 
high technology; the grounds ostensibly being to assist the companies to be 
more competitive in the international arena.^^ In Sweden, there were 
rum ours circulating that Sweden was preparing a final and decisive adaptation 
to the U.S.'s and COCOM's technology embargo.^ As the Summer Paris 
meeting of COCOM approached, rumours of further liberalisation of the 
COCOM statutes appeared in the press. But it seemed unlikely that the Soviet 
Union would be able to benefit from these developments, still being deemed a 
strategic threat.^’
246 N25
Finland and Switzerland were reportedly granted relaxations which in 
actual fact gave their industries the same advantages as COCOM-member 
industries. (K. Eneberg, "USA underlattar import av hogteknik," Dagens 
Nyheter, 21 November, 1990.)
^  Swedish Left MP, Nilsson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 12 April, 1991: "there is 
still a demeaning limitation on trade with the East European countries and a 
hinder for further development of trade with these countries."
A.M. Jonassen, "Nye markeder for hoyteknologi-varer," Aftenposten, 11 
April, 1991, points out that the changes seemed destined to affect trade w ith 
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. (See also L. Kehoe, W. Dawkins, 




COCOM, as a result of its meeting in Paris 24 May, 1991 agreed upon a 
revised Core List, slated to be implemented on 1 September the same y ear.^  
The general features of the Core List included greater specificity in the 
description of items controlled; alignment of control parameters w ith current 
technical standard; decontrol of readily available 'off-the-shelf' items in 
everyday commerce; and improved harmonization w ith the Customs tariff 
system.^*
As the summer came to a close, all indicators pointed to future easings of 
the COCOM rules.^^ In this atmosphere, Norway took an uncommon, 
unilateral decision to soften its rules on high-tech exports to the neutral 5(k) 
countries.^^ Previously sales of questionable goods to these countries were 
subject to individual approval by Norwegian authorities. The reasons given 
were two: first, the Foreign Ministry expressed satisfaction of these countries' 
effective implementation of export control routines. Also, Bjom Blokhus of the 
Ministry said "in the wake of détente between east and west it was natural to 
look at trade relations with those countries which stand close to u s."^  
However, a more comprehensive COCOM re-evaluation was slowed by the 
attempted coup attempt in the Soviet Union on 19 August.^^
^  W. Dawkins, "CoCom eases curb on high-tech sales," Financial Times, 25 
May, 1991. U.S. Commerce official, Allan Wendt, clarifies the policy of "higher 
fences around fewer products."
International Trade Reporter, 29 May, 1991.
A. Maitland, "Cocom eases rules on hi-tech exports," Financial Times, 13 
August, 1991.
K. Fossli, "Norway to ease rules on high-tech exports," Financial Times, 
8 August, 1991.
254 ItNorway to ease rules on high-tech exports."
A. Maitland, L. Kehoe, "CoCom change may be delayed," Financial 
Times, 22 August, 1991.
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Élite Perceptions of COCOM: Help and Hindrance
COCOM: A  veritable trade barrier?
One stands to wonder if the existing COCOM regulations—seen from those 
w ho are daily faced with the matter— have in fact resulted in the stifling of 
either Norwegian-Soviet or Swedish-Soviet trade. There can be no doubt that 
COCOM has been a hindrance, for any Governmental intervention in an 
otherwise free process hampers its natural development. The answer is not 
whether, rather under w hat conditions, with which effect, on which 
industries?
The logical place to look for the answer is within those sectors, and within 
those companies which are assumed to have a competitive edge worldwide and 
which are COCOM-regulated. We must assume the perspective of those who 
affect the policy (officials and politicians) and those who m ust abide by it (the 
business élite). Thus, interviews will be the chief source of data for the 
following section.
The spontaneous reaction of most individuals interviewed was in fact that 
the regulations had no decisive effect on either the volume or type of trade that 
was transacted with the Soviet Union. But, when probed further, most 
cautiously admitted that COCOM's existence may have, in 'certain industries,' 
and during 'certain time periods '^  affected Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian- 
Soviet trade patterns.
Impact on Sweden
Just before Gorbachev took the helm, the Swedish Defence Committee made 
the answer to the question of impact seem crystal-clear. While pointing out that
^  A. Hoff, "USA-press mot svensk lekkasje av teknologi," Aftenposten, 25 
October, 1985: Swedish Trade Undersecretary, Âberg said "the 'affairs' have hurt 
Swedish industry," however pointing out that "once they reached solution the 
Americans let everything go on as before."
314
Swedish neutrality did not mean 'psychological neutrality' the Committee 
painted a sombre picture of the existing situation:
"The embargo on high technology has created special 
problems for Sweden. The U.S. se eü  to maintain its edge 
in relation to the countries in the East through preventing 
access to (such) material, components and technological 
expertise(SOU, 1985:15)...A factor which will become 
increasingly important in the East-West relationship and 
relationship between the alliances is the uneven 
development in the high technological sphere. There is 
reason to believe that high technology trade will be, to an 
increasing extent, utilized as a political instrument during 
the rest of the 1980's." (SOU, 1985:61)
It is interesting to note that in the next of the Committee's papers, presented 
five years later, COCOM is not even m entioned.^
Hardest-hit industries
The Swedish sectors most influenced by the COCOM regulations were the 
telecommunications industry, the electronics industry and industries dependent 
on those technologies. Another traditionally hard hit area was precision 
machine tools. It is perhaps useful to draw a contrast between those industries 
that would potentially export single, COCOM-regulated products to the Soviet 
Union('primary exporters'), and those industries which draw upon high 
technological products only as a part of overall production ('secondary 
exporters'). The difference here being that secondary industries are not wholly 
dependent on the interworkings of COCOM, and are capable of finding 
alternative solutions if one aspect of their product happens to come under the 
umbrella of COCOM. Primary industries are constantly interested in what
"The West's thorough technological advantage has created increasingly 
more problems for the Soviet Union. Therefore (the Soviet Union) will 
increasingly be scared of losing contact with the military-technological 
development in the West." (COCOM never specifically mentioned). (SOU, 
1990:41-2)
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COCOM is doing and are intimately affected by changes in the COCOM 
statutes. Technology which does not draw on COCOM-regulated technology 
and which is manufactured in Sweden is only subject to Swedish regulations 
(e.g. nuclear technology).^
In Sweden, the main Soviet trade players Tetra Pak, Alfa Laval and Axel 
Johnson have only been marginally affected. In the last case, in the words of 
one industrialist, "we simply don't deal in high technological products."^’ 
One must remember that Sweden is only one country in a competitive 
market, simultaneously regulated with the rest of the West by very similar 
COCOM statutes. Therefore, as one individual pointed out "the Soviet Union 
is dependent on the West for Western components—but Sweden is not different 
from any other Western country in this respect."^ One senior Foreign 
Ministry official pointed out that "the potential easing of the regulations would 
not pu t Sweden in a better position, since the regulations would not be relaxed 
more than our main competitor n a t i o n s . " T h e r e  could be some companies 
that offer COCOM-controlled products," said one official, "but they do so 
simultaneously with other West Europeans, such as Siemens."^^
"The Soviets," said one Swedish official, "have had this hysterical interest 
w ith h a r d w a r e . " T h e  technological gap," another individual pointed out 
’betw een the existing (hardware and software) standards and that which can be 
offered from Western Europe is so large," that only recent-past machinery
^  However, S. Dahllof, "Cocom lattar," Ny Teknik 24 May, 1990 quotes 
Hanne Simonsen from the Board of Industry and Trade as saying "we have been 
forewarned that Sweden will initiate export controls of Swedish technology."
Ennerfelt in Sparframjandet (1989:161)
260 n 4 7
261 S3 
S48
S13. This advisor said this was grounded, not in industrial necessity, but 
personal interest.
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should be taken up and used, instead of going to totally new technology."^ 
Only minimal domestic production of computer technology occurs in Sweden— 
and that for Japanese-British NOKIA-ICL. Thus, the transit considerations are 
perhaps the most important in this regard .^
The Swedish situation contrasts somewhat with the Norwegian case, where 
one has one of the formerly major players in computer hardware, Norsk Data. 
Although representatives from Norsk Data were not interviewed, we 
nevertheless gleaned from interviews a vague impression that their Soviet 
export has suffered. Software production is markedly higher in Sweden and 
Norway. But for example Norwegian Data West has had growing opportunities 
to sell onto the Soviet market.
Arguably, the company most influenced by COCOM has been Ericsson 
Telecom .^ To some extent, the regulations may have affected Ericsson's 
Soviet market potential. However, it did not seem that Ericsson had been any 
more hampered than any other Western country on the Soviet market, one 
official said. "No other exchanges from, e.g. Siemens are in operation," although 
adding "there are outstanding orders."^^ We know that one of the more 
controversial complex, multilateral COCOM cases was the refusal by the U.S. 
in mid-1990 to approve a Trans-Siberian fibre optic l in k ^
One individual recounted "I know (COCOM) was an obstacle before, in 1984- 
1986, but not in the case of the Soviet Union." For Ericsson, the approval of a
264 S14
"Cocoms fasad spricker," p.l2, however, point out computer exports are 
the least of the problems, pointing out that it is a question of 
telecommunications and machine tool technology.
^  Ericsson Telecom has traditionally had low sales to Eastern Europe. 
“ ^S23
^  Discussion of an easing of regulations over this project began in the 
Summer of 1991. (W. Dawkins, "West to back trans-Soviet telecom link," 
Financial Times, 21 June, 1991.)
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major international exchange for use in Budapest in early 1989 was a turning 
point. Ericsson had previously installed the Moscow telex exchange in 1977. 
Said one official, "since that approval there has not been any hindrance.
"In any case," said this one official, "Ericsson deals in civilian systems." But, as 
one official told: "Ericsson did not even try to work these countries until two 
years back,"^° perhaps hinting at the coincidence of COCOM-related timing 
factors. With the development of their revolutionary AXE switching system, 
they have only now been able to begin chipping away at the East Europe and 
Soviet market.^^ Alfa-Laval is one industry which is able to w ork w ith 
different solutions in order to find the one that best fits both the COCOM rules 
(on the one hand) and the final consumer's wishes (on the other). One 
individual familiar with the Alfa-Laval case said, "if the Soviets desire a factory 
and have to have it automated, they do use American computers...in some cases 
they are forced to use U.S. computers...and usually they have been able to choose 
things which would be licensed (choosing older, lower computers, PC's etc.)" "The 
problem for Alfa-Laval," one said, "was not technical, bu t rather 
administrative."^^
Norway
Patterns emerged in an examination of Norwegian perceptions of which 
industries had been and would remain most affected by COCOM. First, Norsk 
Hydro, the primary Norwegian actor in Norwegian-Soviet trade, did not feel 
that their trade with the Soviets was of such a character that it would have been 
affected by COCOM, being mostly based on fertilizer and raw chemical
^^S23
270 S23
27^ "Cocoms fasad spricker."
272 S42
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tra d e .^  In fact, most agreed with one Foreign Ministry official who said 
"there are very few Norwegian companies which are COCOM candidates."^^ 
But in the same breath, most officials^^ added that "marine-technology was 
an exception,"^^^ adding that in the future, and with a lightening of COCOM, 
the scope of trade would be b roader.^  Trade in 'marine technology' lay in the 
potential and not in the actual: mainly oil exploration equipment (stabilization 
equipment for platforms, drill bits), but also such products as navigational 
equipment, geological equipment (seismic measuring equipment). One official 
said that:
"our real possibilities have been in offshore, and we have 
presented all the aspects for many years...the Soviet Union 
does not seem to feel that the equipment would have 
made any difference in the COCOM context, but we have 
noticed there haven't been any contracts in the field.
One of the Norwegian solutions in offshore, said one key official, "could be that 
we hand over a package, to which are attached Norwegian control mechanisms- 
-granting no Soviets access at all," however pointing out the problem that "the 
Soviet authorities nevertheless have said they want part of the package."^^
N47, N43
N25
A. Moe maintains however that Western perceptions of profitability 
would go before considerations such as the COCOM rules, which "seem 
unlikely to create any serious difficulties for such deals." (1988:274-5) See also 
Bergesen, Moe and 0streng (1987)
^^N36
^ N 3 6
^  N25
N31. This possibility was expressed as early as 1982, in M. G. Spang, 
"Norge eksporterer olje-pakke," Verdens gang, 14 August, 1982.
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COCOM complexity as hindrance
Both Norwegian and Swedish élites argued that the sheer existence of 
COCOM only added to the, as previously outlined, extensive difficulties and 
complexities involved in Soviet trade, to provide only one more deterrent for 
entering the Soviet market. As one high Swedish official said "some companies 
we deal with have just said 'we rather don't bother with the Soviet Union, it's 
so difficult to figure out what is allowed and what is forbidden."^ This was 
supported by Norwegian Socialist Left MP, Theo Koritzinsky, "the requirements 
are so very difficult and complex to grasp and then to control."^^ One 
Norwegian industrialist confirmed that "the sheer presence of the rules scares 
people away because that means even more preparation and investigation."^^ 
Another Norwegian official called the Norwegians "bad exporters." "All these 
restrictions can easily deter them, however pointing out that "Norwegian 
exporters have suffered markedly less than other European exporters—Norway 
has a need for high technology only in niches," he added.^^
COCOM as an excuse for different company/government priorities
Some Norwegian and Swedish governmental and business officials used 
COCOM regulations as a scapegoat in explaining their non-engagement on the 
Soviet market. As one trade official related, "companies w ho were not engaged 
in the Soviet market before are reluctant in any case to start in w ith the 
uncertain situation."^ One high Norwegian official joined in this reasoning 
saying "yes, the COCOM lightening should have an effect—but that would have 
to be in the long-term, since few firms today can see themselves adopting a
^  Ennerfelt, interview.
N20
282
^  N36 
^ S l l
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long-term perspective," adding that "the Soviet priorities are just not there...they 
pu t their earned foreign currency elsewhere today."^ As one Norwegian 
official put it: "COCOM does not affect their economy, since it is especially 
dependent on rudimentary organisation, market economy, infrastructure, having 
little to do with COCOM actually."^ The question of influence was in fact 
a theoretical one.
Therefore it was common to hear comments such as that of one Swedish 
official "the economic effect of COCOM has been marginal," yet adding, 
"theoretically COCOM has affected." But the real problem, this official pointed 
out, is that "the market is just not there," (a factor which of course has origins 
within the country—NOT related to COCOM)
COCOM loyalty no insurmountable hindrance
Another perspective was provided by those officials who pointed out that 
companies adapted to the rules quite naturally, only viewing the rules as minor, 
either in-and-of-themselves, or better, as contrasted with other m uch more 
formidable complications present in pursuing the Soviet market. As one 
Swedish Foreign Ministry official said, "most of the companies have simply 
adapted their activities to the rules," however pointing out that the Soviet 
officials often complained that the "Swedes were creating trade hindrances 
through not transferring technology of sufficiently high standard ."^  This 
official pointed to Ericsson as a prime example, outlining "Ericsson has adapted 
themselves, they simply have avoided working certain parts of the market.
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W ithin this adaptation process Swedes^ and Norwegians,^^ especially 
in the wake of the "scandals," in fact felt a need to be more active than 
COCOM-regulations required. "With respect to those companies which had a 
lot of contact with the U.S., they have never wanted to stretch their contacts, 
preferring not to annoy the Americans," one official said.^^ "Firms in Sweden 
had learned," said one official, "that it is better to say no to contracts than risk 
being blackmailed from the U.S. market.
An interesting question for the Norwegians is to investigate is which role the 
Norwegian saw themselves playing in COCOM, relative to the other members 
of the club.^^ The Norwegians, even as prominent COCOM members, and 
the Swedes must prove their loyalty to the U.S. and its fellow COCOM 
members; even for Norway, the credibility question was central. Koritzinsky 
stated that "after the KV/Toshiba (event) sometimes the Norwegian officials 
acted hysterically in order to prove that Norway was 110% COCOM-loyal."^
Perhaps the hysteria was necessary. To be sure, improvements in Swedish 
and Norwegian export controls have indirectluy contributed to a more relaxed 
U.S. attitude towards them. One strategically-placed official confirmed that 
"today's laws and regulations (in Norway) are stricter than other countries' 
'statutes and limits,'" adding that "we have also dramatically increased the




This was at times opposed by Norwegian top officials, who, like one top 
official, said "Norway is moving with the consensus, and the consensus is 
moving very fast indeed." (N46)
Koritzinsky, interview.
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amount of people working in the area."^ One high official pointed out what 
could be seen as a balancing effect, namely that "we favoured COCOM because 
we noticed that the other parties' did not take it as seriously as we did," adding 
that "the reason is in the Norwegian political culture, we follow the rules if we 
have joined an international agreement."^ Probing further, this official said 
that "as a small state, being criticized by the big powers makes one feel very 
vulnerable—and thus in order to avoid problems with the larger parties Norway 
was more true to the rules than others."^
N25. Several individuals confirmed that this entailed the distribution of 
a manual on the COCOM regulations, the holding of seminars on COCOM, and 
in general greater assistance and service to the affected enterprises. In terms of 
personnel, one individual said in the COCOM department there are 20 people 
working, "constantly in contact with industry—and in general there are no 
complaints." (N36)




Environmental, Economic and Scientific Cooperation: Gorbachev's Murmansk 
Initiative, 1987
Introduction^
On October 1, 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev launched a major Nordic foreign 
policy offensive with his so-called "Murmansk speech." The speech was chiefly 
intended for domestic political consumption.^ However, the speech's foreign 
policy section was highlighted in the Nordic countries. The speech was 
important because it in itself hinted at a comprehensive re-assessment of key 
features of the Soviet approach to Nordic politics. Students of Soviet politics 
have traditionally learned to study speeches by Soviet leaders as junctures of 
policy change or re-affirmation of chosen policy. The speech also had value in 
that it placed both neglected and previous "non-issues" onto the Soviet-Nordic 
foreign policy agenda.
Chi^ Loci of Inquiry
There is consensus today that the chief target of the speech was Norway. 
Some have argued that this attention provides evidence of Norway's prominent 
place in Soviet foreign policy relative to Sweden. The central task of this section 
is to compare and contrast neutral Sweden's and NATO-aligned Norway's 
reaction and behaviour towards the Murmansk proposal. Did Sweden's 
neutrality influence its reaction to and behaviour toward Gorbachev's proposals 
in different ways than did NATO membership the Norwegian behaviour?
' The best two studies to date are: Archer (1989) and Scrivener (1989). See 
also Bomsdorf (1989) for a closer study of the Murmansk speech.
 ^ Sten Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 December, 1987; Thorvald 
Stoltenberg,(Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 2 December, 1987): "the possibilities we 
see in more positive developments with respect to the East-West relationship are 
closely connected w ith the domestic reform process which has been initiated in 
the Soviet Union under (Gorbachev)."
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It was chiefly over the security-policy aspects of the October speech that 
different Norwegian and Swedish attitudes prevailed.^ However, Gorbachev 
also proposed cooperation in the economic, environmental and scientific realms- 
-proposals which we will discuss in greater depth in this section. It is not 
immediately obvious what role neutrality and alignment play in responding to 
proposals of the non-security policy sort. These proposals became important 
when Gorbachev intertwined them with security policy proposals—as such, they 
provide background to the security policy considerations in Northern areas. 
Sweden's neutral policy and Norway's NATO membership governed certain 
aspects of their respective reactions to the security aspects of the speech—a topic 
dealt with in a later chapter.
Speech Content
Security-policy considerations aside, one of Gorbachev's main themes was 
Arctic cooperation.* As Gorbachev said, "we attach great significance to 
peaceful cooperation with respect to the safeguarding of Arctic resources."^ 
Another specific suggestion Gorbachev forwarded was to create a conference
 ^Reactions to Gorbachev's security-policy proposals are dealt w ith in a later 
section.
* For the broad Norwegian perspective on the issue, see S t  Meld. nr. 11, 
1989-90 ("om utviklinstrekk i det internas] onale samfunn og virkninger for norsk 
utenrikspolitikk")
 ^ 1 quote heretofore from Magnusson's (1987) translation of M urmansk 
speech. Gorbachev spoke of "exchange of experience and knowledge." 
Gorbachev proposed a unified energy-programme for Northern Europe. 
"According to available sources," he says, "the oil and gas potential in the area 
is practic j l y  unlimited...(to this end) technical structures which are able to 
survive the polar climate must be manufactured." Gorbachev mentioned 
"mixed-companies in Canada and Norway for the extraction of oil and gas on 
our Northern continental shelf" as potential participants.
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whereby the sub-arctic states can coordinate their exploration of the Arctic.^ 
Another theme was the environm ent Here Gorbachev envisioned ”a special 
emphasis on environmental cooperation with the countries in the North," 
stressing the "need is obviously pressing." The positive experiences which 
mutual environmental measures have had between the seven participating Baltic 
littoral nations, should, according to Mr Gorbachev, spread to the "Northern 
areas." In concrete terms, Gorbachev proposed a "supervisory system for the 
environment and regional radiation-security." He also expressed a willingness 
to re-consider Soviet nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya.^
Another important area which Gorbachev mentioned was his willingness to 
"open the Northeast passage for foreign vessels with Soviet ice-breaker 
assistance." However, Gorbachev's willingness to do such was contingent upon 
"how things were going with the normalisation of international relations."* 
Gorbachev nevertheless passed over subjects of importance for élites. For 
example, an omission of the Barents Sea delimitation problem in the M urmansk 
speech was noted in Norway.^
* Gorbachev stressed the Soviet Union's willingness "to im part our 
experiences," and in exchange, "we are interested in ongoing research in the 
Nordic and sub-arctic states...we already have a research exchange underway 
with Canada."
 ^"We are trying to figure out how we will solve this complicated problem 
for us—since we have invested such large amounts of money in it." "This could 
be solved immediately, if the U.S. would agree to stop nuclear tests—or at least 
start reducing them to a minimum—both in terms of quantity and strength," he 
added.
* Here we note this point only in passing, and will not discuss this issue in 
detail. The first Western ship to pass through the Northeast passage did so in 
the Fall of 1991.




The speech's timing added to its impact on the Nordic audiences. This 
particular speech took place four days prior to a visit from Finnish President 
Koivisto and a little more than a week before a large Norwegian trade 
delegation was to visit Moscow. Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg held 
a major address at the Nordic Forum for Security on the subject of the 
"Northern Areas," only eight days pnon^ From a security perspective, the 
speech could not have been delivered at a more symbolic location than 
Murmansk: a place which, more than any other, symbolized Soviet-U.S. naval 
rivalry.
The M urmansk speech cannot be seen in isolation—and m ust be seen against 
the background of a string of regionally-oriented speeches which Gorbachev 
delivered. Previously, Gorbachev had held an important speech in the Soviet 
far East—in Vladivostok (28 July, 1986)—which was geared to Asian and Pacific 
rim audiences. He also held a less-publicized address in Belgrade (16 March, 
1988), which dealt with Mediterranean issues. These "appeals" or "initiatives" 
were of particular note for the extent to which they dealt in an interrelated 
manner with military security problems and prospects for economic, 
environmental and scientific issues and cooperation.
The M urmansk speech provided one of the few signs that the Soviet Union 
was thinking of the Nordic region at all. As Anders Aslund pointed out "the 
Nordic countries were not prioritized by Gorbachev whatsoever." "Usually," 
said Aslund, "a trip to Finland would be taken by an incoming Soviet leader 
shortly after beginning his tenure...it took two and one-half years for him to get 
to Finland."" Carl Bildt'^ pointed out that "it is not for the Nordic countries
NUPI, 1987:411-12. The similarities between the basic points which 
Stoltenberg advocated and the Gorbachev address are striking.
" Aslund, interview.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
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to become the object of the type of attention which we witnessed in Gorbachev's 
speech in Murmamsk." The speech was mentioned until at least 1990 by Nordic 
and Soviet officials, is, in-and-of-itself, a sign of the speech's lasting character.'^ 
One should guard against assuming that the Murmansk initiative presented 
dramatically new proposals. For example, concrete proposals for action on 
Arctic cooperation were at least ten years old.'^ As an example, one 
Norwegian official who worked intimately with related questions informed the 
author that then-Chairman of the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, James 
Zumberge took up the first initiative regarding cooperation on the Arctic.'^ 
W hat was new was active Soviet support for and participation in these 
efforts.^^
Comparing Swedish and Norwegian Reactions
W hat was remarkable was the dampened tone of the Swedish reaction. 
Clearly, Gorbachev first targeted Norway, then Finland and Sweden. W hat the 
Swedes reacted to most negatively, insofar as they reacted at all, were to the 
security policy proposals Gorbachev forwarded. They reacted luke-warmly to 
most of the other proposals dealing with economic, scientific, and environmental 
cooperation—partially because the Arctic was peripheral to their chief interests— 
the Baltic. As an explanation of the lack of Swedish interest said one senior 
Swedish diplomat: "the general political atmosphere (at the time the speech was 
delivered) was not inspired to move on it; we were not ready to enter into large
Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, 13 January, 1989 (Forhandlinger i 
Stortinget); Progress Party MP, Rosjorde, 19 January, 1989. In Sweden, see the 
Swedish Defence Committee's report SOU (1990).
Archer (1990) points out that many organisations for cooperation e.g. the 
Nordkalott Committee, founded in 1977, have been active in these questions for 
some time.
15 N21
Soviet participation in the International Arctic Science Committee (lASC) 
is one example. (Archer, 1989:30)
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scale cooperation."^^ As Aslund put it, "the Soviets were struck by the fact 
there was no reaction from the Nordic countries." Further, he said, "when there 
was no positive reaction from the Nordics there was no point in getting 
involved—here he could do a quick 'touch-up' job on the Nordic countries, then 
forget about it."^ * One possible reason the Norwegians received more attention 
was because of their outstanding jurisdictional dispute with the USSR in the 
Barents Sea.^’
As for the spirit of the speech, reactions from both Norway and Sweden were 
uniformly positive. But here one must be careful to draw  a line between, as one 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry official summed it up: "some parts which were 
more realistic than other, more idealistic ones."^ From the Norwegian, and to 
an extent also the Swedish horizon, the 'realistic' proposals included those of 
a non-security nature. "Idealistic" proposals were security-related proposals and 
are dealt w ith in a later section on strategic issues.
'Realistic' Proposals and the Follow-up of M urmansk
Soviet Follow-Up
An interesting point to discuss is to what extent Gorbachev's speech has been 
followed up—from the Soviet,^^ Swedish and Norwegian sides. At the time
"Swedes are pragmatic," he said, "we move from one point to another, we 
don 't like grand designs." (S43)
Aslund, interview.
By October, 1987, the Soviet Union must have realized that an agreement 
with the Swedes in the Baltic delimitation question was imminent. One senior 
Swedish diplomat mentioned, "the speech occurred while we were negotiating 
the Baltic Agreem ent-we used some parts of it in our own negotiations (e.g. 
terms and concepts such as 'good neighbourhood' (gott naboskap)." (S45)
20 N30
After the speech the Soviet officials for at least two years following 
mentioned the speech in writing and speaking, (fonson, 1990c:12-13)
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these measures were proposed, the Soviet Union perceived itself still to be in 
relatively good economic health—relative to its situation today. W ith time, 
whatever intentions the Soviet authorities had to concretely contribute (finance) 
measures to control pollution, have today disappeared w ith the degeneration 
of the Soviet economy. From the Soviet side, it seemed as though scientific 
research was prioritized^. Voronkov^ writes that many of the Scandinavian 
reactions have missed the central part of Gorbachev's speech, namely, "that their 
should be created cooperation between the interested countries regarding a 
common use and exploitation of Arctic resources, environmental protection and 
cooperative scientific projects." But other issues, such as the opening of the 
North-East passage, also seemed to have serious, sustained Soviet support.
Perhaps the largest impediment to increasing scientific cooperation with the 
Soviet Union was the Soviet stand on access to Soviet scientific data. 
Norwegian, Swedish (or any foreign) attempts to examine data on the Soviet 
side (through visits to companies or through direct data measurement) 
constituted intrusions on Soviet national sovereignty and security. As one 
Norwegian advisor close to the questions told, "the Soviet decision-makers in 
Moscow, even though they permitted us to make experiments, did not accept 
or believe the data until such was verified by a bona fide Soviet institution."^ 
Gradually however, the question of the credibility of the Norwegian data in 
Moscow showed improvement. "The decision-makers in Moscow would never
“  R.L. Larsen, "Sovjet ga Norge svarfrist," Aftenposten, 14 December, 1987 
writes that the Soviet Union gave Norway four months to begin research 
cooperation with the Soviet Union in the area of space exploration. According 
to the article, a protocol for cooperation was signed between Norway and the 
Soviet Union the preceding week. The emphasis here was to be on the exchange 
of satellite "fjemmâlning" and atmospheric research.




trust outside information unless it was approved by an internal Soviet research 
organ," one individual close to these matters related.^
Steps towards increased scientific and environmental cooperation
The most positive responses in Norway and Sweden were heard regarding 
the scientific and environmental parts of the Gorbachev initiative.^ Swedes 
w ho expressed a remarkably low interest in Gorbachev's speech in toto, 
emphasized the positive aspects of Gorbachev's scientific and environmental 
proposals. However, the environmental problems the Swedes had to deal with 
were oriented directly Eastward—to the Baltic,^  ^ which Gorbachev only 
mentioned in passing, while the Norwegians were oriented Northwards and 
Eastward.
Swedish Follow-Up
Swedish research connections with the Soviet Union have traditionally been 
strong.^ However it was not until 1987 that both Arctic^^ and environmental 
research was given a very much needed political push by the Soviet leadership. 
Cooperation in these realms was assisted by a more flexible interpretation of 
w hat was considered politically sensitive, both from the Swedish and the Soviet
25 N44.
^  Scrivener (1989:37-44) notes that the Finns have "taken the M urmansk 
baton" to a much greater degree than any of the other Nordic countries.
^  This fact clearly reflected in the amount of money which w ould be 
channelled into research in the Baltic (Government Research Bill 1989/90:90. 
M ain Proposals (Stockholm: Cabinet Office, 1990), p.81).
“  "Sverige och Europa- det vetenskapliga samarbetet," (Stockholm: Royal 
Academy of Science, September, 1989), pps 54-56. At least one agreement is 
from 1966, while others are distributed equally through subsequent years. 
Cooperation regarding space research is said to be particularly strong—and has 
been strong for several years.
^  "Sverige och Europa..." p. 54.
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viewpoints. Desirée Edmar, of the Prime Minister's Office, said,^ "previously, 
we have had an extremely formalised system of cooperation with the Soviets." 
"We experienced that, before, many of the researchers who came (to Sweden) 
had political contacts...in the past years, we have seen an increasing proportion 
of bona fide researchers come to Sweden," Edmar added. The system became 
formalized because of a monetary problem, since they had very little to pay 
with, and instead offered services in exchange. A turning point for such 
cooperation occurred after the trip of former-Finance Minister Kjell-Olof Feldt 
to the Soviet Union, resulting in a bilateral agreement on 28 April, 1989. The 
Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences was also informed by the Government that 
their resource base would be doubled—from five million SEK to ten million 
SEK.31
With respect to environmental research, one Swedish Foreign Ministry 
official pointed out that "although we have not seen any results in our area 
(naval confidence-building measures), you should go over and talk to the 
people working with Arctic questions and environmental questions where they 
probably have a better picture."^^ One retired Swedish diplomat said, "the 
environmental questions he raised are some of the most important questions 
today—the change is that the Soviets see it in the same light, although their 
resource base prevents them from participating financially."^^ The Riksdag^s 
Foreign Relations Committee commented directly on the M urmansk speech, 
hinting that Gorbachev's suggestions should be followed up by a larger 
international audience:
^  Edmar, interview.
G overnm ent Research Bill 1989/90:90. M ain Proposals (Stockholm: The 




"in the proposals which were forwarded two years ago, and 
later supplemented in several ways...there is a great deal to 
('grab hold of'=to fasta pS) in terms of regional environmental 
and research cooperation. The security-policy questions which 
are of a wide-ranging nature should also be resolved within 
wide-ranging frameworks."^
Lack of Follow-up
One Swedish Foreign Ministry expert said the "Murmansk speech was not 
followed up—either from our or their side...the importance of the speech was 
that it was a sign of the times—not of any special practical value.^ A Swedish 
Social Democrat confirmed that their had not been much follow up on the 
Soviet side. "In environmental questions," he related, "the initiative has been on 
our side."^
Norwegian Follow-Up
Norwegians saw Murmansk as a turning point in the Soviet willingness to 
enter into concrete scientific cooperation. "We have noticed that the Soviet 
Union's interest in the process changed from a rather reluctant stance to being 
actively interested in joining the whole process...the Soviet Union was, after ten 
years, finally prepared for practical cooperation," said one MPA official.^^ One 
senior Norwegian MPA advisor said one of the concrete results of the 
Murmansk speech was that "we got information regarding the economic 
structure up North," while simultaneously opening up negotiations on the 
environment and pollution.^ A more sensitive question was the previously 
negative Soviet view of extra-regional participation in its vision of Arctic






cooperation. One official added that whereas they had now arrived at an 
acceptable resolution, before "they were not interested in other countries, the 
Soviets had a strict view of making it a regional organisation,"^^ which of 
course carried overtones for Norway's NATO involvement. In these changed 
times, the U.S. and other NATO partners were encouraged to participate 
alongside the USSR, Norway, Finland and others.
The increased Soviet willingness to allow civilians, say Norwegian 
researchers, to perform otherwise "intrusive" experiments, m ust be seen as 
another important turning point. In this connection, the Soviet willingness to 
accept Western military inspections is also worth noting.^ The formation of 
a Joint, Norwegian-Soviet Commission on the environment was one of the 
results of the signing of an Agreement between the two on 15 January, 1988. 
The first meeting of the Commission took place in August, 1988.
Attempts at further developing economic cooperation
Gorbachev's proposal for increased economic cooperation was directed more 
towards Finland and Norway than at any other party. It would also be fair to 
say that Gorbachev had oil exploration at the top of his priority list, since oil 
exports were the chief source of foreign hard currency.'*^ Thus, Swedish 
industry's reactions have been dampened if not altogether non-existent towards
39 N21
^  N.M. Udgaard, "Noktem optimisme ost-vest," Aftenposten, 12 October, 
1987. An example of this changing attitude is illustrated at a conference in 
Budapest: "the Russians made it clear that they wanted to go further along the 
road to military inspection and that they were going to present several numbers 
regarding (its) military strength."
Scrivener points out Moscow's need to find a "successor to the West 
Siberian fields as the main source of oil producti on by the turn of the century." 
(Srivener, 1989:20)
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this part of the initiative.^ Although Soviet interest in potential oil reserves 
in the Baltic cannot be totally discounted,^ the issue was clearly not prioritized 
in Gorbachev's speech.
Although the Norwegians were targeted in terms of joint oil-exploration, 
nothing ever came of this initiative, since Norwegians stood firm on their 
position of wanting a clear dividing line. The Governmental policy is 
clear^icooperation in offshore activity must be in accordance w ith the 
following points: m ust be on commercial terms; must not be in violation of the 
COCOM strategic embargo; Soviet oil bases are prohibited in Norway; no third 
countries permitted to use Norwegian territory for purposes linked to Soviet 
Barents activity; cooperation by established oil sector firms is preferable to such 
activity by companies specially set up for trade with the U.S.S.R.; such 
cooperation m ust take place outside of the disputed area.
In the wake of Gorbachev's Murmansk speech, a Norwegian mixed Trade 
Commission, under the leadership of Trade Minister, Kurt Mosbakk, travelled 
to Moscow. Mosbakk's reactions in Moscow illustrated the inability of 
Muscovite élites to concretise the potential forms for Norwegian-Soviet 
cooperation set forth in M urm ansk Specifically Mosbakk said "Gorbachev's 
speech in M urmansk was mentioned, but there is a clearly detectable need to 
concretise the possibilities for cooperation." Furthermore, Mosbakk was not
^  The Swedish Foreign Ministry, well before Gorbachev's speech, had 
already researched the possibilities of exploration on the Kola. One study was 
aimed at investigating the possibilities to tap resources of feldspars, nepheline 
and titani-ferrous metals on the Kola. (See Boliden Contech, "Feldspars, 
Nephiline and Titani-Ferrous M ineral- Utilization, Availability and Market 
Conditions," 3 June, 1987; "Svenska affârsmôjligheter inom projektet 'Apatity' 
Kola halvon") The study's conclusion was that the products' quality did not 
correspond to market demand.
^  According to the Vice President for Finnish Oil Company, NESTE, the 
company planned to go on to develop the Baltic (G. De Lange, "Ivrer for 
Nordisk Gassnett," Aftenposten, 13 March, 1991).
^  Norinform, 29 October, 1989 (as in Scrivener, 1989:40)
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reported to have registered any changed discussion climate at the Mixed 
Commission meetings as a result of Gorbachev's "invitations."^
Although cooperation in the disputed area was forbidden, one Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry official mentioned the cooperation which now  occurring in the 
Stockmanovskaya field as a possible outcome of the Gorbachev initiative.^ On 
Ryzhkov's trip to Oslo in January, 1988, Norsk Hydro's General Director, 
Torvild Aakvaag put in a special word for Hydro's drilling rig "Polar Pioneer," 
a display which could be seen as demonstrating Norwegian interest in future 
Soviet contracts.^^
Plaguing Environmental Concerns
In the environmental realm there were several concrete questions. One, was 
a concern about the resumption of nuclear testing on Novaya Zemlya. Two, 
there was a general concern that, as one Norwegian put it "that the Soviets had 
been flushing their nuclear waste under the ice in the N o r t h . A  third 
problem was the general environmental impact which Soviet industry had on
^  A. Willersrud, "Sovjet: Egne krefter i nord," Aftenposten, 15 October, 1987. 
The COCOM scandal surrounding Kongsbergs Vâpenfabrikk was taken up 
during the meeting, as were the possibilities for high-technology cooperation in 
the Barents Sea, "nothing was said other than that the Soviet Union was 
prepared to use its own resources in connection with 'w hat is occurring in the 
Barents Sea.'"
^  N28. Stockmanovskaya is not in disputed area. From the Norwegian side 
the participant is Norsk Hydro.
M. Fyhn, F. Pedersen, "Rysjkov: Vil gjeme tilbake," Aftenposten, 18 
January, 1988.
^  A senior Norwegian foreign policy advisor. (N26) This source mentioned 
that his conclusions were well-founded although they were contradictory with 
the official, public reports which had been published on the matter. It became 
public knowledge in November, 1991 that the USSR had, up to 1985, been 
storing nuclear waste in waters as shallow as 18-20 metres.(S. Lundberg, "Sovjet 
sankte atomsopor i Ishavet," Dagens Nyheter, 15 November, 1991)
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living conditions in the North—the smelting plant just over the Norwegian- 
Soviet border in Nickel being the main concern.
Murmansk Contradicted?: The Resumption of Underground Nuclear Testing on 
Novaya Zemlya.
The Soviet Union resumed nuclear testing on the island-group Novaya 
Zemlya at 15.58 on 24 October, 1990^^—a contradiction, m any said, to the spirit 
of M urmansk—and that, less than two months previous to his planned trip to 
Oslo to receive the Nobel Prize.“  Previous to this resumption, the last 
explosion had occurred on 4 December, 1988.^  ^ The timing was especially 
shocking since the USSR, only seven months earlier, had announced that the 
tests would be moved to the North only in 1993.^  ^ There seemed to be at least 
two reasons for the move from the traditional Semipalatinsk site to Novaya 
Zemlya: public opinion pressure^^ and the revelation of shocking facts
According to Norwegian Prime Minister Syse, the Norwegians had 
intelligence information which pointed out that on 17 October the Soviets had 
constructed a restricted area on Novaya Zemlya—at that point the Norwegian 
authorities had concrete reason to fear an impending detonation (Forhandlinger 
i Stortinget, 24 October, 1990). Ryzhkov had only the day before the explosion, 
according to Syse, reported that the Soviets would detonate one device during 
the year.
^  "Atomtrusel mot Norge," Aftenposten, 26 October, 1990—an article which 
represents key sectors of élite opinion over the issue.
The strength of the blasts were 5.7 on the Richter Scale for both 1988 and
1990. (A. Bonde, T. Hay, R. L. Larsen, "Ny Sovjetisk provesprengning," 
Aftenposten, 25 October, 1990.)
“  M. Fyhn, A. Willersrud, "Alle atomprover i nord fra 1993," Aftenposten, 
9 March, 1990. Six days previous to that Prime Minister Syse, on 2 March, 1990 
raised his voice in over issue ("Atom-trusel mot Norge," Aftenposten, 3 March, 
1990).
"Atom-trusel mot Norge"; M. Fyhn and A. Willersrud, "Alle atomprover 
i nord fra 1993," Aftenposten, 9 March, 1990; "Sovjetisk atomprove 
provokasjon?" Aftenposten, 27 October, 1990.
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regarding the health consequences of the blasts.^ In the Spring of 1991 the 
Soviet authorities announced that in fact Novaya Zemlya would replace 
Semipalatinsk altogether.®
To complicate matters, the Soviet Union, in late 1990,® were accused by the 
Norwegians of having dumped nuclear waste at three separate places on the 
island. Quick discussions between the Norwegians and the Soviets were 
undertaken, resulting in Environmental Minister Thorbjom Bemtsen's proposal 
for a binding agreement for the mutual monitoring of the Barents Sea.^ "The 
negotiatory climate is better than it has been in a long time," emphasised 
Bemtsen.
Although the Swedish and Norwegian reactions to the resumption of testing 
were quite similar, Sweden and Norway have had different approaches to test 
bans previously. Swedish Defence Ministry official, Jan Prawitz contrasted 
Sweden's and Norway's position on test-bans such:
"Sweden has had a much higher verbal profile in the issue than 
Norway. This is partly attributable to the fact that Norway is 
not a member of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (is 
only an observer) and Sweden is. From the viewpoint of 
seismology, the Pentagon has funded (1969-70) a seismographic 
station far advanced relative to Sweden's. I think that the fact 
that Norway is a NATO state has not significantly dampened 
its reaction in the past, say five-six years. The Swedes and the 
Norwegians have had quite similar profiles in the Novaya 
Zemlya question and in the Special Committee for Test-Bans
® C. Norén, "Atomprov drabbar en miljon," Dagens Nyheter, 2 November, 
1990.
® "Sovjetiska karnvapenprov ska genomforas nâra Norden," Blekinge Lans 
Tidning, 19 April, 1991. This occurred amidst an invitation from the Soviets to 
permit Nordic experts to check the blast field there. (E. Veigârd, "Fâr inspisere 
atomprovefeltet," Aftenposten, 30 April, 1991).
® L.B. Tessem, 'Dumping-pâstander granskes," Aftenposten, 24 December,
1990.
® D. Fonbaæk, "Berntsen-invitt til Sovjet i nord," Aftenposten, 13 January,
1991.
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and Seismology in Geneva, Sweden has long been Chairman 
and Norway Chief Secretary.
Norwegian action and reaction
The reaction from Norway was arguably more swift and violent^^ than in 
Sweden.^ Prime Minister Jan P. Syse felt betrayed: "we thought the Soviets 
would behave differently after all of the discussions we have had...the test 
explosions are extremely serious."^^ Syse continued "it is especially since the 
detonation occurred so close to Norwegian territory^^ and that it occurred in 
an ecologically vulnerable^^ area that it awakens such worries."
“  J. Prawitz, telephone interview, 10 September, 1991.
Debate in the Storting began the same day. (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 
24 October, 1990), in response to a question by MP, Anders Aune (Fremskritt 
for Finnmark Party), who, in representing the most exposed region of Norway, 
pointed out "we have seen that the Soviets connect this blast w ith the 
Americans' nuclear tests."
^  One Swedish MP explained the accented Norwegian reaction by saying 
"somehow the Norwegians experience the destruction of the nature in 
Murmansk—well, they experience it more 'beneath the skin' (intimately) than in 
Sweden." (SI5)
A. Bonde, T. Hay, R.L. Larsen, "Ny sovjetisk provesprengning." The 
Norwegians availed themselves of the opportunities to express their displeasure- 
-prior to the 24th (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 24 October, 1990): Syse mentions 
some of the most significant: March, 1990 to the Soviet Foreign Ministry; 
August-September, 1990 on a trip of Undersecretaries of State Hide and 
Vollebaek to Moscow; The Nordic Foreign Minister's resulting joint communiqué 
of 11 September (Molde, Norway); Foreign Minister Bondevik's conversations 
with Shevardnadze (New York), 1 October, 1990 and again by Vollebaek on 16 
October.
It should be noted that it is approximately equidistance from Novaya 
Zemlya to Svalbard as it is to the Norwegian-Soviet border.
This particular point was allegedly pointed out in the joint-Nordic visit at 
the Soviet Foreign Ministry. ("Sovjetfrâgor for Norden," Dagens Nyheter, 27 
October, 1990).
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Bnm dtland's reactions were similar. "It is especially regretable because it 
occurs during a time that one was learning to do without nuclear testing."^ 
"From the Norwegian side we have, with positive interest, registered the Soviet 
desire to step down the nuclear testing activity on Novaya Zemlya," Brundtland 
was quoted as saying. "The Government," she continued, "has previously 
expressed clear support for the conclusion of an agreement which entails a ban 
on nuclear testing."^ As LO official Kâre Sandegren stated, "the reaction in 
Norway to Novaya Zemlya has been very strong and harsh...ifs very bad 
indeed."^
There were however calls for moderation in the Norwegian reaction. One top 
advisor warned against blowing the issue out of proportion: "Novaya Zemlya 
is a minor issue compared with the contamination from vessels and factories on 
the Kola...it will be interesting to see the way people react when they become 
aware of this."^^ Even Jan P. Syse later felt there should be limits to the 
Norwegian official reaction, saying there was "no need to dramatise the 
s i t u a t i o n . I t  is unclear which position the Norwegians took towards the 
Soviet linkage between its resumption of tests on Novaya Zemlya and the U.S. 
nuclear tests. To be sure, the Norwegians felt that moderation was due, since 
they did not w ant to be seen as having a double-approach to the issue—one 
towards the Americans and one towards the Soviet Union.
^  "Sovjetfrâgor for Norden."
^  "Statsminister Gro Harlem Brundtlands kommentar 2. oktober 1987 til 
generalsekretaer Mikhail Gorbatsjovs tale i Murmansk 1. oktober 1987. (UD- 
informasjon (24) 1987 as in NUPI, 1987:413)
^  Sandegren, interview.
^^N26
“  "Ny Sovjetisk provesprengning."
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Swedish action and reaction
The Swedes reacted noticeably more calmly in the wake of the resumption 
of nuclear blasts on Novaya Zemlya. However, it is doubtful whether this was 
a result of its neutrality—rather, most likely it was a factor of its geographical 
remoteness from Novaya Zemlya. Said one MP, "the (Swedish) Government 
has protested, but little has been said about it in the mass media,"^’ Sten 
Andersson^ notes that "the issue has caused great worry in Sweden...for that 
reason, Sweden has, on three separate opportunities, raised the question with 
Soviet representatives (who respond that no decision has at yet been made)." 
The Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee felt a need to be even-handed in the 
question, contrasting the "Soviet declaration of its preparedness to conclude an 
agreement regarding a total halting of tests, while the U.S. sees a ban as a 
remote goal in a gradual process."^^
After the resumption became reality, Sten Andersson^, soon after the first 
new round of detonations had occurred, gave his view of the situation thus:
"The Government naturally regrets that, after a one year 
cessation, the Soviet Union has resumed its nuclear 
testing. This awakens great, warranted unease in Sweden 
and many other countries. The Government, not least 
against the background of different Soviet initiatives 
regarding a total ban on nuclear testing, had nonetheless 
hoped that the Soviet Union would refrain from 
continuing (its) tests."
Then Andersson made clear which steps had been taken:
"The matter has been taken up with the Soviet Union by 
Sweden and the other Nordic countries; the last time being in 
a concerted Nordic call (attendance) on 28 September. On 29
’^ S15
Riksdagsprotokoll, 8 May, 1990.
Riksdagstryck, 1987/88:UU1 ("Nedrustning"). Note date: 7 October, 1987. 
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 27 November, 1990.
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October the five Nordic countries together paid a call on 
Karpov in the Soviet Foreign Ministry.
Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, stated "the decision (to 
resume tests) was taken by the Soviet Defence Ministry—with the Government's 
knowledge."^^ "But this time," said Theorin, there was "real discussion, because 
it was the beginning of democracy."^ Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson,^^ 
pointed out that there was reason to fear a continuation of testing in Novaya 
Zemlya, if the Soviet Union has, thus far in Semipalatinsk been unable to 
perform totally secure (in which no radioactivity leaks out) underground tests." 
"What this means," said Ericson, "is that there is an un-controlled spreading of 
radioactivity in the sensitive arctic environment."
M utual Nordic Follow-Up
Gorbachev's Helsinki Visit
Gorbachev's trip to Helsinki and the speeches he delivered there in October 
1989 may be regarded as attempts to follow-up the Murmansk initiative. 
Important for the Finns, and thus also important for the Nordic security pattern, 
was Gorbachev's recognition of Finland's "unhesitating neutrality."^
^  See also T. Hinnemo, "Atomprotest i Moskva," Aftenposten, 30 October, 
1990. Swedish Foreign Minister Andersson gave further evidence that the 
subject was breached at the Nordic Foreign Minister meeting in Karlshamn, 
Sweden, 21-22 March, 1991 (Riksdagsprotokoll, 21 March, 1991).
Strengthened by T. Hinnemo in "Karnprov fâr fran kritik," Svenska 
Dagbladet, 1 November, 1990.
^  Theorin, interview.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 14 March, 1990.
^  "Finland- ett neutralt nordiskt land," Hufvudstadsbladet, 27 October, 1989; 
"Gorbatjov halsade 'neutrala Finland,'" Hufvudstadsbladet, 26 October, 1989.
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This trip is interesting for us since it encouraged open foreign policy 
cooperation between the Nordic countries, a practice which had been taboo until 
the arrival of Gorbachev/* This Soviet effort in fact, perhaps inadvertently, 
legitimized closer Nordic cooperation on a number of questions, not least the 
environment and joint Nordic support for the Baltic republics. In this way, 
Norway's, Sweden's and the other Nordic security policy commitments would 
become unidentifiable, and to some extent defuse the security policy overtones 
in non-security policy areas. In his presentation, Gorbachev said he envisioned 
closer forms of cooperation between the Supreme Soviet and the Nordic 
Council.^’ This was important given the background of Soviet opposition to 
the Nordic Council's formation. It also seemed as though Gorbachev was 
mistaken in thinking the Nordic Council cooperated on foreign policy matters. 
In response to Gorbachev's speech, an extraordinary session of the Nordic 
Council was called in Mariehamn, Aland in November.
One Swedish MP with intimate involvement in Nordic Council matters, 
related some of the factors which might have gone into Gorbachev's thinking 
in Helsinki. "The Murmansk initiative," it was said, "was received much more 
coldly than the Helsinki speech."*® Gorbachev was sending out his lifelines at 
the time, he was in a very difficult domestic situation, this MP related. In fact, 
related one MP, "we had already been working on the environmental issues for 
at least a half a year back—thus, it was Gorbachev who answered our call for 
cooperation—we know today that they knew about our work in the Soviet
*^ Jonson (1989:20) points to the changing Soviet attitude towards closer 
Nordic cooperation; see also Jonson (1990a:143)
^  "Sovjet vill nârma sig Europa," Hufvudstadsbladet, 27 October, 1989. In 
a speech on 26 October, 1989, Gorbachev proposed a "Commission of Experts 
between the Supreme Soviet and the Nordic Council, as well as the 
establishment of a permanent parliamentary group to discuss problems in North 
Europe with a wide following."
*®S15
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MFA."*^ But what was clear was that Gorbachev, in making a call for 
cooperation with the Nordic Council, had his facts wrong—and one individual 
was willing to give Gorbachëv the benefit of the doubt: "maybe he did not 
know that we didn 't cooperate in foreign policy matters."*^
Norwegian Foreign Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, felt that the Nordic 
Council had given a positive response to Gorbachev's proposal for Nordic 
parliamentary contacts. Bondevik pointed out that the area of environmental 
cooperation was especially fertile for parliamentary contacts.*^ Then-Prime 
Minister, Jan P. Syse, said "we feel we can develop a lot of positive things in 
working out the closest possible cooperation amongst the Nordic countries 
towards cultivating precisely those sort of measures towards the Soviet 
Union."^ But Socialist Left Party's Kjellbjorg Lunde felt that there should have 
been a much more positive reaction in Mariehamn.*^ Labour Party's Bjom 
Tore Godal felt one had to differentiate between two proposals Gorbachëv put 
forth in Helsinki: "one, was the exchange of parliamentary delegations between 
the Soviet Union and Norway (that we are all positive to)...But there was 
another invitation that of creating cooperation, to the Nordic Council as a 
forum."^ As Minister Tom Vraalsen pointed out "Prime Minister Syse, other 
Governmental representatives and the Labour Party's Parliamentary leader, 
Brundtland, expressed identical views on the question which this (move by 
Gorbachëv) raised."*^ Even Norwegian Progress Party's Carl I. Hagen felt that
S15
S15
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989. 
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990. 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
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Gorbachev's proposal could be responded to positively:** "the question of 
pollution alone should be sufficient enough to support Gorbachëv in his attem pt 
to foster contacts with the Nordic Council."*’
M utm l Nordic Efforts to Cure Soviet Environmental Ills
Because Norway and Sweden are both small countries, it follows that their 
financial and manpower bases are insufficient to deal with large problems; the 
Soviet environmental catastrophe is one such case.
It was this realisation which led Norway and Sweden to rely to a certain 
extent on developing a common Nordic strategy towards the problem area—to 
supplement existing bilateral efforts. Norway never raised any formal 
opposition to signing bilateral environmental cooperation treaties w ith the 
Soviet Union—in fact encouraging more of this sort of cooperation. Thorvald 
Stoltenberg noted on 2 December, 1987, "there is already cooperation between 
Norway and the Soviet Union in several of the areas which the General 
Secretary mentioned in his speech." "At present," he said "we are working on 
bilateral treaties in the following areas: environmental preservation, early 
warning regarding nuclear accidents, scientific cooperation in the Northern 
Areas, rescue services for ship and plane crashes in the northern sea areas."’® 
It seems clear that Norway went further on a bilateral basis with the Soviet 
Union than Sweden had in these, for the times, sensitive areas.
Sweden and Norway have approached the situation on a multilateral basis, 
joining hands with their Nordic counterparts in piecing together a solution to 
a problem of truly unimaginable proportions. Environmental pollution on the 
Kola generally (and the Nickel smelting works in particular) have been the 
Norwegians' main, albeit not sole concern. The Swedes have also worried much
** Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990. 
*’ Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990. 
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
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more about the environmental destruction in neighbouring areas, and the Baltic 
area in particular.’  ^ These geographical orientations have determined the 
respective countries' willingness to tackle parts of the huge pie of Soviet 
environmental disaster. The concrete financial inputs of the two countries have 
mirrored these priorities.
The Nordic Council has played a pronounced role in these efforts. At the 
Nordic Council's Minister Council's meeting in October, 1990 a working 
programme was adopted regarding the Central and East European countries, 
with emphasis on the Baltic republics.’  ^ The chief areas of concern were 
exchanges, education, and the environment, as well as efforts oriented towards 
opening Nordic information offices in the Soviet Baltic republics.’^
The first Norwegian decision to undertake aid to Eastern Europe was made 
in November, 1989—in this case to Poland, in the amount of 70 million NOK (for 
food, environment and education purposes), as well as a export-guarantee 
framework of 150 million NOK.’  ^ In May of 1990 the Storting decided to make 
a contribution of 100 million NOK for bilateral contributions to Central and
The Swedish Government approved one billion SEK, over a three year 
period, as "strategic support towards strengthening the Central and East 
European countries' capabilities to execute the political and economic reform 
process...the Swedish support is oriented, in the first place, towards cooperation 
in the environmental sphere...and the majority of the aid will go to Poland, the 
Baltic republics as well as the area in Sweden's proximity." (Jacoby, 1990:24)
"Samarbetet med Central- och Osteuropa i intemationellt och svenskt 
perspektiv," (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs October, 1990), p.33.
"Samarbetet med Central- och Osteuropa i intemationellt och svenskt 
perspektiv," notes: "new investments will be made through a risk-capital 
company for environmental investments in Central and East Europe, called 
"NEFCO." (Decision taken by Nordic Council, March, 1990). Each of the Nordic 
countries was to contribute to the fund and the total amount, administered by 
the Nordic Investment Bank, was approximately SEK 289 million, to be paid 
over a six year period.(pps. 33-34).
^  "Samarbetet med Central- och Osteuropa i intemationellt och svenskt 
perspektiv," p.37.
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Eastern Europe for that year. The 100 million NOK was to come from 
redistribution in the Norwegian national budget, and not from aid sources.^
Norway's policy towards the Nickel smelting works
Closer study of the approaches to Nickel smelting works problem is 
worthwhile for what it reveals of changing perceptions of a particular problem— 
for all concerned parties. One individual dubbed the project "a Norwegian 
initiative, based on a Soviet request for cleaning technology."^ Swedes and 
Norwegians have agreed that the problem is essentially a Norwegian and 
Finnish one being that Nickel is located where it is.^ At the Ronneby 
Conference on 2-3 September, the Prime Ministers of the represented Nordic 
countries appointed a group of experts to study the possibilities for a joint 
approach to the reconstruction of the Nickel plant.’* The "working group" took 
note of a Finnish suggestion that industrial deliveries to the project should be 
divided hence: 50% Finland, Norway 25%, Sweden 19% and others 15%.”  
According to one source close to the matter, Swedish agreement to 
participate on the Kola was a trade-off for a Norwegian pledge to participate 
in the Baltic.^ ®® Thus, "the Swedes promised to participate, on commercial 
terms, in the Kola," he recounted. At face value, this would not seem very
” "Samarbetet med Central- och Osteuropa."
%N44
”  Most involved are Finnish OUTOKUMPU and Norwegian ELKEM a.s..
’* "Speaking Notes of the Kola-Projects," (Helsinki: Outokum pu OY, 21 
September, 1990), p.l.
”  "Working Group on Financial Support to the Nordic Kola Environment 
Project. Agreed Minutes" This division was agreed upon after 14 September, 
1990 ("Report from the group of financial experts,") "Other" sources are deemed 
to be Germany, Austria and the USSR. ("The Renovation Proposition for Kola 
Nickel Smelters by Outokumpu.")
100 n 4 4
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important. However, the Swedish and Norwegian credit guarantee institutes 
had previously suspended credit guarantees to the Soviet Union for the long­
term. Thus, a Governmental pledge to extend such guarantees to a participating 
Swedish firm (rumours were that Svensk Hàkt AB or Asea Brown Boveri were 
top in the running) would be a political move of significance. The decision 
would have to be guaranteed by the Riksdag as a "special case." Since activity 
over the issue has risen to the Prime Minister level,^ ®^  this type of intervention 
was possible—though no such steps had been taken as of this writing. However, 
in m id-1991 the project was showing signs of decreasing Swedish support 
within the intra-Nordic financing scheme.^®^
As of 19 September, 1990 the total cost of the project was estimated at 
2,900,000,000 In one report, the financial feasibility group concluded
the following: "it is considered advisable to arrange the whole financing mainly 
through a combination of the national Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish export 
credit schemes and NIB, with possible complementary financing from non- 
Nordic export credit institutions (such as Germany and Austria) a n d /o r  untied 
loans (Germany)."^^
One m ust remember, that, as one Norwegian Social Democrat, B.T. Godal, 
said, "each one of the Norwegian Governments has given the environment 
priority s t a t u s . N o r w e g i a n  Foreign Minister, Thorvald Stoltenberg, queried 
why the Norwegians were adopting such a low profile on the Baltic 
independence issue, responded that "there were other interests at stake."
Soviet Vice President, Yenaev, was due in Oslo the day following the 
interview (over the death of King 01av)-the interviewee told me that the issue 
would be taken up between Brundtland and Yenaev at that opportunity. (N44)
M. Planting," Svenskar bromsar Kola-projekt," Dagens Industri, 4 June,
1991.
103 "peport from the group of financial experts," (19 September, 1990), p.l. 
"Report from the group of financial experts," (19 September, 1990).
B.T. Godal, interview.
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According one senior MFA advisor, a central consideration here was to have 
been fledgling environmental cooperation with the Soviet Union.*“  Thus, 
Governments in both Finland and Norway have seen the problem in such a 
serious light as to earmark parts of their budgets for efforts to rectify the 
situation.^®^
With respect to a Norwegian desire to chart the flow of pollution from the 
Kola Peninsula (air, land and water) Norway has developed some quite intimate 
forms of cooperation with Moscow. In fact, said one advisor, ’We had only 
talked on one opportunity since the early 1970's.”*  ^ "When we started to 
exchange drafts," he said, in the Fall of 1987-"we sat for one day and the 
Soviets accepted every word which was (in our proposed d r a f t ) . A s  was 
pointed out earlier, the Soviet authorities were also increasingly willing to 
accept otherwise intrusive Norwegian monitoring on Soviet soil."°
^(^N26
S48, re-interview, March, 1991.
108 N44
Some crucial points of this interview are worth recounting: when the 
initiative came in 1987 (with the signature in January 1988), it was clear the 
initiative came from above;- there were some details in the Soviet proposal 
which were not acceptable from the Norwegian perspective (e.g. the overly 
theoretical nature of the draft, the Soviet desire for a contingency plan for oil 
accidents in the Barents) both of which were rejected (N44)
The Soviets agreed to accept monitoring equipment, since the Kola 
Science Centre did not have adequate equipment to analyze the data. The 
following points are worth remarking: the equipment was installed in 1989 
("right in the middle of one of the most sensitive military areas—unheard of at 
this time;" "this marked the first time the Norwegians were receiving primary 
environmental data." (under EMOP, Norway had only received aggregate data, 
or as Soviet Union defined it they would give an aggregate figure for all 
pollution which passes their border); "this marked first time that Norwegian 
environmental data was accepted in Moscow." (N44)
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Swedish involvement
In December 1989, Prime Minister Carlsson presented a proposal for aid to 
Central and East Europe. In the Government's budget proposition for fiscal 
year 1990/91 one billion SEK was proposed for a three year period. 300 million 
of these were earmarked for Poland, while the rest would be distributed over 
Central and East Europe."^ One of the most important documents on 
Swedish-Soviet environmental cooperation was presented to the Riksdag on 28 
November, 1989."^ Several crucial points should be noted with respect to this 
document.
.Sweden has bi-lateral environmental agreements with East 
European states DDR, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union.
(of a technical-economic sort).
.the agreement with the Soviet Union, concluded on 1 May,
1989, was concluded between Governments and devotes 
particular attention to the environmental problems in the 
region, (the portions bordering on the Baltic)
On 2-3 September, 1990 a large conference, with participants from Poland, 
Denmark, then-DDR, Finland, FRG, Norway, the Soviet Union and the EEC- 
Commission, took place in Ronneby, Sweden. A declaration was the result, 
with a great many (19) proposals towards re-setting the ecological balance in the 
Baltic."^ Greatest effort would be demanded from the Soviet Union, former- 
DDR, and Poland."^ A follow-up meeting with the participation, at expert- 
level, of the Ronneby participants was held in Stockholm the following May 
(1991).
"Samarbetet med Central- och Osteuropa," p. 41.
Riksdagstryck 1989/90:UU7 (Samarbete med Osteuropa och vissa 
intemationella miljoinsatser").
S. Leijonhufvud, "Ett genombrott for ekologin," Svenska Dagbladet, 4 
September, 1990.
"Samarbetete med Central- och Osteuropa," p. 46.
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Chapter Nine
Norway, Sweden and Soviet Strategic-Military Issues, 1987-1991
Introduction
In the late 1970's and the 1980's both superpower alliances began to 
prioritize Northern areas, constituting an important shift from their previous 
military-strategic emphasis on the Central European theatre. According to one 
Norwegian expert the first significant upswing in the Soviet military capacity 
in the Nordic area occurred in 1968.  ^ The Soviet Union^ and NATO today 
count the Nordic area as a primary strategic interest. While it seems clear that 
the intention of the Soviet Union is not utilize this strategic muscle against the 
Nordic countries^ its sheer proximity places a tremendous physical and 
psychological burden^ upon the nearby nations, particularly Norway.®
 ^ "We first indicated this to the Storting in 1968," he said, 'b u t no one paid 
any attention to that." (N4)
 ^For example, 2 /3  of Soviet submarine-based nuclear is potential based on 
the Kola Peninsula. (Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1988)
® 0streng  (1987:1) writes: "In Norway there is a broad agreement that this 
huge naval power is not directed toward or still further, not built up because 
of Norway. It reflects the USSR's global engagement."
 ^J.J. Holst, 12 February, 1987: "the military forces which are assigned (to the 
Kola) must be seen, in the first instance, withdn the context of the confrontation 
and balance of power between the U.S. and the Soviet Union's global power 
and interests...but their proximity logically causes special problems for the 
security of Norway." (Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Ârbog 1987 (Oslo: NUPI, 1987), 
p. 157.
® Skogan (1986) points out that the Soviet Northern Fleet has grown at a 
much quicker pace than the Soviet Baltic Fleet. It is also important to note that 
the Soviet Northern Fleet, one of the Soviet Union's strongest fleets, is based in 
Murmansk and often exercises in the high seas off the Norwegian coast.
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The following section will attempt to bring forth the similarities and 
differences between the Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of and responses^ 
to the issues related to the Soviet strategic buildup in the North. Naturally, 
changes in the U.S-Soviet relationship was also one of the central considerations 
for decision-makers, emd needs to be considered. Did neutral Sweden receive 
and respond to changes in Soviet strategic issues differently than NATO-state 
Norway? There were other central questions: Are we overreacting? What 
intentions underlay the Soviet buildup? What effects do these trends have on 
Norwegian or Swedish defence/foreign policy planning?
To an extent, Norway and Sweden shared the same impression of these 
trends. To an extent the similarity between Norwegian and Swedish defence 
outlays is supportive of this statement.
Swedish^ and Norwegian* Defence Spending as part of GNP
1985-6 1986-7 1987-8 1988-9 1989-90 1990-1
N 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.2
S 3.0 3.0 2.9 2.7 2.8 2.6
However, Soviet behaviour towards Norway and its behaviour towards 
Sweden have not been uniform. Thus, the Soviet Union's different approach 
and behaviour—whether intentional or not—has led to some different responses 
and perceptions. Sweden's neutral status and Norway's NATO status have
* By 'response' is meant chiefly statements and perceptions connected to the 
changing strategic environment. No attempt is made to show a connection 
between, say, changing threat perception and military budget.
 ^Forsvarsstatistisk 1990 (Stockholm: Ministry of Defence, 1990), p.l2.
* Forsvarsstatistik 1990, p.8 and Norwegian Defence. Facts and Figures
1991 and 1992 versions (Oslo: Royal Ministry of Defence). Figures for 1990/91 
for Norway are estimated.
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likewise conditioned the two states' reactions to and views of the Soviet military 
buildup.
Swedish and Norwegian Threat Perception: A  Brief Introduction
While land and air-based invasion scenarios are important, the main threat 
was seen as coming from the Soviet Navy, especially from its submarines, with 
their twin threat of nuclear strike against the U.S. and enhanced ability to cut 
maritime supply lines. (Sollie, 1988:18) Norway feels itself far more exposed by 
Soviet strategic planning in the North than does Sweden. The reasons for this 
are obvious and have little to do with its alignment policy today—but had very 
much to do with the Norwegian decision to apply for NATO membership. 
Today, the overhanging presence of the Kola Bases, the open Barents Sea 
delineation question, the proximity of Novaya Zemlya, proximate Soviet naval 
activity and a Soviet border, can be counted amongst the important factors. 
Norwegian decision-makers thus have an unmatched appetite for new 
developments in Soviet Northern military planning in areas near Norway—in 
particular the Leningrad Military District-to a degree uncharacteristic of 
Western countries, including its neighbouring Sweden.
Sweden, for logical geographical reasons, has traditionally been more 
concerned with the naval developments in the Baltic—in particular w ithin the 
Baltic Military District. Historical experience can also explain w hy N orth and 
South have different preoccupations with Soviet security planning. Sweden is 
historically a Baltic naval power, while Norway has historically found its fate 
tied with nations across the North Sea and Atlantic. The decrease in Swedish 
interest can also be partly attributed to the Baltic Fleet's diminished position, 
while the Northern Fleet's significance has increased considerably through the 
1980's and early 1990's.
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Soviet Disarmament: Word and Deed
In the 1980's and early 19990's, the Central European theatre counted most 
in terms of Soviet disarmament. There were no more than symbolic indications 
that the Nordic area held a priority on the Soviet disarmament agenda. It thus 
becomes important to consider the U.S.-Soviet arena in order to chart and 
analyze Swedish and Norwegian perceptions regarding both change and 
stability in Soviet military and disarmament behaviour in places where change 
indeed was occurring.
The Stockholm Conference
While substantial reductions of forces would not materialize until 1985-6,’ the 
Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures 
(CSBM),^® which took place between 16 January, 1984 and 19 September, 1986 
laid important groundwork for change in Soviet disarmament behaviour. Soviet 
behaviour during the Stockholm Conference was one of the first indications to 
Norwegian and Swedish élites of a Soviet re-orientation to disarmament."
"Up until 1986," said one Swedish diplomat who was intimately involved in 
the CSBM talks, "the Soviets conceded on a case-by-case basis—it was still not 
possible to say they had changed their total position."" For many, the Soviet
’ Conservative Norwegian MP Jan Petersen points out that while there was 
"reason to rejoice in the Stockholm Conference's breakthrough with respect to 
proper control and inspection," "the Russian diplomatic offensive clearly has its 
limitations...the Soviet Union has neglected to meet us (half-way) on a number 
of areas which have great significance for us." (e.g. convention^ disarmament, 
chemical weapons...") (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 3 December, 1986).
For background on the conference see A. Kallin, "Stockholmskonferensen- 
forlopp och résultat," (Stockholm: Swedish Foreign Ministry, 1986). The main 
to p ic s  of th e  c o n fe ren c e  w ere : N o n -u se  o f v io le n c e ,
information/verification/communication, measures to limit military activity, 
prior notification, and observation.
"  One Norwegian diplomat abroad (N3); one Swedish MFA official (S40).
" S40
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acceptance of intrusive verificatory measures was the most important result of 
the treaty—something with which the CSCE, as one Norwegian diplomat related, 
had no success.^^ Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, felt 
the Soviet delegates "expressed a greater willingness to accept profound control 
measures...the problem is above all a political one."^  ^ A Norwegian diplomat 
mentioned Stockholm as a "dramatic move by Gromyko, personally, on 
inspections," adding "all our CSBM propositions are actually (included)
The Swedish Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee wrote "the more open 
attitude of the Soviet Union to accept verificatory measures has even affected 
other areas of negotiation (e.g. the follow-up of the convention on the use of 
biological w e a p o n s ) . O n e  Norwegian diplomat related "before they never 
let anyone in—everything was so difficult because of their attitude towards on­
site inspections; they didn 't want people looking into their manuals." "This 
change is clearly brought on by glasnosf he explained.^^
One of the more important Soviet openings, both indirectly and directly 
related to the CSBM, was Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's admission that the 
Soviet radar posting in Krasnoyarsk was, as the Americans had maintained for 
several years standing, in violation of the ABM Treaty.^* The issues of 
verification and inspection brought up in the context of the CSBM were 
expanded and refined in Gorbachev's October 1987 M urmansk initiative.
N3. This is confirmed by the experiences of one delegate to Stockholm, 
Kallin, "Stockholmskonferensen- forlopp och résultat," p .20-21.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 19 March, 1986.
'^N26




The Early Years of Disarmament
Swedish and Norwegian hopes for a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement reached a 
high m ark in 1985-6.^’ However it seems that Norwegian élites, especially 
those on the far Right of the political spectrum adopted a more reserved 
attitude to the possibility for change than did the Swedes. This attitude went 
hand-in-hand with the far Right parties' advocacy of a strong Norwegian NATO 
commitment.
The Soviet presence in Afghanistan would serve to remind élites of w hat still 
needed to be done in Soviet foreign policy.^ Nonetheless, a first summit was 
held between Reagan and Gorbachev in Geneva during the Fall of 1985 which 
sent signals of hope to the outside world. A second summit in Reykjavik in 11- 
12 October, 1986 would further strengthen the impression that, even barring 
concrete result, the two world leaders could now at least speak together. The 
meeting was not important for what it accomplished, but rather w hat it 
symbolized.
The Norwegian Right, as contrasted to the Swedish Right, clearly attributed 
a changed Soviet disarmament approach to U.S. strength. Conservative Party 
Chairman, Syse, said that "it is against the background of Americem proposals 
for disarmament that one must see Gorbachev's last effort in Reykjavik. 
Kâre Willoch adopted the common American Conservative argum ent that the
Swedish Centre MP Karin Soder expressed the satisfaction that: "Reagan 
and Gorbachev have agreed to meet again (has awoke) hope for a more secure 
world" (Riksdagsprotokoll, 19 March, 1986).
^  Karin Soder: "It's deeply saddening that the leaders in Moscow have not 
re-evaluated their military intervention in Afghanistan." This logic was echoed 
by Swedish Communist Party Chairman, Lars Werner: "The Soviets must leave 
Afghanistan and all foreign involvement in Afghanistan m ust cease." 
(Riksdagsprotokoll, 19 March, 1986).
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 3 December, 1986.
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American SDI proposal brought the Soviets to the negotiating table.^ Earlier, 
Conservative Foreign Minister, Svenn Stray^ characterized proposals which 
Gorbachev had made in an interview in Fravda on 8 April, 1985, regarding a 
moratorium of space-based attack weapons and a freeze of offensive strategic 
weapons, as fraught by imprecision and wondered why anti-satellite systems 
were excluded from the proposal. (NUPI, 1985:259)
This contrasted with Norwegian Labour opinion, which tended to attribute 
progress equally to both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.'s willingness to disarm.^ 
Influential Labour MP, Reiulf Steen mentioned that ’'before the eyes of a dazed 
world both Gorbachev and Reagan were placing as comprehensive disarmament 
plans on the table as had ever been proposed...it looked like the two leaders 
were competing to determine who was the most agile at painting a vision of 
future utopia."^ Foreign Minister Knut Frydenlund, felt that there was some 
"radical new thinking towards nuclear weapons" at the meeting."^ Centre 
Party's J.J. Jakobsen joined in this refrain: "the meeting (creates) hopes towards 
a reduction of nuclear weapons...(and with that) new expectations of concrete 
results from the negotiations."
Many Swedes saw progress at Reykjavik as a positive sign. The Swedish 
political party establishment's reception of the conference's result followed a 
pattern similar to Norway's, however U.S. credit was hardly given.^ Swedish
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 3 December, 1986; Labour MR'S Forde and 
Reiulf Steen argue that, in the words of Steen, "we hear this at every crossroads, 
which is usually for supporting every new weapon-technological effort."
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 24 April, 1985.
^  Most evident in the debate of the same day and Stortings Meld. 11,1987-
88).
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987; 19 January, 1989.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 26 November, 1986.
^  One of the most revealing debates on the issue in Sweden took place on 
28 October, 1987 (Riksdagsprotokoll).
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Liberal Party MP, Ingemar Eliasson's reaction correctly mirrors that sentiment: 
"up until Reykjavik a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons was a 
theoretical construction of mind...(Reykjavik) can be seen as a confirmation that 
ideas regarding large reduction in the nuclear weapons arsenals are realistic."^ 
Until Reykjavik talk of disarmament moved very slowly. From Reykjavik 
onwards, élites in both Sweden and Norway were, on the whole, unsure of 
where the process that Gorbachev had set into motion, would end.^
Disarmament in the North: Norwegian Reactions
While Reykjavik imbued Norwegian and Swedish élites w ith hope of a 
superpower rapprochement, qualitative and quantitative cutbacks in their 
backyards were moving in the opposite direction. The seriousness of the Soviet 
Kola bases arguably came into the public eye during 1985-6 and became 
increasingly visible later in the 1980's.^ The Soviet buildup in the Norwegian 
proximity until 1985(Skogan, 1986) would continue relentlessly through 1986.^  ^
Even in light of these developments there were still isolated manifestations of 
innocence emanating from high military quarters about the serious nature of the 
bases.^^ Conservative MP Ingvald Godal's feeling that it now was obvious that 
the Soviets had taken it upon themselves to make the Norwegian Sea into a
28 Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.
^  Swedish Communist MP Oswald Soderqvist, R iksdagsprotokoll, 28 
October, 1987.
^  Aftenposten leaders, "Kola-basene som nabo," 26 August, 1986; "Den 
okende trusel," 10 September, 1986; interview with Finn Sollie, "Nye Kola-baser 
vekker bekymring," Aftenposten, 26 August, 1986.
O.S. Storvik, "I Kolas slag-skygge," Aftenposten, 10 May, 1986 for details 
of changes in the submarine structure on the Kola.
See interview with General Tonne Huitfeldt, "-Sovjet-trusselen overdrevet," 
Arbeiderbladet, 6 February, 1986. The article points out that Huitfeldt's 
viewpoint diverges from such held by Chief of Defence General F. Bull-Hansen 
over the same issue.
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mare Sovieticum^^ was popular both in and outside of Government. This 
increased presence moved Soviet defence lines both Southwards and 
Westwards, with the effect of concentrating firepower further and further away 
from its basing areas.^
Under these conditions^. Defence Minister Holst reaffirms "there is 
consensus in the Storting regarding the security policy line which Norway 
should follow." But several signals of political infighting over Soviet military 
policy nevertheless did exist.
While it would not be correct to say there ran a dividing line between the 
political parties over the seriousness of the buildup, a case could be made that 
the Conservative Government, which was in power until 1986, made the Kola 
complex into a debate item at a comparatively early stage. At the same time, 
the Conservative Party advocated quicker and more intense measures to meet 
this threat than did tlie Labour Party.^ Foreign Relations Committee 
Chairman, Willoch, felt that Western restrænt had not had any impact on the 
Soviet buildup in the area.^^ Thor Knudsen, pointed out a clear political
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.
^  Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Froysnes' speech on 7 January,
1986. (NUPI, 1986:170)
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.
^  Defence Minister Anders Sjaastad's speech, 6 January, 1986, (NUPI, 
1986:126-7); Undersecretary of State Froysnes on 7 January, 1986 (ibid, p. 170).
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986. Same date: Conservative MP 
Thor Knudsen said the increased activity has been also mirrored in the Soviet 
exercise pattern—in both composition of forces and operational areas. See 
contrasting statement by Socialist Left MP Hanna Kvanmo: "-Nâ eller aldri for 
nedrustning," Aftenposten, 22 July, 1987: "the Conservative W estern leaders 
have become panicky, because they are afraid of the cohesion in NATO will let 
up."
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cleavage: "especially from the Socialist Left Party,^ whose aversion to our 
NATO membership is clear, the fault (for this trend) is placed on the increased 
activity of our alliance partners— nothing could be more fallacious."^’
No Norwegian Governmental official would deny the necessity of a U.S. 
presence to counteract this buildup. There was no doubt that w hat was called 
for was a unified NATO approach in the question. Defence Minister Holst 
continuously confirmed the need for such a naval presence in Northern waters, 
through both manoeuvres and port calls, aimed at offsetting possible Soviet 
dominance.^ The Labour Government, however, was careful to avoid giving 
the Soviet Union any reason for further military buildup in the area—especially 
sensitive to the form or scope of Allied exercises.^' Christian People's Party 
MP, Harald Synnes, left no doubt that the Soviet Union's naval buildup in the 
area sharpened the needed for a military presence, and the need to consistently 
demarcate Norwegian territorial sovereignty in the Northern areas.^ It is 
important to note, against this background, as Conservative MP, Kaci Kullmann
^  The Socialist Left Party was far more eager to place the blame for 
increasingly tense military situation in the Northern areas, close to equally on 
both alliances. See "SV: Konferanse om nordomrâdene," Aftenposten, 3 April,
1987.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.
See Foreign Minister Frydenlund, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 
1986; Prime Minister Brundtland points to the wide consensus behind this
effort, (same date) Conservative MP, Sjaastad, denies that any new Allied
marine strategy has come about and points out that from 1985 until the Fall of 
1985 the American carriers had only operated in 33 (24-hour) days in this part 
of the world, contrasted with the Soviet Northern Fleet which has puts on large 
exercises every year and has continuous training activities in the area. 
(Sjaastad's speech on 6 January, 1986 (NUPI, 1986:127-8)
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.
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Five points out, that the Allied presence in the Northern waters had in fact 
decreased over the previous ten to fifteen years.^
Nordic Disarmament: Swedish Reactions
The Swedish debate regarding the increased importance of the Kola and 
forces in its immediate vicinity would be mild compared to Norway. Whereas 
the Baltic Fleet seemed to be of declining importance in terms of capacity, Soviet 
intentions towards Sweden were seen as constant. Conservative MP, Gunnar 
Hokmark,^ argues: ’’...(this) is a time when the Soviet Union increasingly 
desires Baltic domination—both above and underwater...” ”We know,” said 
Conservative Party Leader Carl Bildt, ’’for all intents and purposes all Soviet 
Baltic shipyards have, since the end of 1970, changed from civilian to military 
production.”^  A need to counterbalance this trend was also advocated by the 
Swedish Conservatives, but more indirectly than the Norwegian Conservatives. 
One pathway was to discourage a curtailment of port calls. Said Hokmark ”(a 
ban on port calls) is not in the interest of peace, disarmament or Sweden.” 
During 1985-1986, the Swedish debate was, much like the Norwegian, 
dominated by an intense interest in U.S.-Soviet disarmament. Also, similar to 
Norway, Sweden's chief interest was naval disarmciment.^ Similar to Norway, 
the far Left would place the blame for the lack of progress upon American 
inflexibility. Communist Party leader, Lars Wemer, saw the cause as ’’the U.S.'s 
rigid position on disarmament negotiations,” seeing it as ”blocking disarmament 
negotiations generally,” a reference alluding to the U.S. position on naval
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 16 June, 1986.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 October, 1987.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989,
^  E.g., Sten Andersson, Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 April, 1989.
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disarmament.^^ Swedish Centre Party Chairman, Olof Johansson stated the 
obvious when he said:
"The naval race has caused great portions of the free seas 
to be used for exercises and other military presences. 
(With that) it has become increasingly difficult to get a 
birds-eye view on the military activity in Nor&iem 
waters."^
The locus of concern and action on naval disarmament, would be, in the 
absence of significant U.S.-Soviet activity on the matter, shifted to the United 
Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDQ.^^ Sweden's activity in this body 
and in other multilateral fora for naval disarmament would be high.
The Swedes would also keenly sense and feel an obligation to react to their 
neighbour, Norway's exposed position.^ Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson 
felt the increased interest in the Northern areas was partially attributable to the 
"military-technical development," for most, if not all of the specific reasons 
which Norwegian élites gave.^^ He thought that "the Soviet Navy required the 
control of North Norway's cost in order to secure its bases around Murmansk. 
One of the most difficult pathways to Northern Norway goes through the 
Northernmost part of our country." It is for this reason, said Ericson, that "we
Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.
See Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagstryck, 1990/91:UU4 
(Nedrustning), 18 October, 1990, p.40. However, Jan Prawitz (1990a:27) points 
out that since "the issue of 'naval armaments and disarmament" will no longer 
appear on the agenda of the UNDC, it will be necessary to express Sweden's 
views on the UN-track in other ways."
“  Social Democratic MP, Sture Ericson: "Our most proximate neighbour's 
exposed geopolitical situation influences both our policies and the measures we 
adopt." (Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987).
Riksdagsprotokoll, 18 March, 1987.
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place our best equipment and strongest military units in Norrbotten."(far 
Northern Sweden).^
Developments in Soviet Military Policy 1987-88
Murmansk: October, 1987
Seen from a security policy perspective, Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk 
on October 1, 1987 was for Norwegians and Swedes alike, the most important 
Soviet military policy démarche during 1987. The speech would provide one 
form of Soviet reply to Nordic concerns regarding Naval disarmament.
Speech Content
Whereas Gorbachev discussed environmental concerns, arctic and economic 
cooperation, security questions were clearly a central priority.®^ Gorbachev's 
motivation was "the Soviet Union is for a radical decrease in the level of 
military confrontation in the region."^ The first of Gorbachev's proposals was 
a re-statement of Soviet willingness to form a Nordic Nuclear Free Zone, 
emphasizing that the participating states themselves had to decide how such a 
guarantee should be formulated: by multilateral or bilateral agreements, by 
Governmental declarations or in some other way.^^
“  Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
I will quote directly from Gorbachev's speech as translated by Magnusson 
(1987).
^  Magnusson: "Let the northern part of the earth, the Arctic be a zone of 
peace! Let the North Pole be a pole of peace!" "We suggest," he said, "that the 
concerned parties should initiate negotiations towards limitations of military 
activity in the North—both in the Eastern and Western hemispheres."
Gorbachev said: "The Soviet Union has already unilaterally dismantled her 
launching capabilities for medium-distance missiles on the Kola Peninsula, as 
well as a large amount of launching devices belonging to the Leningrad and 
Baltic Military Districts" and that "military manoeuvres close to Nordic borders 
have been restricted."
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In Gorbachev's second concrete point on security, he welcomed "President 
Koivisto's proposal to restrict the naval activity in areas which bordered on the 
Nordic area, proposing "consultations between the WTO and NATO regarding 
the reduction of the military activity and limitation of the extent of sea and air 
force activities in the Baltic Sea, North Sea, Norwegian Sea and the Sea of 
Greenland—and that confidence-building measures would also spread to these
areas."^
Immediate Swedish Reactions
Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, assessed the speech 
as being "a chock for those in the bureaucracy...it was too early, too quick and 
not pre-negotiated."^^ According to Sten Andersson the problem which 
Gorbachev proposed to resolve had its origins in both superpower camps
"The Government has followed with increasing concern the 
superpower alliances' naval buildup and development of their 
naval developments in Norther waters in the past decades. The 
buildup of the Soviet Navy and the basing area on the Kola, 
with the increase of defensive and offensive seapower, further 
coupled with emphasis by the Western alliance on the 
defensive elements of their Naval strategy, have led to 
increased interest in the seas around Northern Europe...it is
“  Here Gorbachev proposed an agreement regarding the limitation of 
"racing" in the area of ASW, information about large naval and air force 
m anoeuvres-and the invitation of all participating states (from the European 
process) to observe large naval and air force manoeuvres." "This," he said, 
"could be the first step towards the spread of confidence-building measures for 
the Arctic as a whole and to the northern regions of both hemispheres." 
Furthermore, Gorbachev suggested "discussions regarding the ban of naval 
activity in mutually agreed-upon zones in international sounds and all along 
intensively-trafficked sea routes." (Denmark, as Magnusson points out, controls 
four sounds: the Little Belt, the Small Belt, Oresund, and Greenland Sound.)
Theorin, interview.
“  Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 December, 1987; see also "Statement by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Sten Andersson, with reference to General Secretary 
Gorbachev's speech in Murmansk," 2 October, 1987 (Swedish Foreign Ministry).
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against this background, says Andersson, that the "Government 
welcomes the Soviet interest for Naval arms control and 
confidence-building measures which were expressed in the 
(Murmansk speech)."
Liberal MP, Ingemar Eliasson, felt that
"Gorbachev's different proposals for negotiation ought to be 
studied in a positive vein. His proposals for negotiations 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact regarding limitations of 
naval and air activity in, amongst other places, the Baltic, are 
w orth taking note of, especially when considered (against the 
background) of air and sea violations of Swedish territory."^’
Conservative Party leader, Carl Bildt felt doubtful regarding the possibilities of 
limiting naval activity in the Baltic, North Sea and Norwegian Sea.^ 
Conservative MP, Brâkenhielm felt the proposal flew in the face of the facts.*' 
The statistics from 1985, said Brâkenhielm, reflected that "while the Soviet forces 
have spent 900 vessel (24) periods in the area under discussion, NATO has had 
40 such periods— was the move mainly an attempt to meet an anticipated 
stepping up of American naval presence in the area?"“  One diplomat said, 
"we had a great deal of suspicion at the outset of many of the proposals—for 
they were diluted by other things that Soviet diplomats did (e.g. naval 
confidence-building measures were contradicted by Soviet thinking and speech 
making in other areas of disarmament)."*^
The Government was less enthusiastic about Gorbachev's proposal for 
banning naval activity in agreed-upon zones, stating, "the Government on a 
num ber of opportunities has pointed out that there should be mutual.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
*° Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1987. 
*' Riksdagsprotokoll, 4 December, 1987. 
*^  Rikdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988. 
*^S44
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international interest that civilian sea-traffic should not be pushed aside by  an 
increased military utilization of the seas."^ For Sweden, such measures had 
to be treated in the international context. The Riksdags Foreign Affairs 
Committee's statement read: "security political questions which concern wide- 
ranging areas should be tackled in the same wide-ranging form."^ This 
Swedish response, similar to the official line of the Nordic Nuclear W eapons 
Free Proposal, attempted to insure that Sweden would not be isolated by  the 
Soviet démarche.
This perspective was shared in military circles. One senior Swedish official 
placed M urmansk amongst other attempts by the Soviets (e.g. NNWFZ and Sea 
Incident Treaty) as initiatives which were aimed at 'breaking off the Nordic 
countries from their affirmed multilateral perspective, either by having the 
Nordic countries deal with the Soviets, or dealing with the Soviets on a b i­
lateral basis."^ "We are not interested in going into regional arrangements," 
said one defence official while mentioning Sweden's willingness to participate 
in the proposed science and environmental efforts.^^
Immediate Norwegian Reactions
The Norwegians, arguably the target of the speech, reacted in a cautiously 
positive manner. Prime Minister Brundtland, while relieved over the fact that 
Gorbachev had raised the role of the two alliances in realizing the Murmansk
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1987.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll 1989/90:UU6 (Nedrustning), 9 November, 1989.
“  S7. Furthermore, he reminded, all three measures have been dismissed 
and have not led to anything. One Swedish Foreign Ministry official reminded 
me that the reason for his cautious reaction was that "we have worked on 
European level and global level...thus, 1 could see no reason w hy we couldn't 
achieve our goals on those levels." (S40)
S30
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proposals, was on her guard against any attempt to gain a droit de regard by 
accepting any such proposal at face value.
Prime Minister Brundtland's initial reaction was almost complementary: "we 
have noticed that central parts of the Norwegian security and defence policy 
have been the subject of positive mention."^ Thorvald Stoltenberg®^ said 
"(marriage) proposals should be taken seriously," pointing out that he felt that 
"Gorbachev's proposals were a contribution to pacifity and détente in the 
"Northern areas."^°
From NATO quarters, sources put off any hint of an immediate response^^ 
bu t clearly the speech was being handled seriously. The Government 
responded more negatively to other aspects of the initiative. Brundtland 
immediately noted that the "Barents Sea was not one of the sea areas mentioned 
for reducing sea-activity."^ Johan Jorgen Holst showed his "interest in the new 
Soviet signals," while stating "we have some big interests to safeguard." 
Guarding himself, Holst added, "a reasonable balance between Soviet and
“  "Statsminister Gro Harlem Brundtlands kommentar 2. oktober 1987 til 
generalsekretaer Mikhail Gorbatsjovs tale i Murmansk 1. oktober 1987." UD- 
informasjon (24) 1987, quoted in NUPI (1987:413) There was a somewhat 
delayed Norwegian/NATO assessment, attributable to the fact that several 
different drafts of the speech had reached the Norwegians and NATO (see "-Mâ 
vurderes av et samlet NATO," Aftenposten, 2 October, 1987).
For Stoltenberg's broader view on changes in the Soviet Union, see 
"Stoltenberg: Gorbatsjov gir oss nye muligheter," Aftenposten, 6 October, 1987.
B. Lindahl, "Norge. Frieri tas pâ allvar," Dagens Nyheter, 3 October, 1987.
P. Nordrum, "NATO er nolende," Aftenposten, 3 October, 1987.
^  M. Fyhn, "Norge til Gorbatsjov: -Positivt aw entende," Aftenposten, 3 
October, 1987. As one Norwegian diplomat recounted, "on the Ryzhkov trip, 
he brought up the idea of condominium again." "We are prepared to go on as 
equal partners, but refuse if we are to proceed on the basis of a fundamental 
disequilibrium," he said. (N30)
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American navies must nevertheless be maintained in the Northern Areas, such 
that the Soviet Union does not assume a dominant position.”^
Unlike Sweden which had advocated taking the proposals to a greater 
international audience, Norway showed evidence of first wanting to consult its 
allies. Brundtland clearly shed a sigh of relief when Gorbachev not only 
mentioned, but emphasized the role of the two alliances in solving the problems 
which faced them.^^ Foreign Minister Stoltenberg and Storting Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman Willoch responded in much the same vein.^ Willoch 
pointed out that "the security aspects of Gorbachev's speech m ust be dealt 
w ithin the NATO context. This is echoed by Centre Party MP, Johan 
Buttedahl, who stated "the proposals on security-policy are not new...but they 
were more comprehensive than the previous ones and demonstrated a Soviet 
willingness to see security policy from an alliance perspective."^ He is joined 
by Conservative MP Thor Knudsen, who quoted from the one particular spot 
in Gorbachev's speech where this logic was brought out: "consultations between 
WTO and NATO towards the reduction of the military activity and the 
limitation of the extent of the naval and air activity in the Baltic Sea, North 
Sea...""*
73 Dagens Nyheter, 3 October, 1987.
M. Fyhn, "Norge til Gorbatsjov: -Positivt awentende," Aftenposten, 3 
October, 1987 or A. Willersrud, "Brundtland roser Sovjet i Pravda-intervju," 
Aftenposten, 14 January, 1988.
^  "It is not guarantees for respect, but rather a strong and credible alliance 
with strong friends, which secures peace and independence in relation to a 
large, totalitarian neighbour." ('Willoch advarer Vestens ledere," Aftenposten, 
14 October, 1987.)
"-Mâ vurderes av et samlet NATO," Aftenposten, 2 October, 1987.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
78 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
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Progress Party's Hagen saw more sinister Soviet motives: "(the initiative is) 
an attem pt to talk outside of the NATO system, thus m ust be seen as an 
attem pt to break NATO apart. Even Socialist Left Party's Theo Koritzinsky 
felt that "one of the criticisms was that he tried to split off Northern Europe 
from NATO interests was to some extent true." But Koritzinsky added that 
"maybe some of the thinking behind it was to get some of the Nordic countries 
to get the U.S. to move on naval arms control."*®
The Norwegian military locked the Murmansk initiative into a room already 
full-packed with "unrealistic" Soviet proposals. Chief Commanders of Northern 
Norway, Vice Admiral Torolf Rein and Vice Admiral Carsten Lütken referred 
to the speech as a "political move which is hard to comment from the military 
side."*^ Rear Admiral Jan Ingbrigtsen commented that "you shouldn't let the 
Russians succeed in regionalizing security policy..the speech can hardly be 
interpreted as anything other than a clear propaganda (ploy)."."*^ One 
Norwegian journalist, as a result of interviews with Norwegian military, typifies 
the reaction thus: "it can seem that (Gorbachev) is trying to establish 'free zones' 
or 'bastions' in the sea, where the Soviets could operate freely, w ithout running 
the risk of being threatened by Western naval forces."*^
Hagen, interview.
*® Koritzinsky, interview.
Aftenposten, 3 October, 1987.
Ingebrigtsen also mentions the speech in Vladivostok as motivated by the 
same concerns (O. T. Storvik, "Utspill kan splitte," Aftenposten, 3 October, 1987. 
Willoch, Centre MP J. Buttedal and Conservative MP Jan Petersen also 
emphasised this point (an attempt at a 'solo initiative'): see M. Fyhn, "-Nye 
Sovjet-toner i nord," Aftenposten, 5 October, 1987.
O.T. Storvik, "'Prisoner' for Nordflâten?" Aftenposten, 5 October, 1987.
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INF
On the global arena, attention was turned to the superpower summit in 
Washington, D C. (8-10 December), a meeting which resulted in the signing of 
the so-called "INF-Treaty." Both in Norway and Sweden, discussion of Nordic 
disarmament was effectively overshadowed by both the symbolic and concrete 
results of the renewed Soviet-U.S. willingness to disarm.
There was broad political agreement of the historical significance of the INF 
Treaty, the first superpower agreement which in actual fact reduced nuclear 
weapons.^ To Swedish Social Democratic MP, Ericson, it was above all "due 
to the rapid changes in the Soviet negotiating positions that possibilities have 
been opened—not only in terms of the INF, but also in terms of a chemical 
weapons treaty, and in terms of numerical reductions in strategic weapons."*^ 
Conservative Bildt echoed a positive tone, calling it "the first genuine result on 
the disarmament front in the post-War period."^ His party colleague, Anita 
Brâkenhielm, was not equally positive, wondering "how, seen from the Soviet 
perspective, NATO could be expected to compensate for the 'rip ' in the flexible 
response doctrine which the INF implie(d)?"*^
Norwegian Defence Minister Holst termed it "evidence that it was possible 
for the Soviet Union and the United States to negotiate on nuclear weapons, in
^  Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, 2 December, 1987; Conservative MB's Kâre 
Willoch and Kaci Kullmann Five's addresses on 15 December, 1987; Labour MP, 
Liv Aasen, and Prime Minister Brundtland: same date, all reflecting the "historic 
nature" of the INF-Treaty. (Forhandlinger i Stortinget). The Swedish Foreign 
Affairs Committee's pronouncement, reflected a similar tone, Riksdagstryck 
1987/88: UUl (Nedrustning), 7 October, 1987.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 October, 1987.
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988. Bildt contrasted this w ith the 
"Brezhnev era's decenniums," which were characterized "in the first case by a 
striving to offset the so-called correlation of forces between the U.S. and the 
Soviet U nion-in the Soviet favour and to utilize the attained strength to move 
its positions forward."
Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988.
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a w ay that takes into consideration Europeans' interests."** Foreign Minister 
Stoltenberg indicated that there was a change from the previous Soviet position, 
demonstrated in Reykjavik, of connecting Soviet disarmament to the question 
of SDL*’ The Norwegian Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Committee, felt 
the INF Treaty was an "important contribution to disarmament negotiations," 
pointing out the principle of "asymmetrical reductions and comprehensive 
inspections" as essential elements,’® which were, for all practical purposes 
echoed in its Swedish counterpart's statement.”
But Centre MP, Johan Buttedahl pointed out the birth of a trend which 
would continue to haunt Norwegian élites in the following year, namely that 
"an INF-agreement, which deals with land-based missiles, mostly placed in 
Central Europe, could mean that the military balances will place more 
importance on sea-based intermediate weapons and the flanks in  Europe."’  ^
If indeed the INF had such a negative impact on naval disarmament, it would 
be, at best, what one Conservative MP Austad called "a mixed blessing,"’  ^not 
to mention the potential impact on the Northern Flank.
** Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
*’ Stoltenberg, Forhandlinger i Stortinget Labour Colleague, Liv Aasen, 
states, "the summit in Reykjavik broke up because the Soviets tried to connect 
every agreement with a demand that the U.S. should do away w ith its (SDI) 
(Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987).
’® Stortings Meld. Nr. 59, p. 7.
Riksdagstryck 1988/89:UU4 ("Om Nedrustning"), 22 November, 1988.
One of the earliest Storting references to a phenomenon called 
'pelseteorin/(or 'sausage theory') (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 
1987). Swedish Social Democratic MP Viola Furubjelke, Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 
November, 1989), paraphrased Stoltenberg's description of the theory: "If you 
squeeze a sausage in its middle, such that it looks totally empty, one can be 
assured that it will run out of the ends."
’* Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
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Naval Disarmament: Continuous Disappointment 
Naval disarmament was seen to be one of the most unyielding problems 
relating to the Northern military buildup. In general terms, Norwegian and 
Swedish élites have perceived more flexibility in the Soviet negotiating position 
over the issue than they have seen in the American. As one Swedish defence 
establishment official said, "American Naval men even refuse to be present at 
negotiations...the Navy is very independent-minded."^
The Norwegians, and to an extent also the Swedes, are faced w ith several 
dilemmas: There is a trade-off between what is desirable (lessening both 
military alliances' presence in surrounding waters) and reality (the Soviet Union 
has not, thus the Soviet buildup needs a NATO counterbalance). Another 
question concerns the question of the best reaction to achieve the desired result. 
If the Norwegians pressure NATO, this could cause a credibility crisis within 
the alliance. Thus, only the Socialist Left Party has strongly criticized American 
inflexibility. Those who agree with the Socialist Left party are sure to whisper, 
rather than shout, their opposition.’  ^ Socialist Left MP, Koritzinsky stated, the 
"Soviet Union has pronounced its willingness to enter negotiations regarding 
naval measures, the U.S. has until now been rather negative to such confidence- 
building measures and naval arms control."
The dilemmas the Swedes face are similar. While one could argue the 
Norwegian hands are tied by fear of being interpreted as unfaithful allies, the 
Swedish reaction is restrained by neutrality. While there is a visible Swedish 
displeasure with the U.S. Navy's position in Naval disarmament, one Swedish 
official said "we try to avoid looking as though we are in the Soviet camp on 
the issue."’  ^ "We have done this," almost be default, said one defence
94 S19




establishment official, "through supporting the Soviet view here," he addedT  
The Swedes, as a counterbalance, have expressed’* that they have no 
opposition to Norway's demands for an increased NATO presence in Northern 
waters, to balance the comprehensive Soviet naval presence in the Norwegian 
and Barents Seas. However the Swedes simultaneously attempted to promote 
naval disarmament in international fora, e.g. the UN, where their efforts could 
not be interpreted as siding with one alliance over the other.” .
Late 1987-1988
Soviet Northern Buildup Enhanced
Irrespective of the overall tone of Soviet willingness to reduce global tension, 
there was little doubt that through the processes of addition, renovation, 
modernisation, and technological improvement, Soviet forces based on and 
around the Kola continued to improve throughout the Gorbachev years. In this 
context one notices that during 1987 alone, contrary to Soviet statements,'^® 
Soviet military activity continued with unabated strength and scope.'®'
” S19
’* Aftenposten, "En viktig svensk utspill," 12 October, 1987.
”  See, for example. Disarmament Secretary Theorin's speech to the UN, 8 
November, 1990 "Statement by Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin, M.P....in the First 
Committee Assembly." One of the more recent Swedish UN efforts was made 
on 13 November, 1990, see UN document A /C .l/4 5 /8 /R ev .l.
'®® Norwegian Progress Party MP Rosjorde stated (15 December, 1987, 
Forhandlinger i Stortinget): "this force buildup does not seem to correspond to 
the positions which the Soviet leaders express in connection w ith their new 
policy."
'®' O.T. Storvik, "Uforminsket sovjetisk militaer aktivitet rundt Skandinavia," 
Aftenposten, 12 January, 1988. Storvik cites the addition of SU 27 Flankers and 
AW ACS, 11-76 Mainstays, addition of Yankee class submarines, and two large
(continued...)
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Norwegians in 1987 perceived little change in "the military budget which 
Gorbachev inherited from his predecessors."^®^ While Gorbachev continued 
to charm the United States'®^ in effect, all official Norwegian indicators told 
of an unchanged picture of Soviet strategic interests in the North. W ith the 
initiation of conventional disarmament negotiations between the Atlantic and 
the Urals, attention became increasingly drawn away from the Nordic area. 
Foreign Minister Stoltenberg(1988:14) expressed a desire to avoid "force 
reductions in Central Europe (being) circumvented by a buildup of forces on the 
flanks."
Norwegian Defence Minister Holst was quoted in Stavanger as saying, "the 
strategic picture in the North has not changed, but the Soviets' new investment 
in silent attack and rocket submarines in the Northern area is an important 
development.^®^ In early 1987, General Inspector of the Norwegian Air Force
^®*(...continued)
naval manoeuvres. Conservative MP Knudsen pointed out that the "exercise 
pattern has tended to move further West and South," the reason being "none 
other than a Soviet desire to gain better control over her supply lines from 
North America to Europe, and also to Asia." (15 December, 1987^, a judgement 
shared by Defence Minister Holst (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989).
®^^ Conservative MP Thor Knudsen, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 
December, 1987.
®^^ "Atomavtale om et halvt âr," or "Viktig Gorbatsjov-uspill," Aftenposten, 
3 March, 1987 which reported Gorbachev's willingness to remove intermediate 
distance missiles, SS-20, from the Soviet side.
®^^ T. Bo, "Holst, Vi folger utviklingen," Aftenposten, 20 January, 1988; NUPI 
(1987:157). In "Sovjet klart styrket i nord," (Aftenposten 27 October, 1987), Chief 
of Intelligence, Rear Admiral E. Eikanger, confirmed Holst's basic point and 
made his own observations, amongst them: the transfer of the AW AC Mainstay 
to the Kola means the Soviets have significantly increased their possibility of a 
forward defence in the Northern area. Navy vessels are constantly becoming 
larger and more advanced and Air Force weaponry has become more high- 
technological.
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pointed out a long term trend which now meant that Soviet fighter bombers 
could now reach the whole of Norway.^®®
It is especially interesting that this was the backdrop against which Mikhail 
Gorbachev launched his Murmansk Initiative. Head of the Military Intelligence, 
Rear Admiral Egil Eikanger warned against the dangers inherent in three 
different trends (tangentially related to the Murmansk proposals), in addition 
to the issuance of a warning of the discovery of a new Soviet submarine base, 
not more than 40-50 km. from Norway:'®^ First, he drew attention to the 
importance of being able to occupy the land areas surrounding the Kola bases— 
also as an offensive point of departure for control over the Norwegian Sea. 
Second, Eikanger warned that the expression "confidence-building measures" in 
connection with special buffer zones in the Norwegian sea restricted Western 
navies' freedom of movement. Eikanger finally was deeply worried especially 
because of Soviet cruise missile development.^®^ Then-Vice Admiral and 
Commander for Northern Norway, Torolf Rein noted the following Soviet 
developments in early 1988:
1. More m odem  Soviet planes and weapons on the Kola put the 
Soviet Union in a position to push the front further out
2. Ground forces are constantly receiving more and more support 
from helicopters. This makes for more mobile and powerful land 
forces
3. Increased Soviet emphasis on its sea-based forces casts a dark 
cloud over Northern Norway^®®
®^^ Aamoth further expressed the trend that attack helicopters, of the type 
"Hind," "Havoc," or "Hokum" were in the process of establishing local 
operations near the Norwegian border areas. (O.T. Storvik, "Sovjetiske 
jagerbombere kan angripe i hele Norge," Aftenposten, 24 March, 1987).
*®^ O.T. Storvik, "Ny sovjetisk base nær Norge," Aftenposten, 19 January,
1988.
®^^ Supported by Holst's speech in Bodo, (NUPI, 1987:157-8)
®^® L. Hegna, "Sovjet kan skyve fronten fremover," Aftenposten, 5 February, 
1988; O.S. Storvik, "-Offensive Sovjet-planer i nord," Aftenposten, 13 November,
1989.
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Gorbachev's United Nations Speech (1988):
'Unilateralism' Comes of Age.
By mid-1988, élites began confirming what many had feared: "the reduction 
in Soviet military ambitions in Central Europe coincides with an increased 
Soviet military emphasis on areas in Norway's proximity. Defence Minister 
Holst stated that quite contrary to seeing signs of force reductions in our 
vicinity "we have seen a continuation of modernisation of the Soviet forces in 
the North."” ® Norwegian Centre Party MP, Buttedahl, stated that "we have 
not seen a reduction in the amount of boats in the Soviet Northern 
Fleet..neither any change in the strategic thinking of the superpowers in the 
North."”  ^ To this one could add perceptions of changes in weapons 
placement, and the lack of what seemed to be a slow down in the introduction 
of new equipment in the Soviet armed forces as a whole.”  ^ A fact particularly 
worrying for Norway and Swedes was, according to Koritzinsky, "the Soviet 
Union today possesses a 15:1 advantage in nuclear weapons with a range under 
500 kilometres."” ^
These trends aside, 1988 turned out to be a vintage year for movement on 
East-West disarmament issues. M.S. Gorbachev's magnns opus, his speech to the 
United Nations on 7 December, 1988, more than any other speech, represented
e.g. Kâre Willoch, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1988.
” ® Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Jan Petersen, "...900 fighters are added each year, while one new nuclear- 
powered submarine is being launched every 37th day." (Forhandlinger i 
Stortinget, 19 January, 1989).
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989. That very day, 19 January, 
Shevardnadze, according to Koritzinsky, had expressed a Soviet desire to 
withdraw all short-distance missiles from East Europe, (ibid).
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the crescendo of Gorbachev's drive for disarmament."^ This speech still 
stands out today as the pinnacle of a changed Soviet disarmament approach. 
The speech was further significant for it represented a positive, unilateral 
military-foreign policy offensive attended by concrete action. As one 
Norwegian diplomat said, "prior to that people said that any nuclear 
disarmament would only be in the favour of the Soviet Union.""^ The speech 
had tremendously positive reverberations in the ears of Norwegian and Swedish 
élites alike."^
Gorbachev first mentioned a list of "human problems," (e.g. ecological 
destruction), to which the United Nations is given a param ount role in 
attem pting to find a solution. Among other important points he mentioned a 
transformation from the principle of over-armament to the principle of a 
reasonably, sufficient defence. Gorbachev also promised that he would reduce 
Soviet forces-in-arms by 500,000 men over a two-year period and promised to 
w ithdraw  and dispose of six tank divisions from the DDR, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. (The amount of troops in these countries would be reduced by 50,000 
men and 5,000 tanks.
For all intents and purposes, all Norwegian political parties now started 
clearly mentioning movement on Soviet disarmament. The Bourgeois parties 
then shifted to expressing reservations regarding the long-term conclusions one 
should draw  from changed Soviet behaviour. Bourgeois leaders were now very 
open regarding change in Soviet military policy generally, but were nearly as 
interested in reminding where change did not occur. Willoch pointed to the 
"thought of asymmetrical reductions (500,000 men) as an important point of
Anteckningar fr in  Ôstgruppen, (Stockholm: Forsvarets Forskningsanstalt, 
1/1991) p. 57-59.
N3
One exception was a high Swedish military m an who said "this was a 
new example of taking advantage of economic necessity to reduce military 
force—which was carried out by withdrawing old equipment." (S39)
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progress." But Willoch was careful to remind his audience that "we shouldn't 
(be blind to the fact) that this measure, once it is executed, still leaves the 
Soviets with close to one million more soldiers than the country had in 
1960.""^ Willoch further points out the importance of Soviet commitments 
regarding hum an rights in the Vienna CSCE negotiations, a Soviet "yes" to 
inspection of disarmament treaties, the fight against terrorism, and the Soviet 
w ork against chemical weapons.
Norwegian Foreign Minister Stoltenberg dubbed it a "message of new 
thinking and that the reforms at home require international cooperation.""^ 
Stoltenberg further saw the Soviet decision to unilaterally w ithdraw troops and 
weapons from East Europe as a "good start towards conventional disarmament," 
while also being "an admission that there exists an overweight in conventional 
arms...in the East's favour.""’ Socialist Left's Koritzinsky perceived that the 
Soviet Union was also showing progress through its ban on nuclear testing and, 
more precisely, to reduce her conventional forces by 10%.^^
Defence Minister, Holst, felt that Gorbachev's announcement fit into the re­
structuring of Soviet land-based forces, which had already been underw ay for 
some time."* Further, he said "the offers (of reductions) would mean the 
danger for surprise attack has decreased, while stability has increased." Holst 
said, "there are indications from Soviet military that the tanks which will be
*" Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
*" Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 January, 1989. While Stoltenberg pointed 
out increasing progress on Soviet human rights, Soviet involvement in regional 
conflicts and disarmament, he pointed to continued tensions in the Nortii.
**’ Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 13 January, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
*" Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989. These developments, 
according to Holst, included an increased emphasis on m odem  technology, 
stronger support units, and increased numbers of infantry in relation to combat 
units.
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withdrawn will be scrapped...we should expect and suppose that this will take 
place with respect to modem, and not aged tanks, w ith tanks utilized by 
standing forces and not from the reserves."^^ But as had become 
commonplace, the Socialist Left attempted to draw attention away from debate 
which singled out the Soviet buildup, such that the debate would equally 
include the U.S.*^
In Sweden, perceptions of the December speech were very similar to the 
Norwegian. Swedish Communist Party's Gudrun Schyman correctly 
represented a sector of euphoria:
"There is disarmament occurring in our vicinity. The Soviet 
Union is pulling back 40,000 men and 1,200 tanks in our Nordic 
area. The number of tanks will be halved. In the Baltic area 
the majority of the cutbacks will be achieved already by the 
end of 1989. A third of the Soviet forces in the Baltic and 
Leningrad Military Districts will be removed before 1991.
These cutbacks are in percentage terms larger than those which 
have occurred in Central Europe...there are signs that there will 
be more."^^
One senior Swedish military official called the speech "a watershed," for it 
"defined a new foreign policy and brought up the idea of a reasonably sufficient 
defence."^^ Former Swedish Foreign Ministry Soviet expert, Alf Edeen, felt 
that one of the reasons why the speech was important was that it "might be 
followed by more substantial glasnost with respect to Soviet military 
tendencies."^^ Swedish Conservative Party MP, af Ugglas, said the speech 
"declared an end to the war of ideologies...it was an attem pt to find common
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
Koritzinsky, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989. 
Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 December, 1989.
125 S 7
A. Edeen, "Gorbatjovs militara overskottslager," Svenska Dagbladet, 27 
January, 1989.
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g r o u n d . A  demonstration of a common cynical interpretation of 
Gorbachev's promises and their impact on Nordic disarmament was 
surprisingly given by Social Democrat Sture Ericson:
"We don 't know whether the Soviet pledges—I am 
thinking, for example, of the Soviet promise to reduce the 
number of heavy tanks in the Northern part of Leningrad's 
Military District to 200—will be executed. As long as we 
are unsure that this has occurred we should not let things 
get out of hand—making sure that we do not confuse 
promises made at the negotiating table with steps towards 
their execution. It is only in (1995) when we can concretely 
judge whether anything has actually occurred in our 
vicinity.
Swedish Disarmament Ambassador, Maj Britt Theorin, placed great weight in 
Gorbachev's speech, saying that it "demonstrates, above all, that there is a lot 
of room for unilateral cutbacks.
1989-90: No Matter What Happens Russia (Soviet Union) Will Always be a 
Superpower
The prospects for Nordic arms control looked bleaker than ever. The first 
priority remained sea-based forces. Norwegian Foreign Minister Bondevik 
again reminded that "sea-based forces cannot forever remain outside of the arms 
control process," however guarding himself against accusations of going against 
NATO noting "it is important to avoid doing something which could disrupt the 
Alliance's ability to defend and maintain its Transatlantic supply lines."^^
af Ugglas, interview.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 November, 1989.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 22 February, 1989,
18 December, 1989; Brundtland, 4 January, 1990 (Forhandlinger i 
Stortinget)
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Conservative MP, Jan Petersen, and others were still speaking of Soviet force 
modernisation and strengthening in the North.*^  ^ The Norwegians were 
nonetheless signalling progress on the European level; there the ongoing CSCE 
process'^^ in Vienna was of paramount importance.^^ The U.S. and Soviet 
Union continued their romance with meetings in Malta, in W ashington (31 May, 
1990) amongst other meeting points. The CPSU Congress in July 1990 was an 
important landm ark for it implanted in the Soviet leader's profile greater 
credence that there was indeed a plan and a sense of direction to Gorbachev's 
foreign policy.*^
Bondevik mentioned his personal satisfaction over the consensus regarding 
the principle of an upper limit of the number of sea-based cruise missiles w ith 
nuclear warheads.^^^ However, on the Nordic scale, both the Norwegians'^
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990. See Swedish Foreign Affairs 
Committee position paper, Riksdagstryck 1988/89 (Nedrustning): "the Soviet 
Navy has gradually built up and modernised her Navy from a relatively low 
level."
For background see N. Eliasson, "Konferensen om sakerhet och samarbete 
(ESK). Uppfoljningsdokument i Wien 1986-1989" (Stockholm: Swedish Foreign 
Ministry, 1989).
Jan Petersen outlined progress in three aspects of the negotiations: a more 
stable military balance at a lower level of tension, the economic: transformation 
of East European economies to market economies, and progress on the hum an 
rights question. (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990).
One Norwegian diplomat (N3) quoted Gorbachev such: 'have you 
forgotten 1986, 1987 etc...do you remember what we said?' ("in that way made 
his disarmament plans seem intentional, rather than haphazard—or even worse 
as reacting to events rather than acting to form them," he added.
Bondevik pointed out the agreement's weakness: the ceiling is set so high 
that it does not include any reduction in existing weapons. (Forhandlinger i 
Stortinget, 31 May, 1990).
Progress Party leader, Hagen said: "nothing special has happened on the 
Kola or in our vicinity...we should hope that the disarmament negotiations will 
get gather up some new speed..." (Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990). 
Force additions are detailed by Inspector General of the Norwegian Navy, 
Admiral Rolf Pedersen in Storvik, "Skeptisk til sjomilitær reduksjon,"
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and Swedes^^^ lay in waiting until the disarmament would also take their 
proximate, geographical interests into consideration. Progress in pulling back 
Soviet military resources from Eastern Europe would provide one point of 
encouragement,'^ while naval forces remained in great part imchanged.'^’ 
The death of the much-feared 'Brezhnev Doctrine' added further credibility to 
the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe.'^
Political and Economic Disarray and Revision of Soviet Military Intention
Developments in Soviet domestic politics only made the situation more 
complex and disorderly. In 1989, the Soviet Union began showing signs of 
political, ethnic and environmental disarray—events which looked to m any 
observers as the first clear signals of the Soviet Union's total collapse. An
Aftenposten, 4 December, 1989.
Swedish Riksdag's Foreign Affairs Committee (Riksdagstryck 
1990/91:UU4 (Nedrustning), p.lO: "the Soviet forces in Northern Europe have 
seemingly not been reduced significantly...quite to the contrary, there are signs 
of a certain military upgrading which could be occurring because of the past 
year's re-dispositioning and changes which have been already been decided 
upon."
See Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee, Riksdagstryck 1990/91:UU4 
(Nedrustning), p. 8: "During (1990) the Soviet Union has signed a treaty with 
Hungary and CzechoslovaWa regarding the withdrawal of all Soviet forces 
before half of 1991 is over. Over one half of the 73,000 Soviet soldiers, 
previously stationed in Czechoslovakia have left the country..."
Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee points out (ibid, p .l l)  that while the 
"question of agreement between (the U.S. and Soviet Union) is near—there is an 
unresolved problem of land-based Soviet Naval Air Force units, which the 
Soviet Union has not wanted to include in the agreement."
Several interview objects pointed to the "death of the Brezhnev doctrine" 
as one of the most important turning points in Gorbachev's foreign policy 
(N46). See Swedish Defence Commission Chairman, Aberg, "Ny neutralitet i 
nya Europa," Dagens Nyheter, 3 May, 1990 and SOU (1990:42,47), regarding the 
importance of this doctrinal abandonment.
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im portant question became: how would internal unrest and the loosening of the 
Union structure effect military intent and capabilities?
From the Norwegian perspective, there was agreement that, irrespective of 
Soviet domestic political developments, the Soviet Union would remain a 
world-class military factor with which it would need to reckon. Many 
Norwegians were fond of speaking in the same terms as Foreign Minister 
Bondevik:
"Whatever happens in Soviet politics, the Soviet Union will 
remain a superpower neighbour which we will have to relate 
to as an important factor in our security and foreign policy.
The dialogue and the contact we have established must be 
expanded."^^^
This feeling is further reflected in the thinking of former Conservative 
Norwegian Defence Minister Per Ditlev-Simonsen, who pointed out that, under 
the conditions of a militarily strong Russia or Soviet Union, NATO's raison d'ètre 
would persist:
"irrespective (of the changes) the Soviet Union or Russia will 
remain a military power which stretches itself from the Baltic 
to the Pacific...no matter what, the Kola Base will retain its 
strategic and military significance...no matter what, Norway 
will always have a border up North with a military 
su p e rp o w er...N A T O  was created to be a counterweight to 
the Soviet Union, and either Russia or the Soviet Union 
remains..."
Neither did Swedish élites presage a rapid deterioration of Soviet military 
might. One Swedish Social Democrat said "the last thing the Soviets will ever
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990. This same view is echoed in 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 21 April, 1990 and "Intervju med forsvarsminister Per 
Ditlev-Simonsen," Folk og Forsvar- Kontaktblad 1 (1990).
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give up will be the Kola, not least for air defence purposes."^^ For the same 
purposes, many élites felt that Russia or the Soviet Union would always have 
an interest in the Baltic coastline.
W hat remained a point of contention was whether the Soviet leaders still 
cherished its dream of withholding its superpower status. One Swedish 
diplomat said "the Soviet Union still treasures this idea of velikaya derihavats 
(great power) status and will continue to do so."^^ One former Swedish 
diplomat related that "from a geographic standpoint the Soviet Union will have 
the same military, political and economic interests which follow from that."'^ 
Even the Swedish Foreign Affairs Committee joined in this line of thinking.^^ 
This standpoint was opposed by one influential Swedish Social Democrat, who 
proposed that "(Soviet) superpower status is a part of the past...it is now only 
(a superpower) in nuclear terms."^^^ Several élites, in both Sweden and 
Norway, mentioned the scaling back of Soviet engagement in faraway places, 
especially from peripheral areas (e.g. Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique 
and Afghanistan as part of this pattern)—as evidence of a dimming of Soviet 
military ambition.^^
Interviews were replete with references to a Soviet military which had lost 
its préstige, its reputation, a body which had been disowned and altogether lost 
its influence. One Swedish official pointed out "Gorbachev has attacked the 




146 Riksdagstryck 1990/91 (Nedrustning), p.10: "Even after the amount of 
new expenditures (on the military) has ceased, Soviet military strength will 




problems related to those soldiers returning home from Eastern Europe."^^’ 
One Norwegian military figure mentioned that the forces returning home from 
Europe had been 'ganged-up upon/^^ The picture was of a military 
establishment in disarray an d /o r a military establishment at clear odds with the 
political leadership.
Given these conditions, one could not dismiss the common élite impression 
that Gorbachev had radically transformed the Soviet threat picture. One senior 
Swedish Centre Party official said "how could a country with such internal 
problems be a threat or be aggressive?"^^^ One Norwegian General said "in 
NATO we don 't speak of threat anymore, just capabilities (and we said so until 
at least last week)."^“  The paradox is, as one Norwegian diplomat put it, 
"while the Soviets have more arms in the North, it has, at the same time, no 
intention of using them."^^^
Conventional Forces in Europe (CPE) Negotiations
The effort to minimize NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in 
Europe was yet another turning point in Swedish and Norwegian perceptions 
of Soviet foreign and military policy. One Norwegian military official painted 
the picture of the international climate directly following the signing of the CPE 
in Paris in November, 1990: "everlasting peace was on the horizon, CPE was 
around the comer, they were dismantling forces in the Urals, WTO forces in
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East Europe were being pulled back to the Soviet U n i o n . A s  of this writing 
the treaty had not been ratified by the U.S. Senate.
The progress which was perceived to have been made in the early-mid 1990 
CPE negotiations gave way to problems of interpretation later in the year. 
There arose the following major categories of problems:*^ data: Western 
intelligence claimed that the Soviet Union still had a number of formations in 
place that its spokesmen said had been disbanded or removed; Re-designations: 
the USSR claimed that just before the treaty was signed it transferred several 
formations from the army to other branches of the armed forces, and that their 
equipment should not be counted against the allowed Soviet totals e.g. 77th 
motorized infantry division, transfer of aircraft from Air Force into Navy); 
Equipment transfer east of the Urals^^ and thus out of bounds of the CPE.
"We thought we had a common project in Paris, now certain signals we are 
receiving make us conscious that this is not a fact," said one senior Norwegian 
MPA official with respect to the CPE.^ ^^  In the views of Western officials, the 
Soviet Union made a loose interpretation of the CPE such that it could, in the 
words of Finn Sollie, strengthen the Northern Fleet and to avoid the CPE 
limits.^^ As one top-ranking Swedish military man said, "such an agreement 
leaves room for manipulation of original intentions."^^^
N34
"All at Sea," The Economist, 9 February, 1991
Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Torolf Rein wrote, "due to the 
régionalisation effect of the CPE, the Treaty does not oblige the Soviets to make 
reductions on the Kola." (T. Rein, "Porsvaret av Norge i lys av den senere fids 





These problems were duly registered in the Norwegian and Swedish 
Parliam ents/^ For example, Swedish MP, Carl BildP^* maintained that:
"even in our immediate vicinity...we have seen how the Third 
Mechanised Guard Division from Klaipeda and the 77th at 
Arkhangelsk have been totally exempted from arms control, 
through transfer from the army to -o f all places—the navy.
These are profound attempts to circumvent the CPE...bringing 
the arms control process to a halt. Then we risk rapidly being 
faced with a situation of a new cold war in Europe as a realistic 
possibility."
Centre Party leader, Olof Johansson, agreed with Carl Bildt, adding, "for 
Sweden's part, it is important to note that the military forces in Sweden's 
vicinity have hardly been reduced numerically—quite to the contrary. 
Swedish Social Democrat, Sture Ericson and Conservative Eva Bjorne were in 
agreement with Bildt. Norwegian Centre Party official, J.J. Jakobsen concluded: 
"instead of withdrawing and destroying military units they are re-classifying 
them to avoid their Treaty obligations."^^^
To Believe or Not to Believe?
The official Soviet explanation for the shift was well summarized by one high 
Norwegian military man: "we (the Soviet Union) have to put them 
somewhere."^^ As 1990 drew to a close most élites had a bleak view of 
impending Soviet treaty compliance. As one Norwegian military official said:
Conservative Norwegian MP, Jan Petersen or Progress Party's Teije 
Nyberget, Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1990; Swedish Conservative MP, 
Bildt, Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991
Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
Jakobsen, interview. This perception of the Soviet reasoning was 
common in interviews.
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"(to believe or not) depends on who you think is in charge—if Gorbachev is in 
power, I would believe the official Soviet line; but if more conservative forces 
are in charge, I would tend to guard myself."^^ One Swedish military official 
said he could not discount "the movement of equipment from Central to 
Northwest of the Soviet Union in fact, in-and-of-itself constitutes a modernizing 
trend."^^ One senior Norwegian Foreign Ministry official said "the forces are 
a perm anent fixture of the environment and we had better start living with that- 
-most of all we should not measure our own security by whatever is happening 
up there."^^^ One well-placed Norwegian official said "my impression that this 
is a permanent setback has been strengthened in the past few weeks (talking in 
January, 1991),"^^ indicating that "(treaty) infidelity" was a very novel 
phenomenon.
Soviet lack of faith in respect of the CFE Treaty, was seen by some as 
attributable to differing interpretations between the military and political 
establishment of the treaty's desirability and spirit. One well-placed Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry official mentioned "a strong military objective on the Soviet 
side to interpret the treaty in a less committing way, thus aiming to change the 
civilian attitude towards the treaty."^^^ The same official said, "the Soviet 
negotiators in Vienna feel ashamed of the new (military) interpretation," in fact 
pointing to a clear split between "the civilian negotiators in Vienna and the 
military officials in Moscow."^^® The perception of a growing civilian-military 
split was not, according to one Norwegian official, in evidence in the START
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talks, where "the Soviets still have a unified approach. One individual 
hinted that the CFE talks which were more vulnerable to domestic political 
disturbances than the ongoing START negotiations.
Swedish Perceptions of Disarmament in their Vicinity
One Soviet move which received more attention in Sweden than in Norway, 
for obvious geographical reasons, was the announcement that the Soviet Union 
would withdraw its four ballistic missile-carrying Golf-class submarines from 
the B a l t i c . T h i s  decision was also accompanied by rum ours that the Soviet 
Union would cut back on their Baltic marine infantry corps.*^
In the main, élites did not attach any military significance to these moves. 
The great majority of those interviewed in Sweden would agree with Centre 
Party's MP, Par Granstedt, when he said "the submarines were no good (aged) 
anyway." He felt "the Soviets hoped to gain politically out of (the move."^^^ 
One senior military figure felt "you could either take or leave the submarines, 
since they were old in any case," stating "we have not seen any real signs of 
naval cutbacks in the Baltic yet-although one could see (a changed) situation 
with Poland and the former-DDR, in that the Soviets cannot use these bases any 
l o n g e r . O n e  high military figure said, in any case "they have been used as 
'target submarines' in the Baltic—they have been weapons platforms...this move 
confirms what we already knew, that they were to be scrapped anyways."'^^
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B. Stenquist, "Sovjet drar bort fyra Golfubâtar," Dagens Nyheter, 19 
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Altogether, said one high Swedish military official, "the possibility for the 
Soviet Union in the coming years to 'move' on /in  the Nordic area has not been 
reduced."^^ Several important points were made by those Swedes intimately 
familiar with changes in the Soviet portion of the correlation of forces in the 
North.
With respect to the air threat picture, one well-placed military official said 
"we have seen the Soviets reduce the level of their air exercises'^ (more 
towards Soviet coast)," however adding, "from a strictly military point of view, 
things have not changed in our part of the w o r l d . O n e  official saw 
remarkable stability in the air exercises, telling that "they spend about as marly 
air-hours as they did in international water before, and the amount of their air 
violations have not changed (one a year)." "They are still flying from Poland 
and Germany—where they seem to be exercising even more than before- 
irrespective of their withdrawals of tanks," one official said.'*® However, "the 
threat picture from the South has changed," but "not in the North," one official 
added.'*' According to Liberal Party's Hans Lindblad, "before, no attack jets 
could reach Sweden—the use of the SU-24 Fencer changed all of that...now the 
Soviets are able to reach Sweden without refuelling from the Baltic area."'*^ 
But Lindblad cautioned saying, "although the air force (threat) picture has 
worsened, the debate about it has been exaggerated." One official spoke of an
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'*^  Lindblad, interview. Lindblad, as did Norwegian officials, mentioned the 
importance in the Soviet decision to move the 'M ainstay' bomber into the 
Nordic area.
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"air defence upgrade, especially with respect to the MiG 29 and MiG 31's; 
accompanied by more offensive aviation through the whole 1980's."^ *^
The Naval picture was perceived to be in a state of transition. In the Baltic 
today, according to one senior Swedish military official, there is less tonnage 
than previously,^^ the number of submarines has decreased— both as a part 
of a larger trend and of the Baltic Fleef s diminution in p a r t i c u l a r . " W e  have 
witnessed little renewal of the Soviet Navy in the Baltic—in fact very little has 
happened for twenty years," said one official.^^ The main reasons that the 
Soviet Union still had a presence in the Baltic, aside from the sheer importance 
of maintaining a presence were three-fold, according to Lindblad: the 
shipbuilding industry, training purposes and the lack of docking areas for more 
than operational reasons. "This is because they have found that the smaller 
submarine systems have proved more effective (in the Baltic)," he 
concluded.^*^ One also sees six Air Force divisions have been transferred from 
East Germany to the Baltic and Leningrad Military Districts, while more are 
being placed in the Naval Air Force, said Lindblad.
With these developments the plausibility of a coastal invasion scenario over 






Lindblad, interview. Chief of the Army, Âke Sagrén, agreed, saying "the 
risk for coastal invasion, like other types of attack, are small at present." ("Jas 
mâste fâ ifrâgasâttas," Svenska Dagbladet, 11 September, 1990) This point 
conflicts with the viewpoint of Chief of Defence Gustafsson. (M. Holmstrom, 
"Starka forband behovs i Syd" Svenska Dagbladet, 6 February, 1991).
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place such an attack has held in traditional Swedish threat scenarios.**^ The 
traditionally worrisome, famed Soviet challenge to Southern Sweden has 
likewise decreased dramatically—a development whose importance can hardly 
be underestimated. As Lindblad said, "they just don 't have the resources for 
this anymore."'’®
Swedish officials saw stability in terms of Soviet ground forces. "We have 
seen," said one Swedish official, "less of a change with respect to Soviet ground 
forces." 'W hat we have seen are signs that the T-34 Tank might be in the 
process of being replaced by the T-72—and we might even be seeing a reduction 
in the numbers," this Swedish official recounted.'’' "We think we see an 
increase in the number of troops in the Baltic Military District, mainly due to 
the need (read tem porary) to find quarters for homecoming Soviet troops from 
Germany," he related.'’  ^ With respect to ground force units, "we have," 
Lindblad related, seen a decrease in the amount of artillery and tanks stationed 
in the Baltic and Leningrad Military Districts, while we have seen the amount 
of missiles and armoured cars (tanks) increase in the Leningrad area. There had 
been no reductions in direct combat units, according to Lindblad.
'*’ As one senior military official pointed out, "an amphibious attack on 
Sweden is more difficult as East Germany is no longer available as a basing 
area." (S39). See Carl Bildt in the same vein, S. Svensson, "Stor invasion 
uteslutet," Dagens Nyheter, 15 May, 1990.
'’® S27 pointed out that 'before, there were 400,000 Soviet troops in East 
Germany under one command from Leningrad to Lübeck." This year, he 
added, "the border has been moved back to Kaliningrad, a base that is more and 
more isolated from supplies." However, this one individual reminded that the 
"traditional picture for an attack in the North is in great part unchanged."
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' ’  ^According to one MFA official: "We don't know whether this move into 
the Baltic is temporary or permanent...we don't in any case see any reason for 
the increasing military presence." "They are probably just waiting for final 
assignment," he recounted. (S31)
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Drawing Conclusions^"^
In the face of these serious developments, Norway's NATO backbone
provided reassurance. "We shouldn't dramatise things," said a known
Norwegian Conservative foreign policy advisor, instead mentioning the benefits
of a new Soviet notification régime.
"(The Soviet Union) is going to have a manoeuvre of 17,000 
people in September (1991)—a comparatively large exercise, near 
our border. Some might say this is a bad sign, (however) they 
may see it as a new way to re-distribute exercises."'’^
He agreed with the leader of the Storting's Foreign Affairs Committee, Codai, 
who said "I w ouldn't over-react to (the move of Central European military 
potential to the North," besides, they "have an understandable need of forces 
West of the Urals."'’  ^ Norwegian LO's Kâre Sandegren said "I have a hard 
time saying that this is a scaling-up; we don't feel a strong transfer from the 
centre to the North."^^ The lowered tension was in evidence in a statement 
by a senior Norwegian official who said "this was the first Christmas we didn 't 
keep 10,000 soldiers on alert in Troms (far North)—fourth-fifths or five-sixths 
could go home to spend time with their families.
There existed a more favourable interpretation of actual Soviet behaviour 
towards Norway. "We have seen that the Northern fleet operates somewhat 
more in the background, said one top military official."^^* This statement was 
clarified by another senior Norwegian military official: "we have seen a Soviet
Resolution over the CFE seemed imminent in June, 1991 (D. White, "Arms 







tendency to desire to train around, and deeper into the Barents, while they have 
done more around Kola specifically."^^ This same official pointed to the 
Soviet Navy having "given up" up the former "pincer movement (naval 
strategy), whereby the Baltic and Northern fleets should join hands."^
However, existing capabilities painted a contrasting picture. Given the 
numbers, one could logically conclude that the Norwegians and the Swedes 
have been left out of the broader context of European negotiations. Lcxoking at 
closer range, it would not be unfair to say that the Norwegians feel, on the 
whole, more 'left out' of the disarmament business than do the Swedes. The 
Norwegian sentiment lends credibility to the pelseteori.^^
It was partly because the Norwegians did not perceive Soviet change and 
partly because of its unwillingness to pressure its allies that the Norwegians 
adopted a relatively conservative stance relative to the Soviet developments. 
Norwegian Commander-in-Chief, Torolf Rein, expressed his reticence to 
pressure the U.S. over naval arms control, for fear of Norwegian isolation.^^ 
One strategically-placed Norwegian mentioned that from the end of (CFE) 
negotiations—October, 1990 on— we have seen a definite increasing pressure on 
our flanks...they have realized the importance of having increasing numbers of 
forces."^^ Finn Sollie from the Northern Perspectives Group, said "no matter 
w hat Gorbachev says publicly about marine development, it is, for the present.
This is especially interesting since the Soviet Navy has tended to exercise 
further West and South. (N34) The reason given was "it makes it more difficult 
for Western intelligence to get at."
^  The reason for this was according to this official, that the "Soviets 
experienced difficulty in getting out of the Baltic without heavy losses." (N34)
The "Sausage Theory." Essentially the theory predicts that disarmament 
in Central Europe will cause forces to flow over onto the Flanks.




a definite Soviet policy to maintain and improve her own naval assets 
(including Navy, Marine Infantry and Naval Air Force)."^ Although w e have 
seen a reduction in tanks in the Leningrad Military District, one Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry official pointed out, "there has been a quantitative reduction 
in the amount of tanks, they have been compensated by other types."^  Even 
Socialist Left MP, Paul Chaffey said "...the Soviet military capacity is so strong 
today that we are right in having a strong defence."^ "With a rising military 
budget, it is hard to say that disarmament is a Soviet priority, it is just not 
credible," said one senior Norwegian military official.^
Towards the end of 1990 it became clear in Norway that the aircraft carrier, 
Tiblisi would join the Northern Fleet,^ as would the destroyer Admiral 
Kharlamov^. Frightening reports of Soviet construction of airports near 
Norway^^®, reports of increasing numbers of Soviet Scud SS-21 missiles on the 
Kola,^'^ reports of more tanks in the Northwest^*^ and finally serious doubts
^  Sollie, interview. 
^^N30
^  Chaffey, interview. 
^ N 3 5
^  T. Rein, "Forsvaret av Norge i lys av den senere fids utvikling," (Oslo: 
DNAK, 1990), p. 6.
^  O.T. Storvik, "Nytt krigsskkip till nordflâten," Aftenposten, 8 October,
1990.
O.T. Storvik, "Sovjet har bygget felt-flyplasser tett ved Norge," 
Aftenposten, 13 February, 1991.
O.T. Storvik, "Flere Scud-raketter pâ Kola," Aftenposten, 25 January, 1991.
O.T. Storvik, "Flere Sovjet-stridsvogner i nord," Aftenposten, 2 January,
1991.
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whether the Soviet military budget^^^ was in fact decreasing^^t added 
feelings of confusion and disappointment over Soviet Nordic military 
disarmament behaviour, despite continued Soviet assurances^'^ that no 
military buildup was occurring in the Leningrad Military DistricL^*^
The Swedes, the Social Democrats particularly, were more cautious towards 
acceptance of the "sausage theory," not least because the 'theory' is 
manufactured in Norway and chiefly pertains to that country's security policy 
problem. Another reason is that neutrality in some way precludes subscribing 
to one of the central assumptions of the theory—the military buildup in the 
North is chiefly the fault of the Soviet Union. Swedish Defence Minister Roine 
Carlsson professed that "the sausage theory is something which I have in no 
way comprehended, assented to nor d i s c u s s e d . I n  the same breath though, 
Carlsson said, "on the contrary we have not seen very much concrete 
disarmament at all in our v i c i n i t y . C a r l s s o n ' s  party colleague, Swedish 
Social Democratic MP, Viola Furubjelke pronounced that there was nevertheless 
"reason to warn against what I once heard (Norway's Stoltenberg) once call 'the
The difficulties inherent in estimating the direction of the Soviet defence 
budget see Swedish Defence Commission Report, (SOU, 1990:40)
O.T. Storvik, 'Tvil om sovjetisk nedrustning," Aftenposten, 10 December, 
1990 for conflicting Norwegian opinions over the Soviet military budget.
215 "Yhere will be no increase in the number of nuclear vessels in the North," 
said Soviet Admiral Feliks Gromov, quoted in "Sovjets nordflâte pâ ny kurs," 
Aftenposten, 13 March, 1990)
But Lieutenant General Dagfinn Danielsen points out 50-500 km ground- 
to-ground missiles, which the Soviets claimed to have w ithdrawn as of 
November, 1989, were seen in military exercises near the Norwegian-Soviet 
border. (O.T. Storvik, "Norsk efterretning tviler pâ Sovjet," Aftenposten, 17 
November, 1990).
Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 December, 1989,
Riksdagsprotokoll, 11 December, 1989,
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sausage theory/"^'’ Yet another well-placed Social Democratic official said 
"there is no truth, I have never believed in the sausage theory."^ Maj Britt 
Theorin asked the question "we have to ask what these troops who are moving 
are bringing with them—are they offensive weapons?...We also have to ask 
ourselves w hat is going on in Europe generally...there are practical reasons for 
doing this."^^
One senior Swedish Centre Party MP countered, saying there "is a clear trend 
towards the sausage theory: "there is modernization, w ith the increasing quality 
of the troops and the equipment in the N orth."^ Centre leader, Johansson, 
was quoted as saying "from the Swedish perspective, it is important to note that 
the military forces in Sweden's neighbourhood have not been reduced 
numerically—in fact quite the opposite."^ Centre Party's Par Granstedt said 
that one had to come to terms with the qualitative change in forces based in the 
North— a change which meant the 'lowest' forces were taken away, a trend 
which left meaner and leaner power in the area.^
Explanations of Soviet Motivation
It is important to understand the underlying reasons w hy the Soviet Union 
adopted either a change or status quo in its military policies—seen from the
Riksdagsprotokoll, 29 November, 1989.
™ He elaborated: "In the process of withdrawing from e.g. DDR they have 
had logistical problems where to hold their equipment. While this must be 
observed, the situation is much better now than at any time before—especially 
due to European continental agreements." (S37)
Theorin, interview.
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^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 20 February, 1991.
^  Granstedt, interview.
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perspective of Norwegian and Swedish élites. The willingness of Norwegians 
and Swedes to attribute change and stability in the Soviet Union differently can 
partly be explained by their different defence commitments.
Soviet Change as a Result of Western Strength. For obvious reasons this strain of 
logic was used much more frequently in Norway than in Sweden. One of the 
central reasons for Norwegian NATO participation in the beginning was Soviet 
expansionism, and a feeling of defencelessness, while the Swedish reason for 
neutrality is historical—and a question of the "success" of this policy. 
Norwegians have encouraged a closer knit with NATO, accompanied by a 
increase in its military budget, while Sweden has simply only discussed 
(publicly, at any rate), an increase in military budget—and then, only part of the 
reason for such can said to be Soviet change.
The Swedes, especially the far-Right parties, might passively applaud 
NATO's efforts in bringing about Soviet change-but they could not claim direct 
participation.^ Their contribution would be in the form of its advocating 
Nordic stability, by both remaining neutral and militarily strong—such that 
neither of the blocs had to worry about who dictated Swedish policy. The value 
of Swedish strength is illustrated in the Nordic Balance context— a status quo 
security pattern which the Soviet Union, during Gorbachev's reign have 
demonstrated an interest in upholding. Sweden enjoyed being the fortress of 
stability in the face of monumental Soviet foreign policy change. Sweden's 
influence is thus typically of a psychological nature. A continued Swedish 
military strength, based upon neutrality, has always been clearly in the interest 
of the Soviet U nion.^
^  Swedish Cabinet Secretary, Pierre Schori in "Fult pâhopp pâ Palme, Bildt!" 
Dagens Nyheter, 13 January, 1990 writes that "(Carl Bildt) even dismisses as 
illogical that it was Reagan's $ 2,000,000,000,000,000,000 m ilitary investment 
during the 1980's which got Gorbachev to re-think."
^ S 5 2
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One of the traditional Norwegian explanations for "the Soviet Union's return 
to the negotiating table" was Western firmness and streng th ,^  and based 
upon NATO cohesion.^ What is important about this logic is that those w ho 
subscribe to it see it as a positive confirmation of, as well as a prescription for 
similar policies in the fu tu re .^  As Norwegian Foreign Minister Bondevik 
pointed out "the developments in the Soviet Union and East Europe and the 
amelioration of the East-West climate does not mean that a break-up of NATO 
is on the agenda; the need for Atlantic cooperation, based on solidarity and 
within the alliance frcimework, is as important today as previously."^
In a Storting debate over the placement of U.S. intermediate-range missiles 
and Soviet SS-20's in Europe, Conservative Norwegian MP, Willoch, stated that 
one of the reasons the Soviets did not (1981-3) go into negotiations was that 
"they thought they could retain a monopoly on these weapons."^^ "The 
result," maintained Willoch, was that "the Russians ended back up at the 
negotiating table accepting the proposal which they once had thrown out." 
Labour's Einar Forde, counters saying "it is interesting to note that (in the 
debate) this argument was not emphasised.
It could be said the further one travelled towards the right of the political 
spectrum, the more common this logic was. See for example, Norwegian 
Progress Party MP, Hans Rosjorde, in discussing the reasons behind INF: 
"irrespective of disarmament developments, it is important to remember that it 
was only because of firmness that the present missile agreement came about." 
(Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987)
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987: Christian People's Party, 
Kâre Kristiansen; Foreign Minister Stoltenberg ("cohesion in NATO as one of the 
factors contributing to a positive result of the INF negotiations"); Conservative 
MP, Annelise Hoegh in Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 31 May, 1 9 ^
MP Rosjorde in Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 18 December, 1989.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987. He further argues that the 
placement of the rockets was intended to bring the Soviets to negotiations.
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December,, 1987.
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Change as a Result of Soviet Economie Weakness. There was in fact total 
agreement that what lay at the core of Soviet cutbacks was economic 
considerations. One top-ranking Swedish Centre Party MP said "the goal with 
the overwhelming amount of a lot of things which happen in the Soviet Union 
today, is to survive."^^ Norwegian Christian Peoples Party MP, Kâre 
Kristiansen, argued that the reason for Soviet change was "far from pragmatic—it 
is in the first case economic consideration which force the Soviets—and to a 
lesser extent the U.S.—to adopt a more sensible position over arm am ents."^ 
Kristiansen felt that "the reasons for glasnost are not that communism or its 
leaders suddenly have been converted to humanism and democracy—as much 
as we hope that it might be so." Carl Bildt pointed out that "in the beginning 
of the 1980's Soviet national income began to decrease. It concerned a social 
and economic failure of historical dimensions."^^
A representative analysis of the economic need to disarm was given by then- 
former Prime Minister Brundtland:
"Scientific and economic resources are needed in altogether 
more comprehensive dimensions today, in order to resolve 
the central problems connected with defensible use of 
energy, the development of a sufficient food production 
and an industrial development which does not undermine 
the fundamental resource base. This admission has clearly 
been both an important propelling force within the Soviet 
Union itself, for a new security-policy thinking and its 
working position towards the West, and a secure 
fundamental for a gradual dismantlement of the military 
sector."^
233 S2
23^ Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 15 December, 1987.
233 Riksdagsprotokoll, 16 March, 1988. Bildt quotes Gorbachev as having 
recently (note date) said there has not been any growth in the Soviet economy 
for twenty years-if one does not consider oil price rises and the strong effects 
of increased vodka sales."
236 Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990.
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Most would agree with Conservative Norwegian MP, Jan Petersen, saying that, 
rather than Soviet reforms being motivated by optimism, it was in fact "the bad 
results of the Soviet economy throughout the years—and from an admission that 
unless the Soviet economy reforms it will only further fall behind the West."^^ 
Swedish Liberal MP, Maria Leissner said quite simply that "perestroika was 
brought on by the Communist system's political and economic collapse—to get 
economic development going has been decisive for the Soviet leadership." With 
this, Leissner said, we have "detected a change in course in Soviet defence 
policy in the direction of an non-offensive defence."^ As one Swedish official 
explained it "he needed cooperation in order to have a basis for reducing 
military capabilities and in order to obtain Western technology and financial 
support."^’
Quite naturally, U.S. economic difficulties had a role in motivating and 
renewing Western disarmament efforts. The Left side of the political scale never 
neglected to mention that the U.S. also felt a sharp economic need to disarm. 
It was, according to many élites, a coincidence of Soviet and to some extent, 
American economic interests, which brought both to the negotiating tab le .^  
As one Swedish MP expressed it "it has been said that the original (U.S.) 
intention was to (arms) race the Soviets to death...but now the question is 
whether the U.S. is (arms) racing itself to death, as stock market trends and 
other indicators have demonstrated."^^
Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987. 
^  Riksdagsprotokoll, 7 December, 1988.
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^  Labour MP, Gunnar Berge, says "during the 1980's we have seen the U.S. 
go from being the largest creditor nation to the largest debtor nation..." 
(Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 4 January, 1990).
Swedish Left Party MP, Oswald Soderqvist, Riksdagsprotokoll, 28 
October, 1987.
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Military Interests. Traditional Soviet military interests accounted for most 
perceived stability in Soviet military policy. Many expressed the thought that 
today's Soviet military in fact retained much of its influence, in some cases 
making its own foreign policy. Christian People's Party's Bondevik, said that 
while "it is clear that the Soviet Union has both economic and security interests 
in the North," "if these two come into conflict with each other, all experience 
demonstrates that the military, defence-related interests will w in ou t."^  One 
former Norwegian defence official felt stability in Soviet policy could be 
explained by traditional Soviet Naval concerns. The reason for Soviet emphasis 
on the Northern Fleet, for example, was because of the Fleet's continuing and 
demonstrated suitability to carry out traditional naval m issions.^
For Norwegian advisor Finn Sollie, the answer lay in continuing Soviet 
strategic interests. "We cannot discount that (today) Soviet thinkers are 
contemplating the question: what will we do if Germany becomes too strong," 
said Sollie. ("the Euro-strategic dimension"). Additionally, Sollie said he 
believed that the continuing trends were due to Soviet interests to maintain a 
strategic balance with the United States.^ One former Norwegian military 
figure mentioned that Gorbachev was prepared to make sacrifices such that he 
could preserve the Union intact-w ith the eventual goal of "whatever happens 
having a Soviet Union with a global influence."^
Change Necessary for the Societal Good. 'We now have to admit that Gorbachev 
is a societal reformer of dimensions...he has read the writing on the wall...a 
Communistic society, closed as it is, must of necessity be conservative," said
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 9 June, 1987.
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Norwegian Labour MP, Finn K nutsen.^ According to another Norwegian 
Labour MP, disarmament and less dedication of resources to military purposes 
were some of the more important bi-effects of the (societal transformation) 
process(rather than the cause.)"^^
The Swedish Defence Commission, also concluded that societal interests were 
at stake, stating, "the fight to solve Soviet domestic problems incited the will to 
foster international détente." Further the Commission writes "the radical 
economic transformation of the social system, which was judged necessary by 
the present leadership, was not possible within the framework for the, on all 
key points, Stalinistic political system which was still alive."(SOU 1990:27-8) 
"The former system's incapacity to create solutions to growing problems of 
societal, ecological and political nature provided the basis for the glasnost and 
perestroika policies under Gorbachev,"(SOU, 1990:28) the Committee writes.
Personality Factor. There may be some truth to what many individuals, at first, 
attributed change in the Soviet Union: Gorbachev as a propellant in and of 
himself. Indeed M.S. Gorbachev's reform strategy bore his own personal stamp. 
One former Norwegian Defence official hinted that Gorbachev realized w hat he 
did not want, namely, "pre-Gorbachev there was a tendency to think that 
military power could solve almost any situation—on any occasion it was an 
effective instrument for having a say."^ This official thus attributed change 
to a final (seemingly personal) realisation that "power does not buy political 
influence." As Norwegian Conservative MP, Anders Talleraas, said "Gorbachev 
has probably been the propelling power behind the most important events in 
the past ten years."^^
^  Forhandlinger i Stortinget, 19 January, 1989.
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A paired comparison of Sweden and Norway's foreign relations w ith a 
changing Soviet Union has suggested the points where the respective states' 
commitments to either alliance or neutrality have affected the diplomatic style, 
attitudes and approach of the leaderships in selected questions. By capitalizing 
on the recommendations of the authors in the area of controlled comparison, 
this thesis has enriched the number of such studies and illuminated the utility 
of controlled comparison for future studies. The study has also provided an 
opportunity to study, in-depth, the ebb and flow of Scandinavian foreign 
relations with the Soviet Union, deepening the literature of Scandinavian foreign 
policies. As such, this study has hopefully enriched the study of international 
relations, the study of why nations behave in certain ways.
The core of this study has attempted to relate certain propositions found in 
the literature on neutrality and alignment with the behaviour of the Swedish 
and Norwegian leaderships. An examination of selected aspects of Swedish and 
Norwegian diplomacy towards the Soviet Union reveals that there is a 
meaningful connection between specified facets of the theory surrounding 
neutrality and alignment and the world of real diplomacy. It has also pointed 
to the aspects of their foreign relations in which security policy considerations 
play a minor, if not altogether absent, role. As was argued in the introduction, 
the study has aimed solely at suggesting the effect of neutrality and alignment, 
while recognizing that several other credible explanations of these nations' 
behaviour indeed do exist.
An in-depth analysis of selected issue-areas seems to confirm that a central 
pillar of an aligned state's foreign policy-partiality towards its fellow NATO 
members (i.e. loyalty to its allies, full participation in allied activities, 
coordination and consultation amongst fellow alliance members)—was indeed 
present in specified junctures of Norway's Soviet relationship. Norway has 
likewise draw n heavily upon the benefits off m embership—such as allied
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standards, practice and solutions—as useful guidelines in its relations to the 
Soviet Union. The analysis also bears evidence that NATO membership 
provides extra psychological insurance for Norway, allowing it more freedom 
in selected aspects of its relations towards the Soviet Union.
In the case of Sweden, perhaps the principal element of its foreign policy— 
impartiality—appearing to the outside world to lead a credible, independent and 
'Cold War free' line in foreign policy-reappeared many times over a host of 
bilateral questions with the Soviet Union. The Swedish leadership's desire to 
back up this commitment has resulted in a strict interpretation and enforcement 
of its territorial integrity, a sizeable defence budget and its frequent desire to 
resort to supranational and multilateral norms, bodies, legal statutes and 
solutions in its foreign relations with the Soviet Union.
In 1947-9 these cornerstones of neutrality and alignment were only under 
discussion, revision and refinement, whereas in 1987-1991 they were in full 
practice. It was both in relation to past realities—historical experiences in the 
W ar and beyond, and contemporary challenges-the Cold War, American and 
Soviet behaviour that the choices to pursue neutrality and alignment were 
taken.
Neutrality and Alignment in Practice: 1947-9
Neutrality affected the way the Swedes acted towards the Soviet Union and 
the U.S. in a period of extreme turbulence in the immediate post-War period. 
Even though Sweden and Norway were faced by largely similar Soviet 
behaviour, Sweden felt its interests, and the interests of Nordic security were 
best served by maintaining a neutral line. In this way, the Swedish leadership 
could affect Finland's chances of retaining independence while remaining true 
to its historical tradition of neutrality. The central theme in Swedish neutrality- 
in-practice in the post-War period was impartiality in foreign relations. Actively 
pursuing the Finnish cause could not be construed as direct interference in 
Soviet affairs, and thus was not seen to affect Sweden's foreign policy 
credibility. Impartiality was again a central consideration in Sweden's economic 
relations. After much discussion of neutrality's compatibility with U.S.
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economic assistance, and faced with the fact of Soviet non-participation, the 
Swedish leadership chose to participate in the Marshall Plan. A look at the 
Billion Credit Agreement also illustrated the neutral Swedish desire to pursue 
the desirable—to rejuvenate the war-torn Soviet Union while simultaneously 
acting to promote its impartiality by attempting to counterbalance Sweden's 
Western-dominated trading pattern. This measure could likewise be interpreted 
as an attempt to boost the credibility of Sweden's neutral choice.
At another critical juncture, during the Scandinavian Defence Union 
discussions, the Swedish leadership distanced itself from the Norwegian 
standpoint of the need for a U.S. guarantee of a future defence union—this 
would naturally be construed from the Soviet Union as 'taking sides' and could 
be seen as creating a dependence on the West. By contrast, a study of the SOU 
lends credibility to the hypothesis that states seek alignment because they see 
their own security as being linked with assistance from other states. Such was 
clearly Norway's motivation when it sought NATO membership in 1949. The 
Czech coup also illustrated Sweden's neutrality-in-practice. One of the pillars 
of Swedish foreign policy is territorial integrity. The Swedish leadership, seeing 
that Czechoslovakia's territorial integrity and rights had been violated, protested 
loudly, leaving no doubt as to its stance in the question.
As late as 1947, Norway showed many of the same neutralist tendencies 
which were present in Sweden. For example, discussion surrounding the 
Marshall Plan showed a trace of its previous orientation. Although there 
appeared sharp differences of opinion over the compatibility of the MP with 
Norway's overarching foreign policy goals, Norway finally decided to 
participate, having concluded that participation could not be construed as 
contributing to 'bloc-building.' Norwegian trade policy with the Soviet Union 
was however free from Swedish-style idealism. Even in consideration of the 
positive feeling towards the Soviet Union following its liberation of Northern 
Norway, the Norwegian government felt no need to interfere in or bolster 
commercial relations with the USSR. The Norwegian security choice of 1949 
would eventually be accompanied by membership in COCOM in 1950—a 
grouping with unmistakable security policy overtones. This particular move
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was seen in following years to increase and promote Norway's credibility as a 
reliable alliance partner vis-à-vis its fellow NATO members.
Soviet behaviour towards Czechoslovakia and Finland was the central 
impetus for the Norwegian Government's decision to seek security in a Western 
collective. This, combined with its historically Atlantic orientation and its 
Wartime experience of German occupation, propelled Norway away from its 
bridge-building and neutral traditions into an arrangement with formal ties with 
states of similar mind. The maintenance of the NATO 'lifeline' would remain 
one of the central elements of Norwegian policy. The Norwegian insistence 
upon obtaining a U.S. guarantee of a future SDU drove the final nail on the 
coffin of a neutral, all-Scandinavian defence union. While the Swedes 
emphasized the development of an independent capacity to obtain supplies, the 
Norwegians preferred a Western guarantee for the same. Norway, like Sweden, 
used the Finnish argument in ways which fitted its conception of the preferable 
security alternative. Norway threatened to "go Westward" if unacceptable 
Soviet pressure threatened Finnish independence.
Neutrality and Alignment Revisited: 1987-1991
A study of the most important issues in Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian- 
Soviet relations in 1987-1991 also reveals important junctures where neutrality 
and alignment have affected the Swedish and Norwegian leaderships' 
diplomatic style, approach and attitudes towards the Soviet Union. For the first 
time since 1947-9, Norwegian and Swedish leaders were faced with the task of 
developing explanations, seeking solutions, and making policy which adapted 
its standing security commitments with a changed and changing Soviet Union.
A close study of the Norwegian and Swedish handling of the Nordic Nuclear 
Weapons-Free Zone raises some crucial differences between neutrality and 
alignment. That the NNWFZ proposal has not been realized is greatly 
attributable to differing security commitments in the Nordic area. Sweden's 
advocacy of the NNWFZ was designed to enhance its neutrality by promoting 
an issue which was important to it, while at the same time being careful not to 
appear 'one-sided' towards what was originally a Soviet proposal. At an early
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stage, the Swedish Foreign Minister chose the United Nations as the body fitted 
to deal with such a proposal, demonstrating a reliance on international norms 
and institutions. The Swedes behaved negatively towards efforts to further 
regionalize the issue to the Baltic Sea—partially because the strategic superpower 
balance in the Baltic would be undermined, leaving Sweden isolated w ith only 
one superpower presence in the Baltic.
Norway, from the very outset, interpreted the proposal as a Soviet attempt 
to drive a wedge between NATO alliance partners. To be sure, the initiative 
was seen to run contrary to a several central elements in NATO policy—to 
discuss and find solutions within the NATO context, and not in isolated 
circumstances. It was also seen to dislodge Norway from its strategic link with 
NATO—in terms of the implementation of INF, with respect to the 'flexible 
response' strategy and finally in relation to NATO's port-call policy. A senior 
Norwegian diplomat's campaign for the NNWFZ demonstrated how one person 
could go against the established policy stream by putting into question 
Norway's loyalty to accepted norms of NATO behaviour. The resulting division 
in the governing party partially determined a Norwegian withdrawal of support 
for the NATO infrastructure programme in 1983—further putting into question 
Norwegian loyalty to NATO standards.
In the early 1990's the issue became a low priority—for Sweden and Norway 
as well as for the Soviet Union. With the significant easing of superpower 
tension in the late 1980's, both the Norwegians and the Swedes agreed that 
there could be no solely Nordic solution to the problem of nuclear weapons in 
the North—rather, as the inter-Nordic Ministry study group concluded in early 
1991, that the answer must be found in continued dialogue between the 
superpowers and the Nordic countries in a broad international context.
The value of secure boundaries is assessed differently in neutral and aligned 
countries. Territorial integrity is one of the pillars of a neutral state's foreign 
policy. When this cornerstone is violated, as was the case for Sweden in 1981 
and 1982, and arguably through the 1980's and early 1990's, the external 
credibility of the state's neutrality policy comes into question. The continual
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nature of violations transforms this feeling of insecurity into a serious self- 
confidence problem for the leadership in question.
Such a situation confronts the neutral state with several difficult questions. 
One, the production of evidence which would objectively demonstrate that it 
was not 'assuming guilty before proving innocent' was important. In this 
respect, two strengthenings of the standards for submarine identification and 
sighting occurred in the 1980's. It was likewise a question of how to react— 
would the neutral state's reactions be interpreted by the outside world as being 
in accordance w ith neutrality? Sweden has satisfied itself w ith a high public 
profile, by protesting and referring to international laws and statutes. Thus, 
Sweden relied not on its military might, but rather the possibility of the intruder 
being exposed, and embarrassed before an international audience. Also, in the 
1980's Sweden cut off its military exchanges with the Soviet Union as em 
expression of its displeasure—a move that, if taken too far, would have 
jeopardized Sweden's communications channels with Moscow. Neutrality 
dictates that, in the face of inconclusive evidence regarding the identity of an 
intruder, one m ust not make any judgement of nationality. Swedish leaders 
have failed this principle, privately assuming that the violator is the Soviet 
Union.
The strength of the Norwegian NATO backbone allows for greater flexibility 
in interpreting and reacting to border-related violations of Norwegian territory. 
NATO membership also imposes strict standards of evidence upon the 
Norwegian military in the case of territorial violations. For Norway, the 
identity of the eventual intruder is no mystery: the Soviet Union and Norway 
accept inter-alliance rivalry as a part of their daily existence. Even when 
territorial violations do occur, they can be put into the wider perspective of their 
relationship—namely that NATO nevertheless can defend Norway if the 
incursions become sufficiently serious. In fact, Norwegian leaders commonly 
point to Norwegian wrongdoing more often than Soviet in security-related 
border issues.
A closer comparison of the Swedish and Norwegian perceptions of and 
behaviour towards the Soviet invitations to sign bi-lateral Incidents-at-Sea
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treaties also illuminates interesting differences between neutral and aligned state 
leaders' behaviour. For Sweden, the proposal was unwelcome for it was seen 
as trying to extricate Sweden from its multilateral approach on the issue. 
Sweden preferred, as in naval arms control generally, to have the issue brought 
up in large, international bodies such as the UN or multilateral bodies such as 
the forum of the CSCE. Swedish leaders likewise felt that to sign such an 
agreement would put them at a disadvantage with a superpower. Furthermore, 
signing a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union, and not w ith the United States, 
could be challenged from the standpoint of balance and impartiality.
The Norwegian approach to the issue was greatly affected by its membership 
in NATO. Most important for Norway was the precedent whereby other NATO 
countries had previously signed such bilateral treaties w ith the Soviet Union. 
If there were to be any question about the treaty-in-practice, it could best be 
resolved with the help of its alliance partners. Also, Norwegian efforts to limit 
the treaty to a document of strictly technical-consultative character cleansed it 
of points of potential political pressure on Norway. As such the Incidents-at- 
Sea Treaty avoided being perceived as leaving open the possibility of the Soviet 
Union receiving a droit de regard in its relationship with Norway.
A comparison of Norwegian and Swedish perception and policy on the port 
calls issue again reveals important junctures where the different effects of 
neutrality and alignment are felt. While both Sweden and Norway have 
formulated set approaches to the problem, it is only Sweden which has taken 
an active role, demanding, as it does, guarantees from visiting vessels that they 
are nuclear-weapons free. Again, at the root of this policy is a Swedish desire 
to maintain clarity in its border relations with the superpowers. In the view of 
the Swedish leadership, not being able to claim publicly that vessels entering its 
ports are nuclear-free damages Sweden's external credibility and ostensibly 
compromises Sweden's strict interpretation of territorial inviolability. 
Norwegian leaders, perhaps justifiably, believe that a stricter Norwegian 
approach would firstly result in isolation from its allies in  times of crisis and 
secondly, call into question Norway's loyalty to accepted NATO policy. At the 
same time, banning NATO port calls would result in a potential diminution of
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a  Western naval presence in the Norwegian Sea, designed to offset the Soviet 
military advantage one of the key advantages connected with Norway's NATO 
membership.
Swedish leaders have pursued the ideal of a nuclear-free neighbourhood, 
consistent with its high profile in international disarmament more generally. 
In this they have been careful to pursue a policy which cannot be interpreted 
as being partial to either bloc. Thus, they have been satisfied with demanding 
written reassurances that visiting ships do not carry nuclear weapons. 
However, as is usual with neutrality, Sweden has been caught between that 
which is desirable—ridding the seas of nuclear weapons—and what is possible— 
namely obtaining undisputed evidence would mean violating international law 
while also closing the Baltic Sea to all but one nuclear power. The price Sweden 
would have to pay for a stricter practice would be accompanied by a 
compromise on its stance towards international law, its neutrality and its 
desired position mid-way between the superpower blocs.
While the respective Norwegian and Swedish maritime-delimitation disputes 
w ith the Soviet Union were chiefly of a legal character, even these questions had 
security policy overtones. A resolution of either the Baltic or the Barents 
problem-areas would have consequences in the countries' economic, political 
and security relationships with the Soviet Union.
At a relatively early stage, 1978, Norway, under strong pressure from fishing 
interests, deemed a 'grey zone' arrangement proper in a portion of the disputed 
area. A chief consideration was whether this would give the Soviet Union a say 
in Norwegian internal affairs. Considering Norway's NATO connection, such 
an influence could be greatly discounted. It could tolerate a degree of 
'murkiness' in its relations with the Soviet Union so as to obtain something 
which was economically desirable.
The standpoint of Swedish leaders has been quite the opposite—clarity in the 
question was of the utmost importance. Signing such an unclear agreement 
would put Sweden on uneven footing with a superpower— a position, for 
which, unlike Norway, it could not be compensated by a military protector. 
This illustrates the fact that it is much more difficult for a neutral country to
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cooperate with a non-neutral than a country which is part of an alliance. 
Therefore, a 'white zone' arrangement reigned until the conflict's resolution in 
1988.
Both Norway and Sweden have stood by their insistence to have the 
International Court of Justice decide the matter, and both states have defended 
a division according to the median principle. The Soviet Union traditionally 
objected to the use of international courts in the case of jurisdictional disputes. 
In the Norwegian case, the Soviet Union, referring to 'special circumstances' in 
the conflict, approached the question calling on the sector-line principle. The 
Norwegian resistance to the sector principle was strengthened knowing that the 
U.S. had also opposed this principle in previous disputes with the USSR.
In 1988 the Swedish delimitation of the Baltic Sea towards the Soviet Union 
was resolved. Swedish leaders attributed success not only to the skill of its 
negotiators, but also to its attachment to the principles of international law. 
While at the time of writing the Norwegian-Soviet dispute remained open, 
Norwegians were keen to remind that the strength from its NATO ties imbued 
it w ith a patience which allowed them to wait for a solution which was 
desirable rather than one which was pressed upon them.
The question of Norwegian and Swedish perceptions and behaviour towards 
the Baltic independence drive was also a political-legal problem with security- 
policy relevance. The Swedes at a very early stage recognized the annexation 
of the three Baltic states into the body of the Soviet Union. To complicate 
history, Sweden's Government reversed its promise of asylum to Baltic refugees, 
deporting, in 1946, those Baltic citizens which had arrived in Sweden to take up 
this invitation. Norway, in keeping with the majority of Western, future NATO 
members, refused to accept this incorporation. These differing historical 
perspectives created both opportunities and restraints regarding Swedish and 
Norwegian policy until both countries' establishment of formal diplomatic ties 
in late August, 1991.
Sweden adopted a much higher profile on the Baltic issue, at an earlier stage, 
than did Norway. At a very early stage the Baltic question became politically 
divisive in Sweden. Beginning with the Conservative Party, soon followed by
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the Liberal Party's support, the opposition parties consistently criticized the 
Government's handling of the issue—referring to what was in Sweden one of the 
trademarks of neutrality: to raise the Baltic cause in international fora. The 
Government relentlessly dismissed the opposition's views as being politically- 
motivated and unreasonable, only in late 1990 deciding to advocate the question 
of Baltic independence in international fora. The Government also preferred to 
discuss the issue with the Soviet Union in quiet diplomatic terms, such that it 
would not be interpreted as being partial in the conflict. These differing 
perspectives created a major foreign policy conflict, finally resulting in the 
establishment of majority political party consensus on the w ay forward for 
Swedish policy towards the area.
Norway avoided such a political battle, taking the issue up  for the first 
serious time only in 1990. There were no foreign policy crises relating to 
Norwegian Baltic policy. The Norwegians leamt from the Swedish handling of 
the question and experienced, relative to Sweden, an even road to its 
recognition of Baltic independence.
A central dilemma for the Swedish and the Norwegian governments was 
how to show support for the Baltics while still maintaining open dialogue with 
the Soviet central Government. One way for Sweden to foster its Baltic contacts 
while still been seen as 'impartial' was to open cultural and economic exchanges 
with the Baltic republics. Only indirectly could these efforts be interpreted as 
meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union—and thus as being partial 
to the conflict.
Sweden's official recognition of the Baltic states' annexation made possible 
visits and consular representation in the Baltics—and thus opened extra 
communication channels into the Baltic region. Norway, which had not 
recognized this incorporation, was unable to send official representatives from 
Moscow to visit the Baltic republics—they were, on paper, not a part of the 
Soviet Union. This difficulty of representation was further highlighted in the 
Swedish and Norwegian political parties' (not Governments') invitations to 
Lithuanian Prime Minister Prunskiene to visit these countries in connection with 
Lithuania's independence declaration. Here, the Swedish Government's desire
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to play the role of quiet mediator between Vilnius and Moscow became 
obvious. Playing this role would of course be seen as enhancing Sweden's 
ostensibly impartial stance in the conflict between the two capitals. Also, 
referring to Swedish principles of recognition—'universality' and 'effectivity'— 
and by inserting references to international law, Sweden could be seen as 
behaving according to objective standards in the recognition question. 
Norway was restrained in its position over Lithuanian independence by several 
factors. Norway could not be seen as behaving out of step with NATO and its 
own bilateral interests with the Soviet Union. A high profile over the issue 
could potentially damage ongoing U.S.-Soviet disarmament negotiations, while 
simultaneously endangering Norwegian-Soviet co-operation on the environment, 
on the Barents Sea question, to name two examples. It was thus in 
consideration of these interests that members of the Norwegian Government, 
in their capacity as party leaders rather than as Government members, received 
then-Lithuanian PM Prunskiene. The Norwegian position might also have been 
compromised if the Norwegian leadership, acting in their role as a Government, 
would have interfered in the Lithuanian oil crisis. The Government aimed, and 
was rather successful, in channelling, what was a political request into the 
commercial realm.
Both the Norwegian and Swedish Governments played key roles in placing 
the Baltic issue high on the Nordic Council (NR) agenda. Norwegian and 
Swedish utilization of the Council partially acted as a shield against Soviet 
pressure on each of the states' respective bilateral relations with the Soviet 
Union, essentially diluting and mixing together each Nordic state's security 
commitments to their common gain on the first concrete opportunity in the 
post-War period. The beauty of mixing these commitments was that external 
observers could not tell which exact positions each state took in the process— 
thus, individual states could not easily be criticized for particular stances. This 
mixing would not compromise Sweden's impartiality and neither would it 
compromise NATO policy. Sweden was following its natural multilateral 
tendencies. NATO policy over Baltic independence had not been fully 
developed nor clearly enunciated. Nevertheless, it was hard to see how
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Norway could accept being interpreted as acting discordant relative to its fellow 
NATO members. Invitations to attend the NR's meetings and the founding of 
NR representation in the Baltic capitals were two concrete steps in this process.
Following the attempted coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in late August, 
1991, Western nations, Sweden and Norway prominent among them, established 
formal diplomatic ties with the Baltic countries-formally ending an historical 
epoch. Sweden's declaration obfuscated a formal denial of its wartime 
annexation declaration—but did mandate a reference to the 'objective' principles 
of recognition being fulfilled. Norway's position was matter-of-fact, simply re­
stating its historical stance of never having accepted the annexation of the 
Baltics into the Soviet Union.
Security policy orientation explains little of why Sweden and Norway trade 
as they do with the Soviet Union. Only in a closer study of Sweden's and 
Norway's relationship to COCOM is one able to discern differing perceptions 
and behaviour which have their explanation in neutrality and alignment. 
However, since COCOM-sensitive goods are few within Norwegian and 
Swedish trade with the Soviet Union, security considerations play a relatively 
minor role in the context of Sweden's and Norway's foreign policy towards the 
Soviet Union. It is striking in fact how similar Swedish and Norwegian 
perceptions and behaviour are in the area of trade policy and practice. As in 
1947-9, the explanation for the low level of trade relations lies in purely 
commercial factors and realities. However, unlike 1947-9 there were no notable 
efforts at bolstering trade relations with the Soviet Union.
Trade with the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has been less impressive than 
at any other time during the 1980's. Total trade between the Norwegians and 
the Soviet Union rose 12.5% (1989-90) while Swedish-Soviet trade dipped 16%. 
As in 1947-9, the Swedish trade deficit with the Soviet Union was consistently 
sharper than the Norwegian, which has traditionally maintained a relative 
balance in their exports to and imports from the Soviet Union. The composition 
of Soviet trade differs much from Sweden to Norway. While Norway, like 
Sweden has based the majority of its imports on oil and gas, Norway has
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exported paper and pulp while Sweden has exported consumer goods 
(especially food-related) and engineering goods.
Before Gorbachev, the Swedish and Norwegian characterizations of trade 
with the USSR were chiefly dominated by perceptions of lengthy negotiations, 
tremendous bureaucratic exercises, and the lack of suitable projects. To this 
already discouraging picture was added, in the late 1980's, a row of de­
stabilizing political and economic factors which Gorbachev has indirectly or 
directly played a role in bringing about. Furthermore, Swedish and Norwegian 
'lack of effort' and 'courage' has resulted in minimal business engagement with 
the Soviet Union.
With the exception of initial excitement and euphoria from mostly small and 
medium companies—in which only limited amounts of large firms partook, the 
Gorbachev years have clearly given way to disappointment on m any points. 
The balance in the Soviet market has been offset by chiefly domestic economic 
and political difficulties—throwing an otherwise stable trade régime w ith the 
West into chaos. The outcome of this process has been payment defaults from 
Soviet firms, convertibility problems, decision-making confusion, soaring 
inflation, and strikes, just to name a few.
As a result of these complications, Swedish and Norwegian domestic 
financing and guarantee institutions adopted extremely restrictive financing and 
guarantee schemes for firms trying to enter the Soviet market. The Norwegian 
GIEK and Swedish EKN both came under pressure from business to grant 
politically-inspired guarantees for exports. However, only the Norwegian 
Government decided to intervene politically—chiefly to assist suffering 
Norwegian exporters of paper pulp and cellulose in 0stfold , due to their 
dependence on the Soviet market. However, one cannot say that these steps 
were, in the least, attributable to security policy orientations. At the same time, 
élites perceived an amelioration in outstanding Soviet debt—crediting the 
improvement to a combination of domestic Swedish and Norwegian factors as 
well as Soviet payment priorities, both in terms of country (Sweden seen as 
prioritized for political reasons) and in terms of product categories (food-related 
product payments as prioritized).
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Norwegian participation in COCOM has acted to enhance Norway's security 
policy choice while Sweden's COCOM adherence has discredited Sweden's 
neutral line. In short, Norway's participation in COCOM has meant that 
Norwegian trade with the Soviet Union has been dominated by military- 
strategic considerations. Seen from the Norwegian perspective, COCOM 
membership has acted to strengthen its Western economic, military and political 
commitment. Sweden's dependence upon COCOM-regulated technology has 
obliged it to abide by the rules, however timidly. The underlying logic of 
COCOM's founding clearly contradicts one of neutrality's basic tenets: acting 
independently and impartially in the East-West conflict. Sweden's challenge 
was how to seem impartial, while conceding its dependence on Western high 
technology.
Sweden's adherence to the COCOM statutes have meant compromising the 
credibility of Swedish neutrality in Soviet eyes. This has been the price of 
building confidence with the providers of COCOM technology. Seen from the 
U.S. perspective, and barring minor violations, Swedish loyalty to the COCOM 
rules rose sharply in the late 1980's as compared to pre-Gorbachev, resulting in 
the granting of privileged 5(k) status from COCOM. Norwegian COCOM 
membership has acted to re-enforce the credibility of its Western commitment 
in the eyes of both the Soviet Union and its allies.
When Norway became involved in the Kongsberg Vaapenfabrikk scandal in 
1987, Norway's credibility within COCOM was seriously compromised. Seen 
in a wider perspective, this meant Norway's loyalty to accepted NATO norms 
was also at issue. As in Sweden, Norway then proceeded onto a comprehensive 
tightening of rules, control procedures and penalties—with "good" resu lt
Sweden, not a COCOM member, has consistently struggled with clarifying 
its formal position vis-à-vis COCOM. Under criticism chiefly from the 
Environmental and Left parties, the Government has consistently attempted to 
establish that it was not 'participating' in the rules only 'adhering ' to them—as 
was necessary given its Western technological dependence. This debate 
undermined the official position of subsequent governments on the issue, 
making unmanageable the task of defending neutrality against COCOM's
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ideology. The debate regarding Norway's legal-constitutional position on 
COCOM revealed deficiencies in Norway's formal standing vis-à-vis its fellow 
member states. However, this debate was led by the Socialist Left party and 
took place of the mainstream of decision-making circles.
Swedish and Norwegian industry, generally speaking, claim not to have 
suffered because their respective trade structures with the Soviet Union have 
not been dominated by COCOM-regulated goods and services. However, a 
closer look reveals that Swedish telecommunications products, computers, 
engineering equipment sectors have suffered. In Norway, marine technology, 
oil exploration technology and computer technology, all of which have a 
international comparative advantage, have suffered from the COCOM 
regulations, providing a significant hinderance to free trade.
The COCOM factor is the most tangible political factor affecting Swedish- 
Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet trade. It has not only affected their economic 
relations but has also played an important role in their general political 
relations. COCOM is merely an additional g tumbling block to free relations 
between nations. COCOM imposes conditions on the way both Norway and 
Sweden interact with the Soviet Union. However, recent events have pointed 
to COCOM's diminishing importance in both the economic and political 
relationship with the Soviet Union.
Gorbachev's Murmansk initiative of October, 1987, excepting its security- 
policy aspects, signalled a changed Soviet perception of and approach to 
important aspects of Nordic-Soviet relations. Previously, the Soviet willingness 
to co-operate on the environment lacked substance—not least because security 
and environmental concerns were organically related in the pre-Gorbachev 
years. The follow-up of the Murmansk speech shows evidence of a 
comprehensive re-evaluation of the Soviet practice to see questions, in a host of 
areas directly related to cooperation in the scientific, economic and 
environmental realms, through the prism of security-policy concerns. This work 
demonstrated the degree of progress which took place when security concerns 
were not the chief consideration. When Gorbachev spoke of increased scientific, 
resource, and environmental cooperation in the North, he hit a favourable chord
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in the ears of Nordic élites. Gorbachev's approach showed evidence of desiring 
extra-regional actor participation—specifically naming NATO-members Canada 
and the U.S.—which added to its positive reception in Norway.
In the environmental realm, Norwegian scientists were invited to partake in 
w hat previously was seen as obtrusive experiments and monitoring. The data 
which was collected by these researchers was interpreted far more favourably 
in Moscow than had been the case in the past. This atmosphere of increasing 
m utual trust, led to the greater Swedish and Norwegian willingness to 
participate in joint-scientific enterprises. The joint Swedish-Finnish-Norwegian 
proposal to make the Nickel smelting works on the M urmansk peninsula 
environmentally safe could be counted as a result of this development.
The follow-up of Gorbachev's proposal for enhanced economic cooperation 
in the Arctic and in the North was weak. To the extent that Gorbachev had in 
m ind joint oil-exploration, this question was regulated by established 
Norwegian policy on the unresolved delimitation question and COCOM 
guidelines. For the Swedes, mineral exploration possibilities were minimal, as 
a study commissioned by the Swedish MFA demonstrated. A development of 
further economic cooperation also fell due to the increasingly weak economic 
structure in the Soviet Union.
A point of major concern for Swedish and Norwegian leaders was 
Gorbachev's mention of Soviet willingness to re-think the issue of nuclear- 
testing on nearby Novaya Zemlya. The Soviet Union, contrary to what had 
been forwarded in the speech, resumed underground nuclear blasts in the Fall 
of 1990. Sweden and Norway, together with their fellow Nordic colleagues, 
adopted similar stances on the blasts, although Sweden had previously been 
more vocal over the test-ban issue. This joint-Nordic démarche was partially 
possible through Gorbachev's Helsinki speech-which assumed formal Nordic 
foreign policy cooperation when there was in fact was none. One may argue 
that Norway's NATO membership allowed officials to put the explosions into 
a wider perspective of other serious problems—e.g. the storing of nuclear waste 
underwater. Norwegian officials had to be careful not to over-emphasize the
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seriousness, since its ally the U.S. had indicated no intention of initiating a test- 
ban.
The period 1987-1991 witnessed significant change in American-Soviet 
military relations and disarmament. However, evidence of these changes was 
m uch more obvious in Central than in Northern Europe. A study of Swedish 
and Norwegian reactions to Soviet disarmament proposals and behaviour 
revealed some interesting differences and similarities between the way a neutral 
state and an aligned state behave when faced with a changing security-policy 
environment.
Some of the reactions to Gorbachev's proposals and behaviour were not 
influenced by Swedish and Norwegian security policy commitments, while 
others were. Progress on U.S.-USSR disarmament in its various forms—through 
the summits, the Stockholm Conference, the CFE Agreement, the INF 
Agreement, through Gorbachev's 1988 UN speech, was applauded from both 
Oslo and Stockholm. However there appeared differing explanations as to the 
reason for movement on disarmament questions. The far Right in Norway 
presented Soviet movement on disarmament as being attributable to U.S. 
strength, alliance cohesion and cooperation. It further saw this success as a 
mandate for NATO's continuation. The NATO backbone also had another 
benefit—it comforted: key leaders felt that the Soviet buildup should not be 
exaggerated. This perspective contrasted to the far Left parties, and to some 
extent the Social Democratic and Labour parties, who tended to attribute a 
change more evenhandedly to both U.S. and Soviet desires and necessity to 
disarm.
Discussion of the shift in Soviet military resources from the centre to the 
Northern and Southern European flanks, was shunned by Swedes while being 
supported by the Norwegians. Perhaps at the root of this disagreement were 
not the facts—for it was obvious that there had been no significant Soviet scaling 
back of forces in the Northern areas. Rather, it was the central assumptions 
which the theory made: the Soviet Union was not disarming, only shifting its 
force structure—and the guilt for the armaments spiral was on the Soviet Union, 
an untenable position for Swedish neutrality.
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One of the most difficult points of arms control has been naval disarm am ent 
Both Norway and Sweden are intent on seeing a reduction of military activity 
in their vicinities. However, Norway's NATO membership and Sweden's 
neutral status imposed restrictions as to how far leaders may go to advocate this 
desire. Both leaderships are in, sometimes silent, agreement that the U.S. 
position is less flexible than the Soviet. However, as was demonstrated in the 
case of the NNWFZ, and the port call policy, the Norwegian Government is 
careful not to jeopardize its position vis-à-vis its allies by publicly raising the 
issue of naval arms control. It is cornered between the necessity of having an 
allied naval presence along its coastlines and the desire to reduce naval forces 
of both powers. The dilemma of neutrality is somewhat similar. Swedish 
leaders point out U.S. inflexibility, aware of the fact that their high public 
profile, in international organs such as the U.N. and the CSCE, makes them 
seem impartial from the U.S. perspective. Successive Swedish leaderships have 
nonetheless proved willing to pay this price, rather than to remain silent about 
an issue of paramount importance for them.
A look at the security-policy aspects of Gorbachev's M urmansk speech is also 
telling of differing Swedish and Norwegian interpretations based on their 
differing security policies. At the outset, Norway was unusually receptive to 
the tone and letter of Gorbachev's security-related proposals. Gorbachev 
received credit for having presented his ideas with a focus on how they could 
be handled in an alliance-context. Naturally, Norwegian leaders stressed that 
the first proper forum in which to discuss these proposals was none other than 
NATO. The Swedes however, although admitting to the positive spirit of the 
speech, felt that wide-ranging issues should be handled in wide-ranging fora— 
preferably the United Nations. One common denominator between the 
Norwegian and Swedish reactions appeared: the Soviet Union was trying to 
regionalize the issue (e.g. through raising the NNWFZ). Further, both the 
Swedes and Norwegians interpreted the proposals as a Soviet attempt to 
divorce these nations from their multilateral perspective on security-related 
questions.
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Sweden's commitment to neutrality plays a significant role in explaining the 
w ay in which the country's leadership perceives and interacts w ith the Soviet 
Union. Norway's NATO membership has likewise influenced its approach and 
view of a wide range of issue areas with the Soviet Union. The question 
becomes not whether defence commitment has an influence, rather exactly 
where, at which junctures, concerning which questions. An attempt has been 
m ade at pointing to these key points in the course of the body of this thesis. 
Admittedly, neutrality and alignment are limited as explanations of why 
Sweden and Norway saw the issues and acted upon them in the way they did. 
A host of other domestic and external factors also acted upon the two countries 
to adopt at times similar, at times differing approaches. This thesis contributes 
to the knowledge of what neutrality and alignment actually mean in the practice 
of daily diplomacy. It has attempted to spell out and analyze the interface 
between international diplomacy-in-practice and academic theorizing regarding 
neutrality and alignment.
Sweden, Norway and the End of the Cold War
The Cold War embedded in Western and Eastern decision-makers the 
tendency to think of their security interests in a narrow, military sense. Thus 
it was natural that commitments to either an alliance or neutrality, although 
chiefly of military significance, would also affect other major, say "softer" areas 
of these states' foreign policy. Thus, it was highly uncommon that, for example, 
a Swedish foreign policy official would not consider the explicit or indirect 
implications for Swedish neutrality of such questions as environmental, regional 
or economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. In other words, all foreign 
policy questions were funnelled through a nation's standing commitments in 
relation to the Cold War.
During the duration of the thesis' writing, one witnessed the near-total 
unravelling of the Soviet Union and the formal end to the Cold War. The major 
consequences for both East European and Western countries was both threat re­
definition and the proportion of resources which should be dedicated to 
meeting that threat. However one of the effects of these events has been that
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questions which bore no explicit military overtones were increasingly 
considered on their own substantive merits, and not considered through the 
spectacles of military security interests. Today, for example, as compared with 
1947-9, Norwegian-QS/Russian or Swedish-CIS/Russian trade questions have 
been stripped of many of its core political aspects. The future of relations 
between these countries promises also to have a much more pragmatic, 
problem-solving—rather than rhetorical, politico-security—character.
Comparing the case studies
For the Norwegians, several sets of questions were logically linked to each 
other by virtue of history and geographical proximity to Russia. There exist 
common denominators in the Norwegian approaches to the Barents delimitation 
question, environmental cooperation, strategic issues in the North Sea-Barents 
Sea, the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Proposal. The underlying 
Norwegian approach is to delimit the influence of and seek clarity in its 
relationship with neighbouring Russia over these questions. The Soviet Union 
has been seen from Norway as continually putting forth proposals which would 
result in placing the lesser partner of such an eventual agreement, Norway, into 
a reduced or disadvantageous position. In the Norwegian foreign policy­
making community there has been agreement over the need to present a united, 
consensual front so as to strengthen the Norwegian position in these areas. To 
further strengthen Norway's position, it has frequently called upon policy 
precedent in the NATO context and attempted to introduce multilateral 
solutions, with the additional assistance of international legal norms.
In the Swedish case, the logical common denominator, or the thread by 
which foreign policy questions hang together, has been each contemplated 
policy move's compatibility or incompatibility with neutrality. To be sure, 
neutrality is a rather slippery and flexible formulation. Neutrality has been 
used both as an absolute measure of Swedish foreign policy by which Swedish 
responses can be judged and as a relative term which has to be adapted to the 
particular situation. At different times, all foreign policy questions are 
subordinated to the interests of upholding neutrality. In a sense, neutrality
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more easily subsumes trade policy, political policy, and military policy under 
one rcx)f than can NATO policy.
Why Change or Stability?
There remains no doubt that domestic and foreign policy changes in the 
Soviet Union itself were mainly responsible for the 'progress' on a whole range 
of bilateral Swedish and Norwegian questions with the former Soviet Union— 
from the Baltic independence issue to the resolution of the Swedish Baltic 
delimitation dispute. In this, a more lenient re-interpretation of what 
constituted 'core security interests' played a major role. There was no doubt 
that the Russians held the key which unlocked difficult situations or disputes 
which had been pent up for, in some cases, decades. For example, it was only 
when an initiative from high in the Soviet political hierarchy came that there 
was movement on the Swedish-Soviet Baltic Sea question. It was not until the 
Soviet officials began to realise that the exchange of environmental data was 
chiefly of mutual practical, rather than security- or political value to the West— 
that environmental cooperation between either Sweden and Norway and the 
Soviet Union took strides forward.
No change on particular issue areas—here could be counted the stability in 
Soviet strategic and military interests / presence in Northern areas—was mainly 
attributable to continuing Russian interests of defending the Russian heartland 
and its accesses. Continuing reports of Soviet submarine incursions in Sweden 
provide one often-cited example of the maintenance of similar core security 
interests. The attitudes of Norwegian and Swedish leaders clearly reflected this 
realisation, although military expenditures, especially in Sweden, but also to an 
extent in Norway, would slowly decrease as a result of the reduced Soviet 
threat in other parts of Europe. Even the rapid pace and extent of political and 
economic reform movements in the Soviet Union added to leaders' 
understanding of a dramatically changed threat picture. A third example could 
be the previous immobility over the Norwegian-Soviet Barents Sea delimitation 
dispute; core Soviet security interests may be one powerful explanation as to the 
lack of movement previous to late 1991.
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On other issue areas, the responsibility for change was shared. Baltic 
independence was thus a product of Swedish, Norwegian and other Western 
pressures upon the then-Soviet Union, as well as a Russian realisation of the 
untenability of holding onto the Baltic republics over the long run.
Private vs. Public policy change?
The examination of first-hand sources has provided an opportunity to make 
a comparison and contrast between what the Government and foreign policy 
community were saying publicly versus what they were communicating 
privately to each other and in interviews with the author. The contrast between 
the facade of Swedish neutrality and the attitudes upon which it was based was 
starker than in the case of aligned Norway. A widely divergent spectrum of 
opinions exist about neutrality's desirability, practice, and meaning. As was 
very much in evidence in the examination of leaders in 1947-9, behind the 
facade of impartiality lie some very sharply critical views of Soviet foreign 
policy, which some would say constitute a violation of the spirit of neutrality. 
In the latter period, consensus was nearly total about the desirability and 
meaning of neutrality until at least the beginning of the serious debate 
regarding Swedish EEC membership and the formal end of the Cold War. 
Whilst sharply conservative schools of thought did exist regarding Soviet 
foreign policy, there was general agreement that there was no more desirable 
path to security than through neutrality.
The divergence between public policy and private attitudes was much 
greater in cases such as alleged Soviet violations of Swedish territorial waters 
than in the case of the Soviet-Swedish Baltic dispute—where consensus existed 
in great part regarding the goals, approach relating to and the desirability of a 
Baltic delimitation agreement. Swedish neutrality, which dictates that in the 
face of inconclusive evidence, Sweden must accuse no country by name, was 
confronted with the reality of two confirmed Soviet violations. These violations 
continued to orient decision-makers allegations towards the Soviet Union, flying 
in the face of what could publicly be said regarding the suspected intruder's 
national origin. Furthermore, neutrality-in-theoiry and practice collided in our
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examination of Swedish 'adherence' to COCOM. For the sake of economic 
necessity, Swedish leaders were publicly forced to comply with Cold War 
regulations, a step which if given the chance, leaders would have paid almost 
any price to avoid; the contrast between the dictates of neutrality and the 
COCOM-regulated trade practices was stark
The gap between public policy and private attitudes was much more narrow 
in the Norwegian case. Norway, in many ways, has attempted to 'm arket' itself 
as more NATO than NATO itself. While the Conservative Party was the closest 
adherent and supporter of NATO, the Labour Party, barring few minor 
incidents and its somewhat more benign interpretation of Soviet foreign policy 
generally, has also 'toed the NATO line' in its policy towards the Soviet Union. 
Norwegian NATO membership quite clearly lays down the acceptable 
attitudinal and policy parameters of the Norwegian leadership's approach to 
questions vis-à-vis the former Soviet Union.
Similarities between Norwegian and Swedish approaches
Irrespective of the many differences in Swedish and Norwegian behaviour 
towards the Soviet Union chiefly determined by  their varying security 
commitments, there are many similarities between Norwegian and Swedish 
behaviour towards the Soviet Union. For example, Swedish and Norwegian 
leaders basically mirrored each other's perceptions of changes in Soviet 
strategic-military interests and behaviour in their region and worldwide. In 
essence, little disarmament was occurring in their vicinity, while large-scale 
cutbacks were occurring along the Central front in Europe. Also, there are more 
similarities than differences in the way the Norwegians and Swedes, in-practice, 
handled the Baltic independence question. Excepting the COCOM area. Swedes 
and Norwegians experienced and combatted similar problems and issues with 
respect to trade with the Soviet Union. Both have experienced negligible trade 
throughout the post-War period. Irrespective of the efforts to change the 
picture, Sweden and Norway's trade has been dominated by low volumes and 
raw-materials oriented patterns. However, the composition of trade has been 
quite different. While the chief import of both countries are oil-based, Sweden's
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export to the Soviet Union was traditionally dominated by engineering goods, 
while Norway's export was dominated by paper-related products. While one 
m ay analyze these differences in terms of Norway's COCOM membership, one 
could also point to the differences in competitive advantage as the reason for 
these differences. Also, one could point to political factors, such as the Soviet- 
Norwegian border dispute as one reason that the seemingly abundant potential 
in Norwegian-Soviet trade in terms of oil exploration, has never been capitalised 
upon. Nonetheless one cannot avoid the conclusion that trade w ith the former 
Soviet Union has played a declining role in the foreign policies of Sweden and 
Norway up until the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a state.
An Eye to the Future
The treatment of Swedish-Soviet and Norwegian-Soviet relations with a focus 
on two time periods has illuminated some of the central underpinnings of 
neutral and aligned nations' foreign policies. This study not only describes and 
analyzes the end of an historic epoch in international politics, it also can be used 
to give guidance as to the future of Swedish, Norwegian and to some extent 
Russian/CIS foreign relations. Many of the patterns of Swedish and Norwegian 
behaviour described over the course of the thesis are likely to endure in coming 
years. After all, Soviet decision-making has been dominated by "the Russians."
Neither the phenomenon neutrality nor alignment is novel, and it is likely 
that even after the fall of the Soviet Union that they will persist in the relations 
between nations. To say that neutrality and NATO have lost their places in 
international politics is to neglect that the origins of neutrality and NATO were 
only partly attributed to the superpower conflict. Swedish neutrality, for 
example, after all, has strong historical roots and Norwegian NATO 
membership was greatly a result of a surprise attack by Germany—not the 
Soviet Union. Furthermore, to say that the only reason for or benefit of forming 
an alliance or maintaining neutrality was to keep potential aggressors at a 
distance overlooks other benefits connected with these security choices. For 
example, neutrality has provided Sweden with trem endous flexibility in its 
foreign relations, many times it has been able to play "mediator" where other
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States have been barred. NATO membership has provided a tremendous 
political, cultural and social exchange between Western European countries and 
with the U.S. and Canada.
If one were to take a more pessimistic view, a perspective relatively 
common with both Swedish and Norwegian officials, none of the changes which 
have come about in the former Soviet Union are totally irreversible. In fact, 
some of the most threatening parts of the former Soviet Union's existence—its 
military capabilities, its geographical proximity, its past historical relationship 
with the region—remain today. As former Soviet Premier Bulganin once said, 
"we cannot do anything about geography." Barring the newly-independent 
Baltic countries, irrespective of what form the land mass to the East of the 
Scandinavian peninsula takes, whether Russia, the CIS, or some other name, it 
will still remain the dominant military power centre in the region. This is a fact 
that will doubtless need to be considered by Norwegian and Swedish decision­
makers for many years to come.
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